THE HOPES AND THE REALITIES OF AVIATION IN FRENCH INDOCHINA, 1919-1940 by Seltzer, Gregory Charles
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--History History 
2017 
THE HOPES AND THE REALITIES OF AVIATION IN FRENCH 
INDOCHINA, 1919-1940 
Gregory Charles Seltzer 
University of Kentucky, gcseltzer@gmail.com 
Author ORCID Identifier: 
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6668-0764 
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2017.313 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Seltzer, Gregory Charles, "THE HOPES AND THE REALITIES OF AVIATION IN FRENCH INDOCHINA, 
1919-1940" (2017). Theses and Dissertations--History. 49. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/history_etds/49 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the History at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--History by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more 
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Gregory Charles Seltzer, Student 
Dr. Jeremy D. Popkin, Major Professor 
Dr. Scott K. Taylor, Director of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE HOPES AND THE REALITIES OF AVIATION IN FRENCH INDOCHINA, 
1919-1940 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
 
DISSERTATION 
_______________________ 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
 College of Arts and Sciences 
at the University of Kentucky 
 
 
By 
Gregory Charles Seltzer 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
Director: Dr. Jeremy D. Popkin, Professor of History 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
2017 
 
 
 
Copyright © Gregory Charles Seltzer 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THE HOPES AND THE REALITIES OF AVIATION IN FRENCH INDOCHINA, 
1919-1940 
 
My dissertation examines how and why the French employed aviation in the five 
constituent parts of French Indochina (Annam, Cambodia, Cochinchina, Laos, and 
Tonkin) during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. I argue that the French, 
believing that the modern technology of powered flight possessed seemingly endless 
potential, saw aviation as a vehicle for extending, consolidating, developing, and 
protecting their interests both within the colony and around Southeast and East Asia. 
Aircraft, whether civil or military, were viewed and used as a multi-purpose tool of 
empire. Indeed, planes were employed for a variety of tasks in Indochina: transportation 
and communication; delivery of patients and medical supplies; colonial development 
projects; scientific studies; imperial propaganda; internal policing and assertion of 
authority; and air defense of the colony.  
 
My argument is that the realities of what was accomplished with aviation fell far 
short of the sky-high hopes that government and military officials and aeronautics 
enthusiasts had for flight technology in the empire. My dissertation also examines the 
causes and the effects of this yawning gap between what was hoped and what was 
accomplished in matters of aviation. When aviation failed to “get off the ground” to the 
extent that the French hoped, the reasons typically related to a recurring combination of 
unfavorable weather and geography, insufficient funding and aeronautics materials, the 
limits of the era’s flight technology, and foreign competition that originated in Europe as 
well as Southeast and East Asia. Challenges to French aerial supremacy were present 
within the colony itself, although in a more indirect manner, through the ways that the 
colonized responded, or failed to respond, to French aviation. In sum, as much as the 
French envisioned aircraft as being able to rather easily vanquish the perceived 
challenges of the colonial landscape, aviation, in reality, failed to do so or only did so 
after a protracted period of time.  
 
My dissertation is positioned at the intersection of colonial aviation history and 
the history of French Indochina. While studies in each of these fields have considered 
parts of this dissertation’s subject matter, there has been a lack of sustained critical 
analysis on French aviation in Indochina. My project contends that Indochina presents a 
rich area of study for colonial aviation history because, more so than anywhere else in the 
French empire, the aviation efforts in Indochina encapsulated all that the French hoped to 
accomplish with aircraft, the era’s most modern, symbolically saturated transportation 
technology. In addition, my topic reveals much about the hopes and the realities of the 
French colonial project in Indochina as well. Thus by analyzing how aviation was viewed 
and used in the context of the Indochina, my dissertation provides insight into not only 
what the colonizers wanted to achieve in Indochina but also why this effort failed.  
 
KEYWORDS: Aviation, Indochina, French Empire, French History, Interwar Period. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION: AVIATION HISTORY AND COLONIAL HISTORY IN FRENCH 
INDOCHINA 
 
Pierre Cordemoy, who wrote at length on aviation and Indochina in the Bulletin 
de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine in the 1930s, affirmed that “the airplane is a 
marvelous colonial tool particularly adapted to Indochina, one of the most immense and 
most distant of our colonies.” Aviation, he declared, was “an asset of the highest 
importance in the overt struggle between nations for...a prominent position in the Pacific 
Hemisphere.” Furthermore, Cordemoy described three ways that aviation could be 
utilized for the colonial project in Indochina: “the consolidation of peace and security; the 
establishment of rapid, scheduled postal links; [and] the extension of French influence to 
the interior and exterior of the colony.”1 
My dissertation analyzes statements like Cordemoy’s, examining both the logic 
that drove such remarks and the ways that French aviation succeeded—and failed—in the 
work with which it was charged in Indochina during the 1920s and 1930s.2 The reasons 
for these successes and failures—and the resulting consequences—are also considered. 
Overall, the French imagined that aviation would make a modern, distinctive, and 
significant contribution to French colonialism in Southeast Asia. The various ways in 
which aircraft were put to use in Indochina not only reflected this faith in aviation but 
also revealed the challenges that the French faced both within the colony and throughout 
the empire during this period.3   
                                                
1 Pierre Cordemoy, “L’Indochine et l’aéronautique,” Bulletin de l’Agence Economique de 
l’Indochine (February 1930): 45, 37.  
2 By this period in time, French Indochina consisted of five parts: Cochinchina, Tonkin, 
Annam, Cambodia, and Laos. 
3 My dissertation uses the term “air force” interchangeably with “military aviation” and, 
where appropriate, “air service.” Utilizing the term “air force” in the context of pre-1933 France 
is, technically, anachronistic; an independent air force was only established on April 1, 1933, a 
 2 
As a relatively new, multi-purpose “tool of empire,” the airplane represented the 
ascendant hopes and superiority of the French in Indochina. John Tully argues that the 
image of the “heroic aviator” replaced that of the “intrepid explorer” as a symbol of the 
French mission in Indochina. Across the French empire and in the context of European 
imperialism in general, aviation carried this type of symbolic weight during the 1920s 
and 1930s. Thus Robert Aldrich states that aircraft “seemed a fitting symbol for the 
[French] colonialists’ new aspirations and initiatives” during this period, and Daniel R. 
Headrick contends that these years saw “the pioneering aura that railways had once 
possessed passed on to the automobile and the airplane.”4 
Yet as my dissertation emphasizes and as Cordemoy’s remarks indicate, the 
appeal of aviation went beyond representation and symbol. In addition, aircraft were 
perceived and utilized—by government and military officials, scientists, commercial 
airlines, and local businesses—as a vehicle for extending, consolidating, developing, and 
protecting French interests both within Indochina and throughout Southeast and East 
Asia. While aviation may have appeared to be the preeminent “tool of empire,” my 
                                                                                                                                            
date prior to which military aircraft were attached to either the army or the navy. My analysis 
nonetheless employs this term for the entirety of the interwar years as a means of avoiding 
excessive repetition and adding variety. In any case, the creation of the air force in the spring of 
1933 did not have much of a direct, immediate impact on Indochina’s squadrons. Christophe 
Cony and Michel Ledet explain that “the parliamentary turmoil linked to the creation of the future 
[air arm] hardly affected the colony.” They note that there was “little change” for the time being, 
as the functioning of the air force units—“the nature itself of the air squadrons”—kept them in the 
service of the land-based army. Of course, the creation of the air force did result in certain 
alterations to the structure and financing for military aviation, such as how infrastructure work 
would be funded. Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet, L’Aviation française en Indochine: Des 
origines à 1945 (Outreau: Lela Presse, 2012), 202, 210. 
4 John Tully, France on the Mekong: A History of the Protectorate of Cambodia 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), 261; Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A 
History of French Overseas Expansion (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 116; Daniel R. 
Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 49-50. 
 3 
analysis reveals otherwise.5 Thus my dissertation argues that the realities of aviation in 
Indochina—and, indeed, the realities of aviation throughout the French empire—in the 
1920s and 1930 never reached the sky-high hopes that were attached to powered flight. 
This gap between what was envisioned and what was achieved was evident—though to 
differing extents—across the entire spectrum of aviation usage in the colony. The 
realities of flight fell short of the hopes most completely and most noticeably with regard 
to utilizing airpower as a defense against external threats. In other ways, aviation was 
more successfully employed. Prominent among these successes was the gradual 
development of commercial air routes to, within, and through Indochina as well as and 
the application of aerial photography and reconnaissance to colonial development 
projects and scientific studies. The success of other fields of aircraft usage can be judged 
as falling somewhere in the middle. On the whole, even in cases that the French could 
cite as aerial achievements, the realities of aviation tended to fall short of the hopes 
according to some metric—whether cost, usage, practicality, efficacy, or speed of 
development.  
There were various reasons that aviation failed to meet French expectations as the 
                                                
5 The phrase “tool of empire” is taken from Headrick’s book, The Tools of Empire: 
Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century. In this study, Headrick 
examines how developments in different types of technology—these related to breakthroughs in 
medicine, communications, weapons, railroads, and water transport—encouraged European 
imperial expansion during the nineteenth century, particularly from mid-century onward. 
Contending that the Europe’s imperialist projects required appropriate motives as well as 
sufficient means, Headrick asserts that the aforementioned period was characterized not only by 
new technology but also by renewed interest in the penetration, conquest, and consolidation of 
large swaths of Africa and Asia. He argues this point by considering “the technological changes 
that made imperialism happen, both as they enabled motives to produce events, and as they 
enhanced the motives themselves.” Headrick concludes that “the flow of new technologies in the 
nineteenth century made imperialism so cheap that it reached the threshold of acceptance among 
the peoples and governments of Europe, and led nations to become empires.” Daniel R. Headrick, 
The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 9-11, 206.  
 
 4 
arch tool of empire in Indochina. To begin with, the limitations of the era’s planes and the 
colony’s unfavorable weather and challenging geography kept aircraft grounded. 
Additionally, along with European nations and the United States, neighboring Asian 
powers contested, implicitly or explicitly, the supremacy of French aviation in this part of 
the globe. As they worked to establish routes to and through Southeast Asia, French 
aviation interests often were required to negotiate contracts on supposedly equal terms. In 
such cases, the French found themselves in, at best, a position of near-equal footing that 
required compromise or, at worst, a position of weakness and vulnerability vis-à-vis their 
counterparts. Even within the colony, albeit in a more indirect manner, the supremacy of 
French aviation was challenged by the native populations. 
Furthermore, the process of installing and maintaining aviation—from developing 
an infrastructure to acquiring aeronautics materials and personnel to finding a customer 
base—proved difficult, if not impossible at times, and often yielded returns that were 
meager compared to the immediate costs involved. The necessary terrestrial 
infrastructure—networks of airfields, radio and meteorological posts, and fuel sites—was 
itself a hindrance that kept aviation very much tethered to the earth. Aviation in 
Indochina remained tethered to—and frequently handicapped by—developments in 
France as well. Indeed, aviation was an expensive, specialized technology, and the 
funding and resources required to keep it aloft in a colony that was distant from the 
metropole were not always forthcoming; this was an especially problematic issue during 
the 1930s as the economic crisis of the first half of the decade gave way to the reality of 
another war in Europe in the later 1930s. As my dissertation demonstrates, these bonds to 
the metropole related more to large-scale economic, military, and diplomatic concerns 
 5 
than to specific policy changes that accompanied the political shifts within the French 
government amidst the tumultuous climate of the mid-to-late 1930s.  
 
The Significance of Aviation and Empire in the Interwar Years 
While fostering the growth and technological refinement of the aeronautics 
industry, the First World War had aptly demonstrated the usefulness of aircraft for 
military purposes. The postwar years witnessed further rapid development in aeronautics. 
Robin Higham points out that this period experienced “a revolution in various aviation 
technologies.” Higham explains that “as the range, speed, ceiling, and carrying capacity 
of aircraft became greater, the aircraft and engine industries started to flourish.” Aware of 
such technological improvements, governments and entrepreneurs began to grasp that 
aviation potentially possessed “global diplomatic and economic significance.” In turn, 
this realization heightened desires throughout the West to develop national aeronautics 
industries.6  
In addition, public interest in flying dramatically increased during the 1920s and 
1930s. Historian Bernhard Rieger states that European and American publics had 
followed aviators’ exploits since the Wright brothers’ pioneering flights of December 
1903. Yet after the First World War, this fascination with pilots transformed into a 
                                                
6 Robin Higham, “Introduction,” in The Influence of Airpower upon History: 
Statesmanship, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy since 1903, ed. Robin Higham and Marik Parillo 
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 8. For analyses of the French aeronautics 
industry in the twentieth century, see Emmanuel Chadeau, De Blériot à Dassault: Histoire de 
l’Industrie Aéronautique en France, 1900-1950 (Paris: Fayard, 1987) and Herrick Chapman, 
State Capitalism and Working-Class Radicalism in the French Aircraft Industry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991). 
 6 
“subject of popular curiosity verging on the obsessive.”7 Discussing the general appeal of 
aircraft in the 1930s, Robert Wohl argues that “no other machine seemed to represent as 
fully humankind’s determination to escape from age-old limitations, to defy the power of 
gravity, and to obliterate the tyranny of time and space.”8 Yet as aviation was a still-
developing technology in the postwar years, Western nations considered the destructive 
and bellicose potential of aircraft alongside the globally unifying and humane 
possibilities for flight.9  
                                                
7 The nature of this conflict had itself magnified the symbolism of human flight. The 
image of the pilot freely soaring above the trenches to engage in combat with a single aerial 
adversary harkened back to romantic notions of knightly conduct in battle, thus offering a sharp 
contrast to the faceless slaughter in the mud below. In this manner, the airplane—“the most 
significant technological achievement of the modern world”—functioned as a way to affirm 
traditional values. “Through the postwar decade flying retained these associations,” Modris 
Eksteins asserts. Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern 
Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1989), 264-265. Yet Robert Wohl cautions that the reality of how 
aircraft were utilized in the First World War did not reflect such notions: the “passion for aces 
and their exploits...concealed the fact that airplanes were used primarily during the First World 
War to observe movement on the surface of the earth.” Robert Wohl, A Passion for Wings: 
Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1908-1918 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1994), 285. 
8 Bernhard Rieger, Technology and the Culture of Modernity in Britain and Germany, 
1890-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 117; Robert Wohl, The Spectacle of 
Flight: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1920-1950 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2005), 1-2, 4, 279. 
9 Contemporary discussions about aviation within governments and among the public 
reflected both hopeful expectations and profound dread about the potential of powered flight. For 
example, in referencing the “fearsome dangers” and “unexpected opportunities” of aviation in 
this period, Peter Fritzsche remarks that “the air age was both fabulous and horrible.” However, 
as Wohl observes, aerial attacks on civilians “moved from a threat to a destructive reality” 
between the start of the Spanish Civil War in the summer of 1936 and August 1945. The Western 
public’s view of aviation was ultimately changed by news headlines about horrific events 
stretching from the German Condor Legion’s bombing of Guernica in late April 1937 to the 
Allied incendiary attacks on the city of Dresden in February 1945 to the atomic bombs dropped 
on Japan that August. By the end of the Second World War, the use of airpower to level cities and 
decimate civilian populations had seemed to confirm people’s worst fears about aviation’s 
destructive potential. In his chronologically broad comparative study of aviation, Emmanuel 
Chadeau contends that Western nations have struggled since the start of the twentieth century—
and continue to struggle—to reconcile their desires for what has been these opposing yet 
intertwined elements of flight: the capacity of aviation to uplift individuals and unify all of 
humanity; and the capability of aircraft to be a tool of power and conquest. Peter Fritzsche, A 
Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
 7 
The interwar years were also a significant period for the French empire. While the 
empire reached its greatest extent during this time, consolidation and development 
replaced conquest as the primary goals in the colonies.10 Moreover, French governments 
launched an extensive propaganda campaign to arouse public interest in, and knowledge 
of, the constituent parts of the empire.11 “The mark of empire on the contemporary world 
was made in the interwar period,” Raymond F. Betts writes. He explains that “local 
populations [were] mobilized, regional resources [were] exploited, and the general 
environment—both physical and cultural—[was] altered to suit European needs.”12 
Though French imperialists touted the progress made in harnessing colonial 
resources and developing the empire during this era, these years witnessed the rise of 
local nationalist and anti-colonial movements. Threats to the empire originated from 
beyond a given territory’s borders as well. “Colonial domination faced unprecedented 
challenges from within and without,” Martin Thomas observes. These challenges came 
from a variety of sources, “from marginalised and exploited colonial peoples, from critics 
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 1992), 5, 218; Wohl, The Spectacle of Flight, 3; Emmanuel Chadeau, Le Rêve et 
la Puissance: L’Avion et son Siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1996).  
10 Aldrich, 114, 120-121. A key component of these new aims—and, indeed, a term that 
encapsulated the era’s economic projects for the empire—was the mise en valeur of the colonies. 
Detailed by then-Minster of the Colonies Albert Sarraut in the early 1920s, the mise en valeur 
program was a “wholesale plan to develop colonial resources to increase production and stimulate 
trade between France and the empire. This demanded substantial French investment to improve 
roads and railways, port facilities and transport links, schools and hospitals.” For several reasons, 
Sarraut’s proposals were never fully implemented. While certain government officials deemed the 
plans too expensive, others either believed that the metropole had pressing needs that should take 
precedence or simply disapproved of the government intervention that Sarraut’s program 
required. These various objections were being raised even before the Depression and the threat of 
war in Europe made the actualization of Sarraut’s plans only more difficult. Nonetheless, Aldrich 
notes, Sarraut’s ideas “excercised considerable influence in colonialist milieux and led to the 
assumption of a greater economic role by the state in the interwar years. They also fed into the 
debate on the merits or hazards of colonial industrialisation.” Aldrich, 115, 172. 
11 As part of this effort, France hosted colonial expositions in Marseille in 1922 and in 
Paris in 1931. 
12 Raymond F. Betts, Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empires in the Twentieth 
Century (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 11. 
 8 
of imperial practice across the French political spectrum, and from hostile nation states 
opposed to a French colonial presence in Africa and Asia.” This surge of anti-colonial 
sentiment and activity was indicative of a larger trend. As Michael Adas points out, 
imperialists across Europe found that their long-held view that “their unprecedented 
material achievements entitled them to dominate the globe and chart the course of 
development of subjugated peoples” was increasingly being criticized and contested after 
the end of the First World War.13 
The interwar years also marked a significant period for aviation in French 
Indochina. Though the colony’s first flight had occurred in December 1910, aviation 
would not truly get off the ground until after the First World War. As Governor General 
Albert Sarraut explained, the end of hostilities in Western Europe had created a “new 
situation” for aviation in Indochina. Henceforth, Sarraut noted, aviation could be 
reoriented toward “economic and political goals” in the colony, all while ensuring that 
military obligations were not neglected. Air force commandant François Glaize likewise 
reflected in February 1924 that “the armistice arrive[d] without any really serious result 
having been obtained in Indochina in matters of aviation. Everything must be restarted.”14 
For the colony’s air force in particular, the interwar years were the period in which this 
                                                
13 Martin Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and 
Society (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 2; Michael Adas, Machines as the 
Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), 401. Adas’ study considers how from the early years of 
European overseas exploration to the end of the First World War, Europeans’ views of their own 
scientific and technological achievements “shaped their attitudes toward and interaction with 
peoples they encountered overseas.” Adas, 4. 
14 Gen. L.-M. Chassin, “Débuts de l’Aviation en Indochine,” Forces aériennes françaises 
110 (December 1955): 1007; ANOM, GGI 66499, “Télégramme Officiel. Gouverneur Général à 
Colonies,” November 23, 1918; ANOM, GGI 66499, “Note sur l’Aviation en Indochine. 
Demandée par le Gouvernement Général,” [February 3, 1924; a cover sheet preceding this 
document has this February date].   
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service expanded in size and actually acquired a structure and purpose.15 Moreover, the 
progress of civil aviation followed closely behind that of military aviation; thus it is 
reasonable to conclude—and history bears out the case—that the 1920s and 1930s also 
witnessed the development of non-military aviation to, within, and through the colony.  
 
The History of Colonial Aviation  
As a topic of scholarly research, aviation has received considerable coverage.16  
While some of this work touches on flight and empire, colonial aviation has in general 
been the subject of fewer studies. Within the field of colonial aviation history itself, there 
has been even less focus on French Indochina. A pair of recent French-language books 
that are described at the end of this section—these publications proved essential to my 
own analysis—are notable exceptions.  
Scholars have considered how Western nations used civil aviation as a vehicle for 
furthering their imperial agendas. For example, Gordon Pirie—Pirie’s work was very 
helpful for my own project—has analyzed British colonial aviation during the interwar 
                                                
15 Of the nine squadrons established in the colony between 1917 and 1940, five were 
created between 1927 and 1939; the first two squadrons were formed in 1917 and 1918, and the 
last two were set up in October 1940. Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet, L’Aviation française en 
Indochine: Des origines à 1945 (Outreau: Lela Presse, 2012), 628-631. 
16 There is no shortage of works on French military aviation and the French aeronautics 
industry. In particular, several articles and books have examined the struggles to modernize and 
rearm the nation’s air force as war threatened Europe beginning in the mid-1930s. See, for 
example, Patrick Facon’s numerous publications on the French air force, including Histoire de 
l’armée de l’air (Paris: La Documentation française, 2009) and “Politics and French Aviators: A 
Prism on the International European Crises of the 1930s,” in The Influence of Airpower upon 
History: Statesmanship, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy since 1903, ed. Robin Higham and Mark 
Parillo (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 61-84; Christopher Anthony Cain, 
“L’Armée de l’Air, 1933-1940: Drifting toward Defeat,” in Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of 
Defeat, ed. Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 
2006), 41-70; Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarrague, A History of French Military Aviation, 
trans. Frances Kianka (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986); and Robert J. Young, 
“The Strategic Dream: French Air Doctrine in the Inter-War Period, 1919-1939,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 9, no. 4 (October 1974): 57-76. 
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years,17 and Mark Dierikx has written about Dutch aviation as well as air travel in 
general. For the United States, Jenifer Van Vleck has studied the symbolic and actual 
importance of aviation in the country’s rise to the status of an international power in the 
twentieth century.18  
With regard to colonial military aviation, David E. Omissi has examined how 
aircraft were used in the British Empire during the interwar years; notably, his study 
contains a comparative discussion of the French air force’s activity in Morocco and the 
Levant during this period.19 Likewise, David Killingray has written about the use of 
aviation as a tool of colonial authority in British Africa, and Priya Satia has considered 
the intertwined issues of British airpower and Orientalist views in Iraq after the First 
World War.20 Headrick brings the topic of air control closer to the present day. In his 
analysis of the relationship between technology and Western imperialism, Headrick 
                                                
17 Gordon Pirie, Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation, 1919-39 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009). Other useful works on civil aviation in the British Empire 
include Robin Higham, Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918-1939: The story of Britain’s overseas 
airlines (Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1961) and Robert McCormack, “Great Britain and the 
‘Scramble for Africa,’ 1919-1939,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 10, no. 1 (1976): 87-
105.  
18 Marc Dierikx, “Routes Versus Revenue: Pioneering Commercial Aviation in Holland, 
1919-1940,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 78, no.3 (2000): 889-911 and Clipping the 
Clouds: How Air Travel Changed the World (Praeger: Westport, CT, 2008); Jenifer Van Vleck, 
Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American Ascendency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2013). 
19 Employing Headrick’s framework for understanding the relationship between 
European technology and European imperial expansion, Omissi argues that aviation was involved 
in the phases of colonial penetration, conquest, and consolidation. Aircraft, Omissi writes, not 
only helped to penetrate and map areas of imperial interest but also “crushed primary resistance 
movements” and assisted with putting down rebellions. Moreover, once nominal imperial control 
was established, planes were used to “extend state power to marginal areas of swampland, 
mountains or deserts.” David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 
1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 4. 
20 David Killingray, “‘A Swift Agent of Government’: Air Power in British Colonial 
Africa, 1916-1939,” The Journal of African History 25, no. 4 (1984): 429-444; Priya Satia, “The 
Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia,” The American Historical 
Review 111, no. 1 (February 2006): 16-51. 
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includes discussions of military aviation from 1911 to 1936 and from 1946 to 2007; this 
latter part, which factors into my dissertation’s conclusion, has a section on French 
airpower in the First Indochina War and American airpower in the Vietnam War. More 
generally, Headrick asserts that local conditions need to be considered when examining 
the links between technology and imperialism, which is an argument that informed my 
own work.21  
For military aviation and the French empire specifically, Martin Thomas has 
studied how local intelligence gathering in North Africa and the Middle East influenced 
British and French imperial policymaking. As part of his argument regarding the 
“symbiotic relationship between intelligence and empire,” he incorporates discussion of 
aerial reconnaissance and air policing.22 In another publication, Thomas contends that 
airpower was one of the most apparent “innovation[s] in organized colonial violence” 
that the French deployed as a means of maintaining and extending their authority.23 As a 
                                                
21 “Western imperialism,” Headrick points out, “was subject to environmental forces as 
much as by the encounters between peoples.” He explains that “nature is extremely varied, and so 
is its influence on historical events. In some situations, environmental factors greatly aided the 
conquerors; [i]n others,...the environment was an obstacle to conquest.” As my dissertation 
demonstrates, the environment—namely, the local climate and geography, whether across the 
peaks and fog of the Annamese Mountains or the wetlands and rice fields of the delta regions—
proved to be a major “obstacle to conquest” for aviation in French Indochina. Daniel R. Headrick, 
Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 5-6. 
22 Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 
1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 13. In another comparative study, Thomas 
considers how the French and the British dealt with their crises of decolonization in the years 
after the Second World War. Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Thomas has also published more general studies of the 
French empire during the interwar years and in the Second World War. The French Empire 
between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2005) and The French Empire at War, 1940-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1998).  
23 Martin Thomas, “Introduction: Mapping Violence onto French Colonial Minds,” in The 
French Colonial Mind: Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism, vol. 2, ed. Martin 
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final point, Thomas has analyzed airpower in the context of the strategies for defending 
the empire that were drawn up in the mid-to-late 1930s.24 
For the topic of civil aviation and the French empire, Dominique Legarde has 
detailed the development of commercial aviation from the first decade of the twentieth 
century through the era of decolonization. Focusing on aviation throughout the empire, he 
describes the efforts of the myriad airlines, which often collaborated with military and 
government officials, to establish air transport both from metropole to the colonies and 
within the colonies themselves. In doing so, Legarde observes noteworthy connections 
between empire and aviation during this period. “For more than half a century,” he points 
out, “the performances of aviation have faithfully accompanied the colonial saga.” 
Legarde identifies a common spirit of adventure as well as a shared idea that flight and 
the far-flung territories of the empire each represented a type of last frontier. “In men’s 
dreams and ambitions,” he contends, “the airplane and the colony could not more closely 
coincide.” Legarde also notes that commercial aviation in the empire and the French 
empire itself traced similar trajectories of ascendency and decline from the early 
twentieth century until decolonization.25  
                                                                                                                                            
Thomas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), xi-liii. The airpower reference is from 
xxiii-xxiv. 
24 Martin Thomas, “Plans and Problems of the Armée de l’Air in the Defence of French 
North Africa before the Fall of France,” French History 7, no. 4 (1993): 472-495; “At the Heart of 
Things?: French Imperial Defense Planning in the Late 1930s,” French Historical Studies 21, no. 
2 (Spring 1998): 325-361; “Economic Conditions and the Limits to Mobilization in the French 
Empire, 1936-1939,” The Historical Journal 48, no. 2 (June 2005): 471-498. 
25 Dominique Legarde, Aviateurs d’Empire: L’èpopée de l’Aviation Commerciale dans la 
France d’Outre-Mer (Chanac: La Régordane, 1993), 5. Robert Bluffield’s comparative study of 
interwar air transport includes a section on the development of air travel to and within Indochina. 
As is often the case with publications that reference air transport and Indochina, Bluffield’s book 
provides a straightforward description but no further analysis. Robert Bluffield, Over Empires 
and Oceans: Pioneers, Aviators and Adventurers. Forging the International Air Routes, 1918-
1939 (East Sussex: Tattered Flag Press, 2014). 
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Several other publications that deal with air transport in the French empire contain 
useful information about Indochina. Among the numerous materials relating to the 
history of Air France, three issues of the aeronautics journal Icare provide details 
regarding air transport to and within Indochina.26 In addition, an older article by a 
General L.-M. Chassin highlights events and personalities from the history of French 
aviation in Indochina from approximately 1910 to 1940.27 Last, while focusing on 
military aviation in particular, three books that were published as part of the 1931 
Colonial Exposition in Paris present details about flight within Indochina from the 1920s 
to around 1931.28  
                                                
26 Air Orient is covered in two issues of Icare that were published in the fall of 1978—no. 
86—and the fall of 1979—no. 90. This journal also examined Air France’s line to Indochina in 
no. 163, published in 1997. More general studies of Air France include: Fabienne Autier, Gregory 
Corcos, and Georges Trépo, Air France: Des années héroïques à la refondation (Paris: Vuibert, 
2001); Philippe-Michel Thibault and Anaïs Leclerc, Air France: L’art du voyage (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2008); and Robert Espérou, Histoire du transport aérien français (Saint-Malo: Pascal 
Galodé, 2008). Additionally, Michèle Kahn’s study of the Emeraude airplane crash in January 
1934 includes information about French air travel in the context of Indochina. Michèle Kahn, La 
Tragédie de l’Émeraude (Monaco: Éditions du Rocher, 2007). For a broad survey of the history 
of air transport—including a section about air travel in the context of Indochina—see, Camille 
Allaz, The History of Air Cargo and Airmail from the 18th Century, trans. John Skillbeck 
(London: Christopher Foyle Publishing, 2004). Likewise, Chadeau’s study of aviation in the 
twentieth century contains a discussion of the development of mail and passenger air service to 
Indochina. Chadeau, Le Rêve et la Puissance. See, also, Edmond Petit, La vie quotidienne dans 
l'aviation en France au debut du XXe siècle, 1900-1935 (Paris: Hachette, 1977). 
27 Gen. L.-M. Chassin, “Débuts de l’Aviation en Indochine,” Forces aériennes françaises 
110 (December 1955): 1001-1019. Chassin also describes notable moments of flight from the pre-
aircraft era of the late eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries. 
28 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Indochine Française. Section générale. Troupes 
de l’Indochine. L’Aéronautique militaire de l’Indochine (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-Orient, 
1931); Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Indochine Française. Section générale. Troupes du 
groupe de l’Indochine. Les services militaires en Indochine (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-
Orient, 1931). Jean-Baptiste Manchon frequently references a pair of publications from the 
Colonial Exposition, which he cites as follows: Exposition coloniale [1931; Paris], Section 
Indochine, Indochine Française. Section générale. Aéronautique militaire. Historique de 
l’aéronautique d’Indochine (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-Orient, 1930); and Exposition 
coloniale [1931; Paris], Section Indochine, Indochine Française. Section générale. 
L’Aéronautique militaire de l’Indochine (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-Orient, 1931). Jean-
Baptiste Manchon, L’aéronautique militaire française outre-mer, 1911-1939 (Paris: Presses de 
l’université Paris-Sorbonne, 2013). 
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A reference should also be made to Edward M. Young’s history of aviation in 
Thailand. In this study, Young examines the development of Thai military and civil 
aeronautics, with a focus on the period from 1911 to 1945. This book deserves mention 
because it provides an illuminating comparative perspective.29 When placed beside my 
dissertation, Young’s analysis reveals parallels between aviation in Thailand and aviation 
in Indochina. These parallels were evident not only in terms of the development and the 
utilization of aviation but also in terms of the challenges the Thai and French faced in 
getting their respective air services off the ground.30  
Two recent books were integral to my dissertation, providing information upon 
which my work relied as well as historical analysis upon which my project aims to 
expand and improve. Published in 2012, Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet’s L’aviation 
française en Indochine: Des origines à 1945 is an “overview of the history of French 
aviation in Indochina.” They point out that that their topic is one on which “nothing or 
almost nothing had been undertaken or realized.”31 To rectify this situation, Cony and 
Ledet offer a great amount of detail on all aspects of military and civil aviation in the 
context of Indochina through the end of the Second World War. These authors thus seek 
to document the day-to-day activities of the military squadrons—whether naval, army, or 
air force—and the shifting material and administrative structures of these units. In 
addition, Cony and Ledet report on significant long-distance flights between France and 
                                                
29 Edward M. Young, Aerial Nationalism: A History of Aviation in Thailand 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995). Thailand was known as Siam prior to late 
June 1939. For the sake of continuity, my dissertation utilizes “Thailand” rather than “Siam.” 
30 Among the common problems, the most apparent was the challenge of ensuring an 
adequate stream of funds and aeronautics supplies. Young, Aerial Nationalism, 13, 39. 
31 Cony and Ledet, 6.  
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Southeast Asia, and discuss the development of not only commercial aviation but also the 
local aero clubs in Indochina.  
The second major contribution to the history of aviation in French Indochina is 
Jean-Baptiste Manchon’s L’aéronautique militaire française outre-mer, 1911-1939.  
Based on his doctoral dissertation, Manchon’s text analyzes how military aviation 
functioned as “a tool of colonial power.” Manchon explains that “the objective of this 
study is to understand how and why French military aviation deployed in the empire 
evolved from an aviation of domination, dedicated to the control and the development of 
colonial territories, to an aviation of defense and protection.” He contends that the history 
of the empire’s air forces is best understood as a three-stage progression. The initial 
“confused phase” lasted from 1911 to around 1919; this was a period during which 
“aviation tried to find its way, [and] pragmatism won out over overall coherence.” This 
stage was followed by a “colonial phase,” which stretched from approximately 1920 to 
1934, in which aircraft were primarily utilized for “civilizing” purposes in the empire 
(une aviation militaire civilisatrice dans l’Empire). The final stage—the “imperial 
phase”—lasted from 1934 to 1939 and consisted of “the unfinished progression toward 
an aviation of defense and deterrence.”32  
In more detail, Manchon applies the term “colonial aviation” (aviation coloniale) 
to this first stage. He indicates that there was neither a clearly defined purpose for the 
squadrons stationed in the empire nor a distinct difference between these units and those 
located in the metropole at this time.33 Then, at the start of the 1920s, a shift occurred 
regarding the role and structure of the colonial air forces. Because the French empire’s 
                                                
32 Manchon, 18-21.  
33 Manchon, 20.  
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squadrons faced no imminent threat from an enemy air force, these units focused on 
political and economic tasks within a given territory instead of undertaking properly 
“military” missions and defense operations. Manchon asserts that this politico-economic 
emphasis was the hallmark of the second stage, the period of  “aviation in the colonies” 
(aviation aux colonies).34 He determines that, in terms of both organization and 
functioning, the peak of this second phase was from 1928 to 1933.35 Importantly, 
Manchon emphasizes that aviation’s military and politico-economic duties were 
interlinked, with the two operating in support of one another. In this manner, aviation was 
able to contribute to the work of maintaining and strengthening the French empire.36  
The third phase of Manchon’s analysis is “imperial aviation” (l’aviation 
impériale).37 This transition to imperial aviation—which remained unfinished as Europe 
was plunged into war in September 1939—was the result of a combination of factors that 
arose during the course of the mid-to-late 1930s.38 According to Manchon, this third 
                                                
34 Regarding this transformation, a particular legislative text—adopted January 19, 
1920—was especially important. This directive defined “colonial aviation” as a branch of 
military aviation that was under the direction of the Minister of the Colonies and laid out how this 
service arm was to be employed for military, political, and economic missions across the empire. 
This directive thus marked a clear difference between the purpose and activity of the air forces 
deployed overseas and those in the metropole. Manchon, 20, 204.  
35 Manchon, 272-273. While 1928 witnessed the creation of the Air Ministry, an 
independent air force was created in 1933. This era, moreover, saw the stabilization of the 
squadrons stationed in the empire; the amount of credits allotted to overseas aviation quadrupled 
in during these years, and 1932 was the year in which the funding for the colonial air forces 
reached a maximum for the interwar period. 
36 Manchon, 654.  
37 Manchon argues that 1934 was a watershed year for military aviation in the empire. 
Along with Cony and Ledet, Manchon notes this was the year that France’s air force actually was 
given its structure and role. Cony and Ledet, 210; Manchon, 526. Enlarging upon aviation 
historian Patrick Facon’s assessment that 1937 was a turning point for French air doctrine as 
metropolitan air force leadership embraced strategic bombing, Manchon explains that this year 
was also critical for aviation in the empire. Thus Manchon asserts that 1937 clearly signaled “the 
irreversible development toward an imperial aviation.” Manchon, 576. 
38 Manchon highlights the following factors: the creation of an independent air force; the 
worsening international climate; and the swift progress of aeronautics technology. Manchon, 21. 
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stage entailed a shift from a focus on non-military missions within the borders of a given 
colonial space to the development of a service arm “dedicated principally to the tasks of 
defense and air superiority.” The colonial squadrons were integrated into broader 
strategies for protecting France and its empire, and the primary purpose of these air 
forces thus became providing defense against external enemies in possession of 
“powerful and developed” armed forces. Consequently, Manchon explains, “exclusively 
colonial work...became a secondary concern.”39 
Compared to Manchon’s and Cony and Ledet’s books, my study has a narrower 
focus. The subject matter itself—aviation in French Indochina during the interwar 
years—of course overlaps with aspects of these other two works. Yet there are notable 
differences between my dissertation and what Manchon and Cony and Ledet present. My 
analysis aims to address problematic elements and lacunae in their books while 
underscoring different connections between the history of aviation and the history of the 
French empire.  
With Cony and Ledet, a basic problem is the lack of sustained critical 
examination. In addition and in contrast to my dissertation, they do not seek to connect 
their work to broader themes in the history of aviation or, for that matter, the history of 
French Indochina. In other words, they do not fully explain the significance of their 
contribution. Also, unlike Cony and Ledet’s book, my project does not include discussion 
of Indochina’s aero clubs or the various long-distance flights during this period. Instead, 
my work centers on aviation as it related to military, government, and commercial efforts 
within the framework of French interests in Indochina and beyond. Thus the individuals 
and initiatives linked to endurance flights—voyages that sought to set and break 
                                                
39 Manchon, 526, 21. 
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records—or to flying as sport do not factor prominently in my dissertation. It is important 
to acknowledge, though, that the aero clubs and the bold attempts to fly farther, faster, 
and longer did have a significant propaganda effect in favor of aviation in the French 
empire.   
With regard to Manchon’s book, my dissertation analyzes a particular area of his 
wide-ranging study. In doing so, my project presents an interpretation of how Indochina’s 
air force developed that differs from his three-stage argument for overseas military 
aviation. Simply put, Manchon’s characterization of the shift in 1934 from the era of 
“aviation in the colonies” to the short-lived period of “imperial aviation” does not 
emphasize the continuity in purpose and activity of Indochina’s air force during the 
interwar years. Also, Manchon seems to overestimate the immediate impact of the 
creation of the air force, at least locally in Indochina. Finally, the broad scope and 
military focus of Manchon’s work naturally leaves certain analytical and topical gaps, 
especially with regard to the role of airlines and non-military aviation within Indochina. 
Overall, in terms of the history of French colonial aviation, my dissertation argues 
that Indochina presents a rich area of study. More so than anywhere else in the empire, 
the aviation efforts in Indochina encapsulated all that the French hoped to accomplish 
with aircraft. In other words, aviation, in all its iterations, was on full display in 
Indochina as it was nowhere else in the empire. While planes were perhaps used more 
extensively for a particular purpose elsewhere in the empire, nowhere else were aircraft 
used in such a variety of ways during the interwar period. An analysis of aviation in 
Indochina thus lays bare the totality of the hopes and the realities of aviation in the 
French empire.  
 19 
The History of Indochina  
My work contributes not only to the history of French colonial aviation but also to 
the history of French Indochina. While filling a gap in the literature on this subject, my 
dissertation adds another perspective to scholarly understandings both of the relationship 
between the French and the native populations and of the French experience in Laos. 
Through the lens of aviation, my project also provides a fresh perspective on French 
relations with Thailand during this period. More broadly, and more significantly, my 
dissertation contends that an analysis of aviation reveals much about the history of the 
French experience in the colony.  
Generally, published studies of different aspects of French Indochina include only 
passing references to aviation. For instance, Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery’s 
survey of the colonial period includes only brief mentions of aviation. In addition to 
noting that aircraft were used in the reprisals that followed the Yen Bay uprising in the 
fall of 1930, they cite air travel in the 1930s in their discussion of how the French worked 
to improve metropole—colony communications in the first four decades of the twentieth 
century.40 In other studies of the component parts of Indochina—or in texts that address a 
specific aspect of history during the colonial period—aviation typically is mentioned only 
in passing. These references tend to discuss either the usage of airpower against anti-
colonial activities and pockets of dissident populations in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
or the establishment of commercial air travel to or within the colony.41 
                                                
40 Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery, Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-
1954, trans. Ly Lan Dill Klein, with Eric Jennings, Nora Taylor, and Noémi Tousignant 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 318, 184.  
41 For references to airpower, see Alexander B. Woodside, Community and Revolution in 
Modern Vietnam (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 175-176; Truong Buu Lâm, Colonialism 
Experienced: Vietnamese Writings on Colonialism, 1900-1931 (Ann Arbor: University of 
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While the relationship between colonizer and colonized is not the focus of my 
project, my dissertation does show that members of the indigenous populations were part 
of the French aerial endeavor in Indochina. Most of this participation took place on the 
ground. Sources document individuals, typically Vietnamese men, working as aircraft 
mechanics, in aeronautics workshops, or on airfield maintenance. Native personnel also 
accompanied the French air force on missions, usually in the capacity of mechanics. 
Notably, there were instances of the Vietnamese receiving flight training, serving as 
pilots, or taking part in operations in which the French deployed airpower against 
dissident groups. As Manchon notes though, the indigenous personnel “only rarely” were 
involved in such policing missions.42 In addition, members of the local populations—
                                                                                                                                            
Michigan Press, 2000), 20, 36 n.32. Geoffrey Gunn, Rebellion in Laos: Peasants and Politics in a 
Colonial Backwater (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2003), 121, 127; Gerald Cannon Hickey, Sons 
of the Mountain: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands to 1954 (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1982), 319-321. Hickey also describes how aerial reconnaissance was 
utilized in 1925 as a means of determining the best itinerary for a future road. For examples of 
references to air travel both to and within the colony, see, Tully, 261; Penny Edwards, 
Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i, 2007), 
156; and Aline Demay, Tourism and Colonization in Indochina (1898-1939) (Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 141. Scholars have also discussed the symbolic 
importance of flight in the context of Indochina. For instance, Panivong Norindr notes that, in 
their advertisements and posters, travel companies like Air France depicted Indochina as an 
exotic commodity. This graphic art contributed to French government and commercial efforts to 
present the colony as “an alluring and commodified object, a familiar icon or sign to be desired or 
possessed.” Panivong Norindr, Phantasmatic Indochina: French Colonial Ideology in 
Architecture, Film, and Literature (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 4. Also, 
Christopher E. Goscha, in his analysis of Jean Marquet’s 1928 publication The Five Flowers: 
Indochina Explained (Les cinq fleurs: L’Indochine expliquée), demonstrates how the French 
employed the symbolism of aviation to reinforce their colonial authority, knowledge, and 
technological prowess. Christopher E. Goscha, Vietnam or Indochina? Contesting Concepts of 
Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887-1954 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 
1995), 34. Certain of the aforementioned citations are incorporated—and discussed in more 
detail—into the relevant chapters of my dissertation.  
42 For instance, during the First World War, Cao Dac Minh was an airplane mechanic for 
the French before becoming certified as a pilot in the fall of 1915. Recalled to Indochina closer to 
the end of the conflict, he perished in a plane crash on December 27, 1918, as he undertook a 
flight in Cochinchina; Cao Dac Minh, for whom the central hangar at the Bach Mai airbase in 
Tonkin would be named, was the first aviator killed in Indochina while in the service of military 
aviation. In another example, a Vietnamese aeronautics mechanic, Sargent Hoang Van Hao, flew 
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often elites involved in the colonial administration or regional nobles—traveled on 
aircraft and were given short “first flights” (baptême de l’air) by French aviators. 
Generally, these individuals seemed enthusiastic about French aviation, at least from the 
French perspective.43 Finally, in more routine circumstances, native peoples submitted 
requests for a variety of economically oriented tasks, including aerial photography work 
and airdrops of business-advertisement leaflets.44   
In the context of my dissertation, the overall picture of the relationship between 
colonizer and colonized reflects Dierikx’s observation that “flying [in the colonies] was a 
‘white man’s business.” As he explains, “the airplane was the colonizer’s new travel 
instrument, an agent of European vigor and power” throughout Asia and Africa.45 
Likewise, David W. Del Testa argues that “the availability of new forms of 
transportation, mainly automobiles but to some degree airplanes, enhanced the 
possibilities for separation of the Vietnamese and the French.”46 Del Testa’s point 
reinforces how the French tended to view aviation not as a means of bringing colonized 
                                                                                                                                            
on one of the aircraft that took part in the bombing campaign in Kontum in March 1929—this 
mission is discussed in chapter six—and, along with three other French air force officers, was 
cited for his distinguished service during the operation; Manchon reports that two more 
Vietnamese non-commissioned officers participated in this particular assignment. Cony and 
Ledet, 32; ANOM, GGI 66545, “Année 1929. Ordre Général No. 12,” April 24, 1929; Manchon, 
345.  
43 Prince Tiao Phetsarath of Laos was perhaps the most recognizable of the indigenous 
notables who took to the skies with French pilots somewhat regularly during the interwar years. 
See, Cony and Ledet, 198-199, and Manchon, 405.  
44 For examples of such requests—not all of which were ultimately approved—see 
ANOM, RSTNF 2732 and ANOM RSTNF, 4250.  
45 Dierikx, Clipping the Clouds, 33.  
46 David W. Del Testa, “Paint the Trains Red: Labor, Nationalism, and the Railroads in 
French Colonial Indochina, 1898-1945” (PhD Diss., University of California, Davis, 2001), 154. 
For Del Testa’s publications on transportation technology in Indochina, see David W. Del Testa, 
“’Imperial Corridor’: Association, Transportation and Power in French Colonial Indochina,” 
Science, Technology, and Society 4, no. 2 (1999): 319-354; and David W. Del Testa, 
“Automobiles and Anomie in French Colonial Indochina,” in France and Indochina: Cultural 
Representations, ed. Kathryn Robson and Jennifer Yee (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 
63-78. 
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and colonizer closer together in Indochina but as a way to keep distance between the two 
groups and the French above the natives, both literally and figuratively. Thus while the 
indigenous populations participated in French aviation in the colony, their participation 
was regulated by the French and was in the service of French interests. This is not to say 
that the French would not deploy aviation to “help” their Indochinese subjects. In fact, 
officials professed at least some feeling of responsibility to use aircraft to protect their 
colonial protégés against external threats.47  
Continuing, my analysis moves Laos more to the foreground in the history of 
French Indochina. Indeed, Laos often appeared as an afterthought in the minds of 
contemporaries and tends to play only a minor role in histories of the colony. It should be 
noted that this neglect is not necessarily unjustified. As Martin Stuart-Fox observes, Laos 
was the least important and least developed part of Indochina. The colonial 
administration essentially viewed this protectorate as an economic and strategic extension 
of French territory in Annam, Tonkin, and Cochinchina.48 As my analysis shows though, 
Laos factored prominently into French officials’ plans regarding commercial air travel 
and medical aviation. The protectorate also played a significant role in the earliest effort 
at military air transport. In each of these three cases, the aviation work was part of the 
drawn-out process of improving communications and access to Laos, thus “unblocking” 
                                                
47 Governor General Brévié underscored the negative consequences of not providing 
adequate fighter squadrons to the colony and leaving large sections of the territory “open to 
adverse aerial incursions.” Brévié remarked, “without insisting on the disadvantages of a military 
nature presented by such a situation, it is beyond doubt that we would assume a weighty 
responsibility toward the indigenous populations having confidence in our protection.” SHAA, 
2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général d’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” March 11, 
1938. 
48 Martin Stuart-Fox, “The French in Laos, 1887-1945,” Modern Asian Studies 29, no. 1 
(Feb. 1995), 111-112. 
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this region of Indochina.49 In addition, my project demonstrates that Laos was one of the 
primary targets for aircraft missions that the French launched in an effort to assert their 
colonial authority. 
Moreover, my dissertation reveals the complexities of the Franco-Thai 
relationship in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Thai aviation frequently factored into French 
discussions of aviation, from medical transport to propaganda tours, airmail to air 
defense. The crux of the French position, in civil as well as military circles, was to 
cultivate a positive relationship with Thailand. In doing so, France could maintain—and 
then expand—its military and commercial presence in this area of the world; in this latter 
regard, it was particularly important for the French to be able counterbalance Great 
Britain’s predominant influence in the region. Also, France would of course benefit from 
remaining on friendly terms with the countries that bordered Indochina. Conversely, 
Thailand—and China as well—looked to the French as they worked to develop their own 
air forces beginning in the early 1920s; the goal for these two nations was an 
advantageous relationship with France that would allow for access to French aviation 
resources.50  
Describing aviation visits exchanged between Thailand and Indochina between 
September 1930 and January 1931, Manchon writes that “Franco-Siamese fraternization 
                                                
49 However, Stuart-Fox does not include aviation in his discussion of how the French 
sought to unblock the region. “Landlocked Laos had to be ‘unblocked’ in the sense of being 
provided with access to the sea, by river, by rail or by road, and via Vietnam, not Thailand. This 
for a succession of French administrators became the first priority in effecting the mise en valeur 
of the territory.” Stuart-Fox, 123. 
50 Manchon, 468, 454.  
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was at its zenith.”51 Such amicable gestures “soon became rare” though. Manchon 
explains that Thailand, convulsed by the Depression crisis of the 1930s and with a more 
aggressive post-coup regime that looked less favorably upon the French, began to 
reconsider its relationship with Indochina.52 Despite any surface-level indications to the 
contrary, the Franco-Thai relationship had been somewhat tense since the start of French 
imperialist expansion into Southeast Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Eventually, France—and Great Britain, too, in Malaya and Burma—forced Thailand to 
relinquish large parts of what had been considered Thai territory. “Treaties with England 
and France confirmed Siam’s independence and its borders,” Young writes, “but the price 
of these had been heavy.”53 Unsurprisingly, the effect in Thailand was that “suspicion of 
the colonial powers remained for a long time.”54  
Finally, though powered flight had a comparatively short existence in the history 
of French Indochina before the Second World War, this topic encapsulates not only 
imperialists’ highest hopes for the colony but also the reasons that these hopes were never 
fully actualized. The French viewed aviation as a powerful new instrument that could be 
wielded in the service of the colonial project in Indochina. Eyeing the multi-purpose 
potential of flight technology, metropolitan and colonial officials imagined that aviation 
                                                
51 Thailand and China intermittently exchanged such visits with the French in Indochina, 
with most of these occurring in a period from the beginning of the 1920s until the early 1930s. 
For additional information, see Young, Aerial Nationalism, 23, and Manchon, 468-469. 
52 Manchon, 471-472, 472 n.341; Cony and Ledet, 186-187. Regarding the overthrow of 
government in Thailand, a coup in late June 1932 overturned the monarchy and brought to power 
a regime that was more militaristic and nationalist. Young, Aerial Nationalism, 148.  
53 Young details how the British and French acquired large swaths of territory and 
concessions from Thailand: “In 1893 French gunboats blockaded Bangkok to support French 
demands for Siam to cede the whole of Laos east of the Mekong River. In 1907 Siam had to agree 
to cede three provinces in western Cambodia to the French, and in 1909 four states in northern 
Malaya to the English. Economic and financial concessions put a further drain on the country’s 
limited resources.” 
54 Young, Aerial Nationalism, xxv, xxviii. 
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would, as Pirie asserts for British colonial aviation, “modernise, maintain, protect, 
reassert and legitimate Empire.” Yet, Pirie adds, “anticipation and intention exceeded 
actuality and implementation: what was hoped for and promised from aviation was less 
than what it actually achieved on the imperial stage.”55  
Like Pirie’s study, my analysis underscores how colonial power and authority—
even in the form of a modern, multi-purpose machine like the airplane—were neither 
omnipotent nor omnipresent. In the end, aviation failed to adequately rejuvenate, 
maintain, and strengthen French colonial rule. My dissertation thus demonstrates in a 
stark manner the weaknesses and the limits of French control and technological prowess 
in the empire as well as the long-term consequences that these weaknesses had for the 
French in Indochina and for the French empire itself. 
Aviation provides a vehicle for understanding some of the reasons for why the 
French project in Indochina faltered and then failed. As Pirie points out, studies of 
colonial aviation in many ways “illuminate the embodiment, difficulties, dilemmas, risks, 
evasions, muddles and struggles of imperialism in practice.”56 An examination of 
aviation in Indochina indeed reveals much about “imperialism in practice.” Specifically, 
my dissertation shows how a host of issues impeded the work of the colonial project in 
Indochina: financial and material limitations; disagreements among officials; a 
cumbersome, at times confusing, administrative machinery; the vulnerabilities of colonial 
power, technology, and authority against local populations, geography, and climate; 
and—as was plainly evident in the second half of the 1930s—a metropolitan government 
that simply could not afford to sacrifice itself to protect its empire, especially the most 
                                                
55 Pirie, 2, 236.  
56 Pirie, 4.  
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distant parts. Many of the problems that worked against aviation in Indochina during the 
interwar period—especially the challenge of obtaining resources from the metropole, the 
insufficiency of the aerial infrastructure, and the unfavorable weather and geography—
were magnified during the Second World War and still more significantly during the First 
Indochina War. As a result of France’s shocking defeat in this latter conflict, French 
colonialism made its exit from Southeast Asia. In a larger context, by the end of the First 
Indochina War, it had become clear that the French empire itself would not ultimately 
survive. As Brocheux and Hémery contend in describing the French experience in this 
conflict, the nation “exhaust[ed] itself in a war that was the first step toward the 
extinction of its colonial empire.”57  
Overall, then, my dissertation positions aviation at the intersection of multiple 
facets of the history of French Indochina: technology; transportation and communication; 
medicine; colonial development; social science; propaganda; international relations in 
Southeast and East Asia; metropole-colony connections; and the complicated relationship 
between colonizer and colonized, what Brocheux and Hémery describe as the “ambiguity 
of the Indochinese colonial situation.”58 Therefore, in a different iteration of what Eric T. 
Jennings accomplishes in his multi-faceted study of the French resort of Dalat, my 
dissertation argues that aviation provides a type of “window onto the actual workings of 
empire,” a means of “compar[ing] grand imperial schemes against results on the ground, 
imperialist rhetoric against local practices.”59  
                                                
57 Broxheux and Hémery, 337. 
58 They observe that the colonial encounter in French Indochina was complex, diverse, 
and neither “fundamentally civilizing, even if faulty...[nor] purely dominating, repressive, and 
exploitative.” Brocheux and Hémery, xiv-xv. 
59 Eric T. Jennings, Imperial Heights: Dalat and the Making and Undoing of French 
Indochina (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 3.  
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Dissertation Chapters 
My project is organized topically around the different ways in which the French 
used aircraft in the context of Indochina. The two sections—which are composed of 
individual chapters—involve the concepts of transportation and communication and of 
colonial development, internal policing and control, and external defense. Chapter one 
offers an overview of how an aviation infrastructure was established within Indochina. 
The development of this infrastructure was a fundamental part of getting aviation off the 
ground in the colony. The necessity of preparatory groundwork—and the problems that 
could and did result—reflects how aviation remained tethered to the earth despite its 
capabilities to pass high above the landscape. The experience and trajectory of creating 
an aviation infrastructure in French Indochina was similar to that of other European 
powers that sought to launch aviation services within their empires.60  
For a limited period of time and to a limited extent, the air force operated 
scheduled transports within Indochina. These trial attempts of the 1920s and early 1930s, 
the subject of chapter two, functioned as a precursor to non-military air service in the 
colony and helped to stir up enthusiasm for air travel. The work that Indochina’s air force 
accomplished in this regard literally and figuratively established the framework for future 
                                                
60 For example, Robert McCormack identifies five factors that impeded Great Britain’s 
efforts to get aviation off the ground in Africa, and these different impediments were certainly 
apparent for French aviation in Indochina as well.60 While local geography and climate posed 
challenges to a technology that was still relatively unreliable and fragile, the installation of an 
aviation infrastructure was itself a “costly and time-consuming process.” Moreover, with the 
widespread destruction and dislocation caused by the First World War, European governments 
needed to devote significant attention and resources to rebuilding within their borders. The fourth 
factor was that the crippling effect of the Great Depression and the looming possibility of another 
global conflict limited the materials that could be directed toward the colonies as the 1930s 
progressed. Last, McCormack points out that despite the best efforts of flight enthusiasts, 
European governments remained uncertain about the role of aviation; this ambiguity related to the 
fact that, into the 1930s, aviation remained an expensive technology with which most people still 
had not had direct experience. McCormack, 91-92. McCormack also discusses several problems 
that were specific to the British Empire.  
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air transport. This chapter, therefore, reinforces the larger point that military and non-
military aviation in the French empire were often intertwined during the interwar period, 
with the development of the former typically preparing the way for the installment and 
functioning of the latter.61 By detailing these early efforts at air transport, this chapter 
also highlights certain of the impediments—in particular, high costs and a lack of 
infrastructure—that frequently hindered the use of aviation in Indochina. 
Chapter three analyzes civil aviation, focusing on airlines’ efforts to organize 
service for mail and passengers. Aviation companies—with the help of the metropolitan 
and colonial governments—worked to develop routes to and within Indochina and 
through the colony to East Asia. From the early 1920s, plans for launching civil air 
service were envisioned with longer connections in mind. In examining how and why the 
French developed air routes in these different contexts, this chapter reveals the various 
challenges that arose to slow these endeavors. Notable among these difficulties were 
foreign aviation competition and a perceived stubbornness on the part of both China and 
Thailand. Indeed, the reality of flying from France to Indochina and beyond in the 
interwar years was that foreign assistance and agreeability, while not always 
forthcoming, remained necessary. 
The final part of this section, chapter four, examines Indochina’s aeromedical 
service. Air ambulances were used in the colony to transport patients, doctors, and 
medicines. Furthermore, these medical flights were intended to function as a 
demonstration of French mastery over the physical environment and a display of the 
colonizers’ purportedly benevolent civilizing presence. In addition to the shortcomings of 
                                                
61 This air of cooperation was not always evident, as air force leaders occasionally 
disagreed with civil authorities regarding the utilization of non-military airfields by military 
planes. See, for example, Cony and Ledet, 235.  
 29 
the aerial infrastructure and the lack of suitable aircraft, Indochina’s unpredictable and 
uncooperative weather kept air ambulances on the ground in a manner that noticeably 
frustrated its advocates. Two other issues that were more unique to the aeromedical 
service also impeded its use in the colony. First, requesting an air ambulance at times 
appeared as an extremely cumbersome process. Second, most areas of the colony simply 
did not need an aeromedical service.  
In how it was perceived and how it was utilized, aviation was not just a rapid 
means of communication and transportation. Thus the second part of my dissertation 
considers aviation from the perspectives of colonial development, internal policing and 
control, and external defense. The employment of planes for photography and 
reconnaissance is analyzed in chapter five. These missions—requested by colonial 
officials, companies, scientific organizations, or even individuals—assisted in the larger 
work of understanding, promoting, and developing the colony. Generally, the French in 
Indochina envisioned the benefits that aerial photography and reconnaissance would 
bring through the use of the aerial perspective. This vantage point was unimpeded, 
literally above the messiness of the human and physical landscape below.62 Many of the 
impediments that hindered aerial photography and reconnaissance were familiar to 
military and colonial authorities: organizational difficulties; a lack of funding; the 
challenges of the physical environment; and the limitations of the era’s technology. 
Another issue was that, for certain aviation enthusiasts, government officials were not 
providing enough support for aerial photography and reconnaissance work in the empire. 
                                                
62 Other scholars have explored the relationship between the aerial perspective and 
Indochina. See, for example, David Biggs, Quagmire: Nation-Building and Nature in the Mekong 
Delta (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010) and Jeanne Haffner, The View from Above: 
The Science of Social Space (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013). 
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Chapter six considers how aviation was employed within Indochina as a means of 
combatting what is broadly defined as “internal threats” to colonial authority. Aircraft 
were sent to areas of anti-colonial activity to bomb and strafe what were viewed as 
dissident groups. Officials also deployed symbolic demonstrations of airpower that were 
intended to astonish and coerce the local peoples and to reaffirm French colonial 
authority; many of these missions were multi-purpose operations that were carried out in 
the mountainous regions of Annam, Tonkin, and Laos. Whether actual violence was 
inflicted or not, the overall goal of the missions analyzed in this chapter was the 
maintenance of French colonial authority. Despite officials’ confidence that aviation 
would function as the means of defeating supposed internal threats, this use of aircraft 
was hindered by a host of issues. Chief among these were unfavorable weather, 
unreliable flight technology, and an inadequate aerial infrastructure. Additional problems 
were caused by aeronautics competition from Thailand and a fundamental misconception 
of how colonized peoples would react to the sight of aircraft. 
Chapter seven, which mostly details the period from 1934 to 1939, examines 
airpower as a means of protecting Indochina against external threats, meaning the threats 
that originated beyond the colony’s borders. The primary menaces were a politically 
unstable China, a burgeoning Thailand, and an increasingly powerful and aggressively 
expansionist Japan. From the beginning of the 1930s, it was very evident that an 
ambitious Japan posed the greatest threat to the colony.63 While the French imagined that 
                                                
63 Starting with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in the fall of 1931, Brocheux and Hémery 
point out, “successive French governments witnessed the crystallization of the menace weighing 
upon Indochina.” The distance separating metropole and colony ensured that mounting a defense 
against a Japanese attack would be difficult, particularly as an aggressive Vietnamese nationalist 
movement had gained momentum during the 1930s. Moreover, by the second half of the decade, 
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air defense would play a key role in safeguarding Indochina, officials also recognized the 
deficiencies, in terms of both quantity and quality, of the colony’s air force. This chapter 
shows that the failure to sufficiently reinforce Indochina’s air force was not a result of 
metropolitan negligence or a miscommunication of the dangers posed. Instead, the 
reinforcement process was mired in a morass of interconnected issues: political and 
economic problems; an international situation that, in the second half of the decade, made 
another war in Europe seem almost unavoidable; and, alarmingly for French officials, an 
aeronautics industry that was ill suited for mass-producing modern aircraft on the scale 
that would be required to face a mobilizing Nazi Germany.  
The conclusion provides a short examination of how aviation factored into the 
period from June 1940 though the end of the First Indochina War. This section includes a 
discussion of the Franco-Thai conflict that broke out late in 1940, but the primary focus is 
on the years of the First Indochina War. Neither Manchon nor Cony and Ledet offer an 
assessment of the entirety of this particular span of years. While Cony and Ledet include 
discussions of the Franco-Thai conflict as well as the remainder of the wartime period, 
they justifiably end their analysis with the Japanese takeover of French Indochina in 
March 1945; “the time of colonial aviation was definitely over,” these authors assert in 
referencing this particular moment.64 While this point is valid, my conclusion suggests 
that the experience of aviation during the First Indochina War was more connected to the 
experience of aviation during the interwar years than Cony and Ledet indicate. While the 
wartime necessities of the 1940s and 1950s required that military and non-military 
                                                                                                                                            
the looming threat of war in Europe had exacerbated the troubling reality of the French position 
in Southeast Asia. Brocheux and Hémery, 336.  
64 Cony and Ledet, 425.  
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aircraft both function in a narrower scope than was the case during previous decades, the 
hopes and the realities of aviation proved similar for both eras of flight. 
 
A Note on Sources and Names 
My dissertation utilizes published materials as well as archival collections. 
Notable among the former are documents and books produced as part of France’s 
colonial expositions and articles from aeronautics-themed journals or bulletins about 
Indochina. Regarding the archival sources, my project incorporates materials from 
administrators and representatives of commercial airlines, Air France in particular; these 
documents consist mainly of correspondence and meeting minutes.65 Yet among the 
archival sources—and indeed, among the entirety of the primary materials my research 
incorporates—my dissertation most frequently references official correspondence and 
reports composed by French authorities—the majority of whom were stationed in 
Indochina—who were part of the government, the air force, or the military. Thus my 
project relies heavily upon the perspectives—and the biases—of locally situated colonial 
officials.  
Moreover, in the pages that follow, several individuals are referenced in multiple 
chapters. To hopefully assist the reader, some of the more notable of these people are as 
follows: Jules Bosc, who served as the Resident Superior of Laos for a total of nearly ten 
years between June 1918 and March 193166; Jules Brévié, Indochina’s Governor General 
for a period of time from 1936 to 1938; Pierre Cordemoy, who published on aviation in 
                                                
65 Unfortunately, due to more than one miscommunication during my time in Paris, I was 
unable to consult the collection of the Musée Air France. This site has a variety of materials 
relating to French commercial aviation. 
66 Martin Stuart-Fox, Historical Dictionary of Laos (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 
2008), 395.  
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the 1930s; Lieutenant Colonel Louis de Durand de Prémorel, the colony’s head military 
officer (Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine, hereafter 
Commandant Superior) from July 1929 until the end of 193167; François Glaize, who 
served as chief of Indochina’s air force for a total of approximately five and a half years, 
starting in mid-January 1920, prior to working as a representative for French aviation 
firms in the late 1920s; Alfred Guyomar, who proceeded Glaize as head of the air force, 
serving from late April 1919 until mid-January 192068; Inspector of Civil Aviation Louis 
Hirschauer, who conducted several studies of aviation in Southeast and East Asia during 
the mid-1930s; Marcel Puypéroux, an air force officer who was in charge of the Hanoi 
squadron for a period of time in the mid-1930s; and, for clarification purposes, Major 
General Richard Puypéroux, who was Marcel’s father and the Commandant Superior in 
the early 1920s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
67 Cony and Ledet, 143. Manchon cites January 21, 1932, as the end of de Prémorel’s 
tenure. Manchon 682. 
68 The data on Glaize and Guyomar is from Manchon, 682. For additional information on 
the officers who served as head of Indochina’s air force during the interwar period, see Manchon, 
681-682. 
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CHAPTER ONE: DEVELOPING AN AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
INDOCHINA 
 
In February 1930 Pierre Cordemoy wrote in the Bulletin de l’Agence Economique 
de l’Indochine (hereafter Bulletin) that Indochina was one and a half times larger than 
France and had an interior that remained “in large part devoid of transportation routes.” 
The colony was “a vast field of action open to aviation.” At a conference held six years 
later during the Exposition Internationale de Paris, a Monsieur Charvet reflected on the 
progress of air transport in recent years as well as the significance of this development:  
Commercial aviation has taken on a crucial importance in the relations between 
the great colonial nations and their overseas territories. To convince yourself, you 
just have to glance at the aerial map of the world: a well-conceived air network 
appears as one of the centerpieces of the economic equipment of the great modern 
colonial empires.69 
 
During the interwar period, metropolitan and colonial officials worked with 
military authorities to transform Indochina from a “vast field of action open to aviation” 
to a colony with a “well-conceived air network.” Contemporaries believed that such a 
network would not only improve conditions for the French within Indochina in multiple 
ways but also provide a means of linking France to the colony and serve as a springboard 
for accessing southern China. Overall, the goal was to make air transport to, within, and 
through Indochina an efficient, safe, and sustainable option that the French could use to 
further their colonial and commercial interests in Southeast and East Asia. 
                                                
69 Pierre Cordemoy, “L’Indochine et l’aéronautique,” Bulletin de l’Agence Economique 
de l’Indochine (February 1930): 43 [hereafter Cordemoy, February 1930]; M. Charvet, 
“L’aviation commerciale et l’outillage de la France d’outre-mer,” Congrès de l’Outillage Public 
et Privé de la France d’Outre-Mer (Paris: 1938), 173.  
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However, before any of these benefits could be reaped, the French needed to 
establish an aviation infrastructure in the colony.70 As a memorandum from the 
government general observed in the fall of 1929, “aviation will only be able to subsist 
regularly and economically when the country will be organized to allow aircraft to 
circulate without too many risks. The basis of this organization is the aerial 
infrastructure.”71 In its entirety, the task of installing this infrastructure included creating 
a system for managing air traffic, planning route itineraries, and constructing a network 
of landing sites, airfield facilities, and radio and meteorological posts.  
This work proceeded in a careful, deliberate manner throughout the interwar 
period, but a particularly robust effort was exerted during the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
By this point, it was clear that the infrastructure that had hitherto existed had become 
insufficient in light of the advances in aviation technology and the projected growth of 
commercial air transport. With the general organization of the air network essentially 
fixed by the end of 1930, the remainder of the decade saw continued efforts—even with 
an economic climate that became increasingly unfavorable to colonial development—to 
upgrade the infrastructure and catch up with the constantly evolving requirements of air 
transport.  
On the whole, the French consistently struggled to accomplish the goal of 
providing Indochina with a sufficient air network. This is not to say that there was no 
                                                
70 Unless otherwise specified, “infrastructure” will refer not only to air routes but also to 
the totality of the features required for a given landing site. Such elements include—but are not 
limited to—runways, communication and weather equipment, workshops and storage facilities, 
hangars, terminals, and personnel quarters. This chapter will employ the term “air network” in a 
similar manner.  
71 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Note sur l’Aviation,” n.d. Regarding the date of this 
memorandum, the document references a ministerial decree of July 10, 1929, as well as certain 
events from October—no year is listed but, in all likelihood, this refers to October 1929. A 
general date of the fall of 1929 can thus be assumed. 
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worthwhile progress made during the interwar years. Indeed, the infrastructure certainly 
was upgraded in terms of the quality of the airfields, the coverage and capabilities of the 
radio and meteorological posts, and the ability to manage the circulation of air traffic. 
Even so, by the end of the 1930s, the type of modern, safe, and efficient air network that 
officials had envisioned at the start of the 1920s still did not exist. This fact proved to be 
a major reason for why the realities of aviation in Indochina fell far short of French hopes 
for how this technology could be used in the colony. 
 
Reasons for Developing an Aviation Network within Indochina  
 
Gordon Pirie contends that the establishment and maintenance of empire required 
effective methods of transport. “People and nature may or may not be subdued,” he 
explains, “but remoteness positively must be subdued.” Transportation links allowed 
governments to “breach the horizon, spread into new land, occupy and unify distant 
territory, and then to manage, defend and exploit it.”72 Pirie’s analysis of how civil 
aviation could benefit the British imperial project offers parallels for what the French 
hoped that air transport would do for their own empire. Indeed, aviation was expected to 
serve empire in several ways, allowing for:  
Better public administration (quicker personnel travel and document exchange); 
cheaper and more effective aerial survey and management of natural resources; 
quicker trade in small, light and precious commodities; less alienating (semi-
)permanent overseas settlement; more rapid receipt of letters and news; easier 
social circulation by imperial elites.73  
                                                
72 Gordon Pirie, Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation, 1919-39 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009), 1. 
73 Pirie, 2. Both Great Britain and France pushed to develop civil aviation networks in 
Africa as well. Robert McCormack describes a “second ‘Scramble for Africa’” that took place in 
the interwar period and was fostered by the development of aviation and the “new dimension of 
imperialism” that aircraft offered. Yet in this iteration of the Scramble, the goals were “prestige 
and influence, routes and ports of call, and traffic in mail, cargo, and people” instead of the 
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In the case of the French empire in Southeast Asia, officials believed that the 
development of an air network would have benefits for Indochina itself, for metropole-
colony relations, and for French aeronautics interests in China. Within Indochina, a web 
of air routes would make communications and travel faster and permit easier access to 
remote areas. For instance, Emmanuel Chaumié, France’s Director of Commercial 
Aviation, depicted the empire as consisting of expanses of unforgiving terrain in which 
communications were “slow and difficult.” He thus argued that the installation of 
aviation in the colonies had the potential to “truly transform not only the conditions of 
economic life but even those of existence.” Similarly, Alfred Guyomar wrote about the 
challenges of travelling between Cambodia and Cochinchina, noting that the river and 
automobile routes did not offer fast enough access to Saigon. “Aircraft,” Guyomar 
opined, “remain the only practical and swift solution” for bettering communications 
between parts of these two territories.74  
Aside from improving mail and passenger transportation, an air network offered 
other benefits for the colonial project in Indochina. For instance, in August 1928 a 
government-general memorandum judged that aviation had the potential to boost the 
                                                                                                                                            
territory grab that had characterized the European competition for Africa in the late nineteenth 
century. Robert McCormack, “Great Britain and the ‘Scramble for Africa,’ 1919-1939.” 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 10, no. 1 (1976): 89. 
74 M. [Emmanuel] Chaumié, “La coopération internationale,” Congrès International des 
Transports, 261; Exposition Coloniale Internationale, L’Aéronautique militaire de l’Indochine 
(Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-Orient, 1931), 107 [hereafter Exposition Coloniale Internationale, 
L’Aéronautique militaire de l’Indochine”]. As a demonstration of the comparative speed of air 
transport, this publication provided the reader with a diagram displaying the duration of a voyage 
between Hanoi and Saigon for each of six different vehicles: sixty days by sedan chair; fifty days 
by rickshaw; thirty-five days by horse; sixty hours via railroad; thirty-five hours via automobile; 
and, finally, seven hours by plane when traveling in a straight line.  
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colonizers’ status while strengthening the colony’s defensive capabilities.75 Other sources 
likewise commented on how aircraft could serve to reinforce colonial authority and 
power over the local peoples.76 A study from the Société d’Etudes et d’Entreprises 
Aériennes en Indochine et en Extrême-Orient (hereafter SEEAIEO) declared that “the 
airplane, even exclusively commercial, nowadays remains a great instrument of prestige, 
even domination, if…it regularly displays its colors in the sky or makes the drone of its 
motor heard even in the native houses, as far as the depths of nearly inaccessible forests.” 
As this study’s author reasoned, “every influence to acquire or maintain over our 
Indochinese protégés, we must maintain or acquire it.”77  
Proponents of aviation also directly linked the development of air transport to the 
French colonizers professed mission of civilizing and protecting the native populations. 
In a report to air force commandant Raoul Augereau, Captain Pierre Paquier asserted that 
the flying machine was a powerful physical representation of French paternalistic 
benevolence. “By enabling air navigation to work in the best conditions of security,” 
Paquier wrote, the colonial government “will very soon make accessible to this modern 
                                                
75 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note sur l’Activité Internationale en Extrême-Orient en Matière 
d’Aviation Commerciale et Postale,” August 1, 1928. The topic of aviation and colonial defense 
is analyzed in chapter seven of this dissertation.  
76 Airpower as a tool of colonial control is the subject of chapter six of this dissertation. 
77 This undated report is located in the papers of Pierre-Etienne Flandin in the archives 
and manuscripts division of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, NAF 28201, Box 24/D4. 
Regarding the date of this document, it is likely that the report was composed in the second half 
of 1928. The date range of this carton’s material is 1926 to 1928, and, moreover, this document 
both references events from as late as April 1928 and discusses plans for 1929 and 1930. This 
report, titled “Etude de la ligne transindochinoise,” was prepared by SEEAIEO [hereafter 
SEEAIEO, “Etude”]. In an apparent reference to this study, Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet 
cite August 1928 as the date in which the report was submitted to the French government. 
Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet, L’Aviation française en Indochine: Des origines à 1945 
(Outreau: Lela Presse, 2012). SEEAIEO is discussed further in chapter three.  
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and admirable civilizing agent that is the airplane the most distant and most deprived 
areas of the territory that it protects and administers.”78  
Finally, officials considered the establishment of an air network in Indochina as a 
means of achieving goals that went beyond fostering quicker transportation within the 
colony. This larger context entailed creating a metropole—colony air link and developing 
an aerial connection to China. By installing these long-haul lines, the French hoped to 
fashion Indochina into an international hub for commercial aviation. The government-
general memorandum of 1928 underscored this broader context, arguing against 
“dwell[ing] on the study of routes designed to pass over only the territory of our colony.” 
The memo observed, “we must refrain from only seeking the satisfaction of local, 
immediate needs without a view to the future.” Such shortsightedness, the author pointed 
out, would make France risk losing the opportunity to connect Indochina, “in favorable 
conditions” and without costly alterations to itineraries, to what surely was to become a 
grand network of international air routes.79  
Scheduled air service between France and Indochina was viewed as a means of 
tightening the links between metropole and colony. This strengthened bond was judged to 
have benefits beyond simply reducing communication and travel time between France 
and Southeast Asia. For example, the SEEAIEO study suggested that a France—
Indochina line would have a certain positive psychological effect for the colony’s French 
                                                
78 SHAA, 2B33/D4, “Destinataire: M. le Colonel Augereau. Les terrains d’aviation en 
Indochine, par le Capitaine Paquier,” May 2, 1931. Authorities aimed to take advantage of the 
possibilities of aviation as a purported wellspring of imperial propaganda even when no explicit 
reference to the symbolic value of a particular flight was made. As Jean-Baptiste Manchon points 
out, “every opening of an air route, every flyover, even if unplanned, was exploited politically.” 
Jean-Baptiste Manchon, L’aéronautique militaire française outre-mer, 1911-1939 (Paris: Presses 
de l’université Paris-Sorbonne, 2013), 382. 
79 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note sur l’Activité Internationale en Extrême-Orient en Matière 
d’Aviation Commerciale et Postale,” August 1, 1928.  
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population. “The feeling of isolation that our nationals in the Far East may experience 
will diminish,” the report noted, explaining that “the influence of the metropole on the 
colony will increase; the union between [the two], their mutual support, will be 
improved.” In February 1930, Chaumié similarly concluded that a regularly functioning 
air route had the capacity to “bring our grand colony in the Far East closer to the 
metropole.”80 Into the later 1930s, officials continued to highlight how air transport 
served to tighten the links between France and its colonies.81   
Politicians and colonial administrators also wanted to utilize France’s footing in 
Southeast Asia as a springboard for accessing China by air. The government-general 
memorandum from 1928 stressed this point: “Indochina’s privileged position needs to be 
considered [because it] allows France to play a leading role in the realization of the 
Europe—China line.” Air transport not only allowed for “close, amicable collaboration 
with our neighbors [and] confirmation of our privileged position in the sale of aeronautics 
material” but also provided France with a means of “peaceful commercial penetration in 
the Far East.” With Southeast Asia situated only eight days from the metropole by plane, 
Indochina was poised to gain an enhanced commercial and political status. Therefore, the 
memo contended that an air network would make the colony “more than ever...worthy of 
being called by our diplomats ‘the permanent base of French interests in the Far East.’” 
Cordemoy also supported the idea that France needed to capitalize on Indochina’s 
                                                
80 SEEAIEO, “Etude”; ANOM, GGI 66529, “Le Ministre de l’Air au Lieutenant-Colonel 
de Prémorel, Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine,” February 14, 1930. 
81 In his talk at the 1937 Exposition, Charvet likened imperial air networks to a “nervous 
system that allows the central willpower to be felt in all the limbs and to receive all their 
perceptions.” He added that rapid communications affected not only the economy, defense, and 
administration of the empire but also the movement of “people, ideas, and opinions or interests, ” 
the increased circulation of which was itself capable of making “a coherent whole of these 
dispersed territories.” Charvet, 173. 
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position, placing the present-day jockeying for commercial aviation preeminence within 
the context of the history of European competition for access to East Asia. He declared in 
a January 1930 article that the “economic penetration” of southern China “still remains 
one of the fundamental goals of Western civilization.” An air route to this part of the 
globe was destined to become “one of the great aerial routes of tomorrow.”82 
 
Managing Air Traffic within Indochina (1920s and 1930s) 
As early as 1922, officials in France lauded the recent progress of aviation in 
Indochina. Yet the metropolitan government was cognizant of the need to plan for the 
future of air transport in the colony. In the opinion of Minister of the Colonies Albert 
Sarraut, what was now required for Indochina was a government-directed system for 
managing the increase in air traffic that would inevitably be brought about by the 
development of commercial service. The Minister explained: “in preparation for the 
eventual setting up of such [airlines], it is important to determine the conditions in which 
they will operate and how...they will be able to use, together with military aviation, the 
local air network.”83 With these points in mind, Sarraut proposed regulations and outlined 
several key tasks for which the commandant of the air force would be responsible. 
Specifically, the commandant was to direct the organization of the colony’s air network, 
a job that that entailed the selection, construction, technical outfitting, supervision, and 
upkeep of the local airfields. In addition, this officer was to act as the representative of 
                                                
82 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note sur l’Activité Internationale en Extrême-Orient en Matière 
d’Aviation Commerciale et Postale,” August 1, 1928; Pierre Cordemoy, “L’Indochine et 
l’aéronautique,” Bulletin de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine (January 1930): 9 [hereafter, 
Cordemoy, January 1930].  
83 Sarraut, of course, was a well-known theorist of French colonialism; thus the interest in 
the potential of aviation was not limited to a handful of specialists. 
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the Aerial Navigation Service—itself part of the Undersecretary of State for Aviation and 
Air Transports (hereafter Undersecretary)—and, in this capacity, was charged with 
managing the development and functioning of commercial aviation within Indochina.84 
That an air force official should be tasked with these various responsibilities was not an 
illogical decision.85   
From the outset though, this new position did not seem to be much needed in the 
colony. Indeed, Sarraut’s projection for the growth of civil aviation appeared overly 
optimistic. “Up to the present,” a memorandum from April 1925 remarked, “experience 
has shown that these companies are not viable in Indochina and that the Department’s 
expectations concerning the development of air travel in the colonies were somewhat 
                                                
84 ANOM, GGI 66501, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de 
l’Indochine,” May 26, 1922. A subsequent letter further elaborated on this envoy’s role. The 
“Delegate of the Aerial Navigation Service” would be tasked with the following duties: 
researching and establishing a general program for commercial aviation in Indochina; considering 
requests for concessions made by individuals or companies and establishing usage agreements; 
general monitoring of air travel, personnel, and materials used by concessionaires to ensure 
compliance with any current legislation; and, if necessary, drafting “special regulations” that were  
“consistent with the principles adopted in France” but adapted to the “specific conditions of life 
in Indochina.” ANOM, GGI 66501, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général 
de l’Indochine,” December 4, 1923. 
85 Louis Hirschauer, the Inspector for Civil Aviation, explained the rationale in a report 
composed following his study of aviation in Southeast Asia: “the reason cited for the putting all 
aviation under military leadership results from the idea that military aviation, from the 
perspective of national interest, dominates…all the other forms of aviation, commercial and 
private.” He added that the air force and its administration not only had been established in the 
colony longer than other types of aviation but also had been responsible for much of the work of 
installing the local aerial infrastructure. “Mission de l’Ingénieur en Chef Hirschauer, Inspecteur 
de l’Aviation Civile, en Chine et en Indochine. Septembre-Octobre-Novembre 1936” [hereafter 
Hirschauer Mission, 1936]. This study is a four-volume report whose different books are located 
at the following sites: volume one, “La ligne d’Extrême-Orient de l’Air-France: Marseille—
Hanoi. Sa prochaine transformation. Les lignes aériennes de la K.L.M. et de l’I.A.W.,” library of 
the Service Historique de la Défense at Vincennes; volume three, “Les lignes aériennes et 
l’aviation privée en Indo-Chine. L’amélioration de l’infrastructure,” Musée de l’Air et de 
l’Espace at Le Bourget (2156); volume two, “Les lignes aériennes chinoises et leur liaison avec la 
ligne d’Extrême-Orient de l’Air-France. Les liaisons des lignes aériennes chinoises avec les 
lignes de la K.L.M. et de l’I.A.W.,” and volume four, “Annexes. Cartes. Plans. Horaires. 
Statistiques,” Fonds Jacques-Louis Dumesnil at the Archives Nationales at Pierrefitte-sur-Seine 
(130AP/38).  
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excessive.” In addition, the memo frankly stated that air force commandant François 
Glaize had not had much work to do as the delegate and estimated that “several years” 
would pass before this position would truly be needed.86 
Yet the current lack of civil aviation activity did not deter Glaize from 
subsequently commenting on the challenges that, as head of the air force, he faced—or 
would face—in attending to the variety of responsibilities that were assigned to him. In 
1926 Glaize stated, “no means have been put in the hands of the Commandant of Military 
Aviation to accomplish the tasks that come under the jurisdiction of this [civil aviation] 
function, and it is only nominally that he holds this title.”87 He described how he 
possessed neither the resources nor the time to manage the functioning of the entirety of 
the colonial air services. Reflecting on the problem of having his office charged both with 
military and with civil duties, he observed that the role of air force chief “sufficiently 
absorbs his activity so that it is impossible for him to devote to these delegate functions 
all the time that he should.”88  
Glaize reasoned that as air services in the colony were poised to expand in the 
near future, the current system for managing aviation—which he clearly believed to be 
ineffective—needed to be changed. Arguing that some type of organ specifically dealing 
with civil aviation was required, the commandant contrasted the administrative structure 
for aviation in Indochina with the format in France. While the head of Indochina’s air 
force was at present tasked with directing both military aviation and civil aviation, the 
                                                
86 ANOM, GGI 66501, “Note explicative et propositions,” April 11, 1925.  
87 ANOM, RSTNF 4280, “Note sur l’Aviation,” n.d. [the content of this reports appears 
to place the document date to 1926].  
88 ANOM, RSTNF 4280, “Note sur l’Aviation,” n.d.  
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metropole had two separate offices for these two branches of aviation.89 Glaize 
characterized the setup in the colony as “detrimental to the development of aviation,” 
further asserting that “the cause of aviation [in Indochina] suffers from the absence of an 
agency for inspection and research.”90  Overall, Glaize’s comments imply that the 
development and management of the air network in the colony required the dedicated 
oversight of a single government bureau.  
It appears that the type of department of which Glaize bemoaned the lack was 
formed in 1928.  A government-general decree of April 16 created a bureau of civil 
aeronautics that was charged with researching and installing routes in the colony.91 Two 
years later another directive—this decree was dated April 23, 1930—established an 
aviation bureau (Bureau de la Navigation Aérienne) to replace the existing office. This 
newer office’s mission involved not only the “creation and the maintenance of air routes” 
but also the “monitoring of aerial traffic in Indochina.” Therefore, this bureau was to 
continue the work of its predecessor.92  
                                                
89 In France, the War Ministry oversaw military aviation, and the Undersecretary was 
responsible for civil aviation and was assisted in this work by a number of Delegates for Aerial 
Navigation. 
90 ANOM, RSTNF 4280, “Note sur l’Aviation,” n.d. As envisioned by Glaize, this bureau 
would be involved with the planning, resources, and functioning of aviation “in all its forms.”  
91 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Le Général de Division Aubert, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” May 15, 
1928. At the start of 1928, a Monsieur Brunat, who was an aeronautics engineer, was dispatched 
to Indochina to serve as a technical advisor to the government general. Brunat conducted the first 
comprehensive studies for a local air network and recognized the necessity of forming a 
department for civil aviation. Cony and Ledet, 495; SEEAIEO, “Etude.” 
92ANOM, GGI 66502, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” April 23, 1930. The 
aviation network for which this office was responsible included, specifically, the entirety of the 
colony’s airfields with the exception of the military bases at Tong—located near Hanoi—and Cap 
Saint-Jacques, which was situated on the coast of Cochinchina. A footnote in Paquier’s report, 
which was composed in May 1931, mentioned that the Cap Saint-Jacques facility was currently 
being constructed. SHAA, 2B33/D4, “Destinataire: M. le Colonel Augereau. Les terrains 
d’aviation en Indochine, par le Capitaine Paquier,” May 2, 1931. 
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Apparently, the creation of this department did not adequately address the issue of 
managing air transport within the colony. In a report from the fall of 1936, Inspector of 
Civil Aviation Louis Hirschauer determined that the problem related to the fact that the 
positions of air force commandant and of delegate for civil aviation were veritable 
revolving doors. From 1920 to 1936, Hirschauer counted seven different individuals as 
having been in charge of military aviation.93 Similarly, between 1928 and the time 
Hirschauer composed this report, the list of aerial navigation officials included five 
people. Moreover, the position of Secretary General of Indochina, a key liaison in the 
government general in matters of aviation, had switched at least six times from 1921 until 
1936. Hirschauer’s thesis was that these seemingly constant substitutions had caused 
great difficulty in establishing continuity of ideas for the development of air transport 
services in the colony.94  
Furthermore, Hirschauer found fault, as had Glaize, with having these services be 
managed by the head of the air force. The argument that this officer should be responsible 
for the entirety of the aviation-related duties in Indochina was “perfectly legitimate while 
commercial aviation was very little developed and private aviation [was] nonexistent.” In 
recent years though, private aviation had grown somewhat, and, more importantly, 
international commercial aviation had significantly expanded—and continued to do so.95 
Hirschauer thus contended, “the moment has come when we must realize that civil 
aviation is henceforth called to play a leading role in the economy of Indochina.”96  
                                                
93 This position saw more continuity from the summer of 1934 until late 1940. From 
August 11, 1934, until November 27, 1940, only two officers served as air force commandant. 
Manchon, 682. 
94 Hirschauer Mission, 1936. 
95 Hirschauer Mission, 1936.  
96 Hirschauer Mission, 1936.  
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Considering this state of affairs, Hirschauer observed that “we find ourselves 
obliged, we do not say to reorganize, but to organize civil aviation in Indochina.” Clearly, 
he viewed the current structure for managing air transport as still lacking the oversight 
required so that air traffic—the amount of which would surely increase—could circulate 
efficiently within the colony. Hirschauer’s comment implies that, at least for certain 
officials—and Hirschauer was a certainly a credible source in matters of colonial 
aviation—the previously established civil aeronautics positions had not been satisfactory. 
As a solution, Hirschauer proposed that the creation of a Director of Civil Aviation. Yet 
as outlined by Hirschauer, the duties of this proposed office actually appear very similar 
to those of the prior positions.97   
In any case, the government apparently endorsed Hirschauer’s conclusion that this 
type of position was needed in Indochina. On December 2, 1937, a decree established a 
civil aviation department that was to be headed be a special director.98 At the end of the 
decade, the colonial administration put forth another measure to improve the management 
of air traffic within the colony. On March 15, 1939, Governor General Jules Brévié 
issued a decree that created two regional centers for aerial navigation, located in Saigon 
and in Hanoi. These centers were to function as part of the civil aviation service, and the 
relevant duties were to be handled by the commanding officer at Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut 
airport and his counterpart at Hanoi’s Gia Lâm airport.99 The jurisdiction of the northern 
center included the routes, the entirety of the landing sites, and “all manifestations of civil 
aviation activity” within Tonkin, Kouang-Tchéou-Wan, and the areas of Laos and Annam 
                                                
97 Hirschauer Mission, 1936.  
98 Cony and Ledet, 502.  
99 The position held by these airport officials had been established by decrees from March 
and April 1936. ANOM, RSTNF 3421, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, [Arrêté],” March 
15, 1939.  
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situated north of the Tourane—Paksé air route. Conversely, the southern center had the 
same responsibilities but for Cambodia, Cochinchina, and the parts of Annam and Laos 
located to the south of the Tourane—Paksé line. The airfields at Tourane and Paksé  fell 
under the authority of the Hanoi-based center.100  
This section has demonstrated that from the later 1920s, officials deemed it 
necessary that Indochina have an administrative office dedicated to managing what was 
believed would be a future of increased air traffic. However, in a manner that was 
representative of the plodding pace with which the overall aviation infrastructure was 
installed in the colony, this type of oversight position was only fully in place as the 1930s 
came to a close. Of course, the creation of a civil aeronautics bureau was only one 
component of the machinery that was required to get aviation get off the ground. The 
following section shows how the establishment of a network of air routes, landing sites, 
airfield facilities, and radio and meteorological posts was also necessary if the French 
hoped to have aircraft operate efficiently and safely within Indochina.  
 
The Development of Indochina’s Aviation Infrastructure (1920 to 1930) 
The late 1920s and early 1930s witnessed a particularly marked effort to organize 
a network of airfields and air links within Indochina. In fact, colonial and military 
officials had worked to create an aerial infrastructure in the colony since the end of the 
First World War. By 1920, a program for “air routes of general interest” had been drawn 
up. This blueprint, which remained viable until at least the latter part of the decade, 
included a line along the coast, another on the Mekong River, and a third tracing the 
                                                
100  ANOM, RSTNF 3421, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, [Arrêté],” March 15, 
1939. Kouang-Tchéou-Wan was a small enclave on the southern coast of China that France 
acquired around the turn of the twentieth century. 
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border between Tonkin and China.101 A scheme for categorizing the colony’s various 
airfields was also developed in the early 1920s. Writing to the Governor General at the 
end of May 1922, Minister of the Colonies Albert Sarraut discussed how the landing sites 
around the colony could be grouped into three categories: auxiliary terrains (terrains des 
secours), which were essentially landing fields for emergencies; secondary airfields 
(aérohaltes), which would have a shelter for planes, a few supplies and spare parts, and 
some radio and meteorological equipment; and primary airports (aérogares), which 
would be outfitted with a full complement of facilities—hangars, various warehouses, 
storehouses, workshops, and equipment for wireless communications and for weather—
and would serve as air force bases or terminuses for major air routes.102  
A February 1924 memorandum provides more details about the colony’s air 
network as it appeared in the mid-1920s. In this document, Glaize stated that there were 
presently sixty auxiliary landing sites—approximately thirty of which were equipped 
with aircraft shelters and other installations—and larger airbases at Haiphong, Bien Hoa, 
and Bach Mai. Both civil aircraft and military planes could utilize these various airfields. 
Moreover, several air routes, ten of which were listed as primary lines, linked 
destinations around Indochina.103 Approximately two years later, Glaize described the air 
                                                
101 ANOM, GGI 66503, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique 
d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe 
de l’Indochine,” June 4, 1925; ANOM, GGI 66503, “Le Général de Division Andlauer, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” June 12, 1925.  
102 ANOM, GGI 66501, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de 
l’Indochine,” May 26, 1922. Sarraut also pointed out that “civil aircraft passing through will be 
able to receive, at the installations managed by military aviation, at the airfields whose extent will 
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103 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Note sur l’Aviation en Indochine. Demandée par le 
Gouvernement Général,” [February 3, 1924]. These principal routes were as follows: Hanoi to 
Vinh and Saigon via the coast of Annam; Hanoi to Vinh and Saigon via the Mekong River; Hanoi 
to Lao Kay; Hanoi to Vinh and Vientiane; Hanoi to Son La, Dien Bien Phu, and Muong Sing; 
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network as consisting of eighty terrain that were reasonably organized and reasonably 
well situated.104  
A 1937 article in the Bulletin summarized the logic that had guided the efforts to 
develop Indochina’s infrastructure between 1918 and 1930. “On the unquestionable 
premise that airplanes in this region were veritable cripples[sic]” who would be “in great 
danger” if they ventured far from an airfield, the writer explained, “the doctrine was to 
multiply the landing sites in such a way as to end up with a rather dense network so that a 
plane forced to land could have some chance of finding itself in proximity to an equipped 
area.” Officials thus focused on providing the maximum security possible for pilots, 
which essentially meant constructing landing fields no more than fifty kilometers apart 
along the colony’s air routes.105 This reasoning, moreover, underscores the extent to 
which the local conditions—geography and climate in particular—and the unreliability 
and fragility of the era’s aeronautics technology bothered officials as they worked to 
install aviation in the colony.106   
                                                                                                                                            
Hanoi to Lai Chau; Hanoi to Mon Cay; Saigon to Battambang; Saigon to Cap Saint-Jacques; and 
Saigon to Dalat. The Hanoi—Saigon course of travel entailed flying from Vinh to Thakhek in 
Laos and then journeying south along the Mekong River to Cochinchina. A government-general 
memorandum from November 1930 pointed out that the two routes linking Hanoi and Saigon 
were complimentary lines and not redundant connections. Because flying along the coast of 
Annam during the winter monsoon season was a risky endeavor, aviators could utilize the 
Mekong River route during this period, resuming travel along the coastal itinerary during the 
summer. This memo also remarked that the terrain around Dalat did not offer any locations for 
which a landing field could be established “short of considerable costs that do not justify the 
center’s importance.” The selected alternative was to utilize the airstrip at Dran to access Dalat by 
plane. ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note pour Monsieur le Gouverneur Général,” November 22, 1930. 
104 ANOM, RSTNF 4280, “Note sur l’Aviation,” n.d.  
105 “L’Aviation en Extrême-Orient: L’oeuvre aéronautique accomplie en Indochine,” 
Bulletin de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine (April/May/June: 1937): 33 [hereafter 
“L’Aviation en Extrême-Orient”].  
106 It should be noted that this density of installations had not been achieved in France 
itself at this time, likely due to the fact that having terrains clustered together in this manner was 
simply unnecessary: the metropolitan landscape offered more opportunities for safely carrying 
out—and surviving—an unexpected landing. 
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By the end of the 1920s, certain officials were expressing satisfaction with the 
progress made in providing French aviation with a safe, reliable air network in Southeast 
Asia.107 Even so and with an eye to the future of flight in Indochina, the colonial and 
military administrations had by this point determined that the existing infrastructure 
needed to be reevaluated. Already in 1926, Glaize recognized that with the “normal 
development of aviation,” officials could anticipate that Indochina’s aeronautics facilities 
would soon require upgrades.108 Two years later, the work of analysis and planning was 
under way.109 A government-general memorandum from the fall of 1929 subsequently 
concluded that the infrastructure was “already rather advanced” but needed to be 
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Notwithstanding Hirschauer’s observation, the late 1920s to the early 1930s was a period in 
which the colony’s radio-meteorological network was notably improved. In particular, the 
principal cities of the colony were outfitted with more powerful radio posts in the early 1930s, 
which was a time that also witnessed a “remarkable enhancement” in the quality of the 
meteorological data that was collected. Cony and Ledet, 496. Hirschauer’s comment from 1934 is 
found in “Mission de l’Ingénieur en Chef Hirschauer, Inspecteur de l’Aviation Civile. Octobre-
Novembre 1934” [hereafter Hirschauer Mission, 1934]. Like his study from 1936, this report is a 
multi-volume work, with the locations of the books as follows: volume one, “La ligne 
Marseille—Saigon de 1934-1935,” and volume three, “La Ligne d’Extrême-Orient à Partir de 
1936,” Musée de l’Air et de l’Espace (2158). Volume two, “Voyages sur l’Imperial-Airways et la 
K.L.M.,” was not consulted. 
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completed and, in some cases, modified. Furthermore, this memo described the colony’s 
“radio-weather network” as essentially non-existent.110  
While these assessments were being made in the late 1920s, the major changes to 
the infrastructure only began around and after 1930. “In matters of aeronautics,” a 
memorandum from late November 1930 stated, “Indochina has...devoted its efforts in 
1929 and 1930 to the modification of landing sites.”111 This comment was reinforced by 
the colonial administration’s financial expenditures for this work in the first half of the 
1930s. Between 1930 and 1935, the government general allocated the most funds for the 
construction and maintenance of airfields in 1930, with this amount being reduced each 
year thereafter.112  
In mid-January 1930 Lieutenant Colonel Louis de Durand de Prémorel, the 
Commandant Superior, concisely explained the problems with the existing infrastructure. 
The network of airfields in the colony was planned and constructed at a time when the air 
force not only had few resources at its disposal but also was outfitted with planes that did 
not require large runways for landings and takeoffs. However, de Prémorel believed that 
this infrastructure had become “absolutely insufficient.” Most of the landing fields were 
not large enough to accommodate modern aircraft, and, as a result of flooding and bad 
                                                
110 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Note sur l’Aviation,” n.d. This document noted that while 
certain runways could not accommodate modern aircraft, other landing fields were poorly 
situated or were too easily subjected to flooding. The airfields that served Hanoi and Saigon were 
both deemed insufficient as well, with the former site—Bach Mai—being singled out as 
inadequate for the future development of military and civilian aviation. Furthermore, the 
memorandum remarked that “certain important hubs” located either in isolated regions or areas to 
which ground access was difficult, “do not even have an airfield that, in case of political or 
medical necessity, would allow for communication to be maintained with the country’s vital 
centers (les centres vitaux du pays).”  
111 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note pour Monsieur le Gouverneur Général,” November 22, 
1930.  
112 Hirschauer Mission, 1934. According to this report, the figures provided for the years 
between 1930 and 1935 are as follows: 600,000 for 1930; 195,720 for 1931; 108,000 for 1932; 
102,000 for 1933; 62,000 for 1934; and 55,400 for 1935.  
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weather, several of these terrains were usable only part of the year and required costly 
repairs after each season of poor weather. De Prémorel thus determined that it had 
become necessary “to go back over the old aeronautics program with a view to its 
adaptation to the new conditions required by aviation.” Captain Paquier pointed out that 
this reassessment would be accompanied by an infrastructural reorganization that 
included building new landing sites, enlarging certain others, and “decommissioning the 
terrains that could not be improved (sites [that were] difficult to reach, regularly flooded, 
not open to enlargement, or too far from inhabited places, etc).”113  
A wide-ranging program was subsequently drafted to address these various issues. 
The Bulletin reported that the overall goal was improving the existing airfields as 
opposed to increasing their number.114 Regarding the colony’s air routes, the project 
detailed a network that appears similar to what already existed within Indochina.115 
Specifically, this program listed four main routes: the two Hanoi—Saigon lines; a line 
between Vientiane and Vinh; and a line from Saigon to the Cambodian locale of 
Sisophon. In addition, several “less important” routes linked with these primary lines.116 
Moreover, it was advised that Vinh, Vientiane, Hanoi, and Saigon have airports that 
                                                
113 ANOM, GGI 66502, “Exemplaire du Programme d’organisation d’infrastructure 
Aérienne d’Indochine (suite à communication téléphonique du 17 Février 1930)”; SHAA, 
2B33/D4, “Destinataire: M. le Colonel Augereau. Les terrains d’aviation en Indochine, par le 
Capitaine Paquier,” May 2, 1931. De Prémorel’s remarks are from a letter of January 15, 1930, 
that is attached to this document. 
114 “L’Aviation en Extrême-Orient,” 34. 
115 See footnote thirty-five for a description of the colony’s air network in the mid-1920s.  
116 SHAA, 2B33/D4, “Destinataire: M. le Colonel Augereau. Les terrains d’aviation en 
Indochine, par le Capitaine Paquier,” May 2, 1931. The plan also envisioned a Europe—
Indochina route and a line to China. Finally, in the realm of colonial defense, the program called 
for a network of seven airfields located along the China—Tonkin border as well as several 
“fallback terrains” (terrain de repli) to serve as a secondary line of defense.  
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could accommodate the growth in air traffic that an increased civil aviation presence and 
an upgraded infrastructure were likely to foster.117  
Another component of the program of 1930 was grouping the colony’s air routes 
and landing sites into different categories based on their intended purpose. An Air 
Ministry directive forwarded to the government general in August 1930 stated that the 
routes and airfields were to be categorized as either “general interest” (d’intérêt général) 
or “regional interest” (d’intérêt régional); the former category suggested the potential for 
use as an international line while the latter implied a use that was more local.118 The 
colonial budget would be responsible for funding the infrastructure work for both groups. 
These costs consisted of not only an airfield’s “purchase, organization, signalization, 
[and] maintenance” but also the site’s access roads, water, electricity, piping, 
radiotelegraphic equipment, and telegraph and telephone communications. The 
“superstructure work”—the purchase and assembly of hangars, the construction of 
workshops, warehouses, offices, and personnel quarters—would be the responsibility of 
the Air Ministry.119  
While the aviation project of 1930 was to address the deficiencies of the entire 
radio-meteorological network, certain routes were particularly in need of improved 
                                                
117 Cony and Ledet, 495. Saigon’s airfield at Tan Son Nhut was constructed in the late 
1920s, and, in 1931, a location situated to the northeast of Hanoi was chosen as the site for the 
Gia Lâm airport; this facility was inaugurated the following year. Cony and Ledet, 496.  
118 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note pour Monsieur le Gouverneur Général,” November 22, 
1930. A document from the previous summer defined an interior line as “an air route established 
for a local-interest objective in a colonial territory or a group of colonies but capable of being 
linked...to international air routes in operation or under consideration.” ANOM, GGI 66502, “Le 
Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Ministre de l’Air,” July 30, 1929.  
119 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note pour Monsieur le Gouverneur Général,” November 22, 
1930; ANOM, GGI 66502, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Ministre de l’Air,” July 30, 
1929. The letter from the Minister of the Colonies indicated that the superstructure work could 
also be entrusted to an aviation company authorized to operate on the relevant route. In this case, 
the colonial government was to provide any assistance needed to facilitate the work.  
 54 
coverage. Specifically, Chaumié noted that crossing Laos and northern Annam to reach 
Hanoi was “very difficult” because of the region’s equatorial forests. Like other 
contemporaries frequently observed when considering the possibilities of aviation in 
Laos, northern Annam, and Tonkin, Chaumié identified the Annamese Mountains as the 
most formidable obstacle.120 He wrote of the necessity of acting “with the utmost 
prudence” in this area, arguing that a complete network of meteorological, 
radiotelegraphic, and radiogoniometric equipment was required before planes could be 
expected to provide regular service in this region. This was a view shared by the 
Governor General as well as officials in the Air Ministry and the Ministry of the 
Colonies.121  
Over the course of 1930, progress was made on key parts of the colony’s four 
main air routes. Already in February 1930, Cordemoy reported that renovation work had 
started on the Vientiane and Vinh airfields and that the French planned on installing 
twelve auxiliary terrains between these sites.122 Then, in late November 1930, a 
government-general memorandum noted that the work launched at the beginning of the 
year on eight auxiliary landing sites would be completed by the end of December. 
Furthermore, the Vientiane airfield had by this point been upgraded, and the 
improvements to the landing field at Vinh were to be finished toward the end of the 
                                                
120 Chaumié explained that atmospheric conditions tended to differ on either side of the 
range. Thus aviators often met favorable weather on one slope of the mountains but encountered 
haze on the opposing side.  
121 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Conseil Economique. Section des Travaux Publics, des Moyens 
de Communications, de la Marine Marchande et des Pêches. Séance du 9 Mai 1930,” [n.d.].  
122 Cordemoy, February 1930, 43. In a later article, Cordemoy counted only six auxiliary 
terrains between Vientiane and Vinh. Pierre Cordemoy, “L’Essor aérien de la France vers 
l’Extrême-Orient (1930-1931),” Bulletin de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine (July 1931): 
257. 
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year.123 The colony’s other primary lines were upgraded as well during the year. For 
instance, the November memorandum stated that work on several terrains that were part 
of the route from Saigon through Cambodia—which then connected to Bangkok—had 
commenced at the beginning of the month. In addition, upgrades would be made along 
the coastal itinerary that linked Saigon and Hanoi as soon the government general 
received specific information from certain provincial administrators. Finally, a study of 
the “insufficient” auxiliary terrains that interspersed the Mekong River line was 
scheduled for December.124  
 
Indochina’s Aviation Infrastructure after 1930 
With the general framework of the infrastructure established by the end of 1930, 
the remainder of the decade saw efforts to complete, and then improve, Indochina’s air 
network. Specifically, government and military officials worked to upgrade the colony’s 
airfields, streamline the functioning of air routes, and increase radio-meteorological 
coverage. In doing so, the French were seeking to keep pace with—and often to catch up 
with—not only the projected growth of air transport but also an aeronautics technology 
that was constantly modernizing. Though impeded by the era’s economic crisis, the 
infrastructure work continued through the decade. 
Jean-Baptiste Manchon points out that the program for Indochina’s air network 
that was drawn up in 1930 was followed until the start of the Second World War.125 Yet 
                                                
123 These different projects pertained to the infrastructure, meaning that the 
superstructure—the various buildings required at the landing sites—had yet to be completed. 
124 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note pour Monsieur le Gouverneur Général,” November 22, 
1930. 
125 Manchon, 435; Hirschauer Mission, 1934. Beginning in the mid-1930s, there were 
proposals for alterations—as well as actual changes—to the colony’s air routes; these changes are 
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this observation does not mean that, in the years after the plan was drafted, further 
changes were deemed unnecessary. Indeed, in his report from 1934, Hirschauer noted 
that colonial officials were proposing measures that aimed to lower the expenses 
associated with the air network. In particular, to ease the financial burden of airfield 
maintenance—a burden that had recently been weighing heavier on the colony’s general 
budget—the colony’s Secretary General and the president of Hanoi’s Chamber of 
Commerce suggested that the number of functioning airfields be reduced. Hirschauer, 
considering the issue from the perspective of pilot safety, determined that this proposal 
was not an option at present. With the types of aircraft in use, the current infrastructure 
represented the minimum “in a region where every landing outside of the airfields is 
impossible without accident.” Hirschauer explained that it would be several years—a 
period during which more modern, more powerful aircraft would hopefully be sent to 
Indochina—before officials could contemplate reducing the density of the colony’s air 
network. “If at the end of this time,” Hirschauer asserted, “the airplanes are still able to 
reach important airfields, to fly for 100 or 200 kilometers in the poorest atmospheric 
conditions with a stopped motor, on that day we will be the first to say: the plan is 
excessive and you can do away with 20, 30, or 40 percent of the airfields.”126  
The need to improve Indochina’s air network to accommodate newer and more 
powerful aircraft was a more pressing concern than Hirschauer’s comments seem to 
indicate. Hirschauer himself observed in the fall of 1936 that modifications were 
required. He remarked that the layout of Indochina’s airfields had not, on the whole, been 
                                                                                                                                            
discussed in the section of chapter three that deals with air transport within Indochina. For the 
most part though, these modifications did not fundamentally alter the appearance of the aviation 
infrastructure. 
126 Hirschauer Mission, 1934.  
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revised since his previous mission to Southeast Asia. According to his 1936 report, the 
colony’s air network was comprised of ninety-eight terrains for airplanes and twenty 
landing areas for seaplanes. In addition to the two Hanoi—Saigon lines, the primary air 
routes included a line that linked Bangkok with Hanoi via Vientiane and a connection 
from Bangkok to Saigon via Cambodia.127  
Hirschauer stated that this web of landing sites, while impressive, still did not 
fully correspond to the needs of modern aviation. Elaborating, he explained that the 
network was planned at a time when the aviation presence in Indochina consisted only of 
single-engine military aircraft. Until the mid-1930s, the logic for constructing the aerial 
infrastructure thus remained the same: place terrains relatively close to one another at 
regular intervals so that a plane could easily reach an airfield in case of mechanical 
failure.128 However, Hirschauer argued that with the power and weight of modern aircraft 
and the increasing likelihood of flying during non-daylight hours, “the question arises 
under a very different aspect today.” Already by 1935, Christophe Cony and Michel 
Ledet point out, most of the colony’s runways were ill suited to handle year-round newer 
aircraft that were heavier and faster than the planes produced at the start of the decade. 
The totality of this situation led Hirschauer to assert that “a comprehensive revision of the 
airfields” would be a sensible objective for 1937. This modification plan basically aimed 
to decrease the number of landing fields by examining which terrains were rarely used 
                                                
127 Hirschauer Mission, 1936. As depicted in a Bulletin article, the airfield network 
remained essentially the same in the late spring of the following year. See, for example, 
“L’Aviation en Extrême-Orient,” 34. 
128 Hirschauer Mission, 1936. Even with the growth of civil aviation after 1930, 
Hirschauer believed that the number of landing sites was not superfluous. 
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and decommissioning these sites. The available resources, while limited, would then be 
employed to upgrade the remaining airfields.129  
While the Air Ministry had joined with colonial officials in 1934 to develop a 
program for improving the primary landing sites within Indochina, this project’s goals 
evidently had not been satisfactorily met by the fall of 1936. A significant reason for this 
lack of progress involved financial constraints. In fact, this prior plan had proved to be an 
expensive undertaking from the start. Cony and Ledet write that “the work was such that 
its absorbed practically all the funds of the aerial navigation budget for 1935.” Then, 
beginning in 1936, drastic cuts to the Air Ministry budget affected this effort over the 
longer term. Even though the government general managed to partially compensate for 
the diminished funding from the metropole, the project nonetheless remained subject to 
delays.130   
Regarding the status of Indochina’s meteorological network around this time, the 
number of stations along certain routes was judged “insufficient” in the fall of 1934.131 
Officials were attempting to address this inadequacy, at least in part. Cony and Ledet note 
that between 1934 and 1935, the meteorological service was focused on improving the 
coverage along the Indochinese portion of the route that linked Bangkok and Hanoi via 
Vientiane and Vinh.132 Whatever the extent and success of this work—and possibly an 
indication that this project, too, had stalled due to funding problems—Hirschauer 
observed in his 1936 study that the colony’s meteorological network had not been 
significantly modified since his previous mission. While appearing reasonably satisfied 
                                                
129 Hirschauer Mission, 1936; Cony and Ledet, 498. 
130 Cony and Ledet, 498.  
131 Hirschauer Mission, 1934.  
132 Cony and Ledet, 497. 
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with the number of meteorological stations, Hirschauer offered critiques of the radio-
transmitting system, which helped to broadcast local weather conditions.133  
Nearing the end of the decade, commentators continued to point to improvements 
that were still needed for the airfield, radio, and meteorological facilities along the 
colony’s main air routes. Speaking at the Exposition Internationale de Paris in 1937, 
Charvet stated that the landing fields situated along the two primary itineraries—the 
north-south link from Tonkin to Cochinchina and the east-west line that connected Laos 
with Hanoi—were “in proportion to the aviation of fifteen years ago, not only by their 
size but...by their radiogoniometric equipment.”134 Charvet placed the colony’s 
infrastructural deficiencies in a global context, which suggests an undercurrent of concern 
that French aviation would be bested by foreign competition. He declared that the 
“backwardness in which the organization of the infrastructure and ground equipment in 
Indochina finds itself in comparison to other areas of the world” could not be 
overemphasized. Charvet thus urged public authorities to strive to ensure that the 
colony’s problems “will not much longer remain one of the black spots of imperial 
aviation.”135  
                                                
133 Hirschauer Mission, 1936. Hirschauer reported that elements of the radio transmitters 
at Vientiane dated from 1917 and had needed to be replaced for over a year. In addition, there 
was no radio post along the Mekong River for the Vientiane—Saigon route. Finally, he stated that 
only Vinh and Hanoi possessed reliable radio direction finders (radiogoniometers), but even these 
devices provided information that was at times “riddled with errors.” In Hirschauer’s opinion, the 
shortcomings of this system had to be remedied in order to make air travel within Indochina safer. 
The mid-1937 article in the Bulletin counted forty-six stations in Indochina that transmitted 
weather bulletins after receiving data from one of two observatories in the colony, located in 
Tonkin and in Cochinchina. “L’Aviation en Extrême-Orient,” 35.  
134 Charvet, 184. Charvet cited certain work that was “urgently necessary” at Vientiane, 
Vinh, Paksé, Hanoi, Saigon, and in the Red River Delta. In general, these tasks involved building 
or enlarging runways and installing equipment to assist aerial navigation, particularly at night.  
135 Charvet, 184-185.  
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Around the same time Charvet delivered these remarks, officials in Indochina 
were seeking to address some of the complaints that he had voiced. In a letter from 
December 31, 1937, Governor General Brévié informed Minister of the Colonies Marius 
Moutet that over the course of the upcoming year, the colonial government planned to 
devote a “considerable effort” toward improving and expanding the aerial infrastructure. 
Brévié specified that the general budget had 1,110,000 francs earmarked for various 
airfield upgrades and runway construction projects in 1938. The Air Ministry 
provisionally designated another 300,000 francs to finance this program, whose total 
funding—1,410,000 francs—was an increase of 500,000 francs from the previous year’s 
allotment for aviation projects. The scope of this plan was indeed extensive. Included in 
the overall program was improvement work to the facilities at Gia Lâm, Vinh, Vientiane, 
Tan Son Nhut, Tourane, Phnom Penh, Paksé, and Luang Prabang.136 
 
Conclusion 
Installing a reliable aviation infrastructure required more than just constructing a 
handful of airstrips. What was ideally needed was a network of different types of landing 
sites, radio-meteorological posts, and a cluster of ground facilities to house supplies, 
personnel, tools, and planes. In addition, an efficient management structure was required 
to oversee the circulation of air traffic. Cognizant of these different components, the 
French endeavored to lay the foundation for air transport in Indochina. Furthermore, the 
infrastructure was planned and developed with goals in mind that were larger in scope 
than mail and passenger delivery within the colony’s borders. Drawn up in its basic 
                                                
136 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” December 31, 1937.  
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features at the start of 1920s, this infrastructure program was pursued with particular 
vigor in the late 1920s and early 1930s as the French sought to meet the needs of a flight 
technology that was continuously modernizing and an aviation presence that was 
projected to considerably expand. Despite the economic woes of the mid-to-later 1930s, 
officials continued to strive for the goal of providing Indochina with an air network suited 
to the requirements of the present as well as the future.  
On the whole, this infrastructure consistently seemed to be a step behind the needs 
of modern air transportation. The French undoubtedly made progress with regard to 
improving the infrastructure: runways were lengthened and reinforced; the airfield 
network was given more coherence; radio-meteorological posts were upgraded; and a 
system for better management of air traffic was put in place. Yet these achievements 
were, more often than not, a response to what had already become a glaring need or the 
fulfillment of an objective that had been outlined in prior years. In other words, French 
aviation was typically catching up with its infrastructure needs as opposed to setting a 
standard to which other aviation services could aspire in the 1920s and 1930s.  
A reliable infrastructure was doubtless of critical importance for the functioning 
of aviation in general. This reality was even more crucial for the particular situation of 
time and place in which the French found themselves in Southeast Asia. In an era when 
the aeronautics technology itself was relatively fragile and unreliable, this was not only 
an environment where geography and climate were unfavorable to setting up aviation but 
also a location where the chief source of materials and funding was located thousands of 
miles away. As the remainder of this dissertation demonstrates, the inadequacies of this 
infrastructure would play a major role in why aviation failed to achieve all that the 
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French hoped it would within Indochina. Even into the years after the Second World 
War, the air network was a topic of central importance for French aviation in Indochina. 
The need for a reliable air network—and, indeed, the consequences of not having one in 
place—would be dramatically underscored during the First Indochina War. 
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CHAPTER TWO: MOVING MAIL AND PASSENGERS ON MILITARY PLANES 
In mid-July 1926, Deputy Léon Archimbaud submitted a report to the Chamber of 
Deputies that summarized the seemingly indefatigable transport capabilities of the 
military aircraft deployed in the empire:  
In the colonies during recent years, France as well as other countries have 
acquired experience [that] clearly emphasizes the important role of military 
aviation. Above inhospitable regions devoid of transportation routes, the 
airplane...is not stopped by difficult trails, bridgeless rivers, mountains covered 
with virgin forests, foul swamps, or unfriendly tribes.... [The airplane] traces its 
path straight through the sky and in a few hours travels distances that require 
weeks or months by ordinary means.137 
 
Archimbaud’s comments indicate that military planes were recognized as making a key 
contribution to colonial transport by the mid-1920s. Indeed, the period in which the air 
force was most conspicuously involved with regular mail deliveries—and very limited 
passenger service—within Indochina lasted from the 1920s until the early 1930s. By the 
middle of the decade, civil aviation proceeded to take on the majority of these 
responsibilities.  
Indochina’s military squadrons were involved in three key instances that related 
to transporting post and people during the aforementioned period. The first of these was 
an aerial tour across the colony that was undertaken in January 1921. This voyage was 
crucial for arousing interest and inspiring confidence in the functioning of long-distance 
air services. The journey also motivated efforts not only to connect Hanoi and Saigon but 
also to improve communications to parts of Laos. Moreover, the government dialogue 
surrounding this trip encapsulates many of the hopes, anxieties, and practical problems 
                                                
137 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Extrait du Rapport, fait au nom de la Commission des Finances 
chargée d’examiner le projet de Lois portant fixation du Budget Général de l’Exercice 1926 
(Ministère des Colonies et Budgets Locaux des Colonies) par M. Léon Archimbaud, Député,” [a 
stamped date on this document reads February 4, 1926. In footnotes for his book, Jean-Baptiste 
Manchon cites July 12, 1925, as the date on which Archimbaud composed this report].  
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that the French encountered in working to develop air transport in Indochina. Second, the 
air force operated a short-lived line that functioned in the mid-1920s and represented the 
colony’s first scheduled air service. This route linked the Kratié airbase in Cambodia with 
the Savannakhet landing field in Laos; this itinerary was briefly extended south from 
Cambodia to Saigon. Last, military aircraft undertook mail and limited passenger flights 
between Hanoi and Saigon in 1929, continuing this service sporadically in the first half of 
the 1930s. This line not only was the realization of the type of transport touted by the 
1921 mission but also at last linked the colony’s northern and southern hubs through the 
skies.   
Overall, the flights on these routes were not reminiscent of a regularly scheduled 
airmail or passenger service. Instead, the primary focus was propaganda—in the case of 
the Kratié-to-Savannakhet line, this effort was directed toward counterbalancing 
Thailand’s presence in the region—aircrew training, and filling out the colony’s air 
network while establishing a foundation for commercial services.138 Conversely, the 
actual delivery of letters, cargo, and people typically appeared as a secondary concern. 
Moreover, French officials consistently voiced apprehension about the safety of these 
transports and at times even questioned the necessity of such flights.139 Authorities 
expressed further concerns about the costs and funding of what were in fact very 
                                                
138 Speaking to this last point, Jean-Baptiste Manchon describes how the air force played 
a fundamental role throughout the empire in establishing airmail lines that would be beneficial to 
both the public and the military. With a view to transports eventually being entrusted to 
commercial firms, French officials agreed that the colonial squadrons had the “vital task” of 
creating an aviation infrastructure within which such companies would be able to safely operate. 
Jean-Baptiste Manchon, L’aéronautique militaire française outre-mer, 1911-1939 (Paris: Presses 
de l’université Paris-Sorbonne, 2013), 398, 430.  
139 The prerequisite of being able to adequately manage the hazards of geography and 
weather, for instance, was the reason that almost seven years passed between the first nonstop 
Saigon-to-Hanoi journey in 1923 and the inauguration of scheduled airmail between the cities. 
Manchon, 401. 
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expensive mail lines. To exacerbate this issue of cost, customers did not seem willing to 
readily trade the standard means of transport for a service that, while more glamorous and 
swifter, was undoubtedly a pricier option. Thus the more practical purposes of these 
routes related to the said tasks of reconnoitering itineraries, providing training, and 
projecting French power and colonial authority.140 
As a final point, Indochina’s air force provided transport in two other capacities as 
well. In addition to delivering passengers and mail in certain instances when the regular 
modes of transportation failed, military planes carried out various as-needed transports.141 
While these supplemental and on-demand uses are briefly discussed in the following 
section, this chapter’s focus is the January 1921 aerial tour and the two military airmail 
lines because these flight occasions facilitated the development of non-military air 
service.142 
 
Temporary and Supplemental Transports of Passengers and Mail in Indochina 
At the start of the 1920s, many areas of the empire remained isolated and without 
an adequate transportation network. As a result and in the absence of commercial air 
                                                
140 As in Indochina, military aircraft elsewhere in the empire were used to deliver mail on 
scheduled lines only on a limited basis. Indeed, the majority of the postal flights resulted from the 
need to supplement interruptions to standard modes of delivery. Manchon provides a tripartite 
explanation for the infrequent and temporary nature of scheduled military airmail in the empire. 
First, the gradual development of the land-based communications infrastructure made such air 
transport—itself a costly investment—unnecessary. Second, the air forces’ “operational 
priorities” tended to push these missions into the background. Third, the funding for these flights 
could not be permanently assured. Manchon, 401, 398.  
141 Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet diligently attempt to record many of these flights. 
Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet, L’Aviation française en Indochine: Des origines à 1945 
(Outreau: Lela Presse, 2012). 
142 As chapter six explains, aviation missions did at times have multiple purposes. It 
appears that one of the tasks of the aerial operations that took place along the Laos-Tonkin border 
beginning in late December 1922—this mission is discussed further in chapter six—was the 
delivery of mail from Hanoi to this region. Cony and Ledet, 76-77.  
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service that was “organized and sustainable,” military aviators were charged with 
ferrying “important people of the colonial world.” In fact, pilots deployed in the empire 
undertook this type of mission as early as the end of the Belle Époque.143 Within 
Indochina, the air force was carrying passengers on as-needed basis from the early 1920s. 
Jean-Baptiste Manchon characterizes these transports as some of the “first significant air 
missions” undertaken in the colony. For example, the head French administrator in Lao 
Kay was flown from Hanoi to his residence in northern Tonkin in January 1922, and, in 
April, Major General Ernest Blondlat and Colonel Réné Debailleul traveled by air from 
Saigon to Hanoi. Similarly, in recounting the “politically important” air force missions in 
the southern half of the colony in 1923, Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet include the 
transport of Indochina’s Director of Financial Inspection (Directeur du Contrôle 
Financier de l’Indochine) from Saigon to Dalat and a regional aerial tour for Léon 
Garnier, the French Resident in Dalat; during his time in Dalat, the pilot also gave plane 
rides to numerous passengers, at least one of them an indigenous notable.144  
Overall, this selection of flights reflects the types of everyday military transports 
that were carried out in the colony during the interwar period. Yet in Indochina and 
throughout the empire, it was only in the 1930s that there was significant growth in the 
usage of this service.145 A trajectory of increasing use was not always evident though. For 
                                                
143 Manchon, 403. Manchon cites instances of aviators transporting army officers around 
Morocco just prior to the start of the First World War. 
144 Manchon, 404-405; Cony and Ledet, 65, 86.  
145 He identifies the limits of the available aeronautics technology as the reason for this 
slow development. Up to this time, the colonial squadrons were outfitted with models of combat 
planes whose open-cockpit design offered an uncomfortable ride. In addition, many of these 
aircraft were powered by engines that, while relatively robust, were not free from breakdowns. 
Around 1930 though, the arrival in the empire of the more powerful Potez 29 aircraft signaled 
more comfort and security for air travel; this model, equipped with a closed cockpit and cabin, 
was better suited for passenger transport. As the decade progressed, military and administrative 
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example, writing from Hanoi in late January 1935, Captain Marcel Puypéroux observed, 
“it is quite obvious that at present the local governments or the provincial administrators 
do not officially call upon, so to speak, our aerial collaboration.” He theorized that the 
reason was linked to meager monetary resources, stating that officials perhaps were 
concerned about the cost of air transport. More generally, Puypéroux argued that 
“important people” and colonial officials should utilize air travel more frequently than 
was currently the case.146 Of course, for reasons of security and of necessity-versus-cost, 
requests for military transports were not always granted; this proved to be the case even 
into the 1930s, when aviation had become more firmly established in Indochina and 
flying had become a safer, more regular means of travel.147   
On occasion, military aviators also undertook airmail deliveries and a few 
passenger transports when roads and rail lines were temporarily disabled. For instance, 
when the Red River flooded in September 1923 and September 1924, seaplanes from 
Tonkin’s squadron were called on to deliver mail between Haiphong and Hanoi. Once 
again in September 1926, Cony and Ledet indicate, the air force was assisted with 
transport after the region around this waterway became inundated. Round-trip postal 
flights were deployed daily from September 16 until September 28, when the railroad 
                                                                                                                                            
officials throughout the empire more frequently utilized aviation as a swift means of transport. 
Manchon, 407-410.  
146 SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, liaisons postales et 
évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935.  
147 See, for instance, the discussion—and refusal—to grant an air transport requested by 
Tonkin’s deputy postal director in the fall of 1929. ANOM, GGI 66545. For a later example, see 
the discourse and rejection of an inquiry for daily mail flights between Haiphong and Hanoi in the 
late summer of 1937. ANOM, RSTNF 2770.  
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connecting Haiphong and Hanoi was restored; overall, these twenty-six voyages carried a 
total of 351 kilograms of mail.148  
 
The Hanoi—Saigon Aerial Tour of 1921 
In the years immediately after the First World War, colonial and military officials 
were actively investigating the possibilities for connecting Hanoi and Saigon by air. Most 
notably, a test flight between the two cities was organized in January 1921 in 
coordination with a multi-purpose air operation to Xieng Khouang in Upper Laos.149 
Cony and Ledet characterize this pair of missions, which involved a total of eight aircraft, 
as the air force’s “first grand sortie.” Aside from their political significance, these long-
distance voyages—along with another noteworthy operation that had taken place over 
several days in December—had demonstrated “all the advantages of linking the four 
grand provinces of Indochina by air.”150 Observers indeed recognized the potential value 
of the Hanoi—Saigon voyage even before it was launched. On January 9, interim 
Governor General Maurice Le Gallen described the planned flight as having “economic 
and political” aims that related to the establishment of regular air routes in the colony. He 
                                                
148 Cony and Ledet, 87, 119-120; Manchon, 399. One contemporary source noted that 
during the course of the September 1926 missions, several passengers were ferried as well. 
Exposition Coloniale Internationale. Paris 1931. Indochine Française. Section Générale. Troupes 
de l’Indochine. L’Aéronautique militaire de l’Indochine (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-Orient, 
1931), 89. As discussed further in chapter five, the aviation missions that were requested in the 
aftermath of flooding events also involved photography and reconnaissance work. 
149 Chapter six provides an analysis of the Xieng Khouang mission. 
150 Cony and Ledet, 51-52. While not clearly indicated by these authors, it seems that the 
unreferenced province—the fifth piece of Indochina—was probably Cambodia. The reason is that 
the December 1920 and January 1921 missions primarily involved travel and stopovers within 
Cochinchina, Annam, Tonkin, and Laos; the December journey consisted of a flight from Hanoi 
to Thakhek via Vinh. Cony and Ledet, 49; Gen. L.-M. Chassin, “Débuts de l’Aviation en 
Indochine,” Forces aériennes françaises 110 (December 1955): 1013. Chassin describes this trip 
as both the “first real long-distance air rally (raid)” for the colony’s air force and the first flight 
that passed through the Annamese Mountains. 
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later noted that the mission had allowed him to personally examine the economic 
possibilities of a rapid connection between the northern and southern parts of 
Indochina.151  
While the benefits of the aerial tour were appreciated, certain individuals objected 
to parts of the operation, voicing concerns about the risks of the flight and the possible 
consequences of a failed attempt. Major General Richard Puypéroux, serving as 
Commandant Superior, was the source of much of this apprehension. He linked his views 
to a broader argument in favor of exercising discretion regarding the cost and purpose of 
the missions undertaken by the air force. These remarks underscore how the French 
desire to utilize aviation as a tool of empire was not tantamount to unbridled enthusiasm 
and rash action.  
In a letter to the Governor General drafted on January 4, 1921, Puypéroux 
emphasized that meticulous preparation was required for any significant aerial 
operation—especially when the passengers included high-ranking colonial officials—
taking place during what was still the developmental phase of military aviation. This 
careful planning would both reduce the risks and increase the likelihood of success. He 
further warned that the completion of a given long-distance mission did not necessarily 
mean a future of routine flights. In other words, officials would be mistaken in 
concluding forthwith that the prior accomplishment of a round-trip journey between 
                                                
151 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Ordre de Mission,” January 9, 1921; ANOM, GGI 66492, 
“Télégramme Officiel. Gouverneur Général à Résuper Laos,” January 26, 1921. The mission 
order—as well as subsequent citations of a similar nature—are found in a folder titled 
“Aéronautique d’Indochine. Compte-rendu des missions d’aviation. 1. du Haut Laos 2. du voyage 
Hanoi—Saigon,” n.d. This larger report and this telegram—just as with the other telegrams 
referenced in this chapter—are located after a summary sheet that is labeled “Bordereau 
récapitulatif des pièces adressées à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” March 9, 
1921. 
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Hanoi and Thakhek was an indication that such a result would henceforth be repeated 
“when we want and at a date determined in advance.”152  
Puypéroux had expressed similar concerns the previous month, which had 
prompted a dispute with air force commandant François Glaize. Specifically, the Major 
General questioned the necessity of Glaize’s proposal for an aircraft to travel to Thakhek 
as part of a reconnaissance operation; this assignment was likely related to the flight that 
was carried out in January 1921.153 In Puypéroux’s estimation, the proffered mission—
unlike certain other operations—lacked a “tangible objective.”154 He characterized 
Glaize’s journey as being similar to an air rally (raid), and he remain opposed to such 
flights—“these have no practical utility”—as long as the colony’s air routes had not been 
outfitted with a sufficient number of auxiliary landing sites. Furthermore, Puypéroux 
linked what he understood to be an unnecessary mission to the larger need to carefully 
map out how military aviation would function in Indochina. Otherwise, the air force 
would flounder from task to task without a discernible goal while wasting precious 
resources. Puypéroux accepted the likely reality of needing to quickly arrange “a few 
very exceptional, very urgent, and very confidential missions” but still emphasized the 
importance of drafting longer-term plans. “In the absence of such established projects,” 
Puypéroux wrote to the Governor General, “the work of aviation is done without 
                                                
152 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” January 4, 
1921. This letter is found after “Bordereau récapitulatif des pièces adressées à Monsieur le 
Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” March 9, 1921. As a reminder, Major General Richard 
Puypéroux was the father of Marcel Puypéroux. 
153 On November 20 Glaize had notified Puypéroux of his intent to deploy a plane to 
Thakhek to inspect the recently finished airfield. ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Chef de Bataillon 
Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine,” November 20, 1920. 
154 As an example of a mission with a more clear aim, Puypéroux cited a flight to Tran 
Ninh that was intended to intimidate certain dissident elements among the area’s population. 
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continuity, in fits and starts, often following a passing impulsion, that is to say, with the 
maximum expense for the minimum return.”155  
In a response to these comments, Glaize stressed that the Thakhek mission had a 
purpose: “the reconnaissance...of an airfield considered important [italics original].” The 
operation was not “simply an ‘air rally,’” he protested, pointing out that the flight had “a 
very precise goal determined by the installation of the Hanoi—Saigon route.” He then 
stated that this reconnaissance work was part of the previously approved program for 
organizing Indochina’s air network. Glaize also mentioned that the specific missions of 
the colony’s air force—as well as the funding required—were subject to some uncertainty 
due to situational needs, weather conditions, and the nascent state of this service arm. 
Nonetheless, Puypéroux maintained that Glaize’s argument had not altered his original 
opinion regarding the Thakhek operation.156   
For the Hanoi—Saigon aerial tour scheduled for January 1921, the seaplane trip 
between Thakhek and Saigon was especially concerning to Puypéroux due to lingering 
questions about safety. He again used the air-rally comparison, noting that the selected 
itinerary not only possessed too few auxiliary airfields but also had had not been 
thoroughly reconnoitered. Puypéroux wrote that such flights, while impressive and 
                                                
155 ANOM, GGI 66492, Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” December 
2, 1920.  
156 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant de l’Aéronautique 
d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe 
de l’Indochine,” December 3, 1920; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” December 8, 1920. While recognizing that the air force had experienced 
difficult beginnings in the colony, Puypéroux contended that this service now required a more 
specific aviation program with which all the relevant authorities—himself included—needed to 
be familiar; this latter part of his observation suggests that there had been a lack of clear 
communication among French authorities regarding the air force’s missions and plan of 
organization.  
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courageous, inevitably included “contingencies,...risks, [and]...mishaps” and advised the 
Governor General against the mission. Furthermore, he judged that the failure of the 
operation would have broad, long-term repercussions for French Indochina. Puypéroux 
explained that “the moral consequences of a non-success, from the viewpoint of French 
prestige as well as that of the future of Indochinese aviation itself, appear to me too 
grave...[to] express in all frankness my way of seeing this subject.”157  
Governor General Le Gallen himself appeared disinclined to draw too much 
attention to the flight, commenting on January 9 that he worked to “limit the publicity 
made around my trip.” Likewise, the mission report noted that the Governor General 
“wishes that the air rally be disclosed as little as possible.” The report left the specific 
reason unstated, but it can be assumed that this thinking was influenced by the voyage’s 
potential to cause alarm within the Thai government; this supposition is grounded in the 
fact that this document included the reminder that flying over Thailand was formally 
prohibited. In addition, lending credence to concerns about Thailand, a French military 
official pointed out that as the Mekong River marked the Thailand—Indochina frontier, 
foggy conditions could lead a French pilot to land in Thai territory. The implied problem 
was that such a situation could potentially cause diplomatic or political issues. In fact, 
competition with the aviation services of other nations in the region played a part in the 
decision to arrange the January 1921 operation. Le Gallen made a point about pushing 
ahead with such aeronautics missions and not “restrict[ing] our own rise through too 
much caution.” This focus on marching forward was a way to ensure that French aviation 
                                                
157 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” January 4, 
1921.  
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did not lag behind in comparison to “the [aerial] activity of certain of our neighbors.” 
While left unsaid, the main concern was probably Thailand.158  
Another, more evident reason for not wanting to arouse too much public notice 
prior to the completion of the tour was that a failure would be detrimental to French 
aviation, in terms both of prestige and of materials and personnel. Indeed, the mission 
posed various hazards made more dangerous by the technological limitations of the time: 
long distances, an incomplete network of landing sites, and uncertain weather—
particularly east of the Annamese Mountains. Thus a successful journey was not to be 
taken for granted.  
In the end, despite Puypéroux’s protests and urgings of caution, the Hanoi—
Saigon operation was carried out as planned. Le Gallen explained to Puypéroux that as 
Governor General, he was obligated “to make aviation produce the maximum” from both 
a military viewpoint and the viewpoint of economic policy. Le Gallen further stated that 
his work in promoting flight technology—“this arm of science and progress”—was 
aligned with the “political goals” of his office.159  
The mission report described the aerial tour as a three-part voyage: Hanoi to 
Thakhek, undertaken by two airplanes; Thakhek to Khong, traveled by a pair of 
seaplanes; and Khong to Saigon, also to be carried out by two seaplanes. A telegram to 
the Minister of the Colonies recounted a slightly different version of the journey. This 
                                                
158 ANOM, GGI 66492, “[Le Gouverneur Général à] Le Général de Division, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” January 9, 1921. This letter is found after “Bordereau récapitulatif des 
pièces adressées à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” March 9, 1921. ANOM, 
GGI 66492, “Ordre d’exécution”; ANOM, GGI 66492, Le Général de Division Puypéroux, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” December 2, 1920.  
159 ANOM, GGI 66492, “[Le Gouverneur Général à] Le Général de Division, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine,” January 9, 1921.   
 74 
dispatch noted that the operation started on January 13, 1921, as two airplanes—one with 
Le Gallen as a passenger—departed Hanoi and arrived in Vinh after a turbulent flight 
marked by unfavorable weather. The following day the aircrews, now accompanied by a 
pair of seaplanes from Haiphong, crossed the Annamese Mountains in the direction of 
Thakhek. On January 15, the single seaplane that remained in service—the other plane 
required minor on-site repairs for a slightly damaged float after it had been forced to land 
upstream from Thakhek—voyaged south toward Khong with Le Gallen onboard. A lack 
of fuel forced this aircraft to stop short of Khong, leaving the journey to Saigon for the 
next day; for this final leg of the trip, it appears that some aircraft from Squadron Two 
had flown to meet Le Gallen’s plane so that they could travel as a group back toward 
Saigon.160  
To French officials beyond the colony’s borders, Le Gallen extolled the positive 
effects of both his flight and the operation to Upper Laos.161 In addition, the triumphant 
completion of these missions—the flight to Xieng Khouang in particular—fostered an 
increased interest within the colonial administration for developing an air route to this 
part of Indochina. In a telegram of January 26, the Governor General declared himself 
“henceforth a convinced supporter” of utilizing a Mekong River air link to “unblock” 
                                                
160 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Ordre d’exécution”; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme 
Officiel. Gouverneur Général à Colonies, no.1-S,” January 17, 1921. Cony and Ledet indicate 
that this escort contingent from Saigon consisted of an airplane and three seaplanes that had been 
dispatched several days prior. Cony and Ledet, 51. It should be noted that these authors offer 
certain details that differ from some the departure, itinerary, and aircrew information found in the 
archival material. For example, they write that two seaplanes left Thakhek for Khong on January 
16. Cony and Ledet, 51. 
161 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme Officiel. Gouverneur Général à Colonies, no.1-S,” 
January 17, 1921. Le Gallen informed the Minister of the Colonies that he had cabled all of 
France’s representatives in Southeast Asia, emphasizing to them that these voyages were 
accomplished without any special preparation and by relying on currently available military 
aircraft. The Governor General left it to the Minister to spread the news of “the prowess of our 
aviation” in the metropolitan press in a manner that “best serves the interests of our fine colony.” 
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Upper Laos. Le Gallen aimed to promptly proceed to working on such a route. In a 
dispatch sent the following day, he indicated his intention to commission a study for the 
establishment of a seaplane line connecting Cochinchina to this region. Similarly, the 
mission report pointed out that an airmail service could connect Saigon with Vientiane 
and Luang Prabang, thus improving the communications infrastructure of the “so very 
deprived ” protectorate; this account also evaluated different possibilities for postal lines 
that linked Upper Laos with Saigon and Hanoi.162 
While the success of the Hanoi—Saigon flight may have alleviated Puypéroux’s 
worry about the risks and ramifications of that specific voyage, in the months that 
followed he continued to stress economy and prudence in aviation missions. The 
immediate reason was that the Minister of the Colonies had implored Puypéroux “to 
practice the most rigorous supervision” in managing the funds delegated under the 
Colonial Budget for the operation of the armed services, which was an appeal related to 
the larger aim of reducing expenditures. Additionally, the metropolitan government 
desired that the colony’s civil services exercise discretion in utilizing aviation, the 
employment of which was often “very expensive.”163 Consequently, Puypéroux proposed 
in late April 1921 that air force tasks should only be approved if they demonstrated a 
“precise and well-demonstrated need.” Moreover, with this same goal of economy in 
                                                
162 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme Officiel. Gouverneur Général à Résuper Laos,” 
January 26, 1921; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme Officiel. Saigon [à] Colonies,” January 27, 
1921; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Effets et résultats des présentes missions.”  
163 As a point of clarification, the administrative structure of the air force hindered the 
extent to which Puypéroux, as the head military official in the colony, could exercise direct 
control over the financing of this service. While the decree of January 19, 1920, had placed 
Puypéroux’s office in charge of military aviation in Indochina, the air force was to operate at the 
disposal of the Governor General for non-military missions. Though the requestor of a given task 
helped with the costs of the operation, the colonial budget ultimately assumed the majority of the 
financial burden.  
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mind, Puypéroux underscored that authorized missions should end when the stated goal 
was achieved.164  
Though the direct impact of Puypéroux’s campaign for caution is unclear, the 
colonial and military administrations did proceed in a deliberate fashion when 
considering how to build on the progress represented by the January 1921 missions. 
Speaking to the positive effects of this pair of flights, a telegram dispatched in mid-
January emphasized that this “magnificent achievement...will have [a] very favorable 
impact” both within Indochina and beyond the colony’s borders.165 Working to translate 
this “very favorable impact” into concrete results for Indochina’s air network, officials 
thereafter started investigating several options for scheduled air routes. In the summer of 
1922 and seeking to follow efforts made in Thailand, French West Africa, and 
Madagascar, Glaize contemplated developing air transport along three itineraries: Saigon 
to Luang Prabang; Vinh to Vientiane; and Nha Trang to Tourane. However, Major 
General Ernest Blondlat, the head military official in the colony at this point, ultimately 
advised the Governor General against the plan. The cited reasons were the comparatively 
                                                
164 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” April 28, 
1921. To illustrate his point, Puypéroux referenced an operation that was currently underway in 
Laos. He noted that while the “essential objective” of the work appeared to have been reached, 
the mission had not as yet concluded. Instead, the operation continued in the form of “a series of 
demonstrations that, while having a rather remote connection to the studies undertaken, 
significantly increase this mission’s cost.” This particular mission may have been completed a 
few days later, on or before May 3. To explain, a telegram from a French administrator in Laos 
reported that the air force conducted one or more test flights between Saigon and Luang Prabang 
around the time Puypéroux composed his letter. These voyages had the declared purpose of 
researching an itinerary for an air route linking Saigon and Upper Laos. The telegram also 
implied that the operation also had functioned as a form of propaganda for the colonial authority. 
ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme Officiel. Résident Supérieur à Gouverneur Général,” May 3, 
1921.  
165 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme Officiel. Gouverneur Général à Général 
Commandant supérieur Hanoi, January 17, 1921. 
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high cost of air travel—estimated at six to ten times more than traveling by automobile—
and the scarcity of express traffic.166  
The next spring witnessed the first significant airmail flight, as a cargo of letters 
was delivered from Saigon to Hanoi on April 11 via the Mekong River and a crossing of 
the Annamese Mountains at Thakhek. Manchon points out that the journey resembled a 
single, long-distance trek that included mail transport rather than the start of a regular 
postal line. Even so, Cony and Ledet, citing a contemporary colonial bulletin, note that 
the success of this flight had generated interest in the creation of a regular airmail link 
between the two cities.167 While a scheduled postal service would be created over two 
years later, the itinerary of this military line did not exactly follow what had been 
investigated between January 1921 and April 1923.  
 
The Kratié—Savannakhet Line (Mid-1920s) 
One of the elements included in a military aviation program outlined in an early 
February 1924 memorandum was the establishment of a trial airmail line on a yet-to-be-
determined route. Glaize, who authored this document, emphasized the importance of this 
task as he ended the memo.168 When developed, the first air service within Indochina—a 
route from Kratié to Savannakhet—was understood to accomplish multiple goals that 
extended beyond the immediate delivery of postal materials on military planes. While the 
                                                
166 Cony and Ledet, 69.  
167 Cony and Ledet, 84; Manchon 399. This plane carried 330 letters taxed by the postal 
authority in addition to some government and military correspondence. Cony and Ledet, 84. 
Though not part of a scheduled route, the first airmail delivery between Annam and Tonkin took 
place on May 4, 1929. An administrator conferred a cargo of local mail to one of a group of 
military aircraft visiting Tourane just as the plane was preparing to depart for the return trip to 
Hanoi. Cony and Ledet, 141-142.  
168 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Note sur l’Aviation en Indochine. Demandée par le 
Gouvernement Général,” [February 3, 1924]. 
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transport value was recognized, officials came to view this usage as either too expensive 
to maintain or impractical once major improvements to the region’s ground-based 
communications network were completed. The fulfillment of other roles—namely, 
propaganda and expanding the web of air routes within Indochina—proved an equally, if 
not more, significant and compelling motivation. 
These other objectives were evident in early discussions of what would become 
the Kratié—Savannakhet line. Writing to the Governor General on June 30, 1925, Major 
General Andlauer referenced a letter from a week prior that mentioned installing a 
detachment of planes on the Mekong River not only for political and military purposes 
but also for postal, economic, and medical missions.169 Given the opinion that Thailand 
would act similarly, the colonial administration sensed the importance of arranging 
regular flights along the river and near the frontier.170 At the end of September, Glaize 
recounted to the Governor General that a recent Franco-Thai agreement had included 
authorization for both signatories to deploy unarmed aircraft along the Mekong River.171 
                                                
169 ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Général de Division Andlauer, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” June 30, 
1925. In a document attached to this letter, the four types of mission for which these aircraft 
could be used were identified as follows: mail deliveries, medical evacuations, administrative 
transports, and, eventually, some economic tasks. This plan also indicated that in addition to the 
principal air force center at Kratié, there would be smaller bases at Stung Treng, Paksé, and 
Savannakhet. The proposal remarked that three of the seaplanes stationed at Haiphong could be 
relocated to the Kratié site; these seaplanes were to be replaced with fixed-wheel aircraft in the 
future. ANOM, GGI 66344, “Projet d’installation sur le Mékong d’un détachement 
d’hydravions,” June 29, 1925. As predicted, airplanes were substituted for these Breguet 14 
seaplanes in the spring of 1926. Cony and Ledet, 114. 
170 ANOM, GGI 66344, “Projet d’installation sur le Mékong d’un détachement 
d’hydravions,” June 29, 1925; ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Général de Division Andlauer, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” June 30, 1925. 
171 In the plan of June 29, one of the reasons provided in support of Kratié was that this 
site was outside the neutral zone outlined in this accord. The French thus theorized that the Kratié 
base could have certain war supplies stockpiled so that the aircraft would be “ready to act quickly 
at the first opportunity.” In addition, Andlauer noted that placing a military aviation detachment 
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Moreover, he explained that Thailand possessed a burgeoning air force, and the nation 
would “probably very quickly take advantage of the latitude that is left to it.” Thus it had 
been recognized that the French needed to demonstrate their aviation capabilities more 
regularly and with more authority than in the past; this task was deemed particularly 
important for influencing “our Laotian protégés” living along the waterway.172  
The actual airmail line appeared as somewhat of a secondary concern to French 
military officials. When referenced, the subject of airmail typically related to the more 
general need to develop the air network within Indochina. Indeed, on June 4, 1925, 
Glaize observed that the “military services” were thoroughly involved with the 
organization of the aerial infrastructure because “they alone are qualified at this time for 
the execution of such a task.” For the Kratié—Savannakhet route specifically, discussions 
of airmail were informed by the challenges of transportation in this area of Indochina, 
especially Laos. The report from June 1925 described the Mekong River between these 
two locales as an area in which rapids significantly obstructed transit between the upper 
and lower sections of the waterway. Addressing how the proposed air link could improve 
this situation, Glaize asserted that the usage of aircraft for deliveries of both mail and, 
                                                                                                                                            
at this site would help unify the colony’s air force by providing “concrete [and] effective” contact 
between the northern and southern squadrons. ANOM, GGI 66344, “Projet d’installation sur le 
Mékong d’un détachement d’hydravions,” June 29, 1925; ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Général de 
Division Andlauer, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le 
Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” June 30, 1925. 
172 ANOM, GGI 66344, “Etude sur les conditions d’utilisations de la section d’avions 
stationnée à Kratié pour le transport du courrier entre ce point et Savannakhet.” This study 
follows a letter titled “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine à 
Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de 
l’Indochine,” September 25, 1925 [hereafter “Etude”].  
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eventually, personnel appeared “particularly appealing in a region as poorly equipped 
with transportation routes as Laos.”173  
The Director of Post and Telegraph also analyzed this air route, and his measured 
appraisal serves as a realistic assessment of the line’s transport potential. Like Glaize, he 
similarly stated the advantages of utilizing aircraft to ameliorate communications in an 
area where transportation was a “difficult and very lengthy” process. The Director 
determined, however, that the Kratié—Savannakhet itinerary was not of great interest in 
and of itself because rail and automobile lines currently ensured exchanges of 
correspondence between Saigon and Savannakhet via Nha Trang, Tourane, and Dong Ha. 
He did note that this coastal path could be modified if the proposed air service both saved 
an appreciable amount of time over the terrestrial routes and allowed for the delivery of 
the entirety of the mail. The airmail option was nonetheless viewed as having a limited 
fiscal value. The Director pointed out that the quantity of correspondence sent from 
Kratié to Upper Laos averaged 200 to 250 kilograms per week, parcel post excluded. 
Given the relatively large number of package deliveries, he judged that aircraft would 
unlikely be able to handle the transport of these items. “Therefore,” the Director 
explained, “the revenue from the establishment of a surtax on correspondence other than 
letters will not be very high.”174  
Within Laos, the French administration was more enthusiastic about the potential 
for aviation to help the region. Both Resident Superior Jules Bosc and Interim Resident 
                                                
173 ANOM, GGI 66503, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique 
d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe 
de l’Indochine,” June 4, 1925; ANOM, GGI 66344, “Projet d’installation sur le Mékong d’un 
détachement d’hydravions,” June 29, 1925; ANOM, GGI 66344, “Etude.”  
174 ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Directeur des Postes et des Télégraphes de l’Indochine à 
Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” July 21, 1925.  
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Superior Jean-Jacques Dauplay had consistently requested that “regular and permanent” 
air transport be developed within the protectorate. Such a service would compensate for 
the “lack or irregularity” of other means of communication and provide “economic and 
political advantages” for Laos. Dauplay further contended that the establishment of air 
transport had become “all the more indispensable” due to current budget difficulties that 
would delay the completion of the local road network, a project that was itself understood 
to be critical to ensuring Laos’ prosperity.175  
Following this commentary from the summer of 1925, a decree of December 19 
authorized the use of the Kratié seaplanes for weekly round-trip flights to Savannakhet. 
This line was inaugurated on February 9, 1926, as a plane departed Kratié early in the 
morning, stopped at Stung Treng and Paksé, and arrived in Savannakhet after midday.176 
Even prior to the first flight, officials had envisioned lengthening the line both in a 
southern direction toward Saigon and a northern direction toward Thakhek; the southerly 
prolongation of the route was approved around November 9. Discussing the eventual 
extension to Cochinchina, Cony and Ledet highlight the promotional effort of the Friends 
of Aviation League of Saigon (Ligue saigonnaise des amis de l’aviation). This aero-
club’s work to cultivate powered flight in the colony helped unblock the required funds in 
the spring of 1926.177 By mid-March, Glaize estimated that the air force would be 
                                                
175 ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Résident Supérieur p.i. au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” August 1, 1925. Dauplay added that these financial issues would prevent 
the local government from assisting with the costs of the aviation project.  
176 ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique 
d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe 
de l’Indochine,” March 10, 1926; Cony and Ledet, 114.  
177 ANOM, GGI 66344, “Note au sujet de la création de la ligne aérienne Kratié—
Savannakhet,” December 1925; ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant 
l’Aéronautique d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine,” March 10, 1926; Cony and Ledet, 114.  
 82 
prepared to undertake voyages on the new itinerary at the beginning of April. Indeed, the 
first round-trip flight on the Saigon—Kratié line was carried out between April 3 and 
April 8. Thereafter, weekly service was offered from the remainder of April through May 
and June. When needed, the trips were extended north to Savannakhet.178   
Despite the success represented by the establishment of a regular air route, the 
amount of mail that was transported remained quite limited. According to Cony and 
Ledet, the overall postal cargo was “insignificant and even non-existent on certain days.” 
Following a rainy-season stoppage in the summer of 1926, transports resumed on 
October 31 only to cease the following day due to an operating deficit. A government-
general decree subsequently put an end to the Saigon—Savannakhet link on November 
16. Already by early September though, officials had been considering discontinuing this 
service.179  
Other contemporaries, also keenly aware of the line’s shortcomings, offered 
corrective measures during the fall. On October 9, for instance, the Director of Post and 
Telegraph judged that the results for the Kratié—Savannakhet service had fallen short of 
expectations. To remedy this situation, he proposed a reduction in the surtax rates for 
certain postal materials; this expedient was intended to “encourage the public to utilize 
                                                
178 ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique 
d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe 
de l’Indochine,” March 10, 1926; Cony and Ledet, 114.  
179 Cony and Ledet, 114. On September 7, 1926, air force commandant Henri Leblanc 
contacted Major General Andlauer with proposals for stopping flights on this line and for 
vacating the base at Kratié. Then, on October 18, Andlauer submitted a series of measures for 
clearing this site. According to Andlauer’s plan, the base’s aircraft and personnel were to be 
reassigned, but certain of the existing infrastructure was to be left in place. ANOM, GGI 66344, 
“Le Lt. Colonel Leblanc, Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine au Général de Division, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine,” October 6, 1926. ANOM, GGI 
66344, “Le Général de Division Andlauer, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de 
l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” October 18, 1926.  
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this swift means of communication more often.” The Director’s remarks indicate that the 
comparatively high cost of transporting letters and parcels by air was perceived to be 
dissuading people from utilizing this service. Moreover, the public was apparently not 
convinced—at least to the extent that French officials hoped—that the time saved by 
sending their correspondence by plane was worth the extra cost of employing airmail. 
The surtax issue had been debated in the fall of 1925 as well, prior to the inauguration of 
the Kratié—Savannakhet line. At stake in these discussions was how to develop a service 
that people would be inclined to use but that was also reasonably cost effective. In sum, 
the French seemed to recognize that however exciting the prospect of airmail seemed to 
be for the public, simply having such a service available was not enough to convince 
people to utilize it.180  
In their overall evaluation of the functioning of the Saigon—Savannakhet line, 
Cony and Ledet observe that the required expenses were completely disproportionate to 
the line’s results. While the expectation was that the transports would yield ten thousand 
                                                
180 ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Directeur des Postes et des Télégraphes de l’Indochine à 
Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” October 9, 1926. In this particular deliberation, 
the Director of Post and Telegraph preferred to institute a surtax system from the opening of the 
route and, if needed, modify these amounts with an aim to making airmail a more appealing 
option to the public. Conversely, in September 1925 Glaize endorsed having a surtax on parcels, 
packets, and newspapers but not on letters, at least at the start of the service; a memo distributed 
three months later explained a portion of Glaize’s reasoning, stating that he wished to apply a 
surtax to letters “when the public will have gotten into the habit of mail transport by air.” When 
discussing this issue in September, Glaize referenced an airmail line in Thailand that carried non-
surtaxed letters. In order to attract a customer base, this route had operated for more than a year 
without extra charges on transported items. At that point, Glaize noted, people perfectly accepted 
the imposition of a surtax because those who used the line were aware of its benefits. Glaize 
added that this setup would itself be helpful in limiting what had been identified as a “leak” of 
correspondence toward the Thai airmail services. ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Directeur des Postes 
et des Télégraphes de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” November 
14, 1925; ANOM, GGI 66344, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique 
d’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” September 23, 1925; ANOM, 
GGI 66344, “Note au sujet de la création de la ligne aérienne Kratié—Savannakhet,” December 
1925.  
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piasters during the year, the actual profit was “completely null.” In fact, the service 
consumed the twenty-six thousand piasters that were earmarked for it, and this amount 
did not even include the twenty-thousand-piaster operating cost of the Kratié base and its 
annexes. Furthermore, the line was inaugurated during a difficult year for military 
aviation in terms of obtaining monetary resources, a situation that is perhaps indicative of 
an ill-timed decision to launch a trial airmail route. Cony and Ledet explain that 1926 
witnessed a financially driven decrease in the number of missions that the colony’s air 
force carried out. While the funds assigned by the colonial budget for gasoline and 
supplies had not been augmented between 1921 and 1926, the value of the franc—the 
currency in which this sum was calculated—had dropped considerably in relation to 
Indochina’s piaster. In addition, local, piaster-based fuel prices had markedly increased. 
The result was that the funds provided by the metropole financed 1350 flight hours in 
1921 and only 420 flight hours in 1926.181   
Almost two-and-a-half years later, French officials were considering launching 
another military transport service. The goal this time was to set up regular airmail and 
limited passenger flights between Hanoi and Saigon. Compared to the Saigon—
Savannakhet line, this route was a longer, more ambitious course of travel that had 
greater potential for traffic and—despite how officials in Laos may have felt—offered 
more practical utility. Yet just as with the prior service, colonial and military authorities 
viewed the proposed line as having other uses that were equally, if not more, important 
than meeting an immediate demand for air transport. In other words, the Hanoi—Saigon 
route also was imagined more as a multi-purpose air link that included mail delivery 
rather than a regularly operating air service.  
                                                
181 Cony and Ledet, 114-115, 122. 
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The Hanoi—Saigon Line (Later 1920s)  
In a letter from mid-April 1929, the Minister of the Colonies reported the Air 
Minister’s interest in developing a scheduled airmail route between Hanoi and Saigon. 
These military transports were to function in coordination with French postal ships 
arriving in Saigon so that mail could more quickly circulate between metropole and 
colony. As the Director of the Post, Telegraph, and Telephone (hereafter PTT Director) 
asserted, the proffered plan “will not fail to improve the postal connections [within 
Indochina] and those between Tonkin and the metropole.” Furthermore, the Minister of 
the Colonies remarked that this line—the operation of which eventually would be handed 
over to aviation companies—would demonstrate “the advantages offered by air transport” 
and serve as training for pilots and crew. Cony and Ledet note, in addition, that that these 
flights would function as “excellent publicity for military aviation.”182 
Though local aviation firms had attempted some mail deliveries in the first half of 
1929, commercial airmail was an impractical option at this point.183 The colony’s 
administrative and military authorities agreed with the PTT Director that the air force 
should be charged with carrying out the Hanoi—Saigon postal trips.184 The itinerary 
                                                
182 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de 
l’Indochine,” April 12, 1929; ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Directeur des Postes, Télégraphes et 
Téléphones de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” June 10, 1929; 
Cony and Ledet, 145. 
183 Cony and Ledet explain that the available commercial aircraft were not suited for this 
specific task. Moreover, these efforts encountered the problem of profitability, a situation that 
was not helped by the lack of civil airfields in Indochina at the time. Cony and Ledet, 145. 
184 Cony and Ledet, 145. As an example of an endorsement from military officials, Major 
General Aubert wrote of his “very favorable opinion” of the proposition; this route could serve 
the dual purpose of training air force personnel and showing the public the benefits of using 
aircraft for mail delivery. Likewise, Chef de Bataillon Mathis highlighted pilot training, 
propaganda, and future use by commercial airlines. Also, he estimated that, with each trip, planes 
could deliver up to 320 kilograms of letters between the two cities three to four days faster than 
by other means of transport. ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Général de Division Aubert, Commandant 
Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de 
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would follow the coast of Annam, a course of travel that Governor General Pierre 
Pasquier characterized as the best and safest choice for linking the two cities.185 
Pasquier’s opinion was informed by a study from mid-June composed by Chef de 
Bataillon Mathis, then serving as the interim head of military aviation. This report 
concluded that the littoral route was preferable to traveling along the Mekong River. 
While much shorter than the coastal itinerary, the Mekong River option offered aviators 
less security and more uncertainty than a path that traced the coast of Annam.186   
Mathis outlined a schedule for about fourteen round-trip voyages or a total of 
twenty-nine flights—fifteen from Hanoi to Saigon and fourteen in the reverse direction—
in a period stretching from June 23 to January 6, 1930.187 The itinerary of the route 
purportedly would allow for airmail service to several localities between Hanoi and 
Saigon, namely, Vinh, Hué, Tourane, and Nha Trang.188 When the postal line was 
actually operating, the only stopover routinely utilized was Tourane. Indeed, because of 
its location approximately halfway along the route, Tourane’s airfield was to play a 
strategic role as a transfer and resupply point. According to Cony and Ledet, the journey 
from Tonkin to Cochinchina was envisioned as a single day’s trip, with nine hours 
                                                                                                                                            
l’Indochine,” June 19, 1929; ANOM, GGI 66569, “Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Mathis, 
Commandant p.i. l’Aéronautique d’Indochine relatif au projet d’organisation d’une liaison postale 
aérienne entre Hanoi et Saigon en correspondance avec les paquebots poste touchant Saigon,” 
June 14, 1929 [hereafter “Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Mathis”].  
185 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre 
des Colonies,” August 20, 1929. Pasquier explained that this itinerary already had significant 
infrastructural work along its length, and the route could be utilized in the future by commercial 
aircraft as a branch of an international line stretching from Europe through Asia. He also noted 
that the coastal itinerary could be incorporated into defense plans for the colony.  
186 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Mathis,” June 14, 1929. When 
following the river, a pilot not only had to navigate the “very serious obstacle” that was the 
Annamese Mountains but also had to manage flying over a landscape outfitted with significantly 
fewer landing sites than the littoral itinerary. 
187 Elsewhere in this report, Mathis described a timetable of fourteen round-trip transports 
between June 25 and January 1, 1930. 
188 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Mathis,” June 14, 1929.  
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dedicated to flying and one hour reserved for the Tourane stopover. During this short 
interval, the postal cargo would be entrusted to the relevant aircraft and preparations 
would be made for departure. In other words, the pilot arriving in Tourane from Hanoi 
would hand over the mail to another aviator who would then travel to Saigon. 
Meanwhile, the plane from Tonkin would wait at Tourane to receive the postal material 
coming from Cochinchina.189  
A round-trip voyage had in fact been carried out before Mathis drafted his report 
in mid-June, and another flight was completed the following month.190 Even with these 
initial successes, Governor General Pasquier was not willing to conclude that this line 
should immediately become a regularly functioning service. These two journeys, he 
explained, were trial flights along a lengthy itinerary that was still “basically equipped” 
and offered too many risks for scheduled deliveries to be considered at present. 
Highlighting the importance of augmenting the route’s infrastructure, Pasquier stated that 
until such work was finished, flights on this line could take place only intermittently. He 
added that these missions could include mail transport but without any guarantee. The 
director of Indochina’s recently established Bureau of Civil Aviation also weighed in on 
the safety issue. Writing to Pasquier on June 21, this official observed that the line 
                                                
189 Cony and Ledet, 145. 
190 Regarding the June operation, two aircraft undertook the southerly journey on June 4 
then returned to Hanoi four days later, stopping at Tourane on each trip. The second transport 
started on July 7, as a group of planes traveled from Hanoi to Saigon with fifteen kilograms of 
mail for the outgoing postal ship; this vessel arrived in Cochinchina on July 9. Next, a cargo of 
between 130 and 140 kilograms of letters were transferred to the aircraft on July 10 for delivery 
to Hanoi that evening. ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur 
le Ministre des Colonies,” August 20, 1929. 
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needed more airfields and auxiliary airstrips along its length in order to provide aircraft 
with as much security as possible.191  
As with other uses of aviation in Indochina—which subsequent chapters will 
reinforce—authorities had to account for weather and atmospheric conditions as they 
studied the Hanoi—Saigon airmail link. Mathis noted that the most favorable periods of 
the year for flying did not coincide in the north and south of Indochina, but he did not see 
this reality as constituting an insurmountable hurdle to launching the air service. He 
reasoned that the meteorological coverage allowed aircraft to travel on the route “without 
too much difficulty” for most of the year. This was not a unanimous perspective, 
however. At the end of August, Major General Aubert, the head military official in the 
colony, communicated to Pasquier that he had reassessed his previous endorsement for 
immediately proceeding with deployments on the coastal route. Aubert judged that 
meteorological protection currently could not be assured in a satisfactory manner along 
this itinerary. The remoteness of the landing sites only compounded this problem. 
Therefore—and in a manner similar to Commandant Superior Puypéroux several years 
prior—Aubert viewed the voyage between Tonkin and Cochinchina as more akin to a 
long-distance air rally than a routine flight operating with the necessary conditions of 
security. With these points in mind, he decided to temporarily postpone these aviation 
missions. Aubert closed his letter to Pasquier by asserting that the Hanoi—Saigon line 
could regularly function only with the type of safety conditions that had been emphasized 
in Air Ministry circulars distributed in April and June. This requisite would be met, 
                                                
191 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre 
des Colonies,” August 20, 1929; ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Chef du Bureau d’Aéronautique civile 
à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” June 21, 1929. The Bureau chief pinpointed a 
particularly troubling area between Phan Thiêt and Bien Hoa; this 150-kilometer stretch of 
heavily forested land provided no suitable landing sites. 
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Aubert explained, when aviators were provided with an adequate blanket of 
meteorological coverage.192  
Another concern about this airmail route—and another issue that had factored into 
discussions about air transport in previous years—was how potential customers would 
respond to the comparatively steep cost of using this service. Generally, the public was 
electrified about what aviation successes represented and enjoyed the spectacle of such 
flights. In Indochina, this enthusiastic response to receiving letters from France sent via 
airmail was, at least in part, undoubtedly related to the novelty of this means of 
communication. In the summer of 1929, for instance, the Governor General recounted the 
excitement that followed the delivery of metropolitan mail transported by air from 
Saigon: “the European population [in Hanoi] unanimously expressed its satisfaction in 
receiving mail from France a few days in advance.”193  
However, this enthusiasm did not immediately translate into a clientele surge for a 
given air service. Pasquier estimated that potential patrons in the metropole would likely 
consider the postal surtax to be too high to justify what was—in terms of the days 
required to travel from France to Southeast Asia—a marginal amount of time saved with 
airmail. For individuals in Tonkin, air transport would save only some time at departure; 
as a result, the majority of these potential customers would simply continue to have their 
correspondence sent via the maritime route. Furthermore, the prior experience of an 
accelerated automobile-and-railroad postal service between Hanoi and Saigon provided 
Pasquier with “absolutely conclusive” evidence regarding how the public would likely 
                                                
192 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Rapport du Chef de Bataillon Mathis,” June 14, 1929; ANOM, 
GGI 66569, “Le Général de Division Aubert, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de 
l’Indochine à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” August 31, 1929. 
193 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre 
des Colonies,” August 20, 1929.  
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respond to an airmail option. He reported that the amount of mail delivered via these fast-
track transports was “insignificant” even though this service both had a low surtax and 
allowed for expedited delivery.194 “Therefore,” the Governor General reasoned, “we can 
affirm that the airmail line is not likely to pay for the expenses that it would bring about.” 
He maintained that the interest of the route lay primarily in its use for training and 
propaganda purposes.195  
Like Pasquier, the PTT Director was cognizant of the challenges of compelling an 
appreciable customer base to actually use the air service on a regular basis; his analysis 
perhaps informed the Governor General’s outlook regarding this postal link. The PTT 
Director indicated that the public would be hesitant to utilize an airmail line that 
permitted delivery only forty-eight hours faster than other means of transport while 
carrying a surtax that was six times higher than that of transports on the accelerated 
automobile route. In other words, the argument was that, for most people, the time saved 
by using the airmail line would not justify its comparatively high cost.196 
Reflective of how military air service was often viewed as a temporary substitute 
rather than a permanent replacement for land and water transports, an issue that spurred 
officials to campaign for the coastal mail route was the incomplete status of the Hanoi—
                                                
194 The PTT Director deduced that the auto-and-rail link functioned with an annual 
deficit; he noted that the revenues from surtaxed postal items were “far from offsetting” the 
operating expenses. ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Directeur des Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones de 
l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” July 4, 1929. 
195 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre 
des Colonies,” August 20, 1929.  
196 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Directeur des Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones de 
l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” June 10, 1929. As a solution to 
the potential traffic problem, the PTT Director suggested that certain additional stops could be 
included on the itinerary. The placement of these stopovers not only would speed up the transport 
of mail destined for, or sent from, northern Annam and Laos but also would augment the traffic 
on the Hanoi—Saigon route. 
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Saigon railroad. After the railroad construction was finished though, Pasquier observed, 
this airmail “would in all likelihood lose much of its interest.”197 A government 
memorandum similarly remarked that the air service “will no longer be indispensable” 
once the railway was operational.198 Hence the French understood the advantages that air 
travel offered for passenger and mail transport but were equally aware that other means 
of travel, while slower, were less expensive and more practical for the time being.  
After a successful round-trip journey—the legs of the trip were completed on 
August 4 and August 7—the postal flights between Hanoi and Saigon were suspended 
because of severe weather. Pilots attempted to resume service near the end of October, 
but these efforts fell short due to another bout of unfavorable weather.199 A letter of 
November 26, 1929, stated that the voyages between Hanoi and Saigon thus far 
undertaken should not be considered as part of the scheduled postal service discussed by 
the Minister of the Colonies in April and the Governor General in August. In addition, 
the number of round-trip deliveries that were actually carried out was far fewer than the 
figure of fourteen projected by Mathis in mid-June. These trial flights had nonetheless 
facilitated the work of establishing an air route between Tonkin and Cochinchina, and, 
eventually, the creation of the type of airmail line that French officials had described in 
the spring and summer. Moreover, Cony and Ledet explain that with the satisfactory 
performance of these transports on two-seater aircraft, the next step was to upgrade the 
coastal infrastructure. In doing so, the military could proceed to using single-person 
                                                
197 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre 
des Colonies,” August 20, 1929.   
198 ANOM, GGI 66569. “Note du Chef du Cabinet Militaire,” August 16, 1929.  
199 Cony and Ledet, 146. Overall, this line operated from June 4 until October 27. 
Manchon, 400. 
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planes; this move suggests not only a more efficient utilization of material and men but 
also, in all likelihood, more space for postal cargo.  
 
The Hanoi—Saigon Line (1930 and Beyond) 
The air force revived the coastal airmail line several months after service stopped 
in 1929. A total of nine round-trip journeys—thus eighteen individual flights—were 
carried out at somewhat regular intervals between March 2 and October 19, 1930. 
Overall, the planes transported 1880 kilograms of mail on a schedule that aimed to 
correspond with the arrival in Saigon of ocean liners from Europe. Even at this point 
though, these transports were still viewed as test flights rather than a scheduled airmail 
route.200 In fact, at least one official had unsuccessfully solicited the colonial 
administration in May for more regular usage of this service.201 In response, Secretary-
General Graffeuil commented that the air force presently lacked the means necessary for 
scheduled trips. Providing more detail, Major General Aubert stated that with the current 
                                                
200 Manchon, 400; Cony and Ledet, 161. While one round-trip voyage was completed 
every month from March to October—two transports were carried out in April—the amount of 
time between each flight differed. For example, for three months in the summer, the deliveries 
were started on June 21, July 23, and August 10. Furthermore, although the amount of time 
required to complete the circuit was projected as one or two days—and this was indeed how the 
majority of the flights unfolded—unfavorable flying conditions did disrupt this schedule. In the 
case of at least two of these delays, the mail arriving in Tourane from Saigon was transferred to 
railcars for the remainder of the return trip to Hanoi. Finally, while the postal cargo averaged 
about 200 kilograms per round-trip journey, this figure differed from month to month; for 
instance, 150 kilograms of mail traveled on the route in September, but this number increased to 
250 kilograms the following month. This data is from Cony and Ledet, 161. 
201 On May 22 the PTT Director asked that postal flights be deployed between Hanoi and 
Saigon, or at least between Quinhon and Saigon. These missions, which were likely to last for the 
duration of the southwest monsoon season, were requested to accommodate a shift in the date on 
which certain Marseille-bound ships would depart Saigon. Basically, the PTT Director aimed to 
convert what had essentially been intermittent training flights into a regularly operating service 
that would make a round-trip journey once every two weeks, according to a memorandum. 
ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Directeur des Postes, des Télégraphes et des Téléphones de l’Indochine 
à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” May 22, 1930; ANOM, GGI 66545, “Note 
pour Monsieur le Chef du Service de Législation et d’Administration,” June 12, 1930.  
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organization of this air force, this type of proposal “would lead to risks absolutely out of 
proportion to the results that [the PTT Director] intends to achieve.” He noted, in 
addition, that his opinions from the previous August—that more safety was required on 
lengthy itineraries before such routes could offer scheduled air service—remained 
valid.202 Nevertheless, the operation of Hanoi—Saigon line in 1930 stood as a notable 
achievement for the French in Indochina: an airmail link that connected the colony’s two 
major cities and functioned according to a more or less regular timetable.203  
During the next few years, officials aimed to further improve airmail service 
between Hanoi and Saigon. Captain Puypéroux recounted that in 1931 and 1932, weekly 
round-trip flights were arranged to work in conjunction with aircraft arriving from 
France, in principle from April to December. Cony and Ledet offer more information on 
this line. They confirm that the air force’s slate of missions for 1931 included postal 
flights, and, for 1932 as well, they cite several airmail trips with deliveries to Hanoi and 
Saigon. While these efforts indeed represented progress for air transport within 
Indochina, the line was stopped the following year. Puypéroux reported that the flights 
                                                
202 ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Directeur 
des Postes, des Télégraphes et des Téléphones de l’Indochine,” June 16, 1930; ANOM, GGI 
66545, “Le Général de Division Aubert, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de 
l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” June 7, 1930.  
203 Manchon, 401. Manchon’s reference to the Hanoi—Saigon line in 1930 indicates that 
the aircraft flying this route rendezvoused at Tourane to refuel and exchange cargo. This 
description implies that the planes traveling from Hanoi were in the air at the same time as the 
planes from Saigon, which is a departure from the way the current chapter has presented the 
line’s functioning. Though Manchon’s discussion is not fully clear on this matter, his information 
suggests either a change in how this service worked between 1929 and 1930 or simply a different 
interpretation of the route’s operation. Manchon, 401.  
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were carried out with “nearly total consistency,” but the service was nonetheless 
terminated at the end of 1933 due to a lack of funds.204  
As land-based transportation improved in Indochina and elsewhere in the French 
empire during the 1930s, the air force’s scheduled mail routes were considered a less 
practical option in terms of both costs and benefits. Manchon notes that, outside of 
Madagascar, these airmail services were eventually abandoned in favor of the type of as-
needed transports that were better aligned with the “nature and equipment” of the air 
force. The growth of commercial aviation also brought about the gradual cessation of the 
military postal lines, but this development was neither unplanned nor lamented. In 
perhaps the final instance of regular airmail service in the interwar French empire, 
military planes shuttled mail between Rabat and Tunis via Algiers for a few months in 
1935; this task was subsequently handed over to civil aviation.205 
For Indochina specifically, by the mid-1930s the Hanoi—Saigon air route had lost 
much of its utility as a scheduled service. Considering the risks of the flights, this line no 
longer provided a justifiable amount of time to be saved in comparison to the nearly 
finished coastal railway. By the start of 1934, the construction of the Transindochinese 
Railroad had progressed enough to allow for transports in only a few days. When the 
entire rail line was inaugurated in the fall of 1936, the travel time was reduced to forty-
six hours. For several years after 1933, then, military airmail was employed on an ad hoc 
basis.206 Puypéroux, for example, observed that pilots carried out two round-trip postal 
flights between Hanoi and Saigon in rapid succession at the end of October 1934. This 
                                                
204 SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, liaisons postales et 
évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935; Cony and Ledet, 194, 197, 214; 
Manchon, 401. 
205 Manchon, 402-403. 
206 Manchon, 401. 
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assistance was requested to make up for several closures to the land route through Annam 
in the wake of a severe typhoon.207 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Prior to the launching of regular commercial service in Indochina, the colony’s air 
force was tasked with providing limited mail and passenger transports on scheduled 
routes from the mid-1920s to the early 1930s. The establishment and functioning of these 
lines—along with the organization of long-distance flights in general during this period—
reflects how the colonial and military administrations devoted earnest attention to 
ensuring that aviation missions would be undertaken in the safest possible conditions. 
Nevertheless, officials expressed concern, and even outright disapproval, about these 
operations. The reasons related to lingering worries about safety, cost, and necessity, 
especially when the use of aircraft was weighed against available land-based modes of 
transportation. Taken as a whole, both the protests against such flights and the attention 
paid to decreasing the risks—and thus reducing the chance for failure—demonstrate that 
however surefire and powerful aviation may have appeared as a tool of empire, flying 
during this era presented a more fallible reality.  
From the perspective of productivity, consistency, and revenue, the military 
routes in Indochina failed to excel. The Kratié—Savannakhet and Hanoi—Saigon lines 
not only had relatively short existences but also were expensive to operate and were 
utilized infrequently and inconsistently. However, these routes were more successful in 
terms of pilot training, propaganda, and laying the framework for future civil air service 
                                                
207 SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, liaisons postales et 
évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935.  
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in the colony. Generally, officials recognized that these two air links, along with the 
aerial tour of January 1921, had fulfilled the aforementioned purposes. From this trio of 
trial attempts, commercial routes—the subject of the following chapter—were 
progressively developed to, within, and through Indochina in subsequent years.  
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CHAPTER THREE: MOVING MAIL AND PASSENGERS ON CIVIL PLANES 
The June 1930 issue of the Bulletin de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine 
(hereafter Bulletin) reproduced an extract of a recent interview with Air Orient’s 
managing director Louis Allègre.208 Allègre outlined the route from France to Southeast 
Asia that the company was presently preparing. A seaplane would travel from Marseille 
to Beirut, which would be followed by an automobile ride to Damascus, a distance of 
about one hundred twenty kilometers.209 Other aircraft would then carry the cargo and 
mail to Baghdad and on to Karachi. Due to various reasons—chief among these were 
budgetary limitations and a lack of infrastructure—the journey from Karachi to Calcutta 
initially would utilize the existing railroad connecting these cities. The material would 
finally be loaded on a seaplane for the remaining leg of the trip, Calcutta to Saigon via 
Rangoon.210 
Allègre’s description hints at the difficulties that the French encountered as they 
worked to get civil aviation off the ground and regularly functioning during the interwar 
period. Several factors—each of which was magnified in an increasingly competitive 
commercial aviation market—hindered the development of French air transport to, 
within, and through Indochina in the 1920s and 1930s. Chief among these factors were 
                                                
208 Air Orient was not officially formed until July 1930, a point that is further discussed 
later in this chapter.  
209 As Beirut lacked an airfield—and because the seaplanes flying from Marseille could 
not make the journey over the desert to Baghdad—the airmail arriving at the seaplane base in 
Beirut needed to be driven by automobile to Damascus. To solve the problem of driving from 
Beirut to Damascus, a seaplane base was to be built at Tripoli—in present-day Lebanon—which 
would allow aircraft to reach Damascus and then Baghdad. Jean Hennequin points out that Beirut 
was utilized as an arrival point until January 1931, after which the city was replaced by Tripoli. 
ANOM, GGI 66529, “Conseil Economique. Section des Travaux Publics, des Moyens de 
Communications, de la Marine Marchande et des Pêches. Séance du 9 Mai 1930,” [n.d.]; Jean 
Hennequin, “Air Orient: Des Messageries Transaériennes (1923) à Air Orient (1930), Tome I” 
Icare no.86 (Autumn 1978): 56.  
210 “L’aviation marchande en Indochine et en Extrême-Orient,” Bulletin de l’Agence 
Economique de l’Indochine (June 1930): 202. 
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the thorny nature of diplomacy, high costs and poor profits, infrastructural deficiencies, 
and the limits of the era’s flight technology.  
Significantly, this chapter demonstrates how the French, in seeking to further their 
colonial project, were at times required to utilize negotiations, cooperation, and 
purportedly equal terms instead of the “standard” imperial means of coercion, which 
typically amounted to a combination of brute force and agreements that were blatantly 
unfavorable to non-European populations. Indeed, French interactions with Thai and 
Chinese representatives on the topic of air services in Southeast and East Asia usually 
consisted of a series of back-and-forth exchanges, periods of waiting, and flat-out denials 
of French requests. With regard to China in particular, French efforts were consistently 
derailed by the political turmoil that disrupted China from the late 1920s through the 
1930s; this turbulence was not only internal but also included a buildup of tensions with 
Japan and, eventually, a full-scale conflict with this increasingly belligerent nation. 
Additionally, the French were competing with other European powers and the United 
States for aerial supremacy in this part of the globe.  
The French had success with civil aviation during the 1920s and 1930s though, 
especially when compared with the experiences of other types of French aviation in 
Indochina. In particular, the French were able to develop, and then improve, air transport 
within Indochina and between metropole and colony. In addition, the French succeeded 
in winning aviation access to China. As André Evrard notes, Air France was the first 
foreign airline to operate service to China under its own national flag as opposed to 
offering flights in joint efforts with the Chinese.211 Ultimately though, the work of 
                                                
211 André Evrard, “La situation de la compagnie Air France en Indochine au cours des 
années 1939/1940,” Icare no.163 (1997): 85. 
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developing air routes to, within, and through Indochina was—as Allègre’s interview 
indicates—a protracted, difficult process that produced air services that were never as 
lucrative, widely used, or expansive as the French hoped. Indeed, like the military lines 
that preceded them, these civil air links were costly to operate and, for most of the 
interwar years, hindered by the era’s technology. 
 
Civil Air Routes within Indochina (1920s) 
Beginning in the first half of the 1920s, attempts were made to develop 
commercial aviation in Indochina, but these early organizations typically had an 
ephemeral existence.212 A degree of relatively longer-term success was won with the 
Compagnie Aéronautique Française (CAF), which directed the formation of the 
Compagnie Aéronautique Française d’Extrême-Orient (CAFEO) in May 1922. In 
addition to selling French aeronautics materials in Southeast Asia, this firm sought to 
operate several lines within Indochina; by November 1922, this network was envisioned 
as being composed of the following routes, with stopovers along certain of these 
itineraries: Vinh—Vientiane; Hanoi—Vinh; Kratié—Thakhek; Vientiane—Luang 
Prabang; and Can Tho—Saigon—Phnom Penh. However, the promised government 
                                                
212 In March 1920, aviator Charles Ricou founded an aero-club in Portuguese Macau. He 
wrote to Hanoi’s chamber of commerce at the end of September, informing the chamber that he 
intended to set up an Indochina-based air transport company; the proposed firm would serve 
Saigon, Hanoi, and Haiphong along with several other foreign destinations in the region. 
Ultimately, by the summer of 1922 and faced with financial difficulties, Ricou had abandoned 
this project and at least one subsequent plan for air service within the colony. In another instance, 
pilot Etienne Poulet worked to establish an aviation company in Saigon in the first months of 
1922; Poulet’s goals included thrice-weekly mail-and-passenger service between Saigon and 
Phnom Penh. This attempt experienced some success by the end of year—plane rides and 
propaganda voyages—but the larger project never fully materialized. As a final example, a 
company under the name Marcel Chrétien existed very briefly in Indochina. In 1925 and 1926, 
this firm conducted several photography missions for topographic studies. Christophe Cony and 
Michel Ledet, L’Aviation française en Indochine: Des origines à 1945 (Outreau: Lela Presse, 
2012), 476-478. 
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funding for parts of CAFEO’s plan never materialized, and, in February 1924, the 
company discontinued test flights; CAFEO was dissolved the following year.213  
Later in the decade and undeterred by CAFEO’s failure, CAF launched another 
program for developing commercial air service in Southeast Asia. The airline that was 
formed on this second attempt, the confusingly and similarly named Compagnie Aérienne 
Française, was established at the end of the summer of 1928; the firm’s seaplane facility 
was inaugurated toward the end of March 1929. By February 1930 and after some initial 
aerial studies, the firm’s commercial activity within the colony included the following: 
“first flights” (baptêmes de l’air) for “a rather large number of Annamites and Chinese”; 
regular air transport of an unspecified type; touristic excursions to Angkor Wat and 
Dalat; and aerial photography tasks. Yet in another failed attempt at planting a civil air 
service in Indochina, the Compagnie Aérienne Française ceased operations in the course 
of 1930 due to the absence of new clientele and the wearing out of its planes.214  
The formation of the Société d’études d’aviation (SEA) in July 1926 represented 
the establishment of a somewhat longer-term civil aviation presence in the colony. By 
early 1927 this firm, which aimed to investigate the “applications and the development of 
aviation in Indochina and the Far East,” had narrowed its focus to assisting with cadastral 
surveys and setting up air routes between Saigon and Bangkok and Saigon and Hanoi. At 
the start of April 1928, SEA was incorporated as the Société d’Etudes et d’Entreprises 
                                                
213 Cony and Ledet, 477-478.  
214 Cony and Ledet, 481-483; Cordemoy, February 1930, 38-41. This airline also 
launched trial flights for air transport from Indochina to Hong Kong in May 1929, but these 
efforts were not followed by any concrete progress for commercial service. Cony and Ledet, 482. 
Moreover, the company had received authorization on June 11, 1930, to operate a postal link 
from Marseille to Saigon; however, this route remained similarly unrealized. ANOM, GGI 66569, 
“Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Sous-Secrétaire d’Etat des Colonies,” August 12, 1930.  
 101 
Aériennes en Indochine et en Extrême-Orient (hereafter SEEAIEO).215 Then, on October 
22 of the following year, Air Asie was created from SEEAIEO and as a subsidiary of Air 
Union Lignes d’Orient (hereafter AULO).216 From November to early December 1929, 
this new airline conducted several test flights within the colony. In 1930 Air Asie planned 
to launch scheduled service within Indochina while also carrying out trial voyages toward 
China.217 By mid-July 1930, Air Asie and AULO had combined to create Air Orient, 
whose administration continued these prior efforts to develop commercial air transport to 
and within Southeast Asia.218  
The rapid pace with which aviation firms were established, merged, and 
dissolved—and thus the seemingly constant transformation of the French civil aviation 
landscape in Southeast Asia at this time—would continue until the formation of Air 
France.219 The primary reason for these frequent changes likely related to the limited 
availability of aeronautics and financial resources.  
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218 Sardain, 28.  
219 At points when more than one airline existed within Indochina, the relationship 
between the companies was, at least according to one source, more competitive than cooperative. 
At the start of 1930, a letter to the Governor General maintained that the two local commercial 
firms, the Companie Aérienne Française and Air Asie, quarreled over requests for missions. Each 
of these firms appeared to have drawbacks in this writer’s opinion. While Air Asie was “filled 
with good intentions” and offered much lower prices than its competitor—and perhaps 
unrealistically so—the company both lacked equipment and had not yet provided any work on 
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Civil Air Routes within Indochina (1930s)  
In July 1931 Cordemoy argued that Indochina’s air routes should be viewed as 
components of longer international links and not as exclusively interior connections that, 
in general, were “too short to have a commercial traffic of interest.” The Hanoi—Saigon 
line, he had observed in February 1930, was particularly important as such a link in what 
appeared as a burgeoning chain of international air routes.220  
 In actuality, the development of scheduled commercial service between the 
capitals of Tonkin and Cochinchina—long a goal of aeronautics enthusiasts and officials 
in the government and military—was a protracted process. Indeed, even though coastal 
and Mekong River itineraries between Saigon and Hanoi had been traversed by aircraft 
relatively frequently since the mid-1920s, regularly operating civil air transport was not a 
reality until the middle of the following decade. While weekly flights were undertaken 
from late November 1932 until the end of the year, this service was suspended until the 
infrastructure between the two cities was completed; this task required almost two years 
to finish. In January 1935, air force captain Marcel Puypéroux indicated that Air France, 
which had been formed in the summer of 1933, would offer a direct Hanoi—Saigon link 
in the near future. In the late spring of 1938, it was reported that there had been interest 
                                                                                                                                            
which the firm could be judged. On the other hand, the Compagnie Aérienne Française not only 
had proven itself but was also well suited for cadaster work. However, this airline’s mission 
prices were considered too high. Remarking that an agreement between the two companies was 
out of the question, the writer proposed that the Compagnie Aérienne Française carry out 
cadastral tasks and Air Asie handle airmail. ANOM, GGI 66529, “Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général,” February 7, 1930. 
220 Cordemoy, February 1930, 42-43; “L’Essor aérien de la France vers l’Extrême-Orient 
(1930-1931),” Bulletin de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine (July 1931): 256; Cordemoy, 
February 1930, 42-43. 
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the previous year in establishing such a route, and this service was presently the subject 
of ongoing negotiations with “the relevant authorities.”221   
Concerning the action taken in 1937 toward developing Hanoi—Saigon line, 
certain French officials appeared anxious to ensure that this route would soon function as 
planned.222 This worry stemmed from the opinion that the current agreement for British 
Imperial Airways planes traveling through Indochina could have unpleasant commercial 
repercussions for the colony. As Antoine Baffeleuf explained in late October 1937, the 
itinerary for Imperial Airways’ regularly scheduled service between British Malaya and 
Hong Kong, in operation since March 1936, traversed the length of Indochina from south 
to north and included stops in Saigon and Tourane. Yet according to this agenda, neither 
mail nor passengers, whether destined for or in provenance from the French colony, 
could take advantage of these stops. “To date,” Baffeleuf lamented, “Indochina alone 
seems to have remained a stranger to the lively movement apparent in neighboring 
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countries in support of the development and the improvement of their commercial and 
postal relations by air.”223  
Louis Hirschauer, the Inspector of Civil Aviation, also had voiced disapproval 
over this Franco-British arrangement in 1936 when the agreement was drafted. He 
described the frustrating situation for those in Indochina—specified as rice exporters—
who, while seeking to travel or send mail to Hong Kong, watched Imperial Airways’ 
planes bound for this destination land and depart from Saigon without taking on any local 
customers or postal material: 
They see…an aircraft that contains letters to Hong Kong from their 
competitors in Batavia and Singapore, letters that will be the same evening 
in Hong Kong, while their own letters destined for Hong Kong, not being 
able to be loaded on this airplane…, must take the train to Hanoi and from 
there be transported next day…to Hong Kong or Canton!  
 
As a result, businesspeople in Indochina were faced with a distasteful situation in which 
their correspondence to China arrived two or three days after the mail of their commercial 
rivals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Hirschauer reported that this state of affairs, which would 
hopefully be soon remedied, fostered in the colony an “atmosphere unfavorable to Air 
France.”224  
By the later 1930s, scheduled air service had been established between Saigon 
and Hanoi, but the specific itinerary continued to evolve until the end of the decade as 
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officials modified which destinations were served and how often the route operated. For 
instance, on April 29, 1939, Governor General Jules Brévié wrote that an agreement had 
been signed with Air France for round-trip flights each week on a Saigon—Vientiane—
Hanoi itinerary.225 This line was scheduled to open on July 1 after a series of test flights 
between Hanoi and Vientiane in May and June.226 In order for this service to function as 
planned, French officials had to obtain authorization from the Thai government for 
French planes to pass over a portion of Thai territory—a section between Savannakhet 
and Vientiane—as they traveled from Saigon to Vientiane.227 By the end of the 1930s, 
civil aviation had expanded, albeit rather slowly and not without difficulties, throughout 
the colony. This growth did not occur in isolation though; the development of these 
services took place so as to eventually connect with air routes that linked France to 
Indochina.  
 
Connecting France to Indochina (Mid-1920s to 1930) 
The second half of the 1920s was the start of a period in which authorities in 
France and Indochina worked to realize the establishment of a route to the colony, with 
the goal being air service that was both reliable and regularly operating. This effort 
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signaled a move away from—but not a complete abandonment of—the record-setting 
speed and distance flights that had hitherto characterized aviation to this part of the globe. 
The problems posed for developing a Europe—Southeast Asia link were broadly 
categorized as either political or technical, with the former of these appearing as the more 
challenging concern.228 Indeed, in the second half of 1934, an evaluation of Air France 
and its routes remarked that the French imperial air network could not be expected to be 
as powerful as that of Great Britain. The logic was that Air France mainly operated along 
a “grid of international links that...must inevitably meet, on the majority of its lines, the 
competition of national companies that every state of appreciable importance 
maintains.”229 In other words, France was required to negotiate and contend with the 
governments through which French commercial lines passed. In a related vein, because 
much of the infrastructure for these routes was within foreign territory, Air France and 
the French Air Ministry French consequently tended to be without “direct means of 
action” when improvements were needed.230  
By the late 1920s, France had managed to make concrete progress to overcome 
the political hurdles of the route, namely, the need to negotiate agreements for flights and 
landings within the various territories that separated metropole and colony. A short article 
that appeared in the Bulletin in April 1929 described this ongoing process. An accord had 
been signed with Italy, which was necessary for the first portion of the France—
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Indochina route that extended across the Middle East to Baghdad. French officials had 
planned talks with Great Britain for the second part of the connection, from Baghdad to 
Rangoon.231 On July 22, 1929, the Minister of the Colonies wrote that these negotiations 
were soon to begin, with France’s goal being to arrange for Anglo-French cooperation for 
an air route through British India.232  
This possibility did not materialize as planned, however. A Ministry of the 
Colonies letter of November 22, 1929, noted that the British government had determined 
that beginning in 1930 and until the end of the rainy season of 1931, all air traffic—
British and foreign alike—would be prevented from passing over India. The cited reason 
was the need to undertake extensive infrastructural work in this region.233 French officials 
were incredulous about this rationale though. Vital Ferry explains that the British delayed 
granting AULO authorization for regular flights through the Indian subcontinent in no 
small part because Great Britain was not keen on having French commercial aircraft 
utilize sites in the area as stopovers while Imperial Airways remained without a 
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functioning route to Southeast Asia.234 For French officials, this type of maneuvering on 
the part of Great Britain was, to a certain extent, expected. “Great Britain has always 
been anxious to control the Indies route,” a report stated at the beginning of August 1928. 
“It is this unchanging desire that inspired its foreign policy during the last century.”235  
The French were more successful in reaching an agreement with the Dutch for the 
transport of mail between Europe and Indochina. At the beginning of October 1929, a 
telegram from the Governor General mentioned an accord for a fortnightly service in 
which Air Asie would ferry to Saigon a quantity of mail that had been transported to 
Bangkok on a KLM plane. At the end of October, the Minister of the Colonies discussed 
the specifics of this collaborative effort, explaining that the airmail between Bangkok and 
Saigon would circulate on a weekly schedule—the circuit was completed every two 
weeks—and this particular cargo was to be transported only on French aircraft piloted by 
French personnel.236 This Franco-Dutch coordination allowed the inaugural delivery of 
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236 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Télégramme Privé. Gougal à Genesuper,” October 3, 1929; 
ANOM, GGI 66529, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de 
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airmail from France to Indochina on December 9. In the reverse direction, the first 
Saigon—Bangkok airmail service was carried out from December 16 to December 18 via 
Phnom Penh and Battambang.237  
By the first months of 1930, French officials were actively examining two 
itineraries for the Indochina portion of France’s air link to Southeast Asia. The first 
option entailed traveling from Rangoon to Vientiane and then Vinh while the second 
involved aircraft proceeding from Rangoon to Bangkok and then Saigon.238 The former 
route, which Chaumié preferred, allowed for relatively easy coastal access to Hanoi and 
appeared advantageous in terms of a possible extension to China in the future.239 
Ultimately though, Chaumié determined that the “most prudent and the most logical” 
solution was to have the line pass through Bangkok.240  
At the end of May 1930, Chaumié updated the Minister of the Colonies on the 
program for the section of France—Indochina route beyond Baghdad. The Air Ministry 
had earmarked funds for the extension and support of the airmail line from Baghdad to 
                                                                                                                                            
from the fall of 1929, French and Dutch officials sought an accord with the British that would 
entail the responsibilities for air service in Western Europe and in India rotating among the routes 
of the three signatory nations, perhaps on a weekly basis. Beyond India, Dutch and French 
carriers would operate on a weekly schedule between Rangoon and, respectively, the Dutch East 
Indies and Indochina. ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” November 22, 1929.  
237 Cony and Ledet, 485. After being transferred to a KLM plane, the postal cargo 
reached France on December 29.  
238 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Le Ministre de l’Air au Lieutenant-Colonel de Prémorel, 
Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine,” February 14, 1930. 
239 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Le Ministre de l’Air au Lieutenant-Colonel de Prémorel, 
Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine,” February 14, 1930. He noted that the Saigon link 
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advantages were of the type discussed in a Minister of the Colonies letter of January 1930. This 
correspondence described how the Bangkok—Saigon route allowed for quicker access to the 
“important economic centers” of Cochinchina and, in addition, offered a less challenging course 
of travel. ANOM, GGI 66569, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de 
l’Indochine,” January 26, 1930. 
240 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Conseil Economique. Section des Travaux Publics, des Moyens 
de Communications, de la Marine Marchande et des Pêches. Séance du 9 Mai 1930,” [n.d.].  
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Saigon as part of its budget for the 1930 to 1931 fiscal year. More specifically, this 
support would help fund: approximately five round-trip postal voyages on the Baghdad—
Karachi and Calcutta—Saigon portions; about twelve round-trip flights between Bangkok 
and Saigon, scheduled to correspond with KLM’s airmail service to the Dutch East 
Indies; and several reconnaissance flights between Rangoon and Vinh. Before 
undertaking any of the airmail trips though, Chaumié added, AULO needed to conduct 
several test flights on the Rangoon—Saigon course of travel so that the company could 
definitively select its itinerary and landing sites.241  
Whatever itinerary French officials chose for reaching their colony in Southeast 
Asia, France needed to sign an accord with Thailand so that French aircraft could deliver 
their cargo to Indochina. A SEEAIEO report frankly summarized the need to find a 
means of cooperating with Thailand: “from Rangoon to Indochina, there is a wall, Siam; 
we must cross it…by establishing a Franco-Siamese line.”242 A preliminary discussion of 
a French air route through Thailand occurred in the fall of 1927. In a proposition 
submitted to Thailand on November 5, French officials proposed the establishment of a 
Franco-Thai company that would undertake the operation of both the Rangoon—Vinh 
section of a Europe—China air link and an accessory line from Phitsanulok, located in 
Thailand, to Saigon.243  
                                                
241 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” May 
30, 1930.  
242 SEEAIEO, “Etude.” For more details about this source, see footnote nine in chapter 
one of this dissertation. 
243 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note sur l’Activité Internationale en Extrême-Orient en Matière 
d’Aviation Commerciale et Postale,” August 1, 1928. An earlier proposal for a jointly operated 
airmail service, albeit on smaller scale, was offered to the French by Thai officials in December 
1922. According to this scheme, the governments would share the cost of routes linking Thailand 
to Laos and to Cambodia. Legarde, who cites this proposal, does not indicate if the proposition 
ever moved beyond the planning stage, but it appears unlikely that it did. Legarde, 17-18. 
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Though seriously considered by the Thai, the French project was rejected. A 
French government memorandum from August 1928 stated that despite the negotiating 
skills of François Glaize—by this point, he was working as a representative for what was 
to become SEEAIEO—and a proposal that was reasonable, the French effort was stymied 
by “the repugnance of the Bangkok government at any idea of subvention as well as a 
traditional suspicion of bold innovations.”244 Yet this memo was pleased to report that 
“new events have occurred since January that in all likelihood modified Siamese opinion 
and won the cause of Colonel Glaize.” Specifically, the document cited the completion of 
the Tokyo—Paris leg of French aviators Dieudonné Costes and Joseph Le Brix’s global 
circumnavigation and the creation of a bureau for civil aeronautics in Indochina. On April 
17, 1928—three days after Costes and Le Brix completed their journey and the day after 
the establishment of the civil aviation department—Thailand notified the French 
company of their agreement to this proposal in principle.245  
The following year, the operation of a Rangoon—Vinh air route became the 
subject of more serious diplomatic discussions. Thailand’s Prince Purachatra, wanting his 
country to be prominently involved with the development of commercial aviation in 
Southeast and East Asia, traveled to Paris in March 1929 to explore the option of a 
Franco-Thai air service that would operate between Rangoon and Bangkok.246 The 
agreement that ultimately resulted—this accord was signed by the Prince and French Air 
Minister Victor Laurant-Eynac on April 9, 1929—entailed the creation of a route from 
Rangoon to Vinh via Phitsanulok and Vientiane; this trunk route would have branch lines 
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toward Bangkok, Saigon, and Hanoi. The Rangoon—Vinh flight would be undertaken 
alternately by a “special French company with Siamese participation” and a “Siamese 
company with French involvement.”247  
In his history of Thai aviation, Edward M. Young states that a modified version of 
this proposal was submitted to the respective governments in June. According to a 
Ministry of the Colonies letter of July 22, 1929, the terms of the agreement were that a 
French airline and a Thai airline would alternate in providing service between Rangoon 
and Vinh.248 Moreover, the prior stipulation for reciprocal participation was removed, 
and, as Young explains, each of these companies “would have complete freedom of 
action within its own sphere but would cooperate on ground facilities and infrastructure 
along the common route.” Ratified in early 1930, this five-year agreement would expire 
at the end of 1934 but could be canceled with one-year advanced notice.249  
The early 1930s would see the establishment of scheduled air service between 
France and Indochina. During the remainder of the decade, this route would be improved 
as travel time was reduced and flight comfort and reliability increased. Yet much like 
contemporary maps of France’s air route to Indochina depicted an irregular line 
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connecting metropole to colony, the development of scheduled service to destinations 
throughout Indochina was achieved in fits and starts and not without adjustments.  
 
Connecting France to Indochina (1931 to 1940) 
A letter from the Air Ministry to the Ministry of the Colonies, dated August 12, 
1930, outlined how the upcoming months would unfold for French commercial aviation 
in Southeast Asia. Air Orient would carry out round-trip mail voyages between Bangkok 
and Saigon twice a month in coordination with the Dutch route through the region; this 
service was to operate from the beginning of October 1930 to the end of March 1931.250 
In addition, from January 1931 until the end of March, these French flights would be 
arranged to alternate with the extension of the company’s Marseille—Baghdad line as far 
as Saigon.251 The inaugural journey on this long-haul route began on January 17, 1931, 
with the departure of a seaplane from Marseille. Ten days later a tri-motor airplane 
loaded with sixty kilograms of mail touched down in Saigon.252 The completion of this 
circuit was significant for France, in terms of both national prestige and aviation 
progress. This voyage represented the first time that the metropole—colony air 
connection was carried out solely by the French.253 By the end of February, round-trip 
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service from France to Southeast Asia had been fixed to operate twice each month; 
during the intervening weeks, Air Orient arranged for French mail to be transported on 
KLM planes between Baghdad and Bangkok. With the addition of several more tri-motor 
aircraft to its fleet, Air Orient was able to begin offering weekly flights to Indochina 
starting on May 7, 1932. In turn, this adjustment allowed the company to free itself from 
needing Dutch assistance on the line.254   
Officials also sought to develop a regularly scheduled line from France to Hanoi. 
This goal proved elusive until the mid-1930s despite both the importance of this city as 
Indochina’s administrative headquarters and the progress already made in connecting 
France with Saigon.255 Even when the link to Hanoi was realized, the specific itinerary 
for reaching the city shifted several times, much to the displeasure of certain colonial 
administrators. When Hirschauer composed his report in the fall of 1934, the route from 
Rangoon to Hanoi via Phitsanulok and Vinh was still not open, in no small part because 
Phitsanulok was not yet properly outfitted to serve as a stopover. Once operational, this 
route was to function as the “principal artery of the Orient line,” with an eventual 
extension toward southern China. According to this plan, Saigon was to be linked with 
Phitsanulok via an annex line through Bangkok.256  
To connect the metropole with Indochina’s colonial capital, Air France scheduled 
two round-trip trial flights between Saigon and Hanoi at the end of 1934. Each of these 
voyages—one in November, the other in December—was arranged so that they would 
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coordinate with the timetable for the France—Saigon flights.257 In addition, at a meeting 
of the airline’s general administration committee (Comité d’administration générale, 
hereafter GAC) on October 18, 1934, the managing director noted that a reconnaissance 
mission was soon to be deployed to examine the infrastructure between Bangkok and 
Hanoi as part of the preparations for future air service between these two destinations. 
This study indicated the preference, at least for the present, for the Bangkok—Hanoi 
itinerary over the route that passed through Phitsanulok. At the end of January 1935, it 
was reported that service on this route was scheduled to start at the beginning of 
February.258 As a temporary measure and to avoid disrupting the organization of the 
existing Bangkok—Saigon air link, the flights on this route would continue; the line 
connecting Bangkok and Hanoi would function as a branch route for the time being.259 
Hirschauer had indicated in the fall of 1934 that the course of travel linking 
Bangkok and Hanoi would pass through Vientiane and Vinh, with the former site being 
be used as stopover only provisionally.260 This longer-term plan did not find unanimous 
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support within the French administration in Laos though, as certain officials expressed 
disappointment with Air France’s decision for Vientiane. The protectorate’s Resident 
Superior pleaded with Governor General René Robin to highlight the “undeniable 
advantages” of utilizing this city as a regularly scheduled stop.261 The Resident 
emphasized that national prestige was intertwined with the decision about establishing a 
stopover at Vientiane; he explained that outfitting this site for regular flights would bring 
to an end the lamentable situation of airmail between France and Laos being carried 
along Thai or Dutch lines and passing through—and paying postal taxes to—foreign post 
offices. The Resident declared, “it would be humiliating...that a French air route, financed 
in large part by the national budget, serves several foreign countries,…traverses French 
Laos while neglecting its capital, and compels the French in Laos to continue crossing the 
Mekong to Siam in order to find an easy means of communicating with their country.”262   
Meanwhile, the diplomatic back-and-forth between French Indochina and 
Thailand continued. By the mid-1930s, the French were examining another option for 
linking the metropole with the colony, namely, a direct route from Calcutta to Hanoi via 
Mandalay.263 By the end of 1935, French officials were actively investigating this 
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alternative, which was itself emblematic of the continued effort to develop faster air 
service between Europe and Hanoi. Just as significantly, the Mandalay itinerary freed 
French planes from the obligation to make a stopover in Thailand. Such a maneuver was 
viewed as a way to pressure the Thai government to concede to what the French believed 
were less exacting terms than the arrangements of the current Franco-Thai agreement; 
Thailand had evidently denounced this agreement, which, in any case, would soon expire. 
As Indochina’s Secretary General explained in January 1936, the French aimed “to 
demonstrate to this kingdom that the passage through their territory is far from being 
obligatory.” This alternative route was, therefore, “a means of leading [Thai 
representatives] to reduce the demands that they have expressed for the renewal of the 
convention.”264 Shortly thereafter, Franco-Thai negotiations apparently came to a lengthy 
standstill. As November 1938 came to a close, the French still had not received a 
response to a counterproposal delivered that March to Thai representatives.265 
As the previous paragraph suggests, the specifics of the talks between French and 
Thai officials during the mid-to-late 1930s are not completely clear. The archival and 
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secondary materials consulted for this chapter are similarly fuzzy on this matter. Sardain, 
in discussing the accord of 1930, notes that this agreement would be “tacitly renewed per 
five-year period.” In addition, Young indicates that the French were at least somewhat 
responsible for the diplomatic discord between Thai and French representatives during 
this period.266  
Aside from the Mandalay route, the French investigated other courses of travel 
that would allow for quicker air service to Southeast Asia while decreasing French 
reliance on Thai locales as stopovers. In the fall of 1936, for example, Hirschauer 
outlined an itinerary that would link Calcutta with Vientiane via Rangoon, thus bypassing 
Bangkok. Though lengthier than the Mandalay line, this option not only had the 
advantage of being used “as early as tomorrow” but also was shorter than the current 
Calcutta—Hanoi route, which included stops at Akyab, Rangoon, Bangkok, and 
Vientiane. Moreover, according to this proposal, Vientiane would function as the 
terminus for a Mekong River route to Saigon as well.267  
Yet the implementation of the plan described by Hirschauer encountered technical 
and diplomatic issues that hindered its realization. The result was that, for the next few 
years, Bangkok continued to be used as a stop for French commercial aircraft traveling to 
Indochina.  At a GAC meeting held in mid-February 1938, Air France’s managing 
director elaborated on why this layover was maintained. Not only were there still 
challenges relating to nighttime flying across the Annamese Mountains but also 
“diplomatic difficulties” (difficultés diplomatiques) concerning the abandonment of the 
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Thai capital as a stopover. Consequently, this official estimated that for a period of at 
least two years, the main air link would continue to pass through Rangoon, Bangkok, and 
Saigon before connecting to Hanoi.268 
There were several notable developments for French commercial air service to 
Southeast Asia between the summer of 1938 and the signing of the armistice in June 
1940. In July 1938 the itinerary for the metropole—colony route was again altered. 
Having acquired a fleet of more powerful aircraft by this point, Air France announced on 
July 26 that, starting the present week, the company’s Indochina service would be 
adjusted so that the line from Bangkok to Hanoi via Vientiane—a route that Cony and 
Ledet describe as quite unprofitable—would no longer be utilized.269 This adjustment 
would bring to an end flights on the branch line connecting Bangkok and Saigon, a 
change that in turn would result in Saigon regaining its status as the principal terminus 
for the air connection with the metropole. This reshuffling would also cause the airfield at 
Vientiane to be momentarily removed from Indochina’s regular air network.270 
Though French planes would eventually be obligated to avoid Italian territory in 
the Mediterranean and Africa, the outbreak of war in Europe at the beginning of 
September 1939 did not markedly alter air service between France and Indochina. Then, 
on June 25, 1940, France signed an armistice with Germany and Italy, which resulted in 
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the subsequent grounding of all French aircraft, military as well as civilian. From this 
point and until further notice, Evrard writes, all flights required authorization from 
France.271  
 
The Air Link to Southern China and Beyond (Later 1920s to 1940) 
In addition to creating a route from the metropole to Indochina, French aviation 
interests aimed to link the colony—and, by extension, France—to parts of East Asia as 
far as Japan.272 Similar to how France’s civil aviation efforts unfolded in Southeast Asia, 
this endeavor to develop air service beyond Indochina was a drawn-out process that 
required years and lengthy negotiations to produce results. Yet by the summer of 1940, 
the French had succeeded in gaining aerial access to China. 
By the late 1920s the French were cognizant that various foreign competitors—
namely, Germany, Holland, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States—were also 
seeking to become involved with commercial air transport to and within China. France 
thus needed to be prominently involved with the course of travel between Rangoon and 
Canton in order to deter, at least temporarily, other nations’ aviation initiatives in the 
region.273  
                                                
271 Cony and Ledet, 510; Evrard, 89. 
272 In a meeting with Chinese officials in April 1928, a Monsieur Brunat—he was serving 
as a technical advisor for aeronautics to the government general—mentioned that the French plan 
was to develop an air route from Tonkin that would extend northeast into China as far as possible; 
this line would serve Canton, Shanghai, and, eventually, Peking and Manchuria. ANOM, GGI 
66529, “Note sur l’Activité Internationale en Extrême-Orient en Matière d’Aviation Commerciale 
et Postale,” August 1, 1928. While the route to Shanghai was not inaugurated until January 16, 
1947, the Tokyo connection only opened in the fall of 1952. Hennequin, “Air Orient, Tome II,” 
39, 54. 
273 SEEAIEO, “Etude.”  
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Yet the development of a French air route to China witnessed only tentative steps 
forward in this decade. As mentioned previously, in the late 1920s François Glaize 
started working on behalf of French commercial aviation interests in Asia. His duties in 
this capacity included examining the possibility of an air link between Vinh and Canton 
via Hanoi. With this goal in mind, Glaize reached out to Chinese authorities in Canton 
and in Peking at the end of November 1927. This initial attempt was frustrated by the 
political turmoil within China around this time.274 The following month Glaize again 
wrote to the French consul in Canton, requesting that this official reinvestigate the 
opinion of Chinese authorities regarding the Vinh—Canton project. In a letter from 
March 9, the consul explained that the government in Canton appeared interested but was 
preoccupied with certain economic concerns. Unfortunately for the French, the Chinese 
authorities, in an attempt to alleviate these woes, were in contact with British officials in 
Hong Kong to discuss an industrial-economic agreement. “For the moment,” the consul 
observed in perceptively summarizing the situation, “the British seem to have a great 
advantage over us…. The close relations that exist between the Chinese in Hong Kong 
and Canton give the British a privileged place.”275  
Additional talks between French and Chinese representatives took place in April 
1928. The officials in Canton reemphasized their enthusiasm for the proposed route but 
were noncommittal regarding several different options for the line. Writing on April 30, 
                                                
274 Glaize received word in mid-January 1928 that his proposition for Canton could not 
be delivered “for lack of the existence of a stable government.” Moreover, France’s minister in 
Peking informed Glaize that he judged it preferable to delay moving forward with the aviation 
program. The minister reasoned that negotiations with the Cantonese authorities would likely 
trouble the government in Peking.  
275 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note sur l’Activité Internationale en Extrême-Orient en Matière 
d’Aviation Commerciale et Postale,” August 1, 1928. Part of this accord stipulated that the 
British would supply aircraft to the Chinese.  
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the French consul judged that the Chinese not only were anxious about the political 
instability within their country but also harbored “a more or less admitted hostility 
against any enterprise in which foreigners have a stake and that consequently seems to be 
a takeover attempt.” This official continued his unflattering assessment of the Chinese: 
“out of hatred of the foreigner, out of national pride, out of vanity, they are opposed to all 
Sino-foreign collaboration.” In concluding, the consul remarked that the Chinese were 
interested in a given undertaking only to the extent that they ascertained in such a project 
a means of enriching themselves. Even with the hesitations of the local Chinese 
authorities and the consul’s negative appraisal of the situation, Indochina’s government 
general remained optimistic about eventually realizing an air link to Canton.276 
Almost two years later on April 11, 1930, Glaize drafted a letter to Nanking to 
remind the Chinese Republic’s Minister of Communications that a study had been 
submitted at the end of August 1929 regarding a Sino-French air route between Haiphong 
and Canton. Stating that he had not yet received a response about this proposal, Glaize 
reiterated that the French were interested in concluding an agreement that was absolutely 
equal and beneficial for both sides. He stressed that, due to its proximity to southern 
China, only French Indochina—and French aviation—was in a position to reasonably 
offer “complete equality between the two countries, where each one would obtain from 
the other an authorization for operation along a combined route.”277  
Moreover, Glaize asserted that the development of this line was an opportunity 
for China to “define...the position that it intends to take with these international air links 
                                                
276 ANOM, GGI 66529, “Note sur l’Activité Internationale en Extrême-Orient en Matière 
d’Aviation Commerciale et Postale,” August 1, 1928.  
277 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Monsieur le Ministre des Communications de la République 
Chinoise,” April 11, 1930. According to this plan, service along the entirety of this line would be 
carried out alternately by a Chinese company and a French company.  
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and on the question of Canton.” Elaborating, he noted that agreements for international 
air transport were being negotiated “almost everywhere.” While British officials in Hong 
Kong doubtless aimed to connect their imperial enclave to India via a route that would 
pass over Indochina, the French in Indochina sought authorization for their own flights 
through India. “Before long,” Glaize warned, “a Franco-British accord could happen that 
would resolve these questions of aircraft passage; but then the line would lead to Hong 
Kong and not to Canton.” He pointed out that this type of agreement would effectively 
allow planes flying on an Anglo-French route to avoid landing in “a strictly Chinese 
location.” The reason, Glaize explained, was that such an arrangement permitted aviators 
to “request the application pure and simple of the International Convention of Aerial 
Navigation of 1919.” Under the terms of this document—the signatories included China, 
France, and Great Britain—commercial planes were granted certain rights to pass over 
the participants’ territories. In sum, the Anglo-French accord that Glaize described would 
have the effect of essentially excluding Chinese aviation interests.278  
With this pressure applied, Glaize stated that the terminus of the route—Hong 
Kong or Canton—depended on whether or not Chinese authorities wanted to proceed 
with negotiations with the French. As a means of hastening the Chinese government’s 
decision, Glaize informed the Minister of Communications that his company was 
presently prepared to send representatives to Canton to so that a satisfactory agreement 
could be reached. On May 21, 1930, the French received a response in which the Minister 
of Communications suggested that several French envoys could be dispatched to 
Nanking, which was the government capital, in order to more easily resolve the question 
                                                
278 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Monsieur le Ministre des Communications de la République 
Chinoise,” April 11, 1930.  
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of the Canton—Haiphong route. Yet this particular attempt does not appear to have 
yielded tangible results because, as recounted in Hirschauer’s study from 1934, another 
proposition for a joint aerial venture was offered in 1932. This proposal also failed to 
produce an agreement for air service.279  
In 1934 the French continued in their pursuit of an accord for Sino-French air 
transport. This work, which ultimately had the same result as previous talks, began in 
May and focused on a line connecting Canton and Hanoi. As part of these efforts, Glaize 
approached the Nanking-based China National Aviation Corporation (hereafter CNAC), a 
Sino-American firm, about acting as a local intermediary for Air France in the Chinese 
capital. Yet, as Hirschauer reported, government officials were reluctant to authorize a 
foreign airline to operate in Chinese territory. He cited both apprehension about Japan’s 
response and “assured irritation” that negotiations had been conducted with Canton.280 
Then, in October, an attaché for the French Air Ministry made another attempt to reach 
an agreement with the government in Nanking. The terms offered were that personnel 
from a Chinese airline—Hirschauer presumed the airline would be CNAC—would use 
French equipment to operate a Canton—Hanoi route. In addition, Air France, upon being 
                                                
279 ANOM, GGI 66569, “Monsieur le Ministre des Communications de la République 
Chinoise,” April 11, 1930; ANOM, GGI 66569, “Lettre no. 537 du Ministère des 
Communications de Chine,” [received May 21, 1930]; Hirschauer Mission, 1934. According to 
Hirschauer, the 1932 proposition indicated that a French airline would operate between Hanoi and 
Canton and a Chinese firm would fly from Canton to Saigon via Tourane. Cony and Ledet 
provide additional details on these French efforts in 1932. In the fall, several French 
representatives made a trial flight between Saigon and Hong Kong via Hanoi and Canton. The 
French delegates met with British envoys in Hong Kong, Chinese authorities in Canton, and the 
Chinese Minister of Communications. The French delegation’s goal was to secure authorization 
for Air Orient to fly to either of these two foreign locales in order to collect mail destined for 
Europe. Cony and Ledet, 490. 
280 Air France proposed that it would furnish, with eventual reimbursement, the materials 
and funds required to outfit the itinerary between Hanoi and Canton. After repayment, Canton 
would receive twenty percent of the revenue from postal traffic and ten percent for all other 
traffic. French aircraft would be responsible for flying the route, displaying a Chinese flag when 
traveling in Chinese territory.  
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granted permission to pass over Chinese territory, would fly between these two cities. 
Given the “extremely vigorous pressure of the Japanese,” Hirschauer anticipated that 
China would soon consent to this request for overflying rights.281  
By the start of 1935, French aviation interests were keenly aware of Great 
Britain’s goal of—and recent efforts toward—connecting Hong Kong to the British 
imperial air network across Southeast Asia. This reality provided additional motivation, 
and urgency, for France to become involved with the China—Europe mail circuit. 
Sardain writes that during the course of the year, representatives from CNAC informed 
the French that their airline would soon be in a position to offer service between Canton 
and Hanoi. On September 30, 1935, an accord was concluded in Nanking that allowed a 
Chinese company to fly between Hanoi and Canton via Fort Bayard.282  
In his study of CNAC, William M. Leary notes that the Chinese Ministry of 
Communications awarded the contract for this route to CNAC, much to the dismay of 
certain Chinese military officials. As reported in the Far Eastern Survey in late January 
1936, these officials objected to having the Sino-American CNAC be the designated 
airline. Their concerns, which were voiced to the Nanking government, related to the 
                                                
281 Hirschauer Mission, 1934. It appears that Air France would carry out the flights 
departing from Hanoi while the Chinese company would fly in the reverse direction. Also, this 
proposition indicated that French aircrews would pilot the route until the Chinese aviators were 
“sufficiently familiar with the line.” Finally, the terms for percentages and material and 
infrastructure reimbursements included in the proposal from May were retained in the October 
negotiations.  
282 Sardain, 48; AN 19830162/1, “Comité d’administration générale. Procès-verbal de la 
séance tenue le 16 octobre 1935.” The Chinese firm was obligated to make its flight schedule 
correspond to that of Air France. Sardain adds that officials foresaw that this agreement, which 
would purportedly be valid for seven years, would be followed in the next three months by an 
accord between Air France and CNAC to determine the terms and conditions of the route. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese airline was permitted to borrow pilots from CNAC and use aircraft 
similar to those of Air France during an initial transitory period of six months. In May 1936 a 
clause added to the agreement authorized the Chinese company to operate along an itinerary from 
Canton to Hanoi via Wuchow and Long Tchéou. Sardain, 48; Ferry 68.  
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possible negative repercussions of further foreign involvement in Chinese commercial 
aviation. Moreover, the military leaders campaigned for the Southwestern Aviation 
Corporation (hereafter SWAC) to operate the Canton—Hanoi air link; formed in 1934, 
SWAC was a Canton-based Chinese firm whose brief existence ended with bankruptcy in 
1938. Pointing out that the governments of Kwantung and Kwangsi jointly owned SWAC 
and the company’s planes were piloted by military aviators, Leary argues that the 
“nationalistic argument” of military officials “was largely if not wholly specious.” He 
further explains that “South China remained the center of opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, 
[and] the militarists pushed the claims of Southwestern in order to demonstrate their 
independence from Nanking. CNAC became caught in the middle.”283  
In the midst of this contentious situation and prior to launching service on the 
Canton—Hanoi route, CNAC attempted a pair of flights in mid-to-late February 1936. 
During the second of these voyage, authorities in Canton barred from proceeding further 
the CNAC plane arriving from Shanghai. As a result, CNAC decided to suspend 
operations on this line “until Canton and Nanking could settle their dispute.” Leary 
observes that “the action of the Cantonese dealt a sharp blow to the prestige of the 
Nationalists.” Officials in Nanking subsequently sought to soothe this escalating tension, 
at least temporarily: the Nationalist government “swallowed its pride, withdrew the 
contract from CNAC, and awarded the route to Southwestern.”284 Admittedly, the exact 
                                                
283 William M. Leary Jr., The Dragon’s Wings: The China National Aviation Corporation 
and the Development of Commercial Aviation in China (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 
1976), 103; “Protests Against New Chinese-French Airline,” Far Eastern Survey 5, no. 3 
(January 29, 1936): 29. 
284 Leary, 103. Hirschauer’s report provides additional details regarding the problems 
with the joint venture by Air France and CNAC to establish a Canton—Hanoi connection. 
Service on this line not only was expensive to operate—Hirschauer remarked that CNAC was to 
be entirely responsible for these costs—but also required certain upgrades to radio-meteorological 
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relationship between the September 1935 agreement, SWAC, and CNAC is not entirely 
clear.285  
On July 10, 1936, SWAC inaugurated its Canton-to-Hanoi air service. Reflective 
of the tenuous existence of this airline, Hirschauer was uncertain about the sustainability 
of this Franco-Chinese arrangement. “It is precarious,” he tersely acknowledged in 
commenting on this route, which he also described as having a mediocre value. 
Recognizing that the French fleet would shortly be outfitted with a model of newer, more 
powerful aircraft, Hirschauer contemplated a more reliable program for French 
commercial aviation in this region. “We have...to consider a complete transformation of 
our services toward the Far East,” he determined. In Hirschauer’s opinion, the French 
were thus “oblige[d] to examine the realization of a very sound connection” that linked 
Canton, Hong Kong, and Hanoi.286   
                                                                                                                                            
equipment. As a further hindrance, Air France continued to employ a type of aircraft on which “it 
was pointless to carry the slightest freight.” Hirschauer Mission, 1936. 
285 According to Cony and Ledet, French officials had previously entered into 
negotiations with SWAC representatives in order to find a more efficient means of delivering 
SWAC passengers and mail from Long Tchéou to Hanoi; the present schedule required a flight 
from Canton to Long Tchéou and then an automobile ride to Hanoi. For French interests, 
improving this transportation scheme would allow for easier access to departures from Hanoi on 
Air France’s link to the metropole. The chosen solution was simply a direct flight between 
Canton and Hanoi; this service, operated by SWAC, came into force in January 1936. As they 
traveled between Canton and Hanoi on this semiweekly route, SWAC planes alternated making 
stopovers at Long Tchéou and at Fort Bayard. Cony and Ledet, 501. It should be mentioned that, 
somewhat confusingly, an article from the spring of 1937 indicated that SWAC operated the 
Canton—Hanoi route in conjunction with CNAC. Russell E. Hall, “Expanding Airways in the Far 
East,” Far Eastern Survey 6, no. 9 (April 28, 1937): 97. 
286 Hirschauer Mission, 1936. Hirschauer remarked that while SWAC could not continue 
providing flights in the present conditions, the organization and the materials of the company 
could be renovated. In fact, the director of SWAC had approached Hirschauer and an Air France 
representative about this possibility in October 1936. The proposal—which essentially entailed 
the creation of a Sino-French airline—“was not categorically refused.” The French appeared 
unlikely to accept the offer though, particularly since another option for dealing with SWAC was 
to have CNAC undertake the improvements; Hirschauer favored the CNAC alternative. 
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 In the meantime, CNAC had concluded an agreement with Imperial Airways that, 
beginning November 5, 1936, allowed CNAC’s planes to stop in Hong Kong as they 
traveled on the company’s route from Shanghai to Canton. Hirschauer expressed his 
shock: “three months previously, we were still convinced that…CNAC would never 
receive authorization to land on an English base without giving an advantageous 
compensation in return!” Indeed, CNAC had been granted this permission without any 
apparent concession. With this development in mind, Hirschauer observed that the 
French and the British had each authorized a Chinese airline to land in their respective 
territories—SWAC in Hanoi and CNAC in Hong Kong—without receiving any flying 
accommodations in return.287 “But times change, viewpoints evolve,” he opined, 
explaining that “the English truth of June 1936 was no longer that of October 1936…and 
who knows if the Chinese truth of July 1936 will still be that of July 1937?”288  
While CNAC was allowed to fly to Hong Kong starting in November 1936, 
French aviation interests moved to gain access to the British enclave shortly thereafter. 
On December 17, 1936, Air France’s general manager reported that the airline was 
presently prepared to reattempt negotiations with the Chinese for extending its service 
from Hanoi to Hong Kong.289 Yet, as had typically been the case with the efforts to 
expand France’s air network in this part of the world, the achievement of this extension 
was a protracted process. In fact, it was not until the early spring of 1938 that the French 
                                                
287 With frustration, Hirschauer exclaimed that the French still needed to request 
authorization from Chinese officials when carrying out aero-medical evacuations from Fort 
Bayard.  
288 Hirschauer Mission, 1936. The British example was in reference to the change in 
status of CNAC right to land in Hong Kong, and the French example referred to China’s refusal 
to authorize foreign aircraft to fly over its territory.  
289 AN 19830162/1, “Comité d’administration générale. Procès-verbal de la séance tenue 
le 17 décembre 1936.”  
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were able to conclude an agreement with the Chinese. This accord, which was signed on 
March 25, permitted Air France to carry out weekly round-trip flights between Hanoi and 
Hong Kong, with a stopover at Fort Bayard; these voyages would be coordinated with the 
schedule for the France—Indochina connection.290 Transport on this line was set to begin 
in the summer, as an Air France communiqué announced that passenger and cargo 
service to Hong Kong would start on August 10.291  
Assessing the Hanoi—Hong Kong route several months later, officials appeared 
pleased with the line’s performance. At a late-November 1938 conference involving 
government and Air France representatives, it was suggested that the airline should 
double its “very satisfactory” service between the two cities.292 Yet a source observed 
                                                
290 ANOM, RSTNF 4242, “[L’Ambassadeur de France au Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères de Chine],” May 6, 1938. Cony and Ledet note that this agreement was approved by 
the Chinese government on May 1 and France’s Air Minister on June 16. The date on which 
France officially confirmed the plan for service to Hong Kong is not completely clear, as the 
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291 ANOM, RSTNF 2734, “Communiqué,” August 10, 1938. This communiqué indicated 
that the colonial administration still needed to determine the postal surtax before the line could be 
used for regular airmail deliveries. AN 19830162/2, “Comité d’administration générale. Procès-
verbal de la séance tenue le 7 juillet 1938.” On September 25, 1938, Air France began 
investigating a new course of travel through the southern part of the Mediterranean region to 
reach Damascus from Marseille. Aircraft following this itinerary—which was approximately five 
hundred kilometers shorter than the existing route, according to Ferry—flew from southern 
France to Damascus via Tunis, the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi, and Alexandria. Ferry 
identifies December 25, 1938, as the date on which Air France began using this course of travel. 
According to Cony and Ledet, this itinerary was definitively adopted in February 1939, a date 
after which passengers no longer needed to be transported by seaplane between Marseille and 
Damascus. Cony and Ledet 507; Ferry, 71.  
292 AN 19830162/2, “Compte rendu de la conférence tenue au Ministère de l’Air le 
mercredi 23 novembre [1938].” By the later 1930s, the French had concluded another noteworthy 
agreement for air service in this region. In this instance, the French were approached by 
representatives from Eurasia—this airline was a Sino-German firm that aimed to link China with 
Berlin via a northerly itinerary through Siberia—about having their company operate a route 
between Shanghai and Hanoi via Kunming. Eurasia’s first Kunming—Hanoi airmail flight took 
place on December 23, 1937. Hirschauer Mission, 1936; Cony and Ledet, 503. In addition, 
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that the Chinese apparently declined to renew the agreement for this route. The reason 
given was that the Chinese delegates were no longer interested in only the Hanoi—Hong 
Kong line but also desired to collaborate with the French on developing a link from 
Hanoi to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province.293 Negotiations for China to provide 
financial assistance for Air France to operate between these two cities—this service 
would then connect to Hong Kong—started by August 1939 but were soon interrupted by 
the outbreak of war in Europe. On April 17, 1940, French and Chinese representatives 
finally signed an agreement for air service to connect these two cities with Hanoi. 
According to Cony and Ledet, the terms of the agreement stated that Air France, with 
Chinese financial assistance, would provide fifty-two round-trip flights each year on a 
Kunming-Hanoi-Hong Kong route. However, this line was never inaugurated.294 
 
Weighing the Costs of Commercial Air Service and Indochina 
A prominent theme in the history of French commercial aviation to Indochina is 
that this enterprise was never profitable.295 As Hirschauer pointed out in 1936, “one will 
                                                                                                                                            
starting from 1939, the French worked to reach agreements with several other foreign airlines that 
aimed to provide service to this part of the world. Notable among these were Dutch, American, 
and Japanese aviation firms. For more information, see Evrard, 85, and Cony and Ledet, 510. 
293 AN 19830162/2, “Etat des négociations pour la ligne Kunming—Hanoi—Hong 
Kong,” February 1, 1940. Cooperation between French and Chinese interests for air service 
between Hanoi and Kunming had been under consideration since the spring of 1938, if not 
earlier. As explained by Air France’s managing director in early July, this arrangement was 
envisioned as entailing the establishment of a Sino-French company that would fly between these 
two locales. AN 19830162/2, “Comité d’administration générale. Procès-verbal de la séance 
tenue le 28 avril 1938”;AN 19830162/2, “Comité d’administration générale. Procès-verbal de la 
séance tenue le 7 juillet 1938.” 
294 AN 19830162/2, “Etat des négociations pour la ligne Kunming—Hanoi—Hong 
Kong,’ February 1, 1940; Evrard, 84; Cony and Ledet, 510. 
295 Emmanuel Chadeau characterizes Air France’s efforts in the later 1930s as split 
between managing its aerial network in Europe and the “ruinously expensive development toward 
Indochina.” Similarly, Robert Espérou notes that the commercial return for French air routes 
tended to be much lower for long-haul imperial lines than for the connections within Europe. 
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not fail to notice that the operation of the Far East line is very costly when it comes to its 
return.” He calculated that Air France’s commercial revenue for this line in 1935 
amounted to 7.5 million francs—the majority of which resulted from airmail—but the 
company’s expenses for this period stood at 26.7 million francs. Thus it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Air France relied so heavily on government subsidies for the 
functioning of its imperial routes during this era.296 Of course, the need for such 
significant financial assistance was only magnified by the economic woes of the 1930s.  
Moreover, the task of ensuring that aircraft were up-to-date, reliable, and 
competitive consistently proved to be a challenge for French government and airline 
officials. “Whatever the excellence of the maintenance,” Hirschauer opined, “the 
airframes gradually become distorted, the metal of the engines wears out, and, as the 
route’s [flying] material is deteriorating at a uniform pace, the day that the failure appears 
will be a kind of epidemic.” Already by the mid-1930s, observers were commenting on 
the need to replace the existing aircraft with a newer, more powerful model. With regard 
to the Air France fleet operating between Damascus and Saigon, Hirschauer estimated 
that September 1935 represented a date by which the following milestones would be 
reached: the entirety of the airframes would have surpassed 2500 flights hours; nine-
tenths of the engines would have exceeded 1500 flight hours; and twelve of these engines 
would have eclipsed 2000 flight hours. The impending exhaustion of the firm’s 
aeronautics equipment had potential negative consequences that extended beyond safety 
concerns. This material situation could hinder Air France’s ability to offer scheduled 
flights while also damaging French influence in Southeast and East Asia as European 
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296 Hirschauer Mission, 1936.  
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competitors—KLM in particular—showed themselves capable of providing faster air 
service to these areas of the globe.297 
An additional hurdle faced by French aviation in this period was that due to both 
the cost of the journey and the carrying capacity of the era’s planes, the volume of people 
and mail transported remained rather limited; indeed, Hirschauer reported in 1934 that 
passenger traffic on the France—Indochina route was presently “very low.” Aside from 
the fact that relatively few people needed or desired to journey by air from Europe to 
Southeast Asia at a given time, a primary cause for the limited traffic was that, simply 
put, air transport was expensive.298 Cony and Ledet provide an example of the high price 
of flying in the 1930s. In late November 1931, Minister of the Colonies Paul Reynaud 
returned to France by plane after completing an administrative tour of Indochina during 
the fall. Cony and Ledet ironically note that booking passage on this line “cost[ed] a mere 
20,000 francs.”299  
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298 Hirschauer Mission, 1934. From a different perspective, certain analyses determined 
that anxiety about flying was partially responsible for the fact that, in terms of the total numbers 
of passengers, fewer French men and women traveled by air compared to the German, British, 
and American populations. A study from the fall of 1934 traced the reluctance among the French 
to the persisting belief that aircraft were not particularly safe. The conclusion was that a more 
forceful propaganda push was needed to demonstrate that flying was “no more dangerous than 
any other means of rapid transportation.” AN 19830162/1, “La Compagnie Air France et les 
lignes aériennes françaises,” [November 19, 1934]. A contributing factor, and perhaps a major 
reason, for this lingering uneasiness about air travel was that the widely publicized crash of the 
Dewoitine D.332 Emeraude—a powerful, modern model that was to be employed on France’s 
long-haul air routes—remained fresh in the public memory. On its inaugural return trip from 
Saigon, the Emeraude crashed in the snowy countryside of central France on January 15, 1934, 
killing all ten individuals on board. Among the fatalities were several notable individuals: 
Pasquier, Chaumié, and Maurice Noguès. Outside of the deaths of several key figures for French 
aeronautics, this crash had lasting consequences for the nation’s commercial aviation. “This 
national tragedy affected Air France particularly strongly,” Cony and Ledet explain, “especially 
as [the event] delayed for a number of years the putting into service of the new metallic tri-motors 
on which the company pinned much hope.” Cony and Ledet, 494.  
299 Cony and Ledet, 489. Air Orient had started offering passenger service on its route to 
Southeast Asia in October. 
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In addition to being expensive, air travel between France and Indochina was an 
arduous experience for passengers. This characterization remained apt through most of 
the 1930s. By the summer of 1931, ten to twelve days were required to fly the nearly 
twelve thousand kilometers between Marseille and Saigon, with an average of eight days 
needed to journey from Baghdad to Saigon and through the nine stops in between. At the 
start of 1933, the time needed for the metropole—colony voyage had been reduced to 
eight days in the summer and nine days in the winter. Hirschauer reported that Air France 
required this same interval—an average of eight and a half days—to travel from 
Marseille to Hanoi in the fall of 1936. In comparison, Imperial Airways operated between 
London and Singapore in nine days, and KLM flew between Amsterdam and Singapore 
in only six days. For Air France, even with the incremental reductions in travel time, the 
trip to Southeast Asia remained a step-laden, multi-conveyance process involving both 
land and air transport into the late 1930s.300  
Despite the various challenges of linking France to Indochina by air, this line was 
not without tangible value. Moreover, the experience of air travel improved during the 
1930s. Indeed, Cony and Ledet describe an increase in traffic and cargo on this route 
each year from 1931 until 1933. By the end of the 1930s, the volume of material and 
passengers traveling along the line from France to Hanoi and Hong Kong had augmented 
considerably in comparison to earlier in the decade.301  Air France also worked to 
upgrade its fleet for the Indochina route in the later 1930s. At the end of November 1937, 
for example, an airline representative informed the Resident Superior of Tonkin that the 
                                                
300 “L’Essor aérien de la France vers l’Extrême-Orient (1930-1931),” 255; 256; Pierre 
Cordemoy, “Les lignes de navigation françaises de l’Indochine et du Pacifique,” Bulletin de 
l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine (January 1933): 5; Hirschauer Mission, 1936. 
301 Cony and Ledet, 489-491, 507. 
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inaugural flight on the new Dewoitine D.338—“one of the best machines currently 
circulating on the world’s commercial air routes”—was scheduled to arrive in Hanoi on 
December 1.302 Moreover, the Resident himself asserted that the incorporation of this 
aircraft model “marks an important development in our aerial relations with the 
metropole.” Indeed, a report from May 1938 stated that Dewoitine D.338 not only 
allowed the France—Indochina journey to be reduced to five and a half days but also 
provided passengers with enhanced comfort in the plane’s more spacious cabin.303 This 
estimation of the reduced travel time was for the most part accurate; Cony and Ledet 
observe that in the first months of 1939, the France—Saigon flight required five days 
while Hanoi could be reached in six. An additional half-day was needed to fly to Hong 
Kong.304  
 
                                                
302 According to Evrard, these Dewoitine aircraft only traveled between Damascus and 
Hanoi at this point. Seaplanes transported passengers and cargo between France and either Beirut, 
during the winter, or Tripoli, during the summer; Ferry points out that a newer model of seaplane 
had been installed on the Marseille—Tripoli portion of the line in 1935. From each of these 
stopovers, the next leg of the journey was the automobile trip to Damascus. Evrard, 83; Ferry, 68. 
303 The conditions for passengers had compared unfavorably to the flight experience 
offered by certain of Air France’s competitors through the mid-1930s. In 1934 Hirschauer 
admitted that the company’s customers who also had flown with KLM underlined the “absence of 
comfort” on the seaplanes employed for the Marseille—Beirut section and the “very relative 
comfort” of the airplanes used between Damascus and Indochina. Two years later he recounted 
the uncomfortable flight on the Fokker planes that were still being employed for this portion of 
the line. Passengers were exhausted after several days of spending multiple hours in this 
relatively slow, extremely noisy aircraft; this latter discomfort was worsened as travelers were 
forced to open the windows because the cabin otherwise lacked a suitable means of ventilation. 
Hirschauer Mission, 1934; Hirschauer Mission, 1936. 
304 ANOM, RSTNF 4254, “Monsieur le Résident Supérieur du Tonkin,” November 29, 
1937; ANOM, RSTNF 4254, “Le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin à Monsieur le Directeur de la 
Compagnie Air France,” December 8, 1937; AN 19830162/2, “Rapport du conseil 
d’administration à l’assemblée générale du 17 juin 1938,” [May 23, 1938]; Cony and Ledet, 507. 
By the beginning of October 1938, seven of these Dewoitine planes had been put into service on 
the metropole—colony route. Sardain, 51. Then, starting in December, flights from Marseille to 
Hanoi and to Hong Kong were carried out entirely on the Dewoitine D.338. Departing France, the 
aircraft traveled along the southern coast of the Mediterranean with stopovers at Benghazi and 
Alexandria before arriving in Beirut. Evrard, 83.  
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Conclusion 
 During the interwar period, metropolitan and colonial officials worked with 
aviation firms to develop air routes to, within, and through Indochina. Never understood 
as different projects, these efforts were viewed as being intertwined and leading toward a 
larger goal: the creation of a single transportation circuit that was rapid, profitable, and—
for national prestige—conspicuous. The establishment of these different air services 
proved to be a drawn-out and challenging process. From the mid-1920s until the start of 
the Second World War, commercial aviation hopes consistently bounded far ahead of the 
realities of air travel. The French were obligated to deal with foreign competition and 
what was considered an uncooperative attitude on the part of Thailand and China. Indeed, 
the reality of flying from France to Indochina and beyond in the interwar years was that 
foreign assistance and agreeability, while not always forthcoming, remained necessary. 
Furthermore, French commercial aviation encountered obstacles that related to 
technology, infrastructure, funding, and revenue; these issues proved problematic for 
other types of aviation in the colony as well.  
Though success was achieved with more difficulty and at a slower pace than 
aviation and government representatives had hoped, civil air transport had doubtless 
improved between 1920 and the end of the 1930s. While the number of routes and 
destinations expanded, air traffic increased, and service was offered with more regularity 
and speed. The following chapter, which considers medical aviation within Indochina, 
analyzes how the French sought to put the transport capabilities of planes to use for 
delivering patients, medical care—and even French civilizing power itself—to sites 
around the colony. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MOVING PATIENTS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES 
Speaking at a conference for colonial medical aviation held in Paris during the 
1931 Exposition Coloniale, Marcel Olivier, the fair’s Rapporteur General, had “expressed 
the hope of colonial officials in the development of medical aviation” when he asserted, 
“if the doctor treats, the medical aircraft saves!”305 Six years prior, Deputy Léon 
Archimbaud discussed how aircraft had provided crucial medical assistance in the French 
empire, stating that airplanes “have already saved human lives by transporting sick 
patients, wounded patients, doctors, and medicines.”306  
This pair of remarks shows the hopes for “medical aviation”—a term that this 
chapter uses to denote all manner of duties in the aeromedical realm—as well as the 
benefits and uses of air ambulances during the interwar period. In Indochina and 
throughout the empire, military and medical officials worked with colonial administrators 
to employ aircraft for evacuating sick and injured people and transporting medicine and 
healthcare personnel. In addition, medical aviation was viewed as a means of gaining 
control over the colonial landscape; the logic was that the possibility of swift access to 
medical care would make the tropical climate and inhospitable regions of Indochina less 
daunting for Europeans. Finally, the aeromedical service was used to bolster the image of 
France as a benevolent civilizing force, as medicine deliveries and aerial evacuations 
were said to offer a tangible example of France’s proclaimed civilizing mission in 
Southeast Asia. To demonstrate the aptitude of aircraft for these various tasks, the 
                                                
305 “Compte-rendus et voeux des congrès: Journées d’Aviation sanitaire coloniale,” Revue 
des Congrès. Organe officiel de l’Exposition internationale coloniale de 1931, 5.  
306 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Extrait du Rapport, fait au nom de la Commission des Finances 
chargée d’examiner le projet de Lois portant fixation du Budget Général de l’Exercice 1926 
(Ministère des Colonies et Budgets Locaux des Colonies) par M. Léon Archimbaud, Député,” 
[July 12, 1925; February 4, 1926] [hereafter “Extrait du Rapport”].  
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proponents of medical aviation often highlighted several purported benefits of flight 
technology, namely, speed, comfort, and safety.307 
As was the case with other types of aviation in Indochina though, the hopes and 
the realities of medical aviation diverged. In addition to the deficiencies of the aerial 
infrastructure and a lack of suitable aircraft, the colony’s unpredictable and uncooperative 
weather hindered the use of medical aviation. Two further challenges—neither of which 
had as negative an effect on the usage of aircraft for other purposes in the colony—
proved troublesome to the development of the aeromedical service. Specifically, medical 
aviation struggled to “get off the ground” due to the complexities of actually requesting 
an air ambulance. Moreover, there was simply a lack of need for aeromedical services in 
most areas of Indochina. In fact, by the early 1930s, discussions of medical aviation 
among colonial and military officials appeared to indicate that air ambulances were all 
but unnecessary and practically unused. Though the aeromedical service did see an 
increase in usage by the time France capitulated to Nazi Germany in June 1940, colonial 
medical aviation never reached heights that its proponents had envisioned. 
 
Initial Attempts at Medical Aviation in the Metropole 
While the use of aviation for medical purposes was an idea proposed as early as 
1910, aerial evacuations were not systematically employed by any of the belligerent 
nations during the First World War.308 Yet prior to the end of the conflict, more 
                                                
307 While this chapter focuses almost exclusively on the use of fixed-wheel aircraft for 
medical aviation, seaplanes were also utilized for these transports. See Christophe Cony and 
Michel Ledet, L’Aviation française en Indochine: Des origines à 1945 (Outreau: Lela Presse, 
2012), 224, 226, 278, 280, 283-285, 287, 292, 310. 
308 David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 187; David M. Lam, “The Aerochir: The First 
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sophisticated technology had been developed for delivering medical aid via aircraft. 
Specifically, a paper presented to the Académie nationale de médecine in September 
1918 reported on the functioning of a new medical airplane known as the “Aérochir.” 
This device was described a “radio-surgical airplane” that was capable of transporting a 
two-person surgical team and the requisite materials to perform on-site procedures.309 
Despite the successful demonstrations of the Aérochir in early March 1919 and the belief 
that this aircraft could potentially have “great utility” in the empire, the French 
government decided not to purchase the plane. In fact, air ambulances had already been 
employed in the colonies by this point, as several aeromedical flights had been carried 
out in Morocco in September 1918.310  
 
Discussions of Medical Aviation in the Empire 
As the previous paragraph suggests, the colonial domain appeared to offer more 
possibilities for medical aviation than did continental Europe. Many areas of the empire 
were without the established ground-based transportation networks that crisscrossed 
Europe, and, in addition, they often lacked a sufficient number of medical personnel and 
                                                                                                                                            
Flying Hospital,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 76, no.12 (December 2005): 
1174-1175. David M. Lam explains why airplanes were not regularly used for medical purposes 
during the conflict: “the exigencies of combat, combined with the general popular distrust of 
aircraft safety and the lack of sufficient numbers of suitable aircraft to provide any significant 
benefit to the large numbers of casualties being sustained, precluded their [medical planes] use to 
any significant degree.” Lam, 1175. 
309 M.A. Nemirovsky and M. Tilmant, “L’avion radio-chirurgical ‘Aérochir,’” Bulletin de 
l’Académie nationale de médecine, 82, series 3, volume 80 (1918): 202; Lam, 1176. 
310 Lam, 1176-1177; E.M. Cowell, “Air Ambulances,” Journal of the Royal Army 
Medical Corps 62, no. 4 (1934): 261. According to Cowell, eighteen wounded soldiers were 
evacuated by air from Tafilalet to Bou-Denib. Yet Jean-Baptiste Manchon notes that the 
“dramatic evacuation” on January 19, 1919, of General Joseph-François Poeymirau proved more 
significant for demonstrating the utility of medical aviation in the empire. Jean-Baptiste 
Manchon, L’aéronautique militaire française outre-mer, 1911-1939 (Paris: Presses de 
l’université Paris-Sorbonne, 2013), 411.  
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healthcare facilities. Moreover, certain regions of overseas France consisted of cities and 
villages separated by expanses of deserts, forests, and mountains. Colonial spaces such as 
these thus required a form of transport that could traverse vast stretches with relative 
ease. A circular of October 21, 1922, from the Minister of the Colonies described the 
difficulties that colonial medical services faced in providing timely assistance, 
referencing “the shortage of medical personnel in the colonies, the inadequacy of 
communication routes, [and] the considerable distance from certain healthcare 
facilities.”311  
On several occasions during the interwar period, colonial medical aviation was a 
topic of discussion in the Chamber of Deputies. For instance, Jacques Chassaing, a 
physician who had worked to organize aerial evacuations in the First World War, 
explained to the assembled Deputies in November 1926 that aeromedical transport was 
particularly useful in mountainous regions and deserts and in areas that were either 
lacking in security or possessed insufficient communication and transportation networks. 
Two years later Pierre Roux-Freissineng similarly reported to the Chamber on how 
aircraft offered a means of compensating for the inadequacies of the medical services and 
the shortage of doctors in French West and Equatorial Africa.312 
Observers generally identified three ways in which aircraft could be utilized to 
assist with medical care in the empire. First, planes could evacuate a patient toward a 
healthcare facility. Second, in cases where the sick or wounded individual was incapable 
of being transported to a hospital, a doctor could travel by air to the patient. Third, 
                                                
311 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Circulaire. Le Ministre des Colonies à Messieurs les 
Gouverneurs Généraux, Gouverneurs des Colonies et Commissaires de la République,” October 
21, 1922 [hereafter “Circulaire”].   
312 The information in this paragraph is from Manchon, 410. 
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aircraft allowed healthcare services to “exercise medical observation,” especially during 
periods of epidemics. In such a scenario, the standard modes of transport theoretically 
could not be used due to quarantine measures; a publication that appeared in conjunction 
with the 1931 colonial exposition elaborated: “by aircraft, the specialist doctor will 
rapidly be taken close to indigenous localities affected by plague, recurrent fever, [or] 
cholera, to provide support to the local physician and…the necessary prophylactic 
measures.”313  
 
The Appeal of Using Aircraft for Medical Purposes 
When discussing the advantages of air ambulances, observers typically cited three 
key assets: speed, safety, and comfort. Regarding the first of these benefits, sources 
remarked that a swift means of transportation was particularly valuable in the expanses of 
inhospitable landscape found in the empire. As noted in the ministerial circular of 
October 1922, an automobile ambulance was suitable for short, uncomplicated trips and 
in areas with well-built road networks. However, for longer journeys or travel through 
regions ravaged by infection, planes were preferable because they provided “rapid 
transport...with a desirable amount of security.”314  
Similarly, in explaining how the benefits of medical aviation greatly exceeded the 
drawbacks, the book from the colonial exposition emphasized the speed of aircraft.315 In 
                                                
313 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Indochine Française. Section générale. Troupes 
du groupe de l’Indochine. Les services militaires en Indochine (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-
Orient, 1931), 95-96 [hereafter Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en 
Indochine].  
314 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Circulaire,” October 21, 1922.  
315 These drawbacks were characterized as the abrupt drop in atmospheric pressure when 
flying, the high cost of this “new means of transport,” and, more basically, the “inherent danger” 
of flight. Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en Indochine, 92. Despite 
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fact, this writer contended that, overall, utilizing aeromedical transportation was actually 
cheaper than doing without this technology. The logic was that the costs associated with 
slower modes of medical evacuation—namely, “the losses in human capital,” the 
“interminable days of hospitalization,” and the pensions for invalidity—were higher than 
the total expenses of employing an air ambulance service. Moreover, the publication 
pointed out that a faster evacuation “makes it possible to reduce to a minimum” the 
number of dressings required for infected wounds; this comment implied that an 
aeromedical delivery allowed a patient to receive care in a timely fashion, thus limiting 
the spread of infection.316  
Observers also viewed air ambulances as a relatively comfortable option for 
patient transport. As the book from the colonial exposition stated, “there is no mode of 
transport better tolerated than the medical aircraft.” Because the patient could be 
stabilized in a recumbent position at the center of the plane, the writer argued, the air 
ambulance “prevails over the comfort of any other vehicle.”317 Likewise, two French 
officers praised aeromedical transport as both smoother and faster than conventional 
means of evacuation. The airplane, they declared in 1921, had “the dual humanitarian 
                                                                                                                                            
such concerns, aircraft appear to have been a relatively safe choice for medical transport in the 
French empire. For example, Manchon reports that in Morocco and the Levant from the 
establishment of aeromedical services until the end of August 1926, there had been only two 
accidents out of a total of more than three thousand aerial evacuations. More generally, the 
Colonial Exposition book noted that an air ambulance put the patient in no more mortal danger 
than did general anesthesia. In any case, Cowell reasoned that “the possible risks consequent on 
air transport are less dangerous than the certainty of fatal consequences if the man is not 
evacuated rapidly to hospital.” Manchon, 414; Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices 
militaires en Indochine, 100; Cowell, 264.   
316 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en Indochine, 100-101.  
317 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en Indochine, 95.  
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purpose of sparing the wounded from horrible suffering…and giving them…every 
chance for surgical salvation.”318  
Contemporary sources recognized that an aeromedical service would greatly 
benefit the French in Southeast Asia. In 1920, for example, Alfred Guyomar wrote that 
the air ambulance was valuable for an area like Indochina, where “communications are 
difficult and important urban areas are rare and distant.” In addition, the colony had only 
a few major medical centers (grands centres sanitaires), a fact that in and of itself made 
rapid transport to a healthcare facility difficult. Furthermore, as one writer noted with 
regard to the size of the territory, “the distance of the interior urban areas is sometimes 
such that it does not allow repatriates, convalescents, or those suffering from severe 
anemia after tropical maladies to be taken [quickly] to ports of embarkation.” The 
expansiveness of Indochina exacerbated the colony’s perceived shortage of physicians. 
Though “few in number,” the doctors were responsible for “extremely vast districts” and 
were obligated to travel “by rudimentary means” through “chaotic regions.” Aircraft 
appeared to provide a solution for these challenges: “the airplane, even if not exclusively 
medical, will serve the doctor as a means of transport [italics original].”319 
Sources also presented air ambulances as the best option for evacuating patients 
within Indochina. For instance, the publication from the colonial exposition presented a 
                                                
318 Captain Plantey and Medical Officer Vincent, “Les avions sanitaires,” L’Aéronautique 
3, no. 29 (October 1921): 398. The latter part of this comment was supported by evidence, at least 
in the case of the Druze rebellion in Syria. In 1926, twenty individuals died out of the 385 
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S. Montégout, 1920), 23; Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en 
Indochine, 92, 94-95. 
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lengthy comparison that highlighted how aeromedical transportation was the safest, least 
painful way to reach a medical facility. With a skilled aviator at the controls of a reliable 
aircraft, the patient was provided with “security [that] is greater than with the fragile 
sampans or the automobiles that drive on rutted colonial roads.” The author elaborated on 
the undesirable scenario in which an individual needing medical care would find him or 
herself when being transported by land: “evacuated by cacolet or litter along rutted, rain-
soaked paths, the sick suffer difficult journeys. Jolted on the ground, they are then loaded 
on dugout canoes, sampans, or ferryboats and reach their destination only after [a] 
considerable [number of] stops.”320 This ordeal was further aggravated by the colony’s 
unforgiving climate, whose humidity and “sauna temperature crushes the willpower and 
thought…of even a fit European.” Spending a lengthy amount of time in this oppressive 
atmosphere could only complicate illness and injury. To make matters worse, the 
conditions of overland transport had the potential to expose a wound to various types of 
organic matter, thus causing or advancing an infection.321  
 
Medical Aviation in Indochina 
The circular of October 1922 pointed to the organization of the aeromedical 
services in North Africa and the Middle East as models of how medical aviation should 
be arranged elsewhere in the French empire, namely, French West Africa and 
Indochina.322 Indeed, according to historian John S. Haller, by the mid-1920s the French 
                                                
320 Of course, the presented scene entailed conditions that were almost ideal for the 
airplane option but were far from perfect for the other conveyances. 
321 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en Indochine, 100, 92-93.  
322 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Circulaire,” October 21, 1922. In French West Africa, 
authorities began experimenting with medical aviation at the end of 1922; aeromedical services 
“operated regularly” in this federation by 1926. Manchon, 417. Medical aviation was developed 
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experiences in Morocco and the Levant had “demonstrated conclusively” that aerial 
evacuations were essentially as safe and no more costly than ground transportation.323 
Yet even prior to this directive, colonial and military officials were working to establish 
an aeromedical service in Indochina. By the middle of the 1920s, the French were putting 
the colony’s limited number of medical planes to use for a variety of relevant tasks.324 
Also by this point in the decade, officials had drawn up regulations for authorizing and 
funding aerial evacuations within Indochina.325 Air ambulances were most frequently 
utilized  in the colonyfor transporting medicines, patients, and physicians. In addition, 
medical aviation did occasionally function as a form of propaganda that aimed to both 
provide a sense of security to Europeans and reinforce the image of France as a 
benevolent civilizing power.   
                                                                                                                                            
comparatively late in other areas of the French Empire. For information about the air ambulance 
services in Algeria, Tunisia, French Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar, see Manchon 418-422.  
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Internationale de Paris 1931: Rapport général, vol. 5, bk. 1, Les sections coloniales (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale,1933), 470; Omissi, 187; and Manchon, 415. 
324 This point suggests a corrective to Manchon’s argument that “medical aviation was 
organized much later in Indochina” than in other areas of the empire. Manchon, 417.  
325 A decree issued by Indochina’s Governor General on April 2, 1924, outlined the 
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aircrew and a compensation “equal to the sum that would have been spent for evacuation by 
standard means (railroad, boat, etc).” If the evacuation was for active military personnel, the 
colonial budget was charged. For civil servants, non-active military personnel, and the indigent, 
the appropriate local budget was responsible for payment. Ordinary individuals needing an air 
ambulance were required to cover the costs themselves. Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les 
sevices militaires en Indochine, 99. 
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In early March 1919 and with the First World War having mercifully ended the 
previous fall, Minister of the Colonies Henry Simon informed Governor General Albert 
Sarraut that the duties of Indochina’s nascent air force included medical transportation. 
Then, during the last six months of 1921, the squadrons in Tonkin and Cochinchina each 
received a pair of airplanes that were to be employed as air ambulances.326 A test flight 
for one of these aircraft—“constructed and equipped to transport the wounded and 
operate [on patients] if needed”—was carried out at the airfield near Saigon at the 
beginning of December 1921.327  
Despite this seemingly promising start, medical aviation in Indochina soon 
experienced a setback. Two of the medical aircraft were subsequently been destroyed 
while attempting to land, and, by early February 1924, replacements had yet to be 
furnished.328 Moreover, colonial authorities were not confident in the capabilities of the 
remaining pair of air ambulances, with two officials agreeing that these “very fatigued” 
planes needed to be supplemented by additional aircraft.329 A low point for medical 
                                                
326 Cony and Ledet, 34, 61. These authors report that the four planes were the Breguet 14 
Tbis, which, Lam notes, markedly improved on the previous model. As described by Plantey and 
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aviation appears to have been reached by the end of May 1925. On May 28 it was 
reported that the Tonkin squadron “does not even have a surgical airplane.”330  
While this material situation had improved by the end of the 1920s, this progress 
brought medical aviation to a satisfactory level of operation for only a brief period of 
time. By the beginning of 1929, the aeromedical service once again counted four total 
aircraft.331 In a report dated January 3, Major General Aubert, the colony’s Commandant 
Superior, stated that each of these planes “is in good condition [and] ready for use.” He 
judged the current fleet of air ambulances as sufficient for the colony’s needs, observing 
that it was, for the moment, unnecessary to outfit other, non-specialized aircraft for use as 
medical transports.332 However, by the fall of 1930, the quality of the aeromedical service 
had once again degraded. In October of that year, Lieutenant Colonel Louis de Durand de 
Prémorel described Indochina’s Breguet 14 Tbis airplanes as “obsolete aircraft” with 
“well-worn engines.” While indicating that these planes were still capable of assuring 
“some services,” de Prémorel felt that this model needed to be replaced by another type 
in the foreseeable future. Likewise, in November the colony’s Inspector General for 
Health and Medical Services remarked that the “flying material” currently in use seemed 
to be “a bit old” and needed to be modernized.333  
                                                                                                                                            
sur l’organisation de l’aviation militaire sanitaire en Indochine (Exécution des prescriptions de la 
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As the air force presence in Indochina expanded during the 1930s, the 
aeromedical service was improved in terms of quantity, quality, and functioning. At the 
start of 1933, the colony’s four squadrons each received a Potez 29 airplane; these 
aircraft were to replace the “antiquated Breguet 14 Tbis limousines.”334 Five years later, 
there were six air ambulances in Indochina, two of which were held in reserve, and, by 
the spring of 1940, seven Potez 29s were stationed in the colony.335 The local network of 
landing fields and hospitals became better coordinated as well. According to a May 1931 
report from Captain Pierre Paquier, specific “medical terrains” (terrains sanitaires)—
alternately “medical airfields” (aérodromes sanitaires)—were designated within 
Indochina’s expanding web of landing sites; Paquier indicated that these special landing 
fields were reserved for use by the air force for medical purposes. Moreover, the medical 
airfields were organized into a network of five large zones that corresponded to the five 
principal hospital centers within Indochina: Hanoi, Saigon, Hué, Vientiane, and Phnom-
Penh.336  
                                                                                                                                            
Groupe de l’Indochine,” October 8, 1930; ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Médecin Général Inspecteur 
Gaide Inspecteur Général des Services Sanitaires et Médicaux de l’Indochine à Monsieur le 
Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” November 10, 1930.  
334 Cony and Ledet, 202. This newer plane was capable of transporting three stretcher-
bound patients as well as a seated physician or nurse in its closed cabin. Compared to the Breguet 
14 Tbis, the Potez 29 allowed for easier loading of patients and possessed superior insulation and 
ventilation. Manchon, 420.  
335 SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Formations de l’Armée de l’Air détachées en Indochine,” [July 20, 
1938]; SHAA, 2B33/D2, “Note pour le Cabinet Militaire,” May 3, 1940. Regarding the first 
source in this footnote, the information is from a table found in a folder marked “Dotations 
Avions aux Colonies.” A handwritten edit to this table cites changes made to the documet on 
December 12, 1938; thus the data could be current for December instead of July 1938. 
336 The center to which an air ambulance aircraft was to be directed was flexible though. 
“This organization is not mandatory,” Paquier explained, “the doctor...has complete latitude for 
designating the airfield to which the evacuation seems easiest.” SHAA, 2B33/D4, “Destinataire: 
M. le Colonel Augereau. Les terrains d’aviation en Indochine, par le Capitaine Paquier,” May 2, 
1931. Around the same time that this report was composed, a physician proposed the installation 
of “hospital ships” (navires hôpitaux) near Saigon, Haiphong, and Tourane. In this scheme—
which appears to have remained unrealized—these floating medical centers would serve as bases 
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From the early 1920s, the aeromedical service was charged with an assortment of 
missions within Indochina. While the air force carried out the majority of this work, civil 
aviation was involved in at least some capacity.337 In addition to transporting patients and 
medical personnel, air ambulances delivered medical supplies on request. In late 
November 1922, for instance, air force commandant François Glaize reported that the 
Service de Santé had inquired about having “a certain amount of fresh vaccine” 
transported by plane. More broadly, a guidebook for Indochina stated that aircraft ferried 
up to five million doses of vaccines each year by 1931.338  
Despite what this figure for deliveries of medicines suggests, the majority of 
aeromedical missions in Indochina involved the transport of medical personnel or 
patients. The specifics of these flights variety a great deal. In describing the work of 
medical aviation in the colony, the publication from the colonial exposition included the 
following examples: the transport of a gravely ill noncommissioned officer from Lai 
Chau in northwest Tonkin to Hanoi; the evacuation of a seriously injured Lieutenant 
                                                                                                                                            
to which seaplanes would transport patients. Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices 
militaires en Indochine, 97, n.1. 
337 In the early 1920s, the managing director of the Compagnie Aéronautique Française 
d’Extrême Orient presented a plan to Governor General Martial Merlin that included a weekly air 
ambulance service for seriously ill patients along a section of one of the firm’s proposed routes. 
In addition, during the 1931 colonial exposition, the Compagnie Aérienne Française was 
recognized for having played a role in transporting patients in the colony. Later, in June 1940, the 
Governor General requisitioned an aging airplane from Air France’s Indochina fleet. However, 
after being delivered to the air force and outfitted to function as an ambulance, this plane was 
damaged during a test flight that took place on July 2, 1940. As a final point, observers recounted 
specific instances in which civilian aircraft were used for aerial evacuations. In December 1930, 
for example, an Air Orient plane transported a European shark-attack victim from the coast of 
Annam to a hospital in Saigon. The information in this footnote is gleaned from Cony and Ledet, 
477, 310; “Compte-rendus et voeux des congrès: Journées d’Aviation sanitaire coloniale,” 7; and 
Olivier, vol. 5, bk. 1, 471. 
338 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique 
d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe 
de l’Indochine (pour être transmis à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine),” 
November 29, 1922; Henri Gourdon, L’Indochine (Paris: Larousse, 1931), 141. 
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Boulmer from Quang Yen in northeast Tonkin to Hanoi in January 1930; and the delivery 
of a civilian with a life-threatening head wound from Luang Prabang to Vientiane.339 
Presumably one of the most notable patients to be evacuated by air was Emperor Bao Dai 
near the end of 1938.340 This transport is especially noteworthy because it represents one 
of the few instances in which the local population—though, in this case, the 
representative was a royal official who was probably more highly regarded by the 
colonizers than was a regular native——was directly in contact with a technology to 
which the French controlled access.  
Officials understood that, aside from supplying lifesaving assistance, an 
aeromedical mission could have a propaganda effect that was beneficial to France’s 
imperial cause. The logic was that an aeromedical transport—a dramatic display of 
French capabilities in flight technology and medicine—would serve not only to reassure 
those Europeans residing in the colonies but also to demonstrate French authority and 
benevolence among the colonized. The author of the colonial exposition book explained 
that medical aircraft played a “psychological role” (rôle moral de l’avion sanitaire) by 
alleviating the anxieties of Europeans in Southeast Asia341: “a European [who is] isolated 
in the Indochinese brush will know that, in the event of an accident or grave illness, he 
                                                
339 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en Indochine, 100. 
340 “L’Accident de S.M. Bao Daï,” L’Illustration, December 24, 1938. The sovereign had 
traveled to Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands region of Annam for a hunting excursion in 
December 1938. While waiting for the expedition to begin, the Emperor broke his left leg playing 
soccer. Subsequently, an air ambulance, accompanied by an escort plane, flew Bao Dai from Ban 
Me Thuot to the Bien Hoa airport on the morning of December 15. He was then delivered to a 
hospital in Saigon. This aerial evacuation had a propaganda effect that was perhaps unintended. 
Bruce McFarland Lockhart writes that the flight was advantageous for Bao Dai’s public image, as 
a sovereign had not visited Cochinchina in many years. Bruce McFarland Lockhart, The End of 
the Vietnamese Monarchy (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International Studies, 1993), 93. 
341 The decree of July 10, 1929—discussed later in this chapter—made a similar reference 
to “moral support” (l’appui moral) and medical aviation. ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Lieutenant-
Colonel de Prémorel, Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine à M. le Général de Division, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine,” September 17, 1929. 
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can be transported rapidly to a healthcare facility.” In a presentation on medical aviation, 
E.M. Cowell likewise argued that “colonists have a greater sense of security when they 
know that in case of illness, they or members of their families can be rapidly transported 
to hospital.”342 
In addition, medical aviation was recognized as having a positive effect for 
France’s proclaimed civilizing mission. Officials planned for Europeans and non-
Europeans alike to have access to air ambulances throughout the French empire. In 1926 
Chassaing, for example, noted that in Morocco and the Levant, aerial evacuations were 
available to all patients. Similarly for Indochina, Secretary General René Robin pointed 
out to the Minister of the Colonies that “it goes without saying that [medical aviation] 
would apply without distinction to all Europeans and to all the Natives of Indochina.”343 
Yet officials also understood that using medical aircraft to help the local populations was 
a means of enhancing French colonial authority. Remarking that air ambulances provided 
aid to “indigenous nomads,” a military physician asserted that this particular assistance 
“plays a most important role in the pacification and the colonization of regions subject to 
the influence of France.” This official, a Dr. Martinet, stated that an airplane both 
multiplied a doctor’s influence and increased the prestige of aviation in the eyes of the 
native peoples. As a result, the aeromedical service “constitutes an agent of medical 
propaganda rather than a clinic branch.” Similarly, another writer described how, “in the 
indigenous milieu,” aviation doubtlessly contributed to advancing both “medical care 
policy” and the work of “bush doctors...in their civilizing mission.” This observer thus 
                                                
342 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en Indochine, 100; Cowell, 
263. 
343 Manchon, 414-415; ANOM, GGI 66499, “Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies 
(Inspection Générale du Service de Santé), September 13, 1923. 
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declared that the continued progress of the aeromedical service was intertwined with “our 
civilizing work in Indochina.”344  
A late-December 1930 letter from Jules Bosc, the Resident Superior of Laos, 
provides a more specific example of medical aviation functioning as both lifesaver and 
propaganda tool. In this correspondence, Bosc recounted a discussion with the chief army 
physician in Luang Prabang Province, a doctor Vogel, while the Resident was conducting 
an aerial tour in Upper Laos earlier in the month. Vogel reported that a European woman, 
suffering from a severely infected abscess in her arm, required an operation that required 
two doctors and a general anesthetic, none of which the local facilities had available. 
Consequently, one of the aircraft that accompanied Bosc was dispatched to Vientiane to 
retrieve an additional physician and the medicine. The mission achieved its goals, and the 
patient underwent a successful operation the following day. Bosc highlighted how the 
plane had delivered timely aid in a seemingly miraculous manner. He characterized the 
outcome of the surgery as an “unexpected result that could not have been obtained 
without the providential support that the airplane was able to furnish at the critical 
moment and in a minimum amount of time.”345  
While Resident Bosc’s commentary underscores the vital aid that aircraft 
delivered, Bosc also emphasized the important propaganda effect of this aerial assistance. 
The news of this event “spread like wildfire” and even seemed to have a dramatic effect 
on the local population. In the most favorable conditions, the Resident explained, the trip 
from Luang Prabang to Vientiane regularly required around two weeks. Thus the 
                                                
344 “Compte-rendus et voeux des congrès: Journées d’Aviation sanitaire coloniale,” 5; 
Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en Indochine, 100-101.  
345 ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” December 25, 1930.  
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indigenous peoples “had difficulty conceiving the miracle by which the voyage [by 
plane]…has just been accomplished in less than four hours.” In Bosc’s view, the French 
reaped immediate benefits from this flight: “there’s nothing like it for fueling a 
propaganda in favor of French aviation.”346  
 
Limitations and Impediments to Medical Aviation in Indochina 
Along with deficiencies in infrastructure and aircraft, challenging weather 
conditions and an overly complex system for requesting missions hindered the progress 
of medical aviation in Indochina. A final—and perhaps decisive—issue in the slow 
development of aeromedical services was that, simply put, this type of assistance was not 
often needed in the colony. The overall situation, then, was that medical aviation was 
judged to be of great benefit to the French and their colonial project, but only when used 
in certain parts of Indochina. Problematically though, these areas—Laos and parts of 
Tonkin—lacked sufficient infrastructure and aircraft and had weather that was 
unfavorable to flying. 
 Various officials pointed out that the reason that aerial evacuations were not often 
required was that much of the colony already had more convenient options available for 
medical transportation. This proved to be the case even as early as the first half of the 
1920s. For example, in September 1923 Secretary General Robin informed the Minister 
of the Colonies that an air ambulance service was for the most part unnecessary in 
Cochinchina, Cambodia, the coast of Annam, and the middle region and delta of Tonkin. 
Each of these areas, Robin wrote, possessed either a river route or a road or rail network 
                                                
346 ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” December 25, 1930.  
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that allowed for “rapid evacuation” of sick or wounded patients to a healthcare facility 
“supposing that they cannot be treated on site.” In addition, the Secretary General 
examined the option of using non-military planes as air ambulances. Robin concluded 
that the part of Indochina in which civil aviation was most developed, Cochinchina, in 
fact did not need to rely on aerial evacuations because the territory was equipped with 
both enough accessible healthcare facilities and adequate means of transporting the sick 
and wounded.347 
The Secretary General did note, though, that medical aviation could be usefully 
employed in Laos and the upper region of Tonkin. Robin observed that these two areas 
not only were difficult to access but also lacked a “significant medical center.” However, 
according to the information he had obtained, “these remote parts of the colony do not 
have...organized landing sites.” As this comment implies, the absence of a suitable aerial 
infrastructure in the colony impeded the development of medical aviation precisely where 
this service seemed to be most needed. Robin’s point thus reinforces a larger theme of 
this dissertation, namely, the large extent to which the deficiencies on the ground—the 
infrastructure in this instance—prevented aviation from taking full flight in Indochina.348  
In late May 1925 Major General Andlauer, Indochina’s Commandant Superior, 
described the insufficiencies of the aeromedical service.349 He reiterated Robin’s 
                                                
347 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies (Inspection Générale du 
Service de Santé), September 13, 1923. 
348 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies (Inspection Générale du 
Service de Santé), September 13, 1923.  
349 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Considérations,” May 28, 1925. The rather unflattering start to 
this report, which was a survey of aviation in the colony, set the tone for the remainder of this 
assessment: “although Indochina’s Aviation has succeeded in recent years in rendering 
appreciable services to the military services…and the civil services of the Colony…, I cannot say 
that it constitutes an organization that can always [be relied on] and that would have the 
productivity that one would expect.” 
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observation about the limited accessibility to, and infrastructure within, the areas of the 
colony in which air ambulances would be most beneficial; more specifically, he 
identified the upper regions of Laos, Tonkin, and Annam as lacking hangars, airfields, 
and shelters. Moreover, Andlauer reported that the meteorological service tended to have 
incomplete coverage of the parts of the colony that were mountainous and remote. The 
Major General found that the prospect of planning and carrying out any type of aviation 
mission in these particular areas was challenging. “In the presence of the uncertainty of 
voyages in the upper region,” he stated, “I would not take it upon myself to order, for a 
fixed day and a defined hour, either an actual aerial military operation, or an emergency 
medical mission.” Andlauer contended that the weather caused further difficulties, as 
aircraft were unable to reach the upper part of Tonkin for twenty to thirty consecutive 
days at certain times of the year.350 Obviously, not being able to deploy an aerial 
evacuation when needed—and having lengthy periods in which planes could not be sent 
to certain regions—could have a fatal outcome in urgent cases.  
The issue of an inadequate aerial infrastructure and how it affected medical 
aviation continued to concern French officials into the late 1920s. In January 1929 Major 
General Aubert observed that the problem with Indochina’s aeromedical service was that 
the available aircraft were “virtually unused.” In fact, only a single aerial evacuation had 
occurred since the Breguet 14 Tbis airplanes had arrived in the colony seven years 
earlier.351 “These mediocre results,” Aubert explained, “are the consequence of the 
                                                
350 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Considérations,” May 28, 1925.  
351 Cony and Ledet, 134. This medical transport took place on June 7, 1928, and entailed 
the evacuation of a European noncommissioned officer from Cao Bang in the north of Tonkin to 
Hanoi. ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Général de Division Aubert, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” January 3, 1929.  
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difficulties into which we run in the cases where the utilization of medical aviation would 
genuinely be advantageous.”352  
Like Andlauer, Aubert echoed Robin’s opinions regarding the parts of Indochina 
in which medical aviation would be most helpful. Aubert also agreed that aeromedical 
transport was not needed in the delta regions of the colony because much of this area 
already had terrestrial routes that allowed for evacuations that were “almost as rapid as by 
air.” which was a view shared by other officials as well.353 As Aubert remarked at the end 
of his report, “the medical airplane is not regularly usable in Indochina where there are 
methods that are simpler, cheaper, and nearly as rapid.” In Laos and northern Tonkin 
though, an air ambulance service “would present an interest of the first order.” In 
Aubert’s judgment, medical aviation was especially valuable in circumstances “where the 
conditions of distance, terrain, and atmosphere are brought together.”354 
 This trio of conditions was of course apparent in Laos and northern Tonkin. 
However, for these very reasons, flying to these areas was still “unpredictable, dangerous, 
and even impossible.”  Like other contemporaries, Aubert pinpointed unfavorable 
weather and the shortcomings of the aviation infrastructure as the primary obstacles for 
pilots seeking to travel to these regions. “Certain areas will be a hindrance either during a 
part of the year, due to the meteorological conditions,” Aubert wrote, “or permanently, 
                                                
352 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Général de Division Aubert, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” January 3, 1929.  
353 This view was shared by other officials as well. For instance, a military physician 
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possessed “well-appointed” medical services. This doctor determined that medical aviation was 
needed only in the mountains of Laos and certain parts of upper Tonkin. “Compte-rendus et 
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due to the total absence of terrains and the impossibility of constructing them.”355 
Concerns about the local weather and infrastructure were voiced as late as 1931. As the 
publication from the Colonial Exposition commented, these problems “limit the 
possibilities of medical aircraft.”356 
Several months after Aubert drafted his report, air force commandant de Prémorel 
lamented to Aubert that “medical aviation in Indochina does not render the services that 
we have the right to expect of it.” In this letter from mid-August, de Prémorel declared 
that the colony’s aeromedical service “seems to have been completely lost from view.” 
As evidence, he cited the lone aerial evacuation that had been carried out in 1928 and 
added that no air ambulances had thus far been utilized in 1929. To increase the 
frequency with which medical aircraft were deployed, de Prémorel proposed a program 
for enhancing the functioning of local aeromedical service. More specifically, this four-
part plan entailed the following measures: upgrading the airfield network; streamlining 
the process for requesting aerial evacuations; replacing the Breguet 14 Tbis aircraft with 
“more modern airplanes” that could more easily manage the smaller landing fields that 
dotted the hilly terrain where air ambulances were most often required357; and defining a 
                                                
355 Aubert elaborated on these two problems. Regarding the weather, he stated that a 
particularly challenging issue was that meteorological conditions tended to differ greatly on either 
side of the Annamese Mountains. Often, clear weather in Hanoi corresponded to overcast 
conditions in Laos or Lai Chau, located in northwest Tonkin. Aubert also described his four main 
concerns with the existing infrastructure: the number of airfields and auxiliary airstrips were both 
inadequate; the landing terrains were “often impracticable” in rainy weather; many of the 
runways could not accommodate a fully loaded Breguet 14 Tbis plane; and, generally, the 
topography of both northern Tonkin and Laos was poorly suited to aircraft landings, thus making 
emergency landings “very dangerous.” ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Général de Division Aubert, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à M. le Gouverneur Général de 
l’Indochine,” January 3, 1929.  
356 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les sevices militaires en Indochine, 97. 
357 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Lieutenant-Colonel de Prémorel, Commandant 
l’Aéronautique d’Indochine, à M. le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du 
Groupe de l’Indochine,” August 17, 1929. According to Manchon, the Breguet 14 Tbis was 
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set of the regulations for the aeromedical services.358 Seeming to validate at least part of 
this program, Aubert replied that an aeromedical service could not be consistently 
employed where it was most needed—Laos and northern Tonkin—until improvements 
were made to the regions’ airfields and the Breguet 14 Tbis was replaced by a different 
model of air ambulance.359  
A memorandum from the fall of 1929, likely composed after this written 
exchange between de Prémorel and Aubert, identified another issue that impeded the 
work of medical aviation in Indochina: the complicated process for actually requesting an 
air ambulance.360 This problem was becoming apparent earlier in the decade. As Cony 
and Ledet remark in analyzing the procedure for summoning an aeromedical transport in 
the early 1920s, “to call upon an Aérochir is not easy.” At this point in the decade, they 
explain, only the Governor General and the Commandant Superior could approve such a 
mission. Unsurprisingly, this requisite authorization could significantly delay the 
deployment of a critically needed air ambulance. Cony and Ledet provide an example 
from January 1924 of precisely such a scenario: while the commander of the Cochinchina 
squadron awaited flight clearance from the government in Hanoi, the chief physician in 
Saigon’s hospital was unable to travel by plane to Qui Nhon to perform an emergency 
                                                                                                                                            
difficult to fly and needed over six hundred meters of “well-cleared runway” to take off and land 
safely. Manchon, 416.  
358 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Lieutenant-Colonel de Prémorel, Commandant 
l’Aéronautique d’Indochine, à M. le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du 
Groupe de l’Indochine,” August 17, 1929. De Prémorel reported that the Air Ministry was 
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would factor into the proffered regulations. 
359 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Général de Division Aubert, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Lieutenant-Colonel, Commandant 
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August—contains points of disagreement and misunderstanding. 
360 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Note sur l’Aviation,” n.d. For an explanation of this document’s 
date, see footnote three of chapter one.  
 158 
operation. The mismanagement of this incident contrasted sharply—and the French were 
aware of this contrast—with the functioning of Thailand’s aeromedical service, which 
was regularly carrying out transports by this time.361  
Returning to the end of the 1920s, the memo from the fall of 1929 determined that 
the paperwork involved with ordering an aerial evacuation had of late become excessive. 
Specifically, this memo’s author pointed to a decree issued by the Minister of the 
Colonies on July 10, 1929. This decree, which sought to expand the use of air 
ambulances in the empire, was a modification of an earlier directive that dealt with 
aviation requests more generally. Assessing this prior directive—which was dated June 
29, 1927—the author noted that the decree was intended to save time when requesting 
medical missions. “Only the Governor General’s authority comes into play,” the 
memorandum explained, stating that “the order must come from him.”362 
Yet the memo judged that the directive of July 1929 needlessly complicated this 
process. According to this later decree, the Commandant Superior—either “on request or 
requisition from the Governors or Residents Superior”—was charged with making 
arrangements for military aircraft to be used as air ambulances for non-military 
personnel. The author lamented that the more recent directive “runs the risk of delaying 
evacuations[,] however urgent they may be.” As an example, the memorandum 
referenced a case in which a M. Tesson had submitted a request “around October 7” for 
an aeromedical transport to deliver his wife and infant from Xieng Khouang to Hanoi. 
Having to first be approved by the Commandant Superior, the request only reached the 
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appropriate air force official on October 14. An additional delay resulted from the fact 
that a dispatch still needed to be sent to the Resident of Xieng Khouang regarding the 
condition of the local airfield. The memo’s author commented that while this particular 
example was not an urgent mission, “there is no doubt that in the event of illnesses or 
serious injuries the patient would have plenty of time to die before the airplane could 
rescue him.”363 Indeed, as depicted in the publication from the 1931 exposition, the 
system for requesting an air ambulance in Indochina certainly appears as a complex, step-
laden procedure.364 
Into the early 1930s, discussions continued about how to increase both the 
efficiency of medical aviation and the frequency with which aeromedical transports were 
utilized. In March 1930 the Governor General distributed a circular that aimed to regulate 
aerial evacuations in the colony. For de Prémorel though, this circular had not given 
medical aviation “the scope that one would hope to see it have.” Consequently, de 
Prémorel requested that Major General Gaston Billotte, the Commandant Superior, 
organize a panel to investigate how to make the aeromedical service “function regularly 
and be ready in case of conflict.” In particular, de Prémorel proposed that the commission 
examine eight questions relating to this service’s operation. Prominent among the issues 
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364 While perhaps necessary to ensure the safe delivery of a patient, this process does not 
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to be studied were: the aforementioned circular; the needs and materials used for medical 
transport and how these were allocated; the “medical organization of aviation centers”; 
and the maintenance required to keep airfields prepared for “immediate use.”365  
In a subsequent letter to the Governor General, the Commandant Superior 
endorsed de Prémorel’s recommendation for the panel. In addition, Billotte, like other 
officials, observed that the colony’s air ambulances had not rendered the type of 
assistance that was reasonable to expect from an aeromedical service. As he remarked in 
late October 1930, “one is astonished to see that in a colony such as Indochina, for more 
than seven months, this mode of transport has not been utilized a single time”; in fact, 
Manchon points out that the calendar year of 1930 would see only three medical missions 
carried out in the colony.366  
By the latter part of November 1930, the Governor General also had expressed 
approval of the commission, which was scheduled to meet at the start of 1931. Yet he 
was hesitant to support the entirety of de Prémorel’s suggestions. In particular, the 
Governor General believed it premature to devote too much attention to developing the 
aeromedical network while remote areas of the colony remained without “decent 
airfields.”  Without large-scale improvements to the infrastructure, Secretary General 
Graffeuil wrote on November 7, medical aviation would “barely have the chance to 
develop.” He contended that the aeromedical service “will truly expand only on the day 
that this [infrastructure] program will have been realized.” In Graffeuil’s opinion, any 
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l’Aéronautique d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du 
Groupe de l’Indochine,” October 8, 1930.  
366 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Général de Division Billotte, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” October 
27, 1930; Manchon, 418.  
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new regulations for medical aviation would succeed in making aerial evacuations “within 
everyone’s reach” only if the colony’s hubs were served by nearby airfields that could be 
easily accessed. Likewise, Inspector General Gaide—Gaide was part of Indochina’s 
medical administration—agreed that improving the aviation infrastructure would lead to 
improvements for the aeromedical service. He stated that the proposed commission could 
not make any useful contribution to the development of medical aviation as long as the 
colony lacked a network of landing sites that could be utilized throughout the year. Gaide 
thus considered the panel’s object of study—“the medical organization of the aviation 
centers”—to be of tertiary importance, behind upgrading both the aerial infrastructure 
and the air force fleet.367   
Gaide’s assessment appears as a reasonably accurate forecast for the trajectory of 
medical aviation within Indochina over the course of the 1930s. Work on the colony’s air 
network would of course continue through the end of the decade, but, as Cony and Ledet 
observe, aeromedical transports became more frequent with the arrival of first batch of 
Potez 29 aircraft at the beginning of 1933.368 For the period between late February 1931 
and the first weeks of March 1940, Cony and Ledet identify at least twenty-six aviation 
missions that involved medical objectives.369  
Even so, certain of the difficulties that hindered the expansion of medical aviation 
in the 1920s and early 1930s—namely, infrequent use, a lack of suitable aircraft, and the 
                                                
367 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine [à] Monsieur le Général, 
Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine,” November 19, 1930; ANOM, 
GGI 66499, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine [à] Monsieur l’Inspecteur Général des 
Services Sanitaires et Médicaux,” November 7, 1930.ANOM, GGI 66499, “Le Médecin Général 
Inspecteur Gaide Inspecteur Général des Services Sanitaires et Médicaux de l’Indochine à 
Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” November 10, 1930.  
368 Cony and Ledet, 165.   
369 This figure of twenty-six missions is from my own count; thus, there is no specific 
page citation from Cony and Ledet’s book.  
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local climate—remained problematic as the decade came to a close. Despite the progress 
made in the realm of aeromedical transport, certain officials remained unsatisfied with 
the extent to which medical aviation was utilized in the colony. While noting in January 
1935 that the aeromedical service “operates normally” with “numerous” transports being 
carried out, Captain Puypéroux nevertheless opined that this service “is not requested as 
much as it should and, more often than not, [is sought] too late.”370 As this comment 
implies, the timely use of air ambulances—and, more simply, the frequency with which 
medical aircraft were employed—was still an area of concern even after the colony’s 
squadrons were outfitted with better aircraft. In addition, the continued availability of the 
Potez 29 was becoming an issue in the late 1930s. An interdepartmental note from May 
1938 stated that due to the low number of available Potez 29 aircraft in France, colonial 
squadrons soon would no longer receive with this type of airplane; consequently, a 
comparable substitute was needed.371 The unfavorable climate in Indochina only 
exacerbated the problem of a dwindling supply of aeronautics resources in the metropole 
and, eventually, the impossibility of sending new aviation materials to Southeast Asia.372 
For instance, on February 13, 1940, the two-person crew of a Potez 29 fatally crashed in 
rough weather as they flew from the Tong airfield to Mon Cay to retrieve a patient who 
required surgery.373 
 
                                                
370 SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, liaisons postales et 
évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935. Perhaps seeking to remedy this situation, 
he proposed equipping the Potez 29 with a reserve fuel tank so that the plane could more easily 
reach the remotest areas of the colony.  
371 SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Note pour le 3ème Bureau de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air,” 
May 6, 1938. 
372 See chapter seven of this dissertation for a more detailed analysis of the challenges of 
furnishing Indochina with aeronautics materials. 
373 Cony and Ledet, 305.  
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Conclusion 
Beginning in the early 1920s, the aeromedical service in Indochina was utilized 
not only for a variety of medical purposes but also as a symbol of French power and 
civilizing benevolence. Proponents of medical aviation declared that aircraft possessed 
certain attributes—speed, comfort, and safety—that were particularly advantageous for 
improving medical care and asserting French authority within and across vast expanses of 
inhospitable colonial terrain. However, as was the case with other types of aviation in 
Indochina during this period, the hopes and the realities of medical aviation diverged. In 
addition to the shortcomings of the aerial infrastructure and the lack of suitable aircraft, 
Indochina’s unpredictable and uncooperative weather kept air ambulances on the ground 
in a manner that noticeably frustrated its advocates. Two other issues that were more 
unique to medical aviation also impeded its use in the colony. First, requesting an air 
ambulance at times appeared as an extremely cumbersome process, which was especially 
troubling when saving time meant saving lives. Second, most areas of the colony simply 
did not need an aeromedical service. This fact alone surely limited the extent to which 
aerial evacuations could become a regular option for medical transport.  
To a large extent, the trajectory of Indochina’s aeromedical service mirrored the 
path of medical aviation elsewhere in the French empire. Manchon argues that on the 
cusp of the Second World War, medical aviation was firmly established in the empire and 
had shown itself to be a service that was both useful and an “essential” component of 
French colonial propaganda. But, he adds, the hopes of the early 1930s about the degree 
to which this service would be utilized in the colonies were disappointed. Apart from 
Madagascar, medical missions “never represented more than a very small part” of the 
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activity of a given territory’s air force. In the second half of the 1930s, the number of 
aerial evacuations did increase in the empire, but this type of work remained ancillary for 
aircrews. “To a great extent,” Manchon concludes, medical aviation “remained dependent 
on local demands,” which varied greatly from one region to the next and from year to 
year. He stresses, though, that maintaining an aeromedical service was important for the 
French because it helped to convey an “image of security and civilization in the eyes of 
the [local] populations.”374  
The first part of this dissertation has analyzed how aircraft were utilized to deliver 
passengers, mail, medical supplies, and patients to, within, and through French 
Indochina. Simultaneously, these different aerial missions were intended to function as an 
instrument of French colonial propaganda and a representation of French colonial 
authority. As the second part of this dissertation will show, the purposes for which the 
French envisioned using flight technology—and, indeed, the ways that planes were 
actually employed—went beyond transportation and communication. Part two thus 
examines the use of aviation—as well as the impediments to this use—as a tool of 
colonial development, internal policing and control, and external defense.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
374 Manchon, 424.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: PHOTOGRAPHING AND RECONNOITERING THE COLONIAL 
LANDSCAPE 
 
In a speech given in 1920, Alfred Guyomar touted the benefits of colonial 
aviation within Indochina. His remarks included a discussion of how aerial photography 
and reconnaissance could assist with a variety of tasks in the service of colonial 
development. Aerial photos would not only act as “a valued and devoted colleague of 
Indochinese surveyors” conducting cadastral work but also aid in the drawing up of more 
precise maps for the public, the military, and geographers. Moreover, aerial photography 
and reconnaissance would provide an efficient means of scouting future sites for 
highways and railroads.375  
Guyomar’s statement highlights some of the ways that the French conceived of 
using aviation—military aviation in particular—for economic purposes in the interwar 
period. His comments also suggest that airplanes and seaplanes provided the viewer with 
a unique perspective of an object or place of interest below. During the two decades that 
followed his speech, aircraft were used in Indochina for creating cadastral registers, 
completing public works projects, drawing up maps, assisting scientific research, aiding 
local businesses, and helping to package the colony for public consumption.376 The 
specifics of these assignments may have differed, but the common goal of these missions 
                                                
375 Capitaine Guyomar, “L’Aviation en Indochine: Ses moyens, ses buts, ses besoins,” 
brochure éditée et offerte aux amis, défenseurs et protecteurs de l’aviation française aux colonies 
par le journal Le Temps d’Asie, à Saigon (Saigon: Imprimerie Moderne L. Héloury and S. 
Montégout, 1920), 20-21. 
376 The first aerial photography assignment in the colony—this work consisted of 
photographing Saigon—took place on January 26, 1920. The first aerial photography mission in 
Tonkin was carried out shortly thereafter, as aviators were tasked with photographing Hanoi on 
February 7. Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet, L’Aviation française en Indochine: Des origines 
à 1945 (Outreau: Lela Presse, 2012), 40; Jean-Baptiste Manchon, L’aéronautique militaire 
française outre-mer, 1911-1939 (Paris: Presses de l’université Paris-Sorbonne, 2013), 387. 
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was to “capture” the colonial landscape both in terms of control and imaging. In doing so, 
the French sought to develop, understand, and promote the parts of Indochina that were 
photographed or reconnoitered from the air.  
By the later 1930s, proponents of aviation could indeed boast that aerial 
photography and reconnaissance had rendered “inestimable services” for colonial efforts 
in science, industry, and commerce.377 Yet, as was the case with air transport and medical 
aviation, the French encountered various obstacles as they sought to deploy aerial 
photography and reconnaissance in Indochina. Unsurprisingly, many of these 
impediments were familiar to military and colonial authorities: organizational difficulties; 
a lack of funding; the challenges of the physical environment; and the limitations of the 
era’s technology. Another issue was that, for certain aviation enthusiasts, government 
officials were not providing enough support for aerial photography and reconnaissance 
work in the empire. Overall, these hindrances both handicapped the effective utilization 
of the aerial perspective and stripped aeronautics technology of some of its luster as an 
all-purpose tool to be utilized in the service of developing, studying, and promoting 
Indochina.  
 
The Aerial Perspective and Aviation 
 The successful employment of aerial photography and reconnaissance during the 
First World War was crucial for the postwar application of aviation in urban planning and 
                                                
377 Marcel Griaule, “L’Emploi de la photographie aérienne et la recherche scientifique,” 
L’Anthropologie 47, no. 1-2 (1937): 469. 
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the social sciences.378 Jeanne Haffner discusses the wide-ranging influence of these 
wartime uses in the decades that followed the conflict:  
Considering the contribution—both real and perceived—of aerial photography to 
military triumph in World War I, it is no wonder that the airplane became central 
to so many developments in art, science, and social sciences in the 1920s and 
1930s. The literal ability of the airplane to provide a distant, holistic outsider’s 
perspective—not only a new visual angle but also a novel outlook on the world—
inspired a wider variety of intellectual and political movements throughout 
Europe.379 
  
Furthermore, the aerial perspective seemed to offer an objective, scientific tool for 
studying populations—within the French empire at first but eventually within France 
too—and how they related to the surroundings in which they lived. According to Haffner, 
aerial photographs of colonial peoples were a means of obtaining “unparalleled access 
into the inner workings of these societies, overcoming numerous linguistic and cultural 
boundaries.”380 French anthropologist and pilot Marcel Griaule provides an instructive 
explanation of how the aerial perspective allowed the observer to overcome the 
limitations of ground-based reconnaissance. In a text on his fieldwork in Chad in 1943, 
Griaule recounted the way in which this vantage point clarified the obscurities and 
unmasked the secrets of the landscape below: 
Seen high in the air, a district holds few secrets. Property is delineated as if in 
India ink; paths converge in critical points; interior courtyards yield themselves 
                                                
378 Jeanne Haffner, The View from Above: The Science of Social Space (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2013), 7-8. Haffner notes that interest in the aerial perspective stretched back 
hundreds of years before the twentieth century, and observation via hot-air balloon was used for 
military reconnaissance beginning in the late eighteenth century during the French Revolutionary 
Wars. From the mid-nineteenth century, individuals such as Nadar promoted the employment of 
the new technology of photography for capturing aerial images of the landscape.  
379 Haffner, 14. 
380 Haffner, 17. Again, the employment of aviation during the First World War was 
crucial for fostering this belief in the potential of the aerial perspective and aerial images. “If 
reading landscape forms with the assistance of aerial photography had provided insight into the 
minds of German enemies,” Haffner contends, “in the interwar period it offered a means of 
grasping the ‘mentality’ of colonial areas.”  
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up; the inhabited jumble comes clear. With an aerial photograph the components 
of institutions fall into place as a series of things disassembled, and yielding. Man 
is silly: he suspects his neighbor, never the sky; inside the four walls, palisades, 
fences, or hedges of an enclosed space he thinks all is permitted. But all his great 
and small intentions, his sanctuaries, his garbage, his careless repairs, his 
ambitions for growth appear on an aerial photograph.381 
 
Griaule also emphasized the practical utility of aerial photographs. Planes could 
photograph larger areas in less time than traditional, ground-based methods of 
documentation. In addition, aerial images provided scientists and researchers with an 
effective means of tracking changes over time in the societies and environment below.382  
Martin Thomas concisely summarizes how aeronautics and photographic 
technology worked together in the interwar years to furnish imperial powers with new 
ways of viewing and governing colonial spaces. Aerial photography and reconnaissance 
influenced the development of policy in the British and French empires partly because 
these techniques “intersected the ongoing work of colonial mapmakers, geologists, and 
archaeologists.” By the 1920s, Thomas explains, aerial surveys and photographs “had 
revolutionized the working practices of military staffs and civilian specialists whose 
decisions demanded accurate information about topography and climate, agriculture and 
water distribution, or sites of archaeological interest.”383 
 
 
 
                                                
381 Marcel Griaule, Les Saô légendaires (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), 61-62; quoted in James 
Clifford, “Power and Dialogue in Ethnography: Marcel Griaule’s Initiation,” in The Predicament 
of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press), 68. 
382 Haffner, 33. 
383 Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder 
after 1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 24. 
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Aviation and Cadastres in Indochina 
Jean-Baptiste Manchon states that proponents of colonial aviation emphasized 
how aircraft would provide extremely valuable assistance in the task of drawing up 
cadastres, official registers of real estate created for tax purposes. By utilizing aviation in 
this manner, aeronautics technology would contribute to a mapping effort that not only 
was fiscally advantageous for France but also helped consolidate French colonial 
control.384 Yet in the mid-1920s the idea of using aircraft for cadastral work remained “an 
entirely new subject” that was “still far from being up and running” in France. Within 
Indochina though, the flatness of certain parts of the landscape—especially along the 
coast, in Cambodia, and around the delta regions of the Mekong and Red Rivers—offered 
a particularly promising setting for undertaking these aerial surveys.385 Thus it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the colonial administration employed aviation for this purpose from a 
comparatively early date in the interwar years. Indeed, Indochina, along with Algeria and 
Tunisia, was one of the areas of overseas France in which planes assisted early and 
frequently with creating cadastres. The colony, moreover, long remained the primary 
testing ground for developing and refining the techniques for using aviation to prepare 
these real-estate registers.386  
                                                
384 Manchon, 393. Manchon notes that accurate cadastres could also help guarantee 
“equitable justice” in property disputes between neighbors. Manchon, 394. 
385 This information is from a printed report located in the papers of Pierre-Etienne 
Flandin in the archives and manuscripts division of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, NAF 
28201, Box 21/D8. The publication facts are as follows: “Notice: Sur les Conditions d’Emploi de 
l’Aéronautique Militaire d’Indochine dans des Buts Politiques et Economiques” (Hanoi: G. 
Taupin, October 1924), 34 [hereafter “Notice”].  
386 Manchon, 393. 
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As early as the spring of 1920, officials in Indochina were examining the 
possibility of employing aircraft to assist in drawing up cadastres.387 Requests for this 
type of support often emphasized how aerial reconnaissance yielded precise data. On 
June 4, 1920, for instance, the Resident Superior of Cambodia proposed having aircraft 
deployed to aid the territory’s cadastral work. Citing a group of villages near the airfield 
at Phnom Penh, the Resident suggested that aviation be utilized to “inspect [both] the 
exact surface area of a defined region under cultivation and the nature of the crops.” With 
this information, the local government could calculate property taxes in order to provide 
“an indisputable base” for both the administration and the taxpayer.388 Importantly, the 
use of aviation to help resolve property disputes was envisioned as applying to all 
landowners and not just the French. As one French Deputy wrote, aerial photographs 
“can in many cases serve as extremely precise documentary evidence for resolving 
disputes, and property owners, indigenous or European, have not taken long to realize 
this and appreciate them.”389 
As the previous examples suggest, French officials were aware that the clarity of 
the aerial perspective helped sort out confusion on the ground below. Other requests for 
cadastral assistance followed this line of thinking. For instance, the local administrator of 
Hai Duong sought to have aircraft assist with drafting a map of the provincial capital, 
                                                
387 For the most part, military planes were used for economic missions in the colony. 
However, there was occasional discussion of having local aviation companies assist with these 
tasks. See, for example, ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le 
Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” June 20, 1922, and ANOM, GGI 66529, “[letter to the 
Governor General],” July 31, 1928.  
388 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Résident Supérieur au Cambodge à Monsieur le Gouerneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” June 4, 1920.  
389 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Extrait du Rapport, fait au nom de la Commission des Finances 
chargée d’examiner le projet de Lois portant fixation du Budget Général de l’Exercice 1926 
(Ministère des Colonies et Budgets Locaux des Colonies) par M. Léon Archimbaud, Député,” 
[July 12, 1925; February 4, 1926]. [Hereafter Extrait du Rapport].  
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asserting that “this work is absolutely essential if we want to get out of the anarchy in 
which we are stuck.” In a letter from late November 1923, he noted that aviation would 
allow for the required tasks of inspecting claims made by various parties and conducting 
on-site surveys of land plots and rice fields to be carried out with ease and efficiency. 
With this information collected, this official reasoned, the local administration would be 
in a position to precisely calculate the taxes to be levied.390  
Into the 1930s, colonial officials requested that aerial photography be used for 
cadastral purposes. The French thus continued to prize the aerial perspective for its 
perceived ability to provide accurate information swiftly and efficiently. As the head of 
the cadastre service wrote in June 1930, aerial photographs supplied colonial authorities 
with “more exact maps than those resulting from communal surveying.” Likewise, 
French engineer A. Michel commented in November 1936 that aircraft would offer a 
quick remedy for a lingering fiscal problem in Tonkin. Pointing to a pair of immense 
valleys that remained un-surveyed—and whose populations had, consequently, remained 
un-taxed—Michel remarked that “the topographic study of these sites would be carried 
out quite rapidly and in favorable terms by the use of aerial photography.”391 
 
Aerial Photography and Reconnaissance for Development Projects 
In addition to assisting with real-estate surveys, aviation was charged with various 
other tasks in the service of modernizing and exploiting the landscape of Indochina. 
Public works officials, for instance, aimed to utilize airplanes and seaplanes as a cost-
                                                
390 ANOM, GGI 66492, “L’Administrateur de 2e classe A. Bouchet, Résident de France à 
Hai Duong à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin,” November 28, 1923. 
391 ANOM, RSTNF 2730, “Le Chef du Service du Cadastre à Monsieur le Résident 
Supérieur au Tonkin,” May 28, 1930; ANOM, RSTNF 2733, “Le Chef du Service du Cadastre à 
Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin,” November 19, 1936.  
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efficient, safe, and swift means of gaining an unimpeded perspective of an area of interest 
below. According to a contemporary publication, these officials “frequently request 
aircraft collaboration for survey of a route or study of an area in which they have decided, 
for example, to carry out irrigation work or put in a railroad line.”392 In a specific 
example from May 1920, the Governor of Cochinchina inquired about having military 
planes conduct reconnaissance and photography flights as a means of researching an 
alternative route between the coast of Annam and Cochinchina. The existing path ran 
along the coast while the proposed road would cross the Central Highlands; this route 
project was the type of infrastructural program for which Minister of the Colonies Albert 
Sarraut and his ilk campaigned as part of the empire-wide mise en valeur of the 1920s.393  
Several years later, Deputy Archimbaud reported on the success of an aircraft 
mission that was deployed to reconnoiter a direct route from Hue to Saigon. While 
serving as a preferable alternative to the coastal route, the envisioned road would also 
make Kontum—“an important center of colonialism”—more accessible and allow for the 
“peaceful penetration” of a region that remained “difficult and rebellious.” Archimbaud 
stated that the three aircraft deployed for the operation, which took place intermittently 
between late January and early April 1925, logged 135 hours of flight time and returned 
with over 500 pictures.394 Elsewhere in Indochina, the Resident Superior of Laos wrote to 
                                                
392 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Indochine Française. Section générale. Troupes 
du groupe de l’Indochine. Les services militaires en Indochine (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-
Orient, 1931), 119 [hereafter Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les services militaires en 
Indochine].  
393 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Gouverneur de la Cochinchine à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” May 14, 1920. 
394 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Extrait du Rapport.” The duration for this mission is found in 
Cony and Ledet, 106-109. It is unclear if this mission is the same operation as the dual-purpose 
flight involving Colonial Route 14 that is discussed in the following chapter. In addition, this 
same fuzziness applies to the relationship between the reconnaissance mission of 1925 and the 
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the Governor General in 1929, outlining a project for employing aircraft to survey a 
region through which the extension of Colonial Route 8 was planned to pass.395  
Into the mid-1930s, aviation continued to aid the work of expanding the road 
network. For instance, air force officer Captain Marcel Puypéroux recalled being asked 
by a Monsieur Pierrot, the French Resident in Dong-Hoi, to reconnoiter an expanse of 
mountains in the area in order to determine a suitable terrestrial route for penetrating this 
“especially inaccessible” location. In March 1935 an aerial survey and photography 
mission revealed “the existence of an entry valley until then unknown.” With future tasks 
in mind, Puypéroux asserted that aircraft would be particularly useful for helping with 
road-building efforts in certain areas of Annam.396  
Aerial photography and reconnaissance were also utilized in railroad construction 
projects. From late December 1921 until early February 1922, for instance, aircraft were 
deployed to take photos of a sixty-kilometer stretch of land that was part of a planned rail 
link between Saigon and Phnom Penh. Similarly, from March 10 to the beginning of May 
1922, aerial photography was used in Cambodia for studying a rail line connecting Pursat 
to Sisophan.397 Lastly, planes were charged with surveying a portion of the 
Transinochinese Railroad’s itinerary in the mid-1930s; this Hanoi-to-Saigon link was a 
                                                                                                                                            
aforementioned request from May 1920. In any case, the key point remains that aviation was 
charged with a variety of tasks—sometimes during the same mission—that involved the 
economic development of Indochina as well as the maintenance and extension of French colonial 
authority. 
395 ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” October 23, 1929. 
396 SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, liaisons postales et 
évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935. Compared to the 1920s, there is a 
reduction in the frequency of such requests by the middle of the next decade. This observation 
seems to confirm Manchon’s conclusion for the usage of military aviation for development 
projects in the French empire. He indicates that aircraft were employed with success for these 
myriad tasks into the first half of the 1930s. Manchon, 383. 
397 These railroad examples are from “Notice,” 16-18. 
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massive public works project that was launched in 1898 and not completed until late 
September 1936.398  
In some cases, colonial officials sought to employ aviation to help preserve the 
landscape and its resources for the benefit of the local populations. Of course, the purpose 
and manner of these efforts was primarily dictated by French concerns. In one specific 
instance, Yves Henry, the Inspector General of Agriculture, Farms, and Forests, wrote to 
the Governor General about a protected region of mangrove forests in southern 
Cochinchina. Henry’s letter indicated that tanneries in Cholon as well as charcoal 
manufacturers looking to sell their product internationally were removing large numbers 
of the area’s trees in a way that wasted much of the wood. Unregulated and occurring 
throughout the mangrove forests, this harvesting was leading to “the complete ruin of the 
populations” due to the loss of a source of fuel. The solution, as proposed by the 
Inspector of the Forestry Service, included using aerial photography—a “rapid and 
economical method”—to draw up a precise map of the forests so that a concentrated, 
regulated system of timber harvesting could be implemented.399   
The use of aviation for public works projects was not limited to land-based tasks. 
Indeed, aircraft served as a useful tool for studying and resolving issues involving water 
as well. In November 1922 a French engineer working as part of a hydrography project 
                                                
398 Manchon, 428; David W. Del Testa, “’Imperial Corridor’: Association, Transportation 
and Power in French Colonial Indochina.” Science, Technology, and Society 4, no. 2 (1999): 331. 
Manchon does not indicate specifically when or in what capacity aerial reconnaissance was used 
for this railroad project. His citation for this information—8Fi422 in the ANOM—concerns, 
according to the website for the Archives nationales d’outre mer, the Tourane—Nha Trang sector 
of the Transindochinese Railroad and the dates of 1933 and 1938.  
399 ANOM, GGI 66541, “L’Inspecteur Général de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et des 
Forêts à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” December 17, 1926.  The plan was 
approved the following month, with payment to be made by the local budget of Cochinchina. 
ANOM, GGI 66541, “Ordre de Mission,” January 1, 1927.  
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sought to utilize aerial photography for a topographic survey of two ports in the Ha Long 
Bay region of Tonkin. Previous surveys in the area, he explained, had required work that 
was “extremely long and often presented real dangers.” The engineer reasoned that the 
study could be completed faster and with fewer missions if seaplanes were employed to 
take photographs of several islets in the region. This writer added that the aerial photos 
thus obtained could be useful for identifying certain as-yet undiscerned shoals. Engineers 
from the hydrography project requested aviation assistance for similar tasks at least two 
more times during the first half of the 1920s.400 Aircraft also helped with tasks involving 
urban water management. In the first months of 1924, public works officials aimed to 
deploy photography and reconnaissance flights in the area surrounding the Bé River. This 
information would be utilized for a canal-building project intended to alleviate the water 
shortages that Saigon and neighboring Cholon had been struggling with for several years. 
Once again, aviation was presented as a more efficient and economical means of 
completing the work than ground-based methods alone.401  
The view that aviation could assist in “taming” the colony’s waterscape applied to 
situations in which the problem was too much water as opposed to a shortage. Given the 
geography and weather of certain parts of Indochina, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
                                                
400 ANOM, GGI 66492, “L’Ingénieur Hydrographe Principal Pelissier, Directeur des 
Travaux de la Mission hydrographique d’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de 
l’Indochine,” November 6, 1922; ANOM, GGI 66502, “L’Ingénieur Hydrographe Principal 
Villain, Directeur des Travaux de la Mission hydrographique d’Indochine à Monsieur le 
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colony, the Inspector General of Public Works, informed the Governor General of a rock-strewn 
portion of the Mekong River between Kratié and Sambor that was causing navigational 
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charting the riverbed. ANOM, GGI 66502, “L’Inspecteur Général des Travaux Publics à 
Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” March 22, 1926. 
401 “Notice,” 11-13. For this particular task, a public works engineer and two pilots 
completed the mission over a four-week period in which 101 photos were snapped. ANOM, GGI 
66499, “Extrait du Rapport.” 
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colony was the area of the French empire in which aircraft played the most significant 
role in surveying and photographing during periods of flooding. In January 1935, 
Puypéroux discussed some of the benefits of employing planes to survey flood zones. He 
stated that aerial reconnaissance of the colony’s flood-prone rivers during critical periods 
could help spot not only the inflow of floodwaters but also threats of embankment rupture 
or the actual breach of a dike. With these observations in hand, authorities could then 
warn any threatened populations in advance.402 In addition, aerial observation and 
photography of inundated areas provided engineers with key data regarding flooding 
patterns. For instance, following a period of heavy floods along the Red River in August 
and September 1923, the public works department requested that aircraft be dispatched to 
Hanoi to determine precisely which parts of a tract of low-lying, embanked land—known 
as a polder or casier—were submerged. The air force, a French official noted, was the 
“only service capable of furnishing this information before the waters receded.” When 
the Red River flooded anew in 1925 and 1926, aircraft again were used to survey the 
inundated areas.403  
 
Mapping the Landscape in Indochina 
Sources also attested to the valuable contribution that aviation could bring to the 
cartographic project across the French empire. Deputy Archimbaud, for example, 
underscored the benefit of aerial photography, remarking that this technology “finds in 
the colonies a particularly successful application in the execution of topographic surveys 
                                                
402 Manchon, 430; SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, 
liaisons postales et évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935. 
403 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Extrait du Rapport”; SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, 
politiques et économiques, liaisons postales et évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 
1935.  
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undertaken by different services.” This aerial support was particularly important during 
the interwar years because, in general, there remained a lack of accurate maps for large 
swaths of the French empire. Manchon points out that by the time that aviation was being 
installed across the empire, sufficiently detailed maps of the colonies had been created 
only for Algeria and Tunisia.404  
Moreover, colonial organizations such as the Service Géographique complained 
of having to rely on undependable data when undertaking the study of a poorly known 
area. As a publication from 1931 explained, this organization often had to deal with error-
riddled maps or questionable plans based on information collected from local inhabitants. 
The authors contended that aviation offered a remedy to this problem: the airplane 
“makes it possible to determine with exactitude the distances from different points [and] 
their positions, and provides a view of the region that is sufficiently accurate for creating 
a map.” Likewise, another source asserted that aircraft allowed for easier, more rapid 
penetration of otherwise inaccessible areas, and aerial photography permitted “the 
resolution of difficulties that hold back or stop the reconnaissance made on the ground.” 
Additionally, with the broad, unobstructed view from an airplane, an observer could work 
economically and efficiently in the task of correcting errors on existing maps.405  
  Within Indochina, the Service Géographique sought to have aerial photography 
and reconnaissance help with various jobs throughout the colony. These calls included a 
1921 request involving northern Cochinchina and another for work in the South Central 
Coast region of Annam during the summer of 1924. Elsewhere in Annam, two aircraft 
                                                
404 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Extrait du Rapport”; Manchon, 384. 
405 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les services militaires en Indochine, 118; 
ANOM, GGI 66492, “Aéronautique d’Indochine. Compte-rendu des missions d’aviation. 1. du 
Haut Laos 2. du voyage Hanoi—Saigon,” n.d.  
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completed an aerial photography mission in the Pleiku-Kontum area of the Central 
Highlands in February 1926. As a final example, planes were deployed during the course 
of 1929 in the North Central Coast region of Annam and the northeast of Tonkin. The 
purpose, Manchon indicates, was to take photographs that were to be used for drafting a 
series of maps.406 
Into the late 1930s, aviation continued to assist with filling in the empire’s 
cartographic gaps.407 For Indochina, this mapping effort remained unfinished by the 
middle of the decade. As Puypéroux reported in January 1935, the colony “still has 
numerous regions that are poorly known or unexplored.” In particular, he identified 
certain areas within Cambodia and northern Laos that could be “usefully explored” with 
aircraft. Indeed, officials requested aerial photography and reconnaissance help until the 
end of the 1930s. Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet cite several aerial photography 
assignments that were carried out between March and May 1939 and included work in 
Annam, Laos, and Tonkin.408  
 
Aerial Photography and Reconnaissance for Scientific Research 
 Scientific organizations and social scientists throughout the French empire also 
took advantage of aeronautics technology. While a handful of Europeans employed 
planes for scientific study abroad prior to the end of the First World War, this usage 
                                                
406 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Directeur des Services Economiques de l’Indochine à Monsieur 
le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” November 8, 1921; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Ordre de 
Mission,” November 14, 1921; Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les services militaires en 
Indochine, 122, 118; The references to the missions of 1924 and 1929 are found in Manchon, 
392. 
407 Manchon, 392. 
408 SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, liaisons postales et 
évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935; Cony and Ledet, 268-269.  
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significantly increased during the two decades that followed the conflict.409 In 1939, 
pilot-archaeologist J.Y. Claeys stated that for Indochina as well as the Levant, military 
aviation “provides efficient and valuable assistance to scientific research.” He remarked 
that this aid was especially important in regions like Indochina that contained areas of 
undulating terrain that were difficult to access. In addition, Claeys described how aircraft 
not only furnished researchers with an unimpeded perspective of the landscape but also 
revealed the layout of ancient ruins. The configuration of such sites, concealed by time 
and the growth of vegetation, was not evident when investigating the areas on foot. 
However, the aerial perspective penetrated this obscurity with ease. As Claeys explained, 
“lost citadels, razed and invisible on the ground…, appear clearly to the aerial 
observer.”410 
Among the notable social-science patrons of aviation in Indochina was the Ecole 
française d’Extrême-Orient. Beginning in the early 1920s, members of this organization 
sought this assistance for tasks throughout the colony. In 1921, for instance, the group 
submitted a request for aerial photographs of several ancient monuments located in the 
insalubrious marshes of the Plaine des Joncs in Cochinchina.411 Similarly, in 1923 the 
organization’s director approached a military official about having aircraft deployed to 
take pictures of five royal tombs situated in the Thanh Hoa province of northern Annam; 
these images were to be used to draw up a map of the burial site. “These tombs are 
scattered around a dense forest, which makes the work very difficult,” the director 
observed. Yet the project supervisor was confident that aviation offered a means of 
                                                
409 Manchon, 439-440. 
410 J.Y. Claeys, “L’Aviation Militaire d’Indochine et les recherches scientifiques,” Revue 
de l’Armée de l’Air, no. 118 (September-October 1939): 529, 533-534, 536, 542. 
411 Claeys, 531-532. 
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completing the required work in an efficient manner. He wrote, “we would save a lot of 
time if we were able to rely on photographs taken from an airplane.”412 French 
researchers were subsequently able to identify other ancient monuments and sites in 
Tonkin and Annam by utilizing aerial photography. In Cambodia as well, Claeys argued, 
aerial photography and reconnaissance had proven “especially fruitful” tools for social 
scientists. In addition to providing images of the well-known temple complex at Angkor 
Wat, aviation had aided in the “rediscovery”—from the French perspective at least—of 
myriad other features of the ancient Khmer civilization. With the help of aircraft, Claeys 
proclaimed, researchers had drastically improved their knowledge of the former 
civilization. He pointed out that aerial reconnaissance had revealed connections among a 
given site’s scattered monuments and buildings.413  
Social scientists utilized aeronautics technology to capture and categorize the 
colonial landscape not only in terms of natural and built environments but also in terms 
of contemporary indigenous societies. For Pierre Gourou, whose study of the rural 
peoples of the Tonkin Delta was published in 1936, aerial photography was an important 
tool for analyzing the socio-spatial relations of the Tonkinese populations. In the 
abstracted forms of the villages and surrounding landscape captured in aerial 
photographs, he saw a type of unity between local groups and the natural environment. 
Gourou concluded that this seamless blending of the two fostered politico-economic 
balance and social happiness among the peoples he studied. For Gourou, then, aerial 
photographs showed a perspective of the Tonkin Delta that revealed a unity and structure 
                                                
412 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Directeur de l’Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient à Monsieur 
le Général Commandant supérieur des troupes de l’Indochine,” May 30, 1923.  
413 Claeys, 532-533, 538.  
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that was otherwise unapparent in the seeming disorder of daily life in these rural 
communities.414  
In addition, Gourou combined aerial photography with scientific study in the 
Mekong River Delta during the 1930s, a decade that witnessed a socio-political crisis 
compounded by economic and ecological problems in the region. Gourou was among a 
growing cadre of French and Vietnamese social scientists who, equipped with new 
theories for understanding socio-spatial relationships, put forth schemes for land reform 
and redevelopment in the Delta. In this manner, researchers hoped to utilize aviation to 
help resolve present-day challenges involving the colonial landscape. According to David 
Biggs, “new technologies available in this period, especially aerial photography, became 
key to this shifting colonial discourse on development and the rural landscape.” Images 
snapped from above, he explains, “shifted the colonial gaze from horizontal views, where 
interior spaces of villages and homes were hidden to surveyors..., to vertical views 
‘peering over the village hedge’ to show vibrant mosaics of fields, dikes, and villages.” 
Based on this information, Gourou and thinkers of his ilk presented new schemes for 
reordering the space of the Delta.415  
 
Aerial Photographs of Indochina for the Public  
 Aside from being applied to colonial development projects and scientific studies, 
aerial photographs were placed in public exhibitions and printed material on Indochina 
                                                
414 Haffner, 19-20; Biggs, 104-105. 
415 David Biggs, Quagmire: Nation-Building and Nature in the Mekong Delta (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2010), 94, 104-107. The most notable of these reorganization 
plans involved replacing the large, centrally managed “water grid” with self-contained casiers.  
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during the interwar years.416 These images provided the average European viewer with 
unique vistas of what likely would have been an unfamiliar place. The use of aerial 
photographs for this purpose not only demonstrated the progress of photographic and 
flight technologies but also served to publicize and promote Indochina—and the positive 
results that the colonial project had produced therein—during a period in which the 
French invested heavily in the production of such propaganda. For the empire as a whole, 
the basic intent was to more closely link the colonies to French national identity.417 
Beginning in the early 1920s, aerial photographs were used in a variety of public 
venues and printed material to uniquely display and promote Indochina. For instance, 
with the December 1922 opening of the eighth Salon de l’Aéronautique—a popular 
aerospace exposition that France had hosted since 1909—rapidly approaching, the 
Minister of the Colonies solicited the loan of a variety of Indochina-related objects from 
the 1922 Exposition Nationale Coloniale de Marseille. In addition to twenty photo plates 
of sites from around the colony, the Minister’s request included eight aerial photographs 
and maps showing broad perspectives of Saigon-Cholon, Hanoi, Vinh, and several 
provinces in the northern part of Annam. Several years later, more aerial photographs 
were sought for Indochina’s exhibit at the Paris Exposition Coloniale of 1931. In 
                                                
416 Of course, the variety of French journals dedicated to aeronautics included aerial 
photographs, some of which showed sites and scenes from Indochina. See, for instance, the June 
1925 issue of the monthly L’Aéronautique and Manchon’s reference to articles in the Bulletin 
techniques des aéroplanes Henry Potez. Henri Bouché, “Deux jours à l’escadrille de Bien-Hoa: 
Un exemple de travail de l’aviation coloniale en Indo-Chine,” L’Aéronautique 7, no. 73 (June 
1925): 203-207; Manchon, 440. 
417 In pursuit of this aim, the government and proponents of empire worked to do the 
following: cultivate among the French public a greater knowledge of the mutually beneficial 
relationship between overseas France and the metropole; commodify the sites and cultures of the 
empire; and reinforce a sense of French superiority over colonized peoples. Ellen Furlough, “Une 
leçon des choses: Tourism, Empire, and the Nation in Interwar France,” French Historical 
Studies 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 472. 
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December 1929 a Monsieur Eckert, an official for the fair, presented to Lieutenant-
Colonel de Prémorel, the chief of the colony’s air force, an extensive list of aerial images; 
these photos, collected from the five constituent parts of Indochina, were intended to 
function as an overview of life throughout the colony. Additionally, a publication for the 
1931 event contained aerial photographs of the residence of the Governor of Cochinchina 
as well as an aerial image of Hanoi.418 
Moreover, journals and guidebooks incorporated aerial photographs in an effort to 
increase viewers’ knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of French Indochina. For 
example, the well-circulated L’Illustration—this journal published an issue dedicated to 
aviation on a biennial basis from 1924 through the 1930s—printed aerial images such as 
“Terrestrial Mosaic.” According to the caption, this photograph of a rice field in Vinh 
Province “provides, in the decorative form of a geometric ‘cloisonné,’ an accurate idea of 
the Indochinese lowlands.”419 Aerial photographs also appeared in the Bulletin de 
l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine. Articles from early 1930 contained an aerial 
photograph for a cadastral map as well as aerial images of Saigon’s port, Angkor Wat, 
Nha Trang, and a Tonkin airfield.420  
                                                
418 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Ministre des Colonies à M. Le Résident Supérieur 
Commissaire Général de l’Indochine à l’Exposition Coloniale de Marseille,” November 24, 1922; 
ANOM, GGI 66545, “Délégué Général [à] Monsieur le Commandant de l’Aéronautique,” 
December 13, 1929; Exposition Coloniale Internationale de Paris: Commissariat Général, 
Indochine, vol. 2, Documents officiels (Paris: Société d’Éditions Géographiques, Maritimes et 
Coloniales, 1931), plates I and II. 
419 “Mosaïque terrestre: La rizière indochinoise dans la province de Vinh,” L’Illustration, 
July 7, 1928.  
420 The pictures of Saigon and Angkor Wat are found in “L’Indochine et l’aéronautique,” 
Bulletin de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine (January 1930): 7, 9, 12. The cadastre and 
airfield images and the photograph of Nha Trang are in “L’Indochine et l’aéronautique,” Bulletin 
de l’Agence Economique de l’Indochine (February 1930): 39, 41, 44. 
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Similarly, Indochina’s Bureau of Tourism utilized aerial photographs to promote 
airplane tours between Saigon and Angkor Wat. In May 1929 this organization printed a 
guide that included photographs snapped by the Compagnie Aérienne Française. Among 
this material were images of Saigon, Phnom Penh, and the Angkor Wat complex.421 
While implying that the round-trip flight was a simple and delightful journey, these 
photographs—along with the publication’s commentary—aimed to persuade the reader 
that “there is perhaps nothing more splendid than being able, from above, to embrace the 
whole of this ensemble [of Angkor Wat] at a glance.”422 Viewers could also consult aerial 
photographs in French-authored guidebooks for Indochina. One such guidebook from 
1931 contained images of the Royal Palace of Phnom Penh and Angkor Wat while 
another, also printed in 1931, incorporated a larger variety of aerial images.423 
 
Aerial Photography and Reconnaissance for Companies and Individuals in Indochina 
This chapter has thus far analyzed how aerial reconnaissance and photography 
aided the work of the colonial administration, scientists and scientific organizations, and 
promoters of the empire. Aviation was also called on to assist small businesses, 
industries, and individuals throughout Indochina. It should be pointed out that non-
French individuals and businesses could and did submit requests for aerial photography 
                                                
421 A copy of this guidebook is located in ANOM, B.12156. The publication information 
is as follows: Henry Bontoux, L’Inauguration du Tourisme aérien en Indochine: De la rivière de 
Saigon aux douves d’Angkor-Vat. Extrait d’“Extrême-Asie,” Revue Indochinoise Illustrée. 
Organe officiel de Bureau du Tourisme en Indochine (May 1929).  
422 Bontoux, 11.  
423 Henri Gourdon, L’Indochine (Paris: Larousse, 1931), 56, 199; René Théry, 
L’Indochine française: Ouvrage illustré de 32 hors-texte avec trois cartes (Paris: Les Editions 
Pittoresques, 1931), plates XXVIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXII, and XXXII. Among the pictures in 
René Théry’s publication were views of Saigon and Cholon and the cities and ports of Haiphong 
and Faï-Fo as well as images of a distillery facility in Hanoi and a rice field in Tonkin. 
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and reconnaissance. While noteworthy in terms of revealing a glimpse of the day-to-day 
interactions between colonizer and colonized, requests from the native populations can be 
understood as falling within the bounds of a colonial system to which the French 
regulated access.  
A publication from the colonial exposition of 1931 observed that “private 
individuals, service managers, concessionaires, or even manufacturers often request the 
assistance of military aviation.” The writer stated that aerial photographs allowed persons 
to know their property “down to the very last detail.” Armed with this data, individuals 
would be better informed about any improvements, modifications, or repairs that their 
businesses or land required.424 For example, military planes undertook numerous 
photography missions involving distilleries and tobacco factories in Cochinchina and the 
Red River Delta between September 1921 and March 1922.425 In another instance, pilots 
completed a photographic survey of several stretches of land in Cochinchina.426 
Elsewhere in the colony, a mission order from mid-March 1924 authorized a proposal 
submitted by the Compagnie Minière et Métallurgique de l’Indochine; the firm had 
inquired about aerial photographs of a mining site in the mountains of Tonkin.427  
Vietnamese business owners also sought the aid of aerial photography and 
reconnaissance. The archival record suggests that colonial and military officials treated 
                                                
424 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les services militaires en Indochine, 119.  
425 “Notice,” 14-15. 
426 Exposition Coloniale Internationale, Les services militaires en Indochine, 126. This 
assignment, requested by a Monsieur Malandin of Saigon, was carried out on three different days 
from late November to mid-December 1927. 
427 ANOM, GGI 66502, “Ordre de Mission,” March 17, 1924; ANOM, GGI 66502, 
“[letter to] Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” March 3, 1924. According to 
François Glaize, the original request from the mining company was made on February 14, 1924. 
ANOM, GGI 55502, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine à 
Monsieur le Directeur Général de la Cie Minière et Métallurgique de l’Indochine,” February 22, 
1924.  
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requests made by members of the indigenous populations no differently than if the 
requester was French. For example, a mission order from February 1925 approved a 
request made by M. Bach-Thai-Buoi, a Haiphong-based shipowner, for an aerial 
photography survey. Likewise, in August of the following year, authorities authorized a 
request submitted by M. Nguyen-Viet-Vang, a shopkeeper in Hanoi; in this case, the task 
consisted of deploying aircraft to photograph a section of rice fields.428  
 
Limitations and Impediments to Aerial Photography and Reconnaissance in Indochina 
Explaining why planes were viewed as a valuable tool for public works projects 
in Indochina, Manchon notes that “from the moment one moved away from large cities 
this means of reconnaissance appeared incomparably more rapid, precise and economical 
than any ground survey.”429 Similarly, in the mid-1920s, air force commandant Francois 
Glaize highlighted the benefits of employing aviation for different economic tasks in the 
colony. In addition to the “good quality of work” provided by aerial reconnaissance and 
photography, aircraft offered the advantages of speed and low cost.430 
Ideally—and at times actually—statements such as Manchon’s and Glaize’s were 
accurate. Yet French officials did voice concerns about the use of aviation for 
reconnaissance and photography purposes. These concerns typically related to the 
following issues: mission organization and costs; the amount of preparatory work; and 
                                                
428 ANOM, GGI 66502, “Ordre de Mission,” February 5, 1926; ANOM, GGI 66502, “Le 
Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Lieutenant-Colonel, Commandant 
l’Aéronautique d’Indochine,” August 21, 1926; “Ordre de Mission,” August 21, 1926. 
429 Manchon, 428.  
430 ANOM, RSTNF 4280, “Note sur l’Aviation,” n.d. [the content of this report includes 
information that places the document date to around 1926]. An additional copy of this report, 
located in ANOM GGI 66499, has annotations by Lieutenant-Colonel Leblanc, the Chef du 
Service de l’Aéronautique. 
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the limitations imposed by weather and the existing technology.431 Moreover, certain 
observers even lamented the lack of progress made in utilizing aviation for colonial 
development projects. In this case, the complaints tended to focus on how metropolitan 
and colonial authorities not only provided the air force with inadequate resources but also 
remained hesitant to deploy aircraft as a tool of economic improvement and scientific 
understanding in the empire.  
From the start of the 1920s, officials grappled with the basic issue of how to 
organize and pay for aerial photography and reconnaissance assignments. In the summer 
of 1920, the head of Indochina’s air force presented the Governor General with 
information regarding reimbursements for aviation missions in general and aerial 
photography tasks in particular. This clarification was needed, this officer explained, 
because there was no standard process for repaying mission costs. The creation of some 
type of reimbursement strategy was further warranted due to both the increase in the 
number of requests for aviation and the inability of the air force budget to support 
repayment on its own. In an effort to sort out this problem, the air force chief suggested 
that the requester be presented with a precise estimate of the costs of the desired work.432 
                                                
431 These hindrances at times worked in tandem. For example, weather problems could 
lead to delays in the deployment of a mission, which in turn increased the cost of the aviation 
assignment. Similarly, financial and infrastructural obstacles tended to foster a situation in which 
aviation technology was available but not able to be used because the ground facilities lagged 
behind. 
432 This quote would include payment for fuel and aircraft usage, construction of any 
necessary ground installations and living quarters, preparation of any auxiliary airstrips, and 
transport of material and personnel. Aerial photography missions required a more detailed quote 
due to the additional equipment and time that the work necessitated. Also, for missions being paid 
for by either the colony’s general budget or one of the local colonial budgets, reimbursement was 
needed for aircraft and fuel usage only when the annual fuel allotment for the air force was 
exhausted. ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Commandant de l’Aéronautique de l’Indochine à Monsieur 
le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” July 27, 1920. This heading appears on a cover sheet that 
itself precedes two documents titled “Note sur le remboursement des frais de missions” and 
“Tableau de remboursement des missions photographiques.”  
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When aircraft assisted with real-estate surveys, the operation’s costs were split between 
the general and local budgets in Indochina.433 Aside from establishing rules related to 
funding, officials drew up regulations pertaining to aircrew safety and mission execution 
during aerial photography operations.434  
While signaling that progress was being made toward establishing a 
comprehensible system for launching aviation missions for economic tasks, these 
measures do not seem to have immediately clarified this process. As late as the fall of 
1924, French officials still sought a more coherent approach to deploying aircraft for 
cadastral work. As noted in a report from October, the problem appears to have stemmed 
from a lack of organization on the part of the colonial administration. “Even today,” this 
document stated, “the administration has still not formulated a very clear program of 
what it requires concerning cadastre.” An additional difficulty resulted from that fact that 
administrative needs varied across the different jurisdictions in Indochina.435 In other 
words, at this point there was not yet a consensus among the different cadastre services in 
                                                
433 For these assignments, the general budget typically was responsible for paying the 
personnel and covering the costs for fuel, oil, aircraft, and photography material. The appropriate 
local budget was charged with funding the construction of any airfields or hangers in the region to 
be surveyed, paying for the workers’ travel expenses and for the post-flight transfer of photos to 
the photography division in either Saigon or Hanoi, and covering “minimal expenditures of 
material or personnel required by the mission.” ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Chef de Bataillon 
Glaize, Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine, à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de 
l’Indochine,” May 3, 1920. 
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auxiliary airfield was to be furnished with enough materials to allow the relevant aircrews to 
remain at the site instead of making the return journey. ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Commandant de 
l’Aéronautique de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” July 27, 1920.  
435 “Notice,” 34.  
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the colony with regard to the way in which aviation should be utilized for drawing up 
these surveys.436  
A workable approach to ordering and carrying out aerial photography and 
reconnaissance missions had been developed by 1930. According to this arrangement, 
colonial administrators would submit requests to the head of the air force. Each request 
needed to include a detailed list about the areas to be photographed, the scale of the 
photos, the optimal period of time to carry out the task, and the urgency of the job. Upon 
reception of an appropriately detailed submission, this air force official would draft a 
mission order that the original requester would then forward to the Governor General for 
authorization.437 Yet despite the progress implied by the creation and functioning of this 
system, problems appear to have lingered into the late 1930s. In June 1938 air force 
commandant Devèze complained to Governor General Jules Brévié about the difficulties 
that his service was encountering in undertaking photography missions on behalf on the 
government general. Devèze identified those seeking aviation assistance as the source of 
the trouble, stating that requests tended to either lack any indication of the work’s 
urgency or were submitted at the last minute.438   
More generally, the costs of installing and maintaining an aviation presence in 
Indochina hindered the deployment of aircraft. As this dissertation has emphasized, 
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437 ANOM, RSTNF 2730, “Le Lieutenant-Colonel de Prémorel, Commandant 
l’Aéronautique d’Indochine à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin,” May 21, 1930. 
438 ANOM, RSTNF 2733, “Le Colonel Devèze, Commandant de l’Air en Indochine à 
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French officials were aware of the expenses and construction required to make an air 
service function as expected. Already in the early 1920s, the French were cognizant of 
how these financial issues were handicapping the utilization of aerial photography and 
reconnaissance. In June 1920 the Chief Engineer of Public Works determined that aircraft 
would have no more than an auxiliary role in the task of drawing up real-estate registers 
in the colony and recommended that planes be used for this work only in specific 
instances. This official, a Monsieur Lefèvre, explained his reasoning primarily in terms of 
the costs and infrastructure involved with aviation. As he bluntly stated, “airplanes cost 
much, by themselves, by their personnel, by the installations that they require…,which, 
for cadastre, will be numerous.”439  
Lefèvre also pointed out that an extensive ground-based effort was still needed 
when aircraft helped with cadastral tasks. In his opinion, the assistance provided by 
aviation did not greatly reduce the overall workload that creating a cadastre normally 
involved. Lefèvre even went so far as to assert that employing aircraft for these surveys 
would actually be a hindrance to the regular cadastre service. He judged that this service 
would be saddled with additional tasks that related to arranging any required aviation 
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infrastructure. As a result, the cadastre service “will be unable to work regularly, as it 
would do if it was on its own.”440  
Several days after Lefèvre drafted this correspondence, the Resident Superior of 
Annam wrote to the Governor General with regard to how this assessment applied to the 
Resident’s own outlook for conducting real-estate surveys within his jurisdiction. He 
remarked, “cadastre by aircraft will require numerous preparatory works on the ground, 
[which are] expensive installations [on their own], and will then be able to yield useful 
results only after a series of difficult operations involving the use of specialized 
personnel.” Elaborating, the Resident highlighted the different actions needed in terms of 
both infrastructure and human expertise. “The preparatory works on ground require, by 
their importance and their special nature, the existence of a cadastre service that Annam 
does not have,” he explained. He further indicated that “the utilization of components 
furnished by photography will necessitate the employment of specific officials, 
draftsmen, photographers.”441 
Administrators and public works officials were not alone in noting the financial 
and technical drawbacks of putting aerial photography and reconnaissance to use for 
colonial development projects.442 Pilot and journalist Henri Bouché described the burden 
                                                
440 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Note pour Monsieur le Résident Supérieur en Annam,” June 4, 
1920.  
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Général de l’Indochine,” June 12, 1920. When aircraft did assist with cadastral work, drawing up 
these surveys still was a multi-step process. This process included measuring and demarcating of 
the area to be appraised, taking the aerial photographs, resizing and developing the photos, 
interpreting and editing the images to highlight certain terrestrial features, and issuing blueprints 
to then be used for cadastral purposes. ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Chef de Bataillon Glaize, 
Commandant l’Aéronautique d’Indochine, à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” 
May 3, 1920. 
442 Other local administrators worried about the costs of aerial photography and 
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of constructing auxiliary airfields and aeronautics facilities for a given mission. “The 
installation of these auxiliary terrains is itself extremely expensive,” he observed, adding 
that “very often…they [the future sites] are occupied by extensive rice fields that must be 
expropriated at a high price.” Of course, the acquired land still needed assorted 
construction and upkeep, which only increased the total cost. Even with the investment 
already made in readying and maintaining these auxiliary terrains, Bouché found that 
such sites were “only rarely usable.” To further complicate matters, he reported, repairs 
and development work were required after each rainy season.443  
Indochina’s weather and climate also restricted the use of aircraft for economic 
and scientific work. The success of these missions often hinged on having favorable 
flying conditions and visibility, neither of which could be guaranteed for lengthy periods 
in the colony. As Lieutenant Colonel Henri Leblanc stated, the start and end of a given 
aviation operation were “strictly dependent on more or less capricious atmospheric 
conditions [that are] impossible to predict with certainty.” Bouché attested to this reality 
while visiting an airfield outside Saigon in March 1925, noting that “the days where 
photography work is possible are, indeed, very rare.” He estimated that in Cochinchina—
and perhaps in the entirety of Indochina as well—only one out of every ten days had 
weather that was favorable for aerial photography.444 Leblanc’s and Bouché’s remarks 
demonstrate how the clarity of the aerial perspective—so prized by proponents of aerial 
                                                                                                                                            
would cover the expenses of two aerial photography assignments within the protectorate. 
According to Bosc, the local budget lacked the six thousand piasters that the operations would 
likely cost. ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” October 23, 1929. A mission order subsequently authorized the 
Resident’s request. ANOM, GGI 66545, “Ordre de Mission,” February 17, 1930. 
443 Bouché, 206.  
444 ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Lieutenant-Colonel Leblanc, Commandant l’Aéronautique 
d’Indochine à Monsieur le Général de Division, Commandant Supérieur des troupes de 
l’Indochine,” November 9, 1928; Bouché, 205-206.  
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photography and reconnaissance—could be negated rather easily by clouds, rain, and 
other atmospheric disruptions.  
In an attempt to deal with challenges of the local weather and climate, officials 
aimed to be pragmatic about the amount of time needed to complete photography and 
reconnaissance missions. In February 1924, for example, Glaize indicated that an 
assignment requested by a mining company in Tonkin would require three days of work 
in good weather. However, he pointed out that it was unlikely that this timeframe could 
be adhered to because, in northern Tonkin, “the bad days, where we cannot take 
photographs, are unfortunately much more frequent than the favorable days.”445 In 
another instance, unfavorable weather combined with mechanical problems to severely 
limit the number of days on which aircraft were able to carry out photography work for a 
proposed railroad in Cambodia.446 Likewise, Monsieur Le Fol, the Resident Superior of 
Cambodia, wrote to the Governor General in December 1927 with regard to completing 
an unfinished aerial photography operation in Prey-Veng Province. In the initial attempt, 
the pilots undertook only two flights in the region—one in February 1927, the other in 
March—due to atmospheric conditions.447  
Despite officials’ efforts, the fact remained that the exact costs of an aerial 
assignment could not be determined until the job was finished. This situation could 
potentially complicate the general process of organizing, planning, and financing aviation 
missions in Indochina. Additionally, lengthy delays between the submission of a request 
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446 While the Cambodian mission lasted fifty-two days, only eight days were favorable to 
aerial photography. “Notice,” 17-18. 
447 ANOM, GGI 66541, “Le Résident Supérieur au Cambodge à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” December 5, 1927. 
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and the deployment of aircraft affected the cost of the work. This was especially true if 
the area of interest was distant from a primary airfield; in this case, the personnel and 
aircraft needed sufficient materials and supplies to be stationed at an auxiliary landing 
site for an extended period.448  
Furthermore, even with advances in photography and aeronautics during the 
1930s, these technologies were still vulnerable to the tropical climate of Southeast Asia. 
In his 1939 article, Claeys discussed the value that certain technological developments 
would have for the future of aerial observation, but he cautioned his readers about the 
adverse effects that the climate could have on photographic equipment. Claeys noted that 
Indochina’s heat and humidity necessitated that certain measures be taken to protect these 
materials. Problematically though, such precautions often were not possible for 
assignments that required rather lengthy amounts of time.449  
Consideration of the colony’s unfavorable climate aside, aeronautics technology 
could not singlehandedly complete the work of photographing, surveying, and 
reconnoitering Indochina. Put otherwise, despite the various capabilities of aircraft and 
the public perception of flight, there were limits to the usage of aviation as a tool for 
developing, studying, and promoting the colonial landscape. French officials were keenly 
aware of these technological limitations. During the 1937 Exposition Internationale de 
Paris, Monsieur F. Blondel, the Chief Engineer for Mines, assessed the practical 
applications of aviation for mining and geological research in the empire. Discussing the 
utilization of planes for preparing topographical maps, Blondel commented that aerial 
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exploration “must be accompanied by an effort on the ground.” He further judged that the 
costs of employing aircraft for this purpose remained “rather high.” Moreover, Blondel 
reported that the current state of aeronautics and photographic technology allowed, for 
the most part, only large-scale maps to be drawn up from the data collected from the 
air.450 As a final point, he stressed that aerial reconnaissance should never be seen as a 
substitute for work on the ground: “it is essential...to thoroughly underscore that no one 
has ever claimed that aerial exploration will entirely replace conventional exploration on 
the ground.”451  
The fact that Blondel felt it necessary to emphasize this point suggests that 
exactly such a belief existed in some capacity, likely among a public for whom aviation 
was still a spectacular and marvelous technology. Indeed, French officials noted the 
prevalence of this perception. For instance, in a summary article from 1932, Lieutenant 
Colonel Edouard de Martonne identified what he felt was a misguided and widely held 
view: “aerial photography is considered today as a universal panacea.” He also contended 
that many people mistakenly believed that the development of this technology made the 
task of mapping the entirety of the French empire “no more than child’s play.” Similarly, 
“ill-informed public opinion” was inclined to think that improvements in aerial 
photography allowed for small-scale maps to be created with a minimal amount of effort. 
Yet as de Martonne explained, an assemblage of photographs snapped from above was 
not tantamount to a map, especially as these aerial images had distortions and errors that 
required correction via more precise means of analysis. Like Blondel, he emphasized that 
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while aviation was valuable for aiding the work occurring on the ground, aircraft should 
not be expected to replace this terrestrial effort.452   
Finally, even though aviation was being utilized for a variety of colonial 
development projects, certain observers maintained that flight technology should be used 
more extensively in the empire. In seeking to account for why aviation was not fully 
being taken advantage of, contemporaries typically cited either government hesitation to 
employ aircraft for economic purposes or officials’ reluctance to provide adequate 
materials to the colonial squadrons. For example, the author of a 1924 report on the use 
of aircraft for creating cadastres asserted that this technique was “slowly but surely 
making strides.” However, aerial cadastral work was apparently being held back by a 
skeptical colonial administration. Since 1920, the study pointed out, cadastre by plane 
had “encountered numerous obstacles, various objections—justified or not—the principal 
of which was general and arose from the Administration’s fear of embarking on an 
adventure whose outcome, in the current state, appeared dubious.” This writer was 
optimistic about the future though, foreseeing a closer and more regular collaboration 
between aviation and government and scientific organizations. According to the report, 
“the day does not seem far when Aeronautics will be asked to work regularly with 
cadastre and not in fits and starts.”453 
Glaize described a different way in which government was hindering the usage of 
aircraft for economic missions in Indochina. In a memorandum from February 1924, he 
noted that military aviation received only a meager allotment of resources from France. 
Additionally, Glaize outlined several measures for improving the colony’s air force; this 
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list included a point about bolstering this service’s materials and personnel. He reasoned 
that these reinforcements were critical to ensuring that military aviation was capable of 
“execut[ing] the more and more economic missions that are entrusted to it.” Without 
additional resources, Glaize remarked, the air force soon would be unable to carry out 
these assignments.454   
In 1926 Glaize pleaded anew for more materials, again contending that “the 
demand increases, and military aviation remains the same.” In his view, the problem was 
that the metropolitan government was providing the air force with resources that were 
both inadequate and unsuited to assisting with colonial development projects. Glaize 
elaborated on this situation and how it was negatively impacting this service’s operation. 
First, the current financial crisis had caused “certain restrictions...to the application of the 
decree of January 19, 1920”455; according to a military official quoted by Glaize, these 
restrictions were “doubtless going to require aviation to limit the missions of an 
economic nature that ordinarily are entrusted to it by the local Governments.” Second, 
aeronautics materials designed for military use were poorly adapted to the various 
economic tasks that were increasingly being requested in Indochina. Stating that the 
squadrons needed new types of specialized aircraft, Glaize pointed out that the model of 
airplane in use—the Breguet 14—was “suitable for many civil missions, but in no way 
adapted to any one in particular.” An upgrade to the colony’s flight technology was 
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warranted because, simply put, “the possibilities of aviation in 1926 are no longer what 
they were in 1919.”456 
Into the later 1930s, certain observers echoed the previous decade’s complaints 
about a lack of aeronautics materials for the colonies. For instance, in April 1937 Marcel 
Griaule described with frustration how researchers in the empire were utilizing aerial 
photography only haphazardly: “until now...aerial photography is scarcely used but in 
case of immediate necessity and depending on the chance circumstance of the work or the 
state of mind of those concerned.” He added that the scientists who employed aerial 
photography tended be those who had worked with this technology while serving in some 
capacity with the air force. Most other researchers were not familiar, or even aware, of 
the advantages of aerial images.457 
Reflecting on the problem in its entirety, Griaule noted a disconnect between the 
public authorities who had “powerful aeronautics resources” at their disposal and the 
scientific community. As the former were not always well informed about the work of the 
latter, the public powers tended to view scientific research—and presumably the usage of 
aerial photography therein—in terms of “speculations with distant returns.” To rectify 
this situation, he called both for improved coherence and coordination of aerial 
photography services and for authorities to provide scientists with easier access to this 
technology. Griaule concluded by arguing for a better understanding of the importance of 
aerial photography on the part of researchers and the public powers: while scientists 
needed to request this technology more frequently, government organs needed to readily 
provide the means for using this valuable tool of study. With this renewed effort, aviation 
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would contribute more significantly to “the inventory of our colonial riches in land, 
plants, and human institutions.”458  
 
Conclusion  
During the interwar years, aviation was charged with a variety of photography 
and reconnaissance missions throughout Indochina. While differing in their specifics, the 
common purpose of these missions was to gain control over the colonial landscape—
whether natural, constructed, or human. In doing so, the French hoped to develop, 
understand, and promote Indochina. From a broader perspective, the utilization of aircraft 
for economic and scientific tasks demonstrates how aviation technology enabled the 
French to imagine that they could exercise full control throughout the colony despite the 
small number of settlers and administrators on the ground. 
The employment of aviation for this work did furnish tangible results for the 
colonial project, as evidenced by the assorted cadastres, land surveys, scientific articles, 
and photography collections that were produced with the help of aircraft. In the longer 
term, Biggs, in his analysis of “nation-building” in the Mekong River Delta in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, states that aerial photography and remote sensing 
“changed the way that most nation builders and those who read their studies understood 
and represented the delta.”459 
As this chapter has shown though, aerial photography and reconnaissance 
encountered various impediments that literally and metaphorically grounded these 
services. Once again, the hopes and the realities of aviation diverged. The program of 
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employing photography and reconnaissance to develop and understand the colonial 
landscape—as well as rejuvenate the colonial economy and public interest in 
Indochina—remained incomplete as France entered the Second World War. Moreover, 
even as he notes the aforementioned changes in perception and representation, Biggs is 
careful to point out that the aerial vista and aerial photographs tended to obscure the 
complexities of the natural and human landscape below, thus limiting the effectiveness of 
schemes for increased control and better management therein.460  
The French imagined that aviation, as a multi-purpose tool of empire, was capable 
of controlling the colonial landscape in Indochina in ways that went beyond 
reconnaissance and photography. As the following chapter demonstrates, officials viewed 
aircraft as a powerful and efficient means of asserting French colonial authority.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
460 Biggs, 109, 124. He describes how this situation unfolded in the Mekong River Delta. 
“By flattening the landscape into a two-dimensional plane,” Biggs explains, the aerial perspective 
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social unravelings” in this area of the colony. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DEFENDING INDOCHINA AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS 
In 1911 France’s General Henri-Nicolas Frey summarized the potential 
advantages of airpower for European nations seeking to suppress rebellions and control 
dissent within their empires. Aviation, Frey declared, would provide colonial 
administrations with “easy, rapid, and continuous police surveillance on barbarian 
nomadic tribes and on numerous and civilized populations that are, by nature, suspicious, 
hostile, and quick to revolt.” Planes also would permit authorities to intervene “with the 
speed of a bird of prey” in “threatened or troubled places.” If necessary, aircraft—
“formidable engines of destruction”—would handily overcome the “imperfect weapons, 
the cunning, and the ingenious tricks” of the “the so-called ‘inferior’ races.”461 Regarding 
Indochina specifically, in 1920 Alfred Guyomar explained how aircraft could function as 
an effective tool for both quickly putting down revolts and deterring the indigenous 
populations from carrying out further rebellions in the future. He confidently stated, “the 
airplane’s speed and ease of travel over regions lacking communication, the...moral effect 
it will have on the indigenous populations, make it an especially powerful weapon in this 
country.”462 
Frey’s prediction and Guyomar’s assertion demonstrate how proponents of 
empire viewed aviation as a potent and efficient means of quelling anti-colonial activity 
and bringing about submission. Indeed, throughout the French empire, airpower was used 
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to bomb and strafe dissident groups, to astonish and coerce the native peoples, and even 
to reaffirm to the colonized that the French were their benevolent guardians. In this 
capacity, aviation was intended to function as a symbol of power and an efficient means 
of asserting colonial authority.463  
When utilized in this manner—in other words, to protect Indochina against what 
this chapter refers to as “internal threats” to colonial rule and stability—airpower was 
most often sent to rural areas, Laos and the Central Highlands of Annam in particular. 
This focus on rural areas is perhaps unsurprising, as these regions were judged to be the 
most troublesome parts of the colony. Of course, colonial authorities also had a larger 
presence—and thus more resources immediately available—in urban areas.464 
Furthermore, missions against internal threats involved symbolic displays of power more 
often than actual deployments of violence. These aerial demonstrations, the majority of 
which took place in Laos, could include other objectives as well, but the importance that 
officials placed on the symbolic role of the flights is clear. 
Despite the seeming omnipotence and omniscience of aviation—and despite 
French confidence in the potential of airpower—many of the same problems that 
encumbered other uses of aircraft also hindered plans for utilizing planes against internal 
threats. Prominent among these recurrent problems were the challenges of the local 
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weather and geography, the limits of the era’s technology, and a lack of infrastructure. 
Another concern was competition with Thailand and this country’s air service; Thailand 
also emerged as a significant impediment for the French in matters of civil aviation and, 
as the next chapter shows, colonial air defense. A final problem—and one that was very 
troubling for the French if they wanted to appear as powerful colonizers whose position 
demanded obedience—was that planes did not always seem to have the coercive effect 
that the French imagined they would. Taken together, these different issues effectively 
limited the extent to which aviation could take flight as a tool of colonial control. 
 
Airpower as a Means of Colonial Control  
In the late nineteenth century, new technologies in the fields of medicine, 
transportation, and armaments provided European imperialists with a safer and cheaper 
means of establishing profitable colonial holdings.465 However, as the century came to a 
close, indigenous populations began to gain access to certain of these technologies, 
especially weapons, and utilized them to resist colonial authority. Accordingly, 
colonizers sought to develop new technologies in order to remain in a dominant position. 
While colonial territories had served as laboratories for testing and refining new methods 
of organized violence even before the First World War, this practice only intensified in 
the interwar years as wartime advances in weapons technology were put to lethal use 
overseas. In addition, European nations employed new weaponry to police their empires 
partly because the colonial landscape—distant from Europe and subject to fewer national 
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and international regulations—was considered to be a more acceptable setting than the 
European continent for experimentation.466 
Daniel R. Headrick contends that the “most striking” of the technological 
innovations for maintaining control within European empires was the airplane, which 
“promised to give [colonizers] back the advantage they were losing on the ground.” 
Aviation allowed colonial powers to maintain authority at minimal cost, the “maximum 
projection of and minimum actual use of force,” according to historian Priya Satia.467 
Martin Thomas likewise argues that aircraft—the arch example of colonial powers 
seeking to effectively and cheaply maintain their authority—radically altered the 
political, military, and cultural significance of the colonial airspace.468 
Regarding France and its colonies, Jean-Baptiste Manchon observes that the 
French expected that aircraft would greatly benefit the empire in terms of “prestige, 
force, and development.” Initially, colonial aviation often was linked to local military 
operations, but, by the mid-1930s, the “political usage” of aviation had both intensified 
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and diversified across the empire.469 This progression was evident in Indochina as well, 
although the use of aircraft for multipurpose missions was already occurring in the early 
1920s. For the next two decades, the belief persisted that aviation could serve as a 
“multipurpose tool” within Indochina in “all conceivable eventualities,” able to intervene 
swiftly and across vast distances to provide aid to French forces.470  
 
Deploying Airpower in Bombing and Strafing Missions in Indochina 
By the mid-1920s, French officials were requesting that military planes be put to 
use in policing operations to stamp out anti-colonial activity in Indochina. There does not 
appear to be a scholarly consensus regarding exactly when aircraft were first charged 
with these missions, but the earliest instance likely occurred in the Central Highlands of 
Annam in the spring of 1924. This region had been causing the French difficulties earlier 
in the year, but the use of violent force was not authorized until the spring.471 By this 
point in the year, a group of “Mois” people in and around the village of Konkroi had 
made it known to the local administration that they vehemently opposed the planned 
construction of a road through their territory.472 After ground troops proved unable to 
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quell the protests, the Resident Superior requested that two aircraft be sent to bomb 
Konkroi as a demonstration of French power and colonial authority. In an attempt to limit 
the loss of life, the colonial administration warned the local population that Konkroi was 
to be bombed on April 11. The bombardment that followed destroyed between seventy 
and eighty huts but failed to stop the rebellion. After a group of Mois subsequently 
invaded a neighboring village that was supposedly under French protection, another air 
strike was ordered on Konkroi for April 18. This second bombing, which came without 
advanced notice, succeeded where the prior operation had failed. The following day, 
troops entered the village unimpeded.473  
For the rest of the decade, the Central Highlands remained an area of concern for 
authorities. Most notably, in March 1929 an air strike that targeted several villages was 
ordered in response to the local population’s ongoing hostility to French efforts to 
develop transportation networks and profitable coffee, tea, and rubber plantations in the 
region.474 This particular mission was one of the few instances during the interwar years 
in which French military and colonial officials were candid about deploying aircraft 
specifically to attack Indochina’s native populations. Between March 19 and March 26, 
aircraft dropped thirty-two bombs on villages in the regions of Ankhé and Dak To as part 
of a joint operation with French forces on the ground. During these raids, the aircrews 
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supposedly were careful to avoid hitting those peoples who were considered to not be 
associated with the rebellious elements of the population.475  
From the French perspective, this mission was judged to have been a complete 
success. An undated, unsigned report confidently stated that “without a doubt the moral 
effect was considerable, especially because of the speed with which the repression took 
place.”476 Other reports echoed this conclusion. In a letter composed in April 1929, the 
Resident Superior of Annam wrote that the airplanes provided “very effective assistance” 
to the local colonial militia. “These [flying] machines,” he noted, “have shown 
themselves to be the most powerful auxiliary of a vigorous repression.” The Resident 
emphasized how quickly the dissidents submitted when faced with a combination of air 
and land forces. He observed that various groups that in the past had staunchly opposed 
the French presence in the region capitulated “almost immediately” in the wake of the 
March 1929 mission.477 
Into the next decade, the French continued to rely on bombing and strafing 
operations as a purportedly efficient and swift method of dealing with anti-colonial 
activity within Indochina. According to one scholar, aircraft “played a very important 
role in the repression of the numerous rebellions of the 1930s.”478 Perhaps most notably, 
the air force launched reprisals following the Yen Bay uprising of 1930. The military was 
able to rapidly suppress a mutiny by Vietnamese infantrymen stationed at the Yen Bay 
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garrison on February 10, 1930. However, this initial effort failed to stop the insurgent 
activity, and the colonial administration faced additional anti-colonial manifestations. On 
February 16, French aircraft attacked the Tonkinese village of Co Am, considered to be a 
rebel refuge, dropping fifty-seven bombs and strafing the villagers; the 420 kilograms of 
explosives that peppered this site completely destroyed the village.479 Then, during the 
spring, bombers and army patrols were dispatched to deliver reprisals on other villages 
suspected of supporting insurgent activities. A cycle of indigenous protests and police 
retribution continued into the fall of 1930. By September the colonial administration 
determined that the provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh were ungovernable. This 
judgment was followed by the implementation of a program of focused, systematic 
reprisals that included bombing villages in these neighboring provinces and strafing 
peasant demonstrators and rebel units in the region.480  
In a more specific instance that autumn, a column of between four thousand and 
six thousand villagers marched to Vinh to protest excessive taxes. On September 1 the 
Resident Superior of Annam requested that military planes be deployed to the city to 
assist with handling the demonstration. Sent to Vinh on September 12, these aircraft 
subsequently bombed the protestors; though unsure if the group was armed, local 
administrators were certain that the crowd was not responding to officials’ orders to halt 
the march. To warn the demonstrators, the airplanes first dropped projectiles in front of 
the column. Having failed to dissuade the protestors from further activity, the aircraft 
then launched a bombardment that killed 157 people and caused the remaining 
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demonstrators to scatter. When villagers returned to the site in the evening to bury the 
dead, the French mistook the action for another demonstration and ordered a second 
bombing mission that killed approximately fifteen people.481  
Airpower was utilized in a similar capacity outside of Annam and Tonkin, but 
such operations were much less frequent. On June 6, 1931, for instance, three planes were 
dispatched to Cambodia to bomb several Mois villages and strafe a local trail leading 
toward Annam. This action was intended as a reprisal for the late-May murder of a local 
French official by an armed group of tribesmen.482  
The examples from this section illustrate how aviation was put to use in Indochina 
as a tool of suppressing what the French interpreted as insurgent activity. Aircraft were 
utilized for this purpose to a greater extent elsewhere in the French empire, namely, 
Morocco and the French mandate in Syria.483 Ultimately though, French officials 
determined that a strategy of colonial policing that involved the systematic usage of 
aircraft, such as that of Great Britain in Iraq,484 was impractical and unnecessary, with the 
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possible exception of the Levant. Manchon identifies several reasons for why French 
colonial authorities never implemented such a strategy on a large scale: an inadequate 
supply of aeronautics materials; the immense size and purported impenetrability of the 
regions that would require aerial surveillance; and the perceived docility of the local 
peoples. Thus aircraft primarily played a supporting role for ground forces during 
colonial policing missions. Moreover, David E. Omissi notes that this reliance on ground 
forces for regular policing duties was partly a result of the fact that France lacked an 
independent air force in name until April 1933 and in actuality—proper organization and 
a defined role—until the following July.485  
 
Deploying Airpower as a Symbol of Colonial Authority in Indochina 
Emmanuel Chadeau points out that between 1919 and the early 1930s, military 
aviation was most often employed in the French empire as a tool of propaganda and as a 
symbol of the power and the reach of colonial authority.486 As the French believed that 
aviation represented their control and technological prowess in Indochina, officials 
utilized aircraft to coerce and astonish the indigenous peoples.487 Aviation was frequently 
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used for this purpose in Laos or in the Central Highlands of Annam, regions where the 
French acutely felt the need to remind dissident groups that colonial power radiated far 
beyond the colony’s political and commercial centers.  
It is worth noting that airplane sightings had an effect on the Europeans in the 
colony as well. This point serves as a reminder that in the 1920s and 1930s, aviation was 
still a technology with which most people did not regularly have direct contact. Thus it 
was not uncommon for the appearance of an aircraft to spark public interest and even to 
amaze onlookers. For example, the French Resident in the Cambodian city of 
Battambang described a mid-June 1920 landing at the local airfield. This official, a 
Monsieur Lambert, observed that the city’s European and indigenous populations 
gathered en masse around the airfield to welcome the two-person crew. The following 
day, a crowd of several thousand people convened to watch the plane’s departure. “Soon 
the aircraft disappeared in the clouds,” Lambert recounted, “leaving each person with the 
memory of an unforgettable and unprecedented spectacle.”488 
From the early 1920s, French officials attested to the value of aviation as a potent 
source of French prestige and colonial authority. For instance, Battalion Chief Roux 
remarked in January 1923 that airplanes were an “excellent and productive manifestation 
of our superiority.” Three years later Jules Bosc, the Resident Superior of Laos, referred 
to aircraft as an “admirable instrument of propaganda” that produced both awe and 
submission among Indochina’s native populations. He wrote of “the considerable and 
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occasionally prodigious effect” of aviation on the “mind of the various races of the 
country, those who live in the valleys as well as the semi-independent—and at times 
dissident and rebellious—groups who remain in the upper mountainous region.” Bosc 
subsequently reiterated this opinion, praising flight technology for making a significant 
contribution to the “growth of our authority and our prestige among the indigenous 
populations that inhabit the most remote parts of French Asia.” He went so far as to 
describe aviation as the embodiment of the colonizers’ self-appointed position of 
civilizing protector: aircraft brought to the native populations “a concrete vision of the 
powerful guardianship that assures their security and protects them from the dangers that 
once threatened their lives and their homes.” Finally, at the end of January 1935, Captain 
Marcel Puypéroux stated that the act of traveling by air was itself a tool of colonial 
propaganda. As Puypéroux explained, air transport of influential French and indigenous 
passengers had “a considerable effect on the Annamite as well as Laotian or Montagnard 
populations.”489 
Aviation was employed for these symbolic purposes as early as the spring of 
1920.490  In general, the colonial administration judged these operations to be an effective 
means of asserting their authority. For instance, on December 22, 1923, Resident 
Superior Bosc wrote that the French needed to “once again to display our flag” in a 
region of Upper Laos that bordered Burma. With an interest in “show[ing] our air force to 
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the populations who still are ignorant of it,” Bosc cited the symbolic power of aviation: 
“these peaceful demonstrations of the genius and strength of France grab the attention of 
the indigenous populations and have a lasting impact on their state of mind and on the 
political situation of the country.”491 Carried out in early 1924, this mission had 
purportedly left “a profound impression” throughout Laos and had demonstrated the 
“excellent qualities and mastery of...military aviation.”492 In December 1924 the French 
Resident in Kontum described the native peoples’ response to the sight of an aircraft in a 
similar manner. He noted that the appearance of airplanes in the southern region of 
Kontum had made “a substantial impression on the rebellious villages.” The Resident 
added that no further action was needed “to overcome the last hesitations of some of 
them and bring about their submission.”493 
Into the 1930s, the French continued to praise aviation as a valuable tool of 
colonial propaganda and coercion. For example, Louis Ménès declared that his January 
1930 seaplane voyage to Laos had amazed the indigenous populations situated along the 
entirety of his route. Recounting this round-trip journey from Saigon to Luang Prabang, 
he claimed that local peoples were both stupefied and dazzled by the sight of his aircraft 
and the machine’s ability to land on water. Furthermore, local officials professed that 
French prestige among the Laotians would be “considerably enhanced if similar 
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demonstrations occurred more frequently.”494 In another instance, Ménès described a 
June 1930 aerial mission in which he dropped ten thousand leaflets on a sizeable group 
that was protesting against the colonial administration in Cochinchina. The circular—
which apparently was effective in intimidating the demonstrators—contained the 
following message: “Today I throw paper, tomorrow I will drop bombs if you are not 
well-behaved!”495 Elsewhere in the colony, Captain Puypéroux, while in Vinh in 1933 as 
part of a joint operation between air and ground forces, spoke with the province’s 
Resident about how low-flying aircraft could be used to deter insurgents from further 
disrupting the work of the local administration. Later, Puypéroux dispatched three 
airplanes to fly over the region. “The result was, so to speak, immediate,” he stated. 
“Certain excited minds calmed down and…taxes came in more easily.”496 
 
Multi-Purpose Aviation Missions in Indochina 
Finally, aviation missions did at times have more than one goal and, therefore, 
were not solely about coercing, intimidating, or dumfounding the native populations. 
Such multi-purpose flights typically included either photography work for colonial 
development programs or policing-related surveillance and reconnaissance of the 
colonized peoples.497 Aside from Laos, the area in which this type of mission occurred 
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most frequently was the Central Highlands. Between 1923 and 1927, aircraft were 
deployed to this region of Annam to assist with mapping and photographing for colonial 
road projects. In addition to providing Public Works engineers with key information, 
these missions included low-altitude flyovers that were intended to astonish the people 
below.498 In May 1925, for instance, Governor General Monguillot informed the Minister 
of the Colonies of the success of a recent aerial operation in the Kontum region of 
Annam. Initially tasked with reconnaissance of the planned layout of Colonial Route 14, 
the aircrews were also instructed to conduct a flyover above several dissident Mois 
villages. While local administrators had made progress in civilizing the area’s indigenous 
populations, certain groups persisted in demonstrating a “fierce independence” that 
colonial authorities found unacceptable. The Governor General wrote that aircraft were 
ordered to this area to “inspire a salutary fear and bring about their submission.”499 This 
comment reflects how the French tended to see the modern technology of flight as being 
able to accomplish in the empire certain goals that otherwise and hitherto remained 
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unachievable; in this particular case, the goal was bringing a particular group of insurgent 
villagers to heel.  
Multi-purpose missions were carried out in this section of Indochina into the mid-
1930s. In June and August of 1934, for example, Puypéroux took part in what he later 
referred to as “economic and political missions” along the border between the Central 
Highlands and South Central Coast regions of Annam. At the request of Quang-Ngai 
province’s Resident, three airplanes were sent to a forward post that had recently been 
attacked by a group of Mois peoples. This aerial mission and an ensuing air-and-land 
operation—each of which the French proclaimed to be a resounding success—furnished 
officials with information regarding the most practical path for a future route between 
this post and a neighboring position. In addition, the aircraft “made an immeasurable 
impact among the hostile Moïs populations,” as local villages subsequently appeared 
much less antagonistic to colonial authorities.500  
Aside from their utilization in the Central Highlands, military aircraft were 
deployed for multi-purpose assignments throughout Laos during the 1920s and early 
1930s. In fact, Laos appears to have been the area of Indochina in which aviation was 
called on most frequently for these missions. This observation is perhaps unsurprising 
when considering the geographical and administrative challenges that the French faced in 
establishing and maintaining a protectorate in this part of Indochina. Indeed, this 
expansive territory consisted of large portions of heavily forested, mountainous terrain. 
Moreover, the region’s historical capital of Luang Prabang was distant from both Hanoi 
and Saigon, and the number of French in Laos was miniscule compared to their presence 
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elsewhere in Indochina.501 The reality of this situation hints at why officials saw in 
aviation an efficient tool of colonial control that could be frequently used for, and 
extremely beneficial to, French efforts in Laos.  
Not long after a viable aviation presence had been established in Indochina, 
officials were requesting that aircraft be deployed to Laos for multi-purpose missions. 
The first such operation was ordered in the fall of 1920 and took place in January 1921; 
this mission was scheduled to coincide with the Hanoi-to-Saigon aerial tour analyzed in 
chapter two of this dissertation. According to a mission order of November 6, 1920, this 
operation involved reconnoitering several airfields in Upper Laos and “exercis[ing]…a 
moral action on the [local] méos populations.”502 Following the mission’s completion in 
January, various officials remarked that the aircraft had both astonished and dazzled the 
native peoples. A telegram stated that the airplanes’ mid-January landing on the Plain of 
Jars outside Xieng Khouang had caused an “admiring and fearful stupor” to spread 
among the crowd of indigenous onlookers. Over the next few days, interim Governor 
General Maurice Le Gallen observed, Méo delegations flocked to Xieng Khouang to 
affirm their loyalty and declare their absolute submission.503 Similarly, Commissioner 
Barthélémy, the French administrator in Xieng Khouang, reported to Resident Superior 
Bosc that the arrival of the planes had had “a profound impression and moral impact of 
                                                
501 For instance, in 1921 there were just 360 French in Laos, a much lower figure than in 
the four parts of Indochina: 11,429 in Cochinchina, 9,643 in Tonkin, 2,125 in Annam, and 1,515 
in Cambodia. Brocheux and Hémery, 86, 183. 
502 ANOM 66492, “Ordre de Mission,” November 6, 1920. This document is found in an 
undated folder, “Aéronautique d’Indochine. Compte-rendu des missions d’aviation. 1. du Haut 
Laos 2. du voyage Hanoi—Saigon,” that contains different documents recapping both the Upper 
Laos mission and the aerial tour from Hanoi to Saigon. The term “Méo” refers to the Hmong 
peoples of the mountainous areas of Laos. The term “Méo” refers to the Hmong peoples of the 
mountainous areas of Laos. 
503 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Télégramme Officiel. Gouveneur Général à Colonies,” January 
17, 1921; ANOM, GGI 66492, “Saigon [à] Colonies, Paris,” January 27, 1921. 
 218 
considerable significance” on the area’s inhabitants. Barthélémy also judged that, in 
terms of French influence in the region, this mission had been able to achieve in several 
days what the local administration had needed twenty years to accomplish.504 
Considering the political unrest in this part of Indochina, this assessment may not have 
been much of an exaggeration.505  
Along the Laos-Tonkin border as well, aircraft were utilized for multi-purpose 
missions in the early 1920s. In particular, François Glaize, the head of the air force, 
sought to have aircraft deployed to this region in December 1922 to inspect the airfields 
at Sonla and Dien Bien Phu. While stating that the primary goal related to developing air 
travel to this part of Indochina, Glaize pointed out that sending planes to the Laos-Tonkin 
border would also be beneficial for the colonial administration in their efforts to deal with 
local dissident groups.506 
 The French would indeed take advantage of this opportunity to use aviation as a 
vehicle for demonstrating the superiority of the colonizers and their technology. 
Recounting this operation, Battalion Chief Roux reported that a trio of planes had arrived 
at the Dien Bien Phu airfield on December 26, and the aircrews spent the next few days 
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carrying out several tasks.507 These jobs included giving airplane rides on request—
Europeans first, then indigenes—and conducting an aerial survey for a future landing 
field. Roux described how the native inhabitants were stupefied by the aircraft, by the 
speed and apparent omnipotence of a device that they did not understand. The local 
peoples, he explained, were convinced that the airplane could travel wherever it chose in 
an “unimaginably short amount of time” and that “nothing would be able to escape its 
watchful eye and its blows.” Roux added that the propaganda effect of this operation was 
“even better than anything it had been possible to imagine.” He explained that “the ease, 
the sureness with which the takeoffs and the landings took place, the steadiness with 
which the airplanes came to align...one near the other a few meters from the spectators, 
gave the natives the impression that these enormous machines were completely 
subservient to us in every situation.”508 Of course, Roux’s appraisal was the opinion of an 
enthusiastic French observer. Accordingly, this commentary reveals more about what the 
French imagined that aviation was doing as a tool of colonial authority than what planes 
were actually achieving in this role.  
As a final point of praise, Roux indicated that this operation was able to coerce 
the Méo peoples into respecting and accepting the authority of the French. On the request 
of an administrative official in Luang Prabang, one of the airplanes carried out a low-
altitude flyover above three dissident villages on December 29, 1922. According to Roux, 
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this action succeeded in getting the attention of the Méo villagers; the flight was followed 
by a display of submission on the part of these previously disobedient groups.509  
Multi-purpose aviation missions continued to be deployed in Laos as the 1920s 
progressed. The tasks of one such operation from late January 1925 included aerial 
demonstrations “of a political interest” above an area whose population was being 
harassed by groups of malefactors who had entered the protectorate from China.510 “The 
more or less complete absence of any effective authority,” Resident Superior Bosc 
explained, “offers these opium smugglers and brush pirates a place of refuge of which 
they never fail to take full advantage.”511 Bosc believed that a symbolic display of French 
airpower would reassure the native peoples in the area that the colonial administration 
was fully capable of keeping them safe from foreign threats.512 The Resident was thus 
pleased to report the mission’s success in this regard, writing that the aircraft had “a 
profound impact” everywhere that the aircrews traveled. He avowed that every 
population encountered was “joyful, eager to gaze at the great birds in the sky or on the 
ground...that materialized for our distant protégés, in a form that was all the more striking 
because its existence was shown to them for the first time.” As a manifestation of “the 
force, the power, and the genius of the grand protector Nation,” aviation had yet again 
                                                
509 ANOM, RSL J/2, “Le Chef de Bataillon Roux, Commandant le 5ème Territoire 
Militaire à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Laos,” January 10, 1923. 
510 The two aircraft that took part in this mission were also charged with transporting 
Bosc from Vientiane to “the extreme confines of the Colony” and with collecting specific 
geographic and topographic data.  
511 ANOM, GGI 66502, “Rapport à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” 
March 4, 1925.  
512 Captain Puypéroux would later recount that between 1921 and 1929, aircraft had on 
numerous occasions been deployed along the Sino-Indochinese frontier as an effective means of 
dissuading bands of Chinese marauders from making raids into French territory. SHAA, 
2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, liaisons postales et évacuations 
sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935. 
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provided “the most favorable results for the influence and prestige of the French 
authority.”513  
Resident Bosc requested another mission in October of the following year. 
Specifically, he aimed to have military planes provide assistance in the Bolovens Plateau 
area of southern Laos. According to Bosc, aircraft were needed to examine—and possibly 
to deal with—an ongoing situation in which a rebel named Komadam was attempting to 
stir up further anti-colonial sentiment among several dissident tribes.514 For the sake of 
efficiency, Governor General Varenne planned for two aircraft that were scheduled to 
photograph of the region’s rapids between January and February 1927 to survey the 
disturbances in the Bolovens Plateau after completing this photography work.515  
This whole operation came to be postponed, though. With the administration still 
concerned about the political troubles in this area, in September 1927 Bosc again sought 
authorization for what was envisioned as a similar type of dual-purpose mission. 
According to telegrams exchanged in February 1928, this operation, too, was temporarily 
shelved. While it was realized that equipment problems would make the aerial 
photography work impossible, weather reports indicated that local conditions would 
restrict visibility in the area inhabited by the dissident groups.516 
                                                
513 ANOM, GGI 66502, “Rapport à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” 
March 4, 1925.   
514 ANOM, GGI 66541, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” October 21, 1926. A telegram from the Resident Superior to the 
Governor General mentioned that the assignment was at first intended to be a topographic study 
of the dissident region, but the mission took on a “political character” as well. ANOM, GGI 
66541, “Télégramme Officiel. Résuper à Gougal,” January 20, 1927.  
515 ANOM, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au 
Laos,” January 13, 1927. 
516 ANOM, GGI 66541, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” September 24, 1927; ANOM, GGI 66541, “Télégramme Officiel. 
Gougal à Résuper,” February 3, 1928; ANOM, GGI 66541, “Télégramme Officiel. Résuper à 
Gougal,” February 6, 1928. 
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The Limitations of Airpower as a Tool of Colonial Control in Indochina 
The problems encountered in organizing the mission to the Bolovens Plateau 
serve as a reminder that the actualities of aviation at times failed to match the theoretical 
omnipotence of airpower. In addition, because the colonial administration occasionally 
found itself repeatedly requesting that aircraft be sent to certain areas, it is clear that 
aviation failed to achieve in a single blow what the French believed it would, whether in 
a symbolic manner or in an actual deployment of airpower.  
Furthermore, officials were aware that mission delays, cancellations, and failures 
had the potential to damage French prestige and authority in the eyes of the native 
peoples. Speaking to this matter, Commandant Superior Richard Puypéroux offered 
comments that underscore not only the contrast between the supposed power of aviation 
and the reality of aeronautics technology but also the colonizers’ reluctant 
acknowledgement of the tenuousness of their control in the empire. “At the risk of 
compromising the moral benefit that we...expect from this new instrument of 
domination,” Puypéroux asserted in January 1921, “every demonstration must be assured 
of success in advance.” He explained that due to the publicity that was often given to 
aerial operations, peoples harboring anti-colonial sentiments would take advantage of any 
mission setbacks. Puypéroux’s assessment suggests that the French believed that the 
cancellation or postponement of an announced flight revealed the limits and weakness of 
their colonial authority, particularly when the flight was scheduled to be carried out in a 
region in which insurgency was a problem. Battalion Chief Roux made a similar 
argument. While declaring that aircraft were for the French a tool of prestige that “for a 
long time will remain unmatched,” he emphasized the need to take “all the necessary 
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precautions in order to avoid a failure.” Roux contended that nonsuccess would have the 
immediate effect of “markedly diminish[ing] the very great fear of aircraft that...all the 
natives have who have seen them and those who have heard of them.”517 
Of course, despite the care taken in organizing aviation missions, certain issues—
namely, unfavorable weather, equipment problems, and infrastructural deficiencies—
impeded the deployment of aircraft. As noted at the end of the previous section, poor 
visibility disrupted the plans for sending airplanes to the Bolovens Plateau in February 
1928. Likewise, the January 1921 operation to Upper Laos was originally scheduled to 
begin at the end of November 1920, but “exceptionally unfavorable atmospheric 
conditions” and problems with the aircraft delayed the departure.518 At the start of the 
next decade, Resident Bosc remarked that a multi-purpose mission to this region of the 
protectorate required great piloting skill due to the inadequacies of the aviation 
infrastructure throughout the area’s mountainous terrain. As a final example, even the 
widely praised Central Highlands bombing raid of 1929 encountered difficulties because 
of flight conditions and airfield issues.519  
                                                
517 ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant Supérieur des 
Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” January 4, 
1921; ANOM, RSL J/2, “Le Chef de Bataillon Roux, Commandant le 5ème Territoire Militaire à 
Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Laos,” January 10, 1923.  
518 ANOM, 66492, “Ordre de Mission,” November 6, 1920. A typed note that is attached 
to this mission order—this attachment also provides the explanation for the delay—stated that 
officials eventually determined that the mission should be rescheduled to coincide with the 
Hanoi—Saigon aerial tour that was slated for January 1921. According to Puypéroux, this 
operation to Upper Laos had in fact been postponed at least one other time during the previous 
year, in May 1920. ANOM, GGI 66492, “Le Général de Division Puypéroux, Commandant 
Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de 
l’Indochine,” January 4, 1921.  
519 ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” December 25, 1930; ANOM, GGI 66545, “Mission aéronautique du 
Kontum,” March 29, 1929. Captain Tapie, the mission chief for the March 1929 operation, 
characterized the site at Ankhé as “a very poor terrain”; this airfield was in fact preferable to the 
landing strip located at Qui Nhon, described simply as “dangerous.” The airfield at Dak To also 
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Another significant limitation to the use of aviation as a tool of colonial control 
was that airpower was not as coercive and astonishing as French authorities imagined it 
to be. In short, aircraft were not always able to stupefy colonized peoples or to swiftly 
alter the mindset of recalcitrant natives, which was a fact that officials acknowledged. For 
example, Roux held that utilizing airpower against dissident groups—or threatening to do 
so—was doubtless an effective method of control, but only when flights were deployed 
regularly to areas of concern.520 Roux’s point was indeed valid; as this chapter has 
shown, aircraft were ordered to the Kontum region of the Central Highlands on several 
occasions during the 1920s. Yet even after the bombing raid of 1929, officials were not 
convinced that this problematic area would remain pacified and, consequently, did not 
rule out the possibility of additional aerial operations.521 
Furthermore, as previous chapters have indicated, French aviation did not have 
exclusive possession of the skies above Indochina. Indeed, the French at times felt that 
they were locked in an aerial propaganda battle with Thailand. This battle was especially 
intense in Laos, where the French found themselves fighting off Thai attempts to gain 
influence over the local peoples through symbolic displays of airpower. As one official 
remarked, “it is important to show the Laotian population that France in Indochina also 
                                                                                                                                            
was cause for concern. Tapie failed to take adequate account of this runway’s slope, and the plane 
he was piloting overran the landing strip and crashed into a stump. Regarding the weather 
difficulties, low visibility delayed the bombing and reconnaissance flights for several days.  
520 ANOM, RSL J/2, “Le Chef de Bataillon Roux, Commandant le 5ème Territoire 
Militaire à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Laos,” January 10, 1923. 
521 The Resident Superior of Annam expressed his support for an April 1929 proposal for 
establishing munitions depots at Tourane and Nha Trang as a means of simplifying the armament 
of aircraft in the event of future bombing raids in the Central Highlands. ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le 
Résident Supérieur en Annam à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” April 22, 
1929. 
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possesses an aerial force that is every bit as good as that of Siam.”522 This struggle 
between Thailand and French Indochina in the realm of aviation fits into a longer history 
of a difficult relationship between these neighboring territories. In general, the Thai and 
the French had had a rather strained relationship from the moment that France became 
involved in Southeast Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century. Additionally, it is 
worth reemphasizing that the Thai had been forced to cede to France a large portion of 
territory—from which was established the French protectorate in Laos—in 1893. 
Colonial officials were aware of the presence of Thai aircraft over Indochina from 
the early 1920s and sought to respond accordingly. In the spring of 1921, three seaplanes 
were deployed up the Mekong River on a round-trip journey from Saigon to Luang 
Prabang as a means of “affirming our prestige on our frontier.”523 For the rest of the 
decade, officials remained anxious that Thailand, with its burgeoning air service and 
distinctly non-European aircrews, would win influence over the native populations and, 
as a result, damage French colonial authority. For instance, when Resident Bosc 
originally requested an aerial mission to Upper Laos in the fall of 1924, he described the 
goal of the operation as “counterbalance[ing] the effect on the populations residing along 
the Mekong that frequent Siamese airplane flights produce.” Previous aviation missions 
in the region were of a similar nature, with one such flight having been carried out in 
February 1924.524  
                                                
522 ANOM, GGI 66492, “[Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à] Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” December 22, 1923. This quote is from a comment, dated December 27, 
1923, that is typed on a cover sheet for this letter from the Resident Superior. 
523 ANOM, GGI 66492,  “[Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à] Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” December 22, 1923; Cony and Ledet, 55.  
524 ANOM, GGI 66501, “Du Cabinet Militaire,” November 7, 1924; ANOM, GGI 66502, 
“Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” September 
21, 1924. Bosc reported that just eight days after the February mission was completed, 
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Several years later, the French were still grappling with the issue of Thai aircraft 
in the vicinity of the Laos-Thailand border. Thus Bosc’s October 1926 request to travel 
by air from Vientiane across Laos and on to Hanoi was in part a propaganda move 
intended as a response to Thai aerial activity in the area.525 In September of the following 
year, Bosc used similar reasoning when he requested an aerial tour along the Mekong 
River.526 Perhaps unsurprisingly, he later argued in October 1929 that the French needed 
to continue launching aircraft to the parts of Laos to which Thailand was still sending 
their own airplanes with some regularity. For France, Resident Bosc explained, such 
flights were “essential for the safeguard of our prestige and our influence in the eyes of 
our populations bordering the Mekong.”527  
Officials elsewhere in Indochina also expressed concerns about Thai aerial 
activity. For instance, Resident Lambert of Battambang asserted that the arrival of a 
French plane in June 1920 had boosted the prestige of the colonial authority among 
Cambodia’s natives. Indicating that this landing was especially important because the 
local peoples had watched a Thai airplane touch down in the region several months prior, 
                                                                                                                                            
Thailand—in what Bosc interpreted as a reply to the French flight—deployed a plane over the 
same area.  
525 ANOM, GGI 66541, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” October 21, 1926. 
526 ANOM, GGI 66541, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” September 24, 1927. The Commandant Superior subsequently noted, 
however, that the Mekong River flight would need to be postponed because the fuel depots at 
Vientiane and Luang Prabang were empty and could not be refilled for at least a month. ANOM, 
66541, “Le Général de Division Andlauer, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de 
l’Indochine à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” October 15, 1927. 
527 ANOM, GGI 66545, “Le Résident Supérieur au Laos à Monsieur le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” October 23, 1929.  
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Lambert pointed out that the French flight was “indispensible” for counteracting the 
“enormous effect produced on them by the Siamese airplane.”528 
In any case, by the mid-1930s, officials were submitting fewer requests for 
symbolic displays of airpower.529 In his report from January 1935, Captain Puypéroux 
wrote of a recent decrease in the number of military flyovers above dissident regions. He 
identified two primary reasons for this decline: the continued use of aircraft that were 
outdated and unreliable; and budgetary constraints that had forced reductions both in fuel 
allowances and the number of joint missions with the other armed services.530 While 
these very straightforward causes were certainly evident—the economic crisis that 
plagued France during the 1930s hindered aviation efforts in the empire—the drop in the 
number of these missions could also have related to a pair of other, more indirect causes. 
First, it is possible that the French simply realized by this point that aircraft were 
becoming less effective as a way to coerce and astonish the colonized populations. 
Second, as they were faced with foreign competition in the skies above Indochina, the 
colonial administrators could not hope to utilize aviation as a marker of prestige and 
power to which only the French themselves had—or provided—access. 
 
 
                                                
528 ANOM, GGI 66499, “L’Administrateur des Services Civils, Résident de Battambang 
à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Cambodge,” June 18, 1920. 
529  More generally, as French colonial administrations throughout the empire expanded 
their reach and consolidated control, the local air forces undertook fewer operations. Manchon, 
351. 
530 Manchon, 351; SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Missions aériennes, politiques et économiques, 
liaisons postales et évacuations sanitaires en Indochine,” January 31, 1935. According to 
Manchon, aircraft continued to be used as a tool of colonial authority and coercion in Indochina 
until the end of the 1930s. Manchon, 381. However, sources tend make far fewer references to 
such flights after the mid-1930s. 
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Conclusion 
 From the first decade of the twentieth century, the French had envisioned using 
airplanes and seaplanes in the empire as a powerful instrument of authority, technological 
prowess, and coercion. Like the colonial officials of other European nations, the French 
aimed to utilize airpower “to lay the most solid foundation for their domination of 
[native] tribes and races,” in the words of General Frey.531 Within Indochina from the 
1920s to the mid-1930s, aircraft deployed for this purpose conducted policing operations 
as well as flights—some of which included additional aviation work—in which the use of 
airpower was symbolic. While the specific tasks of these missions differed—and whether 
or not these operations involved the use of weapons—the common goal was to assert the 
power of the colonial authority and bring about the submission of the native peoples 
below.  
Despite officials’ confidence that aviation would function as the preeminent 
means of defeating supposed internal threats, this use of aircraft was hindered by a host 
of issues. Chief among these were unfavorable weather, unreliable flight technology, and 
an inadequate aerial infrastructure. Additional problems were caused by aeronautics 
competition from Thailand and a fundamental misconception of how colonized peoples 
would react to the sight of aircraft—not to mention a lack of consideration of how these 
reactions could change over time. Yet as the following chapter demonstrates, the sky-
high expectations that the colonizers had for utilizing aviation to maintain control and 
assert authority within Indochina carried over into the realm of colonial defense. Indeed, 
the French sought to integrate airpower into schemes for protecting the colony against 
external threats as well. 
                                                
531 Headrick, Power over Peoples, 303. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DEFENDING INDOCHINA AGAINST EXERNAL THREATS 
 
“The situation in the Far East indeed demands all of our vigilance because of the 
conflicts that may arise and expand in the Pacific,” Minister of the Colonies Louis Rollin 
observed in late November 1934, adding that turbulence within the nations that bordered 
Indochina could have repercussions for the colony itself. With these concerns in mind, 
Rollin declared that “aviation, [a] versatile arm, would be singularly invaluable...to the 
capacity for rapid and extensive intervention.” More than three years later—a time by 
which the possibility of another European war loomed large and a conflict had already 
erupted between China and Japan—Governor General Jules Brévié found himself 
pleading yet again for critically needed reinforcements for Indochina’s air force: “the 
defense of the countries of the Union forms a whole, and we would not be able to 
consider it effective while lacunae as serious as those that currently exist in the aerial 
realm remain.”532  
 Rollin’s comment highlights how aviation in Indochina was viewed as a means of 
protecting the colony against external threats, with this air defense typically taking the 
form of coordinated action with land or naval forces; the potential enemy was understood 
to be China, Thailand, or Japan, with these latter two taking precedence in the minds of 
French authorities as the 1930s progressed. Beginning in the middle of this decade, 
French anxiety about these external threats amplified along with corresponding calls for 
improvements—both quantitatively and qualitatively—to Indochina’s air force. Much 
more often than not though, France was unable to provide the desired aviation 
                                                
532 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Ministre de l’Air,” 
November 27, 1934; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le 
Ministre des Colonies,” March 11, 1938.  
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reinforcements, a situation whose gravity is encapsulated in Brévié’s appeal from mid-
March 1938. 
There were multiple, interconnected reasons for why the metropole was incapable 
of furnishing Indochina with the aeronautics materials that local authorities desperately 
sought. Chronic political instability, economic problems, inter-service rivalries within the 
armed forces, and an increasingly foreboding international climate in Europe combined 
with an aeronautics industry that, for most of the 1930s, was ill suited for the efficient 
production of modern aircraft. This chapter thus shows the extensive reach of the 
problems that plagued metropolitan France in the 1930s and how the lack of an adequate 
resolution of these issues directly handicapped not only the air force but also French 
military capabilities throughout the empire. 
It is important to note that the specifics of the political shifts that occurred in the 
metropole during the 1930s appear to have had little direct effect on aviation in 
Indochina. Social, economic, and political turmoil in the metropole during this decade533 
of course had an effect on the French empire, and the political instability and lack of 
coherent leadership that was a characteristic of France in this period did actively frustrate 
the efforts to bolster the empire’s air forces. Yet, in the case of Indochina, it remains 
difficult to pinpoint if and how the policy shifts that accompanied the changing 
governments in France specifically altered the colonial and military administrations’ 
approach to aviation. It seems, though, that the meaningful impact was limited. Even 
                                                
533 The nation-wide crisis that France faced in the 1930s was itself the result multiple 
intertwined problems. As Eugen Weber points out, this critical situation “was as much economic 
as diplomatic, as much institutional as economic, as much about public morality, confidence, and 
self-confidence as it was about economic interests, employment, or the balance of payments.” 
Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1994), 7. 
 231 
major political changes—such as that which came with the election of the left-wing 
Popular Front in 1936—do not seem to have directly modified the longer-term 
development, or lack thereof, of Indochina’s air force.534 This is not to say that metropole 
and colony operated in isolation of one another or that political developments in France 
had few repercussions in the empire.535  
This chapter seeks to avoid an overly complicated account of the minutiae and 
shifts in the designations of squadrons and in the command structure of the air force in 
Indochina—indeed, a thorough understanding of the organization of the armed forces 
themselves requires a grasp of rather esoteric details.536 The focal points, therefore, are 
                                                
534 Analyzing colonial policy during the Popular Front’s tenure, Amanda Sackur and 
Tony Chafer observe that this coalition was “simply another example of well-intentioned colonial 
reform that promised much but, in the end, yielded little.” Importantly though, this bloc’s failures 
sowed seeds of disillusionment among colonial populations bitterly disappointed by the lack of 
meaningful reform; thereafter, these groups would adamantly pursue change—and 
independence—via avenues outside the framework of a colonial regime that was apparently 
uninterested in any significant reform. Chafer and Sackur argue that the two-year period of the 
Popular Front was thus a watershed for French colonial history because this government initiated, 
albeit in an unintentional manner, “an irreversible process of reform that was ultimately to lead to 
decolonisation.” Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur, “Introduction,” Chafer, Tony, and Amanda 
Sackur, “Introduction,” In French Colonial Empire and the Popular Front: Hope and Disillusion, 
ed. Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 3, 6. 
535 Indeed, Jean-Baptiste Manchon contends that colonial aviation influenced, to a small 
extent, the metropolitan discussions about how an independent air force in France should 
function. Specifically, he notes that overseas aviation “indirectly played a role in the doctrinal 
debates that affected the Air Force from its creation until the Second World War.” This 
observation, though, mostly deals with the use of airpower during the French military operations 
in the Maghreb and the Levant. Jean-Baptiste Manchon, L’aéronautique militaire française 
outre-mer, 1911-1939 (Paris: Presses de l’université Paris-Sorbonne, 2013), 651.  
536 For instance, the general structure of Indochina’s air force remained unchanged for 
years, but, starting in 1938, officials began crafting plans for reorganizing and re-designating the 
squadrons; these proposals were developed even though new aircraft and personnel for these 
squadrons—or for future units—were not arriving in the colony as quickly as hoped. Christophe 
Cony and Michel Ledet acknowledge the confusing nature of these organizational diagrams, 
wittily observing that “from time immemorial our bureaucrats have often drawn up plans and 
other charts [that have led], in many cases, the best linguist to be confused.” Manchon provides a 
broader example of one of these structural shifts in his discussion of a decree of February 16, 
1929, which dealt with transferring administrative authority for aviation from the War Ministry 
and the Ministry of the Colonies to the newly created Air Ministry. This directive “definitively 
connected” colonial aviation to the aviation service in the metropole and, as a result, left open the 
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the general framework for military aviation in the colony, how officials worked to make 
this air force capable of defending Indochina against external threats, and why many of 
these attempts ultimately fell short. The most realistic option for bolstering Indochina’s 
air force was to have the metropole outfit the colony with a capable fleet of aircraft. Two 
alternatives were also examined in the mid-to-late 1930s, although neither proposal was 
ultimately deemed practical: planes could be sent from France as a means of directly 
assisting Indochina in the event of an attack; and local resources could be gathered to 
strengthen the colony’s air force. Overall, the failure to establish the type of modern, 
powerful air force that was envisioned for Indochina illustrates another way in which the 
realities of colonial aviation fell short of the hopes. In fact, the gap between hopes and 
realities perhaps yawned widest in the case of aircraft functioning as a key component of 
colonial defense strategies.  
 
French Views of External Threats to Indochina and the French Air Response  
The diplomatic climate in Southeast Asia at the beginning of the 1920s presented 
a reality in which, Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet observe, “it [was] inconceivable 
that a neighboring nation [would] attack a French colony.”537 The atmosphere was 
relatively calm in East Asia as well, which was at least partly due to three agreements 
concluded among six Western European nations, the United States, China, and Japan 
between late 1921 and the end of 1922.538  
                                                                                                                                            
possibility of repatriating the overseas squadrons if required. Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet, 
L’Aviation française en Indochine: Des origines à 1945 (Outreau: Lela Presse, 2012), 246; 
Manchon, 262.  
537 Cony and Ledet, 233.  
538 Drawn up during the Washington Naval Conference from November 1921 to 
December 1922, these accords appeared to have laid the groundwork for more stability in East 
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 Circumstances both within East Asia and on a broader scale caused this relatively 
firm foundation to begin to deteriorate as the 1920s came to a close. John F. Laffey 
pinpoints the contributing factors and describes how the overall situation proved 
increasingly troubling for French Indochina:  
The nominal unification of China, as well as the onset of the Depression, began to 
pose new problems. Shortly thereafter, Japanese aggression, [starting in the fall of 
1931 with the invasion of Manchuria], not only overturned any semblance of an 
East Asian status quo, but began to interact with developments in Europe in a 
fashion which threatened the entire treaty structure upon which French security 
rested..... [T]he French position in the Far East steadily eroded during the 
1930s.539 
 
With the danger that Japan posed to French Indochina was apparent and the status 
of China a lingering problem, Thailand represented “an even more pressing, if less 
intimidating” menace. By the late 1930s the specter of an increasingly powerful Thailand 
caused particular alarm. Edward M. Young points out that while the actual threat of a 
Thai attack on the Indochina was essentially non-existent prior to the mid-1930s, “the 
energy and effort that the Siamese devoted to expanding aviation aroused the keen 
interest, and at times the concern, of the British and French authorities” in Burma and 
Indochina.540 
The validity of Young’s observation—as well as French officials’ awareness of 
the reality of the Thai threat—is shown in an April 1938 report written by Lieutenant 
                                                                                                                                            
Asia. John F. Laffey, “French Far Eastern Policy in the 1930s.” Modern Asian Studies 23, no.1 
(1989): 118. 
539 Laffey, 118. Summarizing France’s fruitless approach to diplomatic matters in East 
Asia from the Manchurian Crisis to the eve of the Second World War, Laffey writes that “the 
active appeasement of Japan had come to eclipse the more passive appeasement characteristic of 
French Far Eastern policy during the earlier years of the 1930s.” Laffey, 149. 
540 Martin Thomas, “At the Heart of Things?: French Imperial Defense Planning in the 
Late 1930s,” French Historical Studies 21, no. 2 (Spring 1998), 353; Edward M. Young, Aerial 
Nationalism: A History of Aviation in Thailand (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 
1995), 19. 
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Colonel F. Pichon. Following a recent visit to Bangkok to view a series of aerial 
demonstrations, Pichon remarked that he was particularly caught off guard by the 
unveiling of at least fifty-one locally built aircraft. The reason for his surprise was that 
this spectacle indicated that Thailand possessed more sophisticated facilities for 
assembling aircraft than the French had previously envisioned. “On the whole,” Pichon 
stated, “Siam is already in a situation clearly more favorable than that of...Indochina.” He 
explained that the colony was at present “incapable of building aviation equipment of any 
kind on site” and, consequently, would have to rely on the metropole for all aeronautics 
resources in the event of a conflict. Taking account of Thai military aviation in its 
entirety—including production capabilities, infrastructure, and resources—Pichon 
asserted that the potential of Thailand’s air force placed it in a position that was 
“dangerously superior” to the air force in Indochina. He added that Indochina presently 
could not close the quantitative and qualitative gap between its air force and the Thai air 
force.541  
Not only was the growth of Thai military aviation rather unexpected, but it also 
made more likely a scenario in which the French armed forces would be placed in the 
unenviable position of having to simultaneously defend a terrestrial western front against 
Thailand and two thousand kilometers of coastline against Japan.542 Air force officials in 
                                                
541 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Lieutenant-Colonel F. Pichon, Attaché Militaire, Naval et de 
l’Air au Siam à M. le Ministre de la Défense et de la Guerre,” April 8, 1938. Although Thailand 
still did not have the capability to build aircraft engines, it was likely that these could be, or had 
been already, purchased from the United States. In addition, Thomas notes that French military 
intelligence from February 1940 reported Thailand’s current push to increase the strength of its 
armed forces included the recent acquisition of 120 modern aircraft from the United States. 
Thomas, “At the Heart of Things,” 353.  
542 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Colonel Augereau à Monsieur le Président du Conseil de 
Défense du Groupe de l’Indochine,” November 23, 1936. The burden of this already daunting 
responsibility was not eased with reports that, as Governor General Brévié observed in March 
 235 
Indochina thus foresaw a situation in which Thailand, emboldened by a successful 
Japanese penetration via the colonial coast, would then aggressively push into 
Cambodia.543  
In his November 1936 report to Indochina’s Council of Defense, Colonel Raoul 
Augereau captured the totality of the threats that faced the colony during this time. 
Specifically, he described two emerging developments in Southeast Asia that merited the 
careful attention of colonial military officials. First, he cited the Chinese army’s 
“methodical and continuous reorganization” as well as the modernization of its military 
materials and aircraft. Second, Augereau noted that recent years had witnessed the 
“increasing influence of Japan on Siam[,] with all the political, economic, and military 
consequences that may result.”544  
In the event of an attack on Indochina, the air force would be charged with a 
variety of duties. Moreover, due to the limited capabilities of the colony’s naval forces, 
the role of military aviation would be even more important. Augereau listed the wartime 
obligations of the local air arm: determine the adversary’s strategic plans; cooperate with 
army and navy forces in colonial defense operations; attack weak points in the enemy’s 
                                                                                                                                            
1938, the colony’s anti-aircraft defenses only assured meager security against enemy airplanes for 
a few “sensitive” areas of the territory, leaving the majority of Indochina vulnerable to an air 
attack. SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général d’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” March 11, 1938. 
543 Accordingly, a series of mobilization exercises in 1937 and 1938—these appear to 
have taken place at intervals from the spring of 1937 to early 1938—were based on this 
possibility SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Exercices de Cadres et Manœuvres avec Troupes du Programme 
d’Ensemble: Années 1937-1938. Rapport du Commandant de l’Air en Indochine,” n.d. [hereafter 
SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Exercices de Cadres et Manœuvres”]. 
544 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Colonel Augereau à Monsieur le Président du Conseil de 
Défense du Groupe de l’Indochine,” November 23, 1936. In his account of the March 1937 
meeting of the Council of Defense, General Jules-Antoine Bührer reiterated these concerns in 
pointing to the efforts made by Japan, China, and Thailand to strengthen their aviation services. 
SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Conseil de Défense, de l’Indochine. Session de Mars 1937. Rapport de 
Présentation,” March 12, 1937. The Council of Defense’s recommendations for strengthening the 
air force were likely based in part on Augereau’s conclusions from November 1936.  
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position; resupply isolated posts; and provide transport for military personnel and sick or 
wounded patients. Overall, then, the daunting situation that the air force could potentially 
confront was having to grapple with the challenges of defending an immense territory 
against China, Japan, and Thailand, each of which were determined to possess, in 
Verdier’s estimation, “far from negligible” aviation capabilities.545  
The French faced this forbidding scenario even though metropolitan and colonial 
officials had for years toiled to transform the air service into a robust defensive force that 
could assist in launching a response to attacks from without. In fact, as the following 
sections demonstrate, the effort to provide Indochina with a strong air force began during 
the First World War.   
 
Indochina’s Air Force (1917 to 1929) 
Jean-Baptiste Manchon notes that officials in the metropole decided on the 
establishment of a military aviation service for Indochina at the start of 1917. This 
decision had been motivated by recent concerns about the stability of the Chinese 
provinces that bordered Indochina as well as worries about Chinese pirates making raids 
into parts of Tonkin and Laos.546 Cony and Ledet state that the first unit was created as a 
“trial squadron” (escadrille d’études) on July 13, 1917; this group became Squadron One 
on April 6, 1918, the same day that a second squadron was established.547 
                                                
545 SHAA, 2B33/D6, “Exercices de Cadres et Manœuvres; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Colonel 
Augereau à Monsieur le Président du Conseil de Défense du Groupe de l’Indochine,” November 
23, 1936; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Général de Division Verdier à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” October 25, 1934. 
546 Manchon, 193. 
547 Manchon, 193; Cony and Ledet, 628-629.  
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 By the mid-1920s, French authorities were both highlighting how aviation would 
be a key contributor to the defense of the colony and expressing doubt about the 
defensive capabilities of the local air force. “In the event of a conflict,” air force 
commandant François Glaize argued in February 1924, “it is unquestionable that military 
aviation would have a very important role to play in Indochina. Unfortunately, the quality 
of its personnel [and] the value of its materials would not compensate for the inadequacy 
of its size.” He stated that officials should consider if the air force could hold out for long 
with its twenty pilots facing the “scores of crews that certain of our neighbors could put 
into service.” Three years later, Major General Andlauer forwarded to the Governor 
General a program for the development of the colonial air network and the enhancement 
the air force’s defensive capabilities. While not fundamentally different from previous 
plans, this project had become necessary in part due to the “the increased threat of a 
conflict with Chinese units in possession of modern matériel.” The third squadron was 
subsequently formed on October 1, 1927, and the fourth was established exactly one year 
later. The fifth unit—a seaplane squadron—was created three years later on October 1, 
1930.548  
 
Indochina’s Air Force (1930 to 1934) 
In terms of qualitative and quantitative improvements for Indochina’s air force, 
the 1930s proved to be a frustrating decade. As will be shown, requests for aviation 
reinforcements and replacements often encountered critical delays, inadequate 
                                                
548 ANOM, GGI 66499, “Note sur l’Aviation en Indochine. Demandée par le 
Gouvernement Général,” [February 3, 1924]; ANOM, GGI 66503, “Le Général de Division 
Andlauer, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Groupe de l’Indochine à M. le Gouverneur 
Général de l’Indochine,” February 7, 1927; Cony and Ledet, 629-630.  
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substitutes, and flat-out refusals from the metropole during this period. Yet the responses 
from France were not a result of stubbornness, stinginess, or ignorance. Rather, 
metropolitan officials—consistently and for most of the 1930s—were grappling with 
various industrial, economic, and diplomatic problems of greater immediate significance. 
By mid-1933, government and military authorities were considering establishing a 
sixth squadron in the colony. By this time, a five-year project for the gradual 
improvement of the colonial air forces had been drafted with goals that included the 
renovation of the existing materials throughout the empire and the formation of a sixth 
squadron in Indochina. While agreeing to this plan in principle, the Air Minister advised 
that due to program’s high cost, the creation of new air force units in the colonies could 
be carried out only after the work required for the existing squadrons was completed.549  
Discussions over the creation of a sixth unit continued the following year. On 
January 13, 1934, the head military official in Indochina judged that the growth of 
aviation in Southeast Asia, especially in China, should be countered by an increase in the 
colony’s air force. To address this need, this official suggested that a sixth squadron be 
established in Tonkin between 1935 and 1936. Yet the Ministry of the Colonies doubted 
the feasibility of this plan in the format that it was presented due to this department’s 
concerns about location and costs.550 In the fall of 1934, the creation of the sixth 
squadron was again considered and again stalled due to budget limitations as well as the 
need to first upgrade the existing aviation units and facilities.551 The lack of financial 
                                                
549 SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense 
Nationale et de la Guerre, Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale,” December 8, 1937.  
550 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre de la France d’Outre-Mer à Monsieur le Ministre de 
l’Air,” February 3, 1934.  
551 Responding to a portion of a late-November letter from Minister of the Colonies 
Rollin, Air Minister Denain, citing these concerns about credits and the required upgrades to the 
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support for the renovation of the Indochina squadrons remained an issue the following 
autumn, but metropolitan aviation requirements proved a more urgent matter. By this 
point in the 1930s though, the available funds were meager even for the aeronautics 
demands of the metropole.552  
By the spring of 1934, Cony and Ledet remark, more than three years had passed 
since Indochina’s air force had received newer models of aircraft. In late October, the 
Governor General made clear that with the political environment in Southeast Asia 
becoming increasingly unstable, Indochina was in danger of being left to appear as the 
neglected relative of a distant France. The Governor General thus pressed for the 
expedited delivery of a number of tri-motor planes, advocating for the shipment to be 
sent at the beginning of 1935 instead of the end. The recipient of the Governor General’s 
plea was Minister of the Colonies Rollin, who himself hoped that these aircraft would be 
transported to Indochina with enough time for the planes to be put into service toward 
March or April 1935. A decision on the expedited delivery of the aircraft was reached by 
mid-December, as Air Minister Victor Denain informed the Minister of the Colonies that 
he had resolved to submit an order for a number of Bloch 120 planes to be shipped to 
Indochina. Ultimately though, this plan was discarded by the end of 1935 due to both the 
                                                                                                                                            
existing squadrons, stated that the plan for a sixth unit would need to be delayed until at least 
1936. SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Ministre de l’Air,” November 
27, 1934; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” 
December 11, 1934.  
552 As a memorandum from the air force Deputy Chief of Staff explained, “the moment 
does not appear opportune to devote important sums to the renovation of the colonial squadrons, 
given that the credits available to the Department…are barely sufficient to assure the renovation 
of the metropolitan air forces in reasonable amounts of time.” However, this note recommended 
that “it would be good policy to give satisfaction, at least partially” to the requests from the 
Ministry of the Colonies for aviation reinforcements for Indochina. Consequently, the General 
Staff proposed sending between three and six multi-motor aircraft to Southeast Asia the following 
year. SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Note pour le Ministre (Etat-Major Particulier),” October 2, 1935.  
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priority of stationing these aircraft elsewhere and the eventual decision to provide 
Indochina with a different type of multi-engine plane.553  
 
Indochina’s Air Force (1935 to 1940) 
Cony and Ledet note the rather stagnant state of the colony’s air force between 
1935 to 1938, describing how the status of this service would “but for minor details 
remain unchanged” for nearly three years despite the efforts of military and government 
authorities. The sluggish—or even non-existent—pace of improvements witnessed in 
Indochina was reflected elsewhere in the empire during this time. Concerning 
metropolitan plans for reinforcing the colonial squadrons in the period lasting from 1935 
to 1939, Cony and Ledet observe that “multiple projects [were] drawn up, all [were] 
doomed to fail because of a chronic shortage of money.” Moreover, these authors 
indicate that Indochina would receive almost no modern aircraft during between 1935 
and 1939. Until 1939, the colony received from around fifty “so-called modern aircraft” 
from the metropole; these planes served as reinforcements—but not replacements—for an 
existing fleet composed of flying machines that were mostly outmoded.554  
As the previous statement implies, officials in Indochina were forced to deal with 
the problem of the quality of the aircraft currently in use. Concern about the existing 
planes had been voiced throughout the 1930s, but this worry grew more pronounced as 
                                                
553 Cony and Ledet, 234-235; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général à Monsieur le 
Ministre des Colonies,” October 29, 1934; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre des Colonies à 
Monsieur le Ministre de l’Air,” November 27, 1934; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à 
Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” December 11, 1934. The sixth and seventh squadrons were 
set up on October 1, 1939, and February 15, 1939, respectively. The final two, which brought the 
total number of air force units in the colony to nine, were both created on October 10, 1940. Cony 
and Ledet, 631. 
554 Cony and Ledet, 233, 230.  
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the 1930s progressed. In short, newer models were needed to replace the colony’s 
airplanes and seaplanes, many of which were either outdated or poorly suited for the local 
climate and terrain. For instance, air force commandant Augereau highlighted the 
military’s concerns about the quality of the aircraft in his report from November 1936.555 
“From the viewpoint of aviation,” Augereau asserted, “Indochina is practically disarmed 
if we consider the progress and achievements of modern technology.” He concluded that 
both the renovation of existing units and the establishment of supplementary squadrons 
were “an absolute necessity.”556  
The problem of needing more and better aircraft would not be immediately 
remedied despite the continued efforts of colonial officials. At the end of December 
1937—over a year after Augereau drafted his report—Governor General Brévié 
discussed the minimum program to undertake so that the colony’s air force could mount 
an effective defense against an aerial attack. The features of this project—which was a 
summary of a plan authored by air force commandant Devèze that the Governor General 
had dispatched to the Minister of the Colonies on October 4, 1937—included, broadly: 
                                                
555 Augereau outlined the underwhelming characteristics of the airplanes in each of the 
four land-based squadrons: “poor speed, insufficient armament, very limited bombing power.” He 
described the seaplane squadron in similar terms. While the unit’s listless CAMS 37 were even 
more mediocre than the airplanes, the CAMS 55 planes were an obsolete design whose wood-
and-canvas construction greatly hindered their usage in reconnaissance missions due to water-
related durability issues. Augereau was certainly not alone in his critiques. Brévié observed at the 
end of June 1937 that the CAMS 55, while usable for coastal surveillance and long-distance 
exploration, “would make easy targets for enemy fighter planes” because of their slow speed and 
limited armaments. SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Colonel Augereau, Commandant de l’Air en 
Indochine, Membre du Conseil de Défense à Monsieur le Président du Conseil de Défense du 
Groupe de l’Indochine,” November 23, 1936; SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de 
l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” June 29, 1937.  
556 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Colonel Augereau à Monsieur le Président du Conseil de 
Défense du Groupe de l’Indochine,” November 23, 1936.   
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equipping the colony with newer, more powerful aircraft; reworking parts of how the air 
force was organized; and establishing an additional squadron.557  
In this same correspondence from December, Brévié implored Minister of the 
Colonies Marius Moutet—he was repeating an entreaty from mid-November—to press 
the Air Minister to address the fact that Indochina’s air force possessed no fighter planes. 
Brévié pointed out that gathered intelligence indicated that Japanese forces would launch 
an attack into the southern provinces of China in the near future, thus extending the Sino-
Japanese conflict to the doorstep of Indochina. “Therefore,” he reasoned, “it would be 
advisable to no longer postpone the sending of these aircraft.”558 That Indochina lacked 
fighter aircraft at this point, Cony and Ledet remark, was in part a result of the way in 
which French officials anticipated utilizing the nation’s colonial squadrons in a military 
capacity. From the moment that air units were first established in the empire, the 
squadrons’ military tasks were generally understood to be policing missions focused on 
maintaining order within a given territory. For Indochina specifically, there had been 
little interest in having fighter squadrons prior to 1935 because of the nature of the air 
force’s coordinated land-and-air policing tasks. After mid-decade though, the colonial 
administration watched with alarm as Thailand boosted its military capabilities and 
relations between China and Japan further deteriorated; calls for fighter aircraft 
consequently grew louder.559 Stated otherwise, fighter planes were not needed as long as 
the air force was considered a means of controlling the native populations. Only when the 
                                                
557 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” December 31, 1937.  
558 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” December 31, 1937. Brévié requested that Indochina be provided with a squadron of 
Potez 63 fighter planes; he proposed that these aircraft could even be used on loan until the 
colony was in possession of its own, more permanent means of air defense.  
559 Cony and Ledet, 233, 243.  
 243 
French contemplated that they would be on the receiving end of an air attack did they 
think about the need for this type of combat aircraft. 
Notwithstanding Brévié’s plea for fighter planes, metropolitan officials had been 
working to provide aviation assistance to Indochina. According to a December 1937 
letter from Air Minister Pierre Cot, the renovation of the aircraft in the colonies “has been 
undertaken inasmuch as possible.” With regard to Indochina, Cot reported not only that 
four bi-motor Potez 542 planes were in the process of being shipped to Southeast Asia 
but also that the most significant components of the sixth squadron had just been set up in 
the colony. The Air Minister explained that several tasks still needed to be finished before 
the five-year plan’s goals were fully realized.560 “With an eye to the full execution of this 
program in 1938,” Cot asserted, “every measure is being taken by my Department.” He 
specified that Indochina’s sixth unit would have all its required materials from the 
beginning of 1938 (dès le début de l’année prochaine).561  
The improvement of Indochina’s air force did not progress as swiftly as planned 
though. On January 25, 1938, Brévié was informed that the Air Minister was not able to 
fill the Governor General’s late-December request for fighter aircraft. Indeed, on January 
4, 1938, a note for the air force Chief of Staff estimated that the modern light aircraft that 
the colonial administration was hoping for during the current year would likely remain in 
France due to metropolitan needs.562 In a letter of March 11, 1938, Brévié admitted that 
                                                
560 In addition to completing Indochina’s sixth squadron, the remaining objectives 
included the establishment of a fourth squadron in French West Africa and the putting into 
service of the multi-engine aircraft needed to convert several colonial squadrons into units 
consisting of both single-engine and multi-motor planes. 
561 SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense 
Nationale et de la Guerre, Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale,” December 8, 1937.  
562 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” March 11, 1938; SHAA, 2B33/D3, “Note pour le Général Chef d’Etat-Major Général 
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he was surprised to have learned that there was as yet no commitment from France that 
could lead him to anticipate additional materials. He expressed his astonishment as he 
referred to several pieces of correspondence exchanged between metropole and colony in 
the second half of 1937 that seemed to indicate that the process of reinforcing 
Indochina’s air force had been initiated. “Although I had never received formal 
assurances,” Brévié contended, “I had a right to expect supplementary air resources, light 
defensive aircraft included. This way of seeing things, perhaps a little optimistic, found 
itself justified.”563  
Brévié forecasted that the issue of sufficiently bolstering Indochina’s air force 
would remain unresolved in the immediate future. Furthermore, the Governor General 
judged that it was advisable to move away from the current method of augmenting 
Indochina’s air force, which consisted of having France send small shipments (par petits 
paquets) of planes that were poorly suited to conditions in the colony. In fact, the 
Governor General theorized that the utilization of dated equipment in the sweltering 
humidity of Indochina was not even beneficial from a financial standpoint. Operating in 
this climate, an older model of aircraft—likely to have already been in service for an 
atypically long duration due to the lack of a replacement—required repairs and expensive 
new parts more frequently than its newer metropolitan counterpart. As he succinctly 
stated, “an outdated aviation is...a costly aviation as well.” Brévié judged that the 
                                                                                                                                            
de l’Armée de l’Air,” January 4, 1938. This memorandum proposed what was, frankly, an 
unhelpful solution of possibly allocating a few older-model light aircraft to the colonies at the end 
of the 1938. 
563 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” March 11, 1938. As a source of this justification, he cited the decision of October 12, 
1937, to dispatch a number of Loire 130 and Farman 221 aircraft to Indochina as well as the 
Minister of the Colonies’ “consistent support” for his prior proposals.  
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colony’s air force remained both “ill suited to wartime missions” and expensive to 
maintain.564 
Additionally, Brévié called attention to how delays in the delivery of new aircraft 
put the air force in the predicament of receiving planes that were already outmoded by 
the time they arrived in Southeast Asia. In frustration, he professed that the failure to 
provide Indochina with new aircraft in a reasonable amount of time left the colony with 
“material that, perfectly adequate to the period envisioned for its usage, becomes obsolete 
at the date of its delivery.”565 Brévié wrote about this particular dilemma because, by 
mid-March 1938, an announcement had been made for a delivery of four Potez 542 
airplanes and several Loire 130 seaplanes would be transported to Indochina; these 
reinforcements, the Governor General remarked, had actually been anticipated two years 
earlier. Brévié worried that the aforementioned situation regarding extended delays and 
the resulting problems could be repeated with the Potez 542 delivery if these planes were 
slow to reach the colony.566 He also lamented that even with the fulfillment of this pledge 
                                                
564 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” March 11, 1938. He characterized the material in the land-based units as inapt for 
fighter, bombing, and reconnaissance missions; to exacerbate this troubling situation, the 
airplanes had recently been having mechanical issues. Likewise, he seriously doubted the extent 
to which the seaplanes—which also had been experiencing in-flight problems—would be useful 
in a wartime scenario due in part to the fact that a few recent peacetime operations had exhausted 
the capabilities of the squadron. As a final setback, the air force’s two Farman 221 planes—“the 
only relatively modern aircraft that we have”—required repairs and could not be fixed completely 
due to the lack of a specific piece of equipment. These two Farman airplanes arrived in the colony 
during an overseas military-aviation exercise that began in the fall of 1937; the circumstances in 
which these aircraft were flown to Indochina are discussed later in this chapter as part of the 
section on metropolitan reinforcements. 
565 As examples of this problem, he cited the shipment in November 1936 of the CAMS 
55 seaplanes as well as the more recent delivery of the Farman 221 aircraft.  
566 With regard to exactly when this set of Potez 542 planes were dispatched to Indochina, 
there appears to be either confusion in certain of the secondary material or a lack of precision on 
Brévié’s part. While the Governor General made the referenced remarks in his letter of March 11, 
Cony and Ledet estimate that the four Potez 542 planes arrived in Indochina the previous month, 
February 1938. Cony and Ledet, 242. This chapter’s account suggests that Cony and Ledet’s 
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of additional aircraft, Indochina would still have an aviation fleet “whose efficacy will 
remain quite problematic.”567  
Apparently, only three days after Brévié drafted his lengthy letter of March 11, 
Air Minister Guy La Chambre had submitted a plan for military aviation in the empire for 
1938; La Chambre noted that the main components of this program had been provided in 
prior communications from October, December, and January. Among the project’s aims 
for Indochina were the creation of the long-anticipated sixth unit and the upgrading and 
restructuring of the colony’s other squadrons. In the second half of April, air force 
Deputy Chief of Staff Tarnier stated that the process of improving Indochina’s aircraft 
fleet was being followed “as fast as resources allow.” These renovations included the 
delivery of two Farman 221 airplanes, four Potez 542s and five Loire 130s. As of April 
21, the Potez planes “currently reach” the colony while the Farman planes were 
designated as having been “recently assigned.” The Loire seaplanes were scheduled to be 
transported beginning in June.568 The effort to move forward with the measures outlined 
by La Chambre continued over the following months and until the end of the year.569  
                                                                                                                                            
information is incorrect. In any case, what remains clear is that colonial officials were obviously 
dissatisfied with the sluggish pace of what were perceived to be desperately needed 
reinforcements for the air force.  
567 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général d’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” March 11, 1938.  
568 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” March 
14, 1938; SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Plan de Défense de l’Indochine. Note concernant les moyens 
nécessaires à la défense de l’Indochine,” [n.d.]. This document is attached to SHAA, 2B31/D3, 
“Le Colonel Tarnier, Sous-Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur le Général de 
Division Bührer, Inspecteur Général des Troupes Coloniales, Président du Comité Consultatif de 
Défense des Colonies,” April 21, 1938.  
569 On September 6 the Air Minister wrote that he had authorized the creation of the sixth 
unit via a letter dated July 22. The two Farman 221 airplanes were to be sent to Indochina by the 
end of the year. Moreover, five Loire 130 seaplanes were soon to depart for Indochina, and seven 
more Loire 130 aircraft were slated for delivery in July 1939 or even earlier in the year. 
According to Cony and Ledet, two of this initial batch of seaplanes were sent by ship from France 
in late September 1938 and probably reached the colony in November for reassembly; the 
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In another attempt to equip the colony with modern fighter aircraft, a mid-
November letter to the Minister of the Colonies stated that the empire’s fighter-plane 
squadrons would be provided with two models of Dewoitine aircraft between July 1, 
1939, and the end of the year; this objective was to be accomplished by deducting planes 
from the metropolitan units, which is a solution that appears quite unrealistic considering 
that the squadrons in France were chronically in need of materials in the second half of 
the decade.570 Unsurprisingly, Indochina never received this particular shipment of 
planes. In at least three other instances between the fall of 1938 and the following 
summer, officials labored with little success to find a way to allocate a sufficient number 
of fighter aircraft to the colony without diverting critically needed resources from 
France.571  
                                                                                                                                            
remaining three aircraft left the metropole on October 15. They also note that the other seven 
Loire planes did in fact arrive in Saigon in July 1939 to be reassembled. As 1938 came to a close, 
metropolitan air force officials sought to outfit Indochina with further reinforcements. On 
December 12 the Chief of Staff wrote that additional Potez 542 planes were currently in the 
process of being delivered to Southeast Asia. Several days later the Air Ministry indicated that 
only three of these aircraft would be dispatched to the colony in January 1939; Cony and Ledet 
deduce that these airplanes likely arrived between April and May. SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre 
de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” September 6, 1938; Cony and Ledet, 291-293, 
295; SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Le Général Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur le 
Ministre de l’Air,” December 12, 1938. SHAA, 2B33/D3, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le 
Commandant de l’Air en Indochine,” December 21, 1938. 
570 SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Note pour l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air,” December 12, 1938. 
Earlier in 1938, a decision had been made to send, as and when metropolitan aeronautics needs 
allowed, a total of fifty-two Dewoitine 510 airplanes to Indochina. Cony and Ledet, 244.  
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Minister of the Colonies for the delivery to Indochina of enough weapons and munitions to outfit 
eleven Dewoitine 510 planes, which the Governor General had planned to incorporate into the air 
force; these aircraft, currently stripped of their armaments and had originally been destined for 
sale to China, were presently in transit in Indochina. The affair was resolved the following month, 
as the Air Minister wrote on November 21 that the planes were to be moved to China as 
originally planned. SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” 
October 14, 1938; SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre des Colonies,” 
November 21, 1938. Then, in January or February of 1939, France requested about fifty Dutch-
made Koolhoven fighter planes, earmarking these aircraft for Indochina. In the end though, these 
airplanes remained in the metropole, as production delays were followed by the outbreak of war 
in Europe. Cony and Ledet, 251; Manchon, 638. The third effort occurred several months after 
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In December 1938, metropolitan officials also delineated long-term plans for 
reorganizing and repurposing the empire’s air forces. Writing to the Air Minister on 
December 12, the air force Chief of Staff provided a detailed note concerning a two-year 
project for the air defense of the colonies. Following the recommendations put forth 
during a key meeting of the Superior Air Council that took place on July 26, 1938, this 
program was adopted on September 14 and included refurbishing and expanding the air 
forces throughout overseas France.572 More specifically, the plan entailed the following 
measures, which were to be achieved by 1941: renovating the aircraft that were in 
currently in service; establishing an air unit “specially prepared for the defense of the 
overseas territories”—Manchon refers to this as the “Imperial Division” (Division 
impériale)573; and, in total, twelve more squadrons to the colonies.574 According to this 
                                                                                                                                            
the Dutch order was placed. At this time, officials in Indochina again tried to secure several 
fighter aircraft that were originally intended for China; a total of three of these planes, 
disassembled and missing certain parts, had arrived in Haiphong in the summer of 1939 for 
eventual delivery to China. As a result of Devèze’s insistence, the colony’s air force would 
eventually gain a single, fully equipped Potez 63 after a back-and-forth discussion that extended 
to the summer of 1940. For further details, see Cony and Ledet, 302.  
572 SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Le Général Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur 
le Ministre de l’Air,” December 12, 1938; Manchon 635. Manchon explains the significance of 
the late-July meeting, asserting that this gathering was critical for defining the imperial policy 
that the Air Ministry would pursue until the outbreak of war the following year. More generally, 
he argues that by this point there was evidence of the definitive transition toward an “imperial 
concept of aviation in the colonies.” Instead of creating squadrons focused on policing within a 
given territory, it was determined that the colonial air forces needed to be transformed from “a 
simple aviation of domination” into a multi-purpose strike force; these squadrons thus needed to 
be able to provide assistance elsewhere in the empire. In other words, officials henceforth viewed 
colonial airpower as more of a unified force, the constituent parts of which could be shifted as 
required. Manchon, 634-635.  
573 The Imperial Division was to be based in North Africa and equipped with long-range 
multi-motor aircraft. Manchon notes that this unit represented an attempt to shift the 
responsibility for protecting the empire from metropolitan squadrons to what he describes as “a 
reserve air force capable of acting exclusively for the benefit of the Empire”; if required, the 
Imperial Division could be utilized to assist with the defense of the metropole. Manchon adds that 
this imperial strike force was “the archetype of what would have been imperial aviation.” SHAA, 
2B31/D3, “Le Général Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur le Ministre de 
l’Air,” December 12, 1938; Manchon, 649-650, 645-646. 
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plan, Indochina’s own air force was to be augmented from five to twelve squadrons: three 
fighter units, three observation units, two seaplane units, and four bomber units.  
It was calculated that the colony would possess this projected number by the end of 
1940.575  
An Air Ministry letter of February 10, 1939, elaborated on the establishment of 
Indochina’s fighter squadrons. This document indicated that these units would be created 
on October 1, with one each to be stationed at the Bach Mai, Tourane, and Bien Hoa 
airfields. The Chief of Staff anticipated that these squadrons would be progressively built 
up so that they would be fully in place at the beginning of 1940.576 However, a 
fundamental problem was that when this letter was composed—and, indeed, until a 
fortuitous but accidental delivery of Morane-Saulnier aircraft in the fall of that year—
Indochina possessed no fighter planes.577 
More generally, even officials like Joseph Vuillemin—then serving as air force 
Chief of Staff—believed that the two-year plan for the empire’s air forces would still 
leave Indochina in a position that would “definitely be insufficient against a powerful 
                                                                                                                                            
574 In this instance, the category of  “Colonies” referred to Indochina, French West 
Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar, and French Somaliland.  
575 SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Le Général Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur 
le Ministre de l’Air,” December 12, 1938.  
576 SHAA, 2B31/D1, “Le Ministre de l’Air à MM. le Commandant de l’Air en Indochine, 
le Commandant de l’Air en Afrique Occidentale Française,” February 10, 1939.  
577 Cony and Ledet, 297. Explaining this windfall, a letter of from early May 1940 
recounted, “as a result of an error in the shipment of Morane 406 aircraft, 20 of these planes 
arrived in Indochina, and the 1st fighter squadron was established.” SHAA, 2B33/D2, “Note pour 
le Cabinet Militaire,” May 3, 1940. Another issue, which was perhaps less obvious, was that 
Indochina’s air force lacked personnel who were capable of flying these modern aircraft. To 
address this lacuna and allow the fighter squadron to be in place by the October 1 deadline, three 
planes earmarked to serve as training aircraft were shipped to Indochina in the spring of 1939. 
Then, at the beginning of August, the fighter-plane training section was created at Bach Mai. 
Cony and Ledet, 299.  
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enemy.”578 The colony’s squadrons were not alone in suffering from a lack of adequate 
defensive means; indeed, Indochina’s armed forces as a whole as well as the air forces 
elsewhere in the empire were plagued by this issue.579 This point underscores how 
scarcity of material and monetary resources was a widespread problem that the 
metropolitan government was simply unable to address without taking away from 
France’s ability to defend itself as war threatened in the later 1930s. 
While the outbreak of war in Europe at the beginning of September 1939 did not 
significantly alter life within Indochina, this event extinguished the hopes that the 
colony’s air force would receive major material assistance from France. Moreover, in 
Cony and Ledet’s estimation, even the Potez 542 and Farman 221 planes—these were 
certainly some of the “newer” types of military aircraft in Indochina at the time—
“already seem[ed] out of another age” in the fall of 1939.580 By the spring of 1940—and 
with war underway in Europe—the colony’s air force amounted to sixty-one total 
airplanes and seaplanes in service and fifty-four additional aircraft of varying quality and 
                                                
578 SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Le Général Vuillemin, Chef de l’Etat-Major Général de l’Armée 
de l’Air à Monsieur le Général Gamelin, Chef d’Etat-Major Général de la Défense Nationale,” 
November 8, 1938.  
579 For instance, a report likely composed in the latter part of the summer of 1939 plainly 
stated that the military resources presently available in Indochina would be “clearly inadequate” 
at mobilization. This document acknowledged, though, that the budgetary situation did not allow 
for a marked increase to the current peacetime means. Also, in February 1938 Tarnier judged that 
“it is unlikely that the air forces anticipated for the Far East and Black Africa can insure an 
effective air defense of these territories.” SHAA, 2B31/D3, “Défense des colonies: Plan 
d’ensemble de défense des Colonies. Annexe no. 1: Théâtre d’opérations de l’Afrique Noire 2. 
Théâtre d’opérations de l’Indochine 3. Théâtre d’opérations de l’Océan Indien 4. Théâtre 
d’opérations des Antilles et de l’Atlantique Occidental 5. Défense de nos concessions en Chine,” 
[August 11, 1939]. This lengthy title is found on the folder within which the report is contained; 
the document itself is found in proximity to two archival pieces dated August 11, 1939, that are 
likely related to this report. SHAA, 2B31/D4, “Le Colonel Tarnier, 1er S/Chef de l’Etat-Major de 
l’Armée de l’Air à Monsieur le Général Billotte, Membre du Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, 
Gouverneur Militaire de Paris, Président du Comité Consultatif de Défense des Colonies,” 
February 14, 1938. 
580 Cony and Ledet, 296, 300.  
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type in reserve.581 Even at this point, Minister of the Colonies Mandel continued to 
request renovations to the content and structure of Indochina’s air force.582  
While France was clearly incapable of furnishing Indochina’s air force with 
adequate aeronautics reinforcements, two other options were examined for improving the 
colony’s air defenses. Yet these alternatives—arranging for metropolitan aircraft to 
directly assist with protecting Indochina and marshaling local aviation resources within 
the colony—each proved as unrealistic as Mandel’s hopes that the French government 
would send reinforcements to help in Southeast Asia in the spring of 1940.  
 
Direct Metropolitan Assistance for Indochina 
In an account submitted to the Governor General on December 17, 1937, air force 
commandant Devèze recounted that several Farman 221 and Farman 222 aircraft had 
arrived in the colony in late November.583 This delivery was part of a more extensive 
military exercise that had commenced earlier in the fall. Regarding the background of this 
air force maneuver, on December 22, 1936, Air Minister Pierre Cot and the air force 
                                                
581 SHAA, 2B33/D2, “Note pour le Cabinet Militaire,” May 3, 1940.  
582 Air force Chief of Staff Picard determined that Mandel’s requests—these were put 
forth in a letter of letter of April 22, 1940—were impractical. Picard explained that these various 
renovations, should they be put in place, would be detrimental to the existing air force units, 
especially those in the France. SHAA, 2B33/D2, “Note pour le Cabinet Militaire,” May 3, 1940. 
The Minister of the Colonies and the Air Ministry also continued to push for major renovations to 
Indochina’s air infrastructure in the first months of 1940. In late March 1940, these two 
departments provided the Governor General with information regarding the construction of a 
large aero-naval base on the coast of Annam at Cam Ranh Bay; the air force Chief of Staff urged 
that that the required funding be provided so that the facility could be completed as soon as 
possible, ideally in October 1940. SHAA, 2B33/D4, “Note pour la Direction des Travaux et 
Installations,” March 23, 1940. 
583 A total of four aircraft—two Farman 222s and two Farman 221s—completed the 
journey to Indochina, arriving in Hanoi on November 22 before proceeding to Saigon on 
November 26. The pair of Farman 221 planes remained in the colony and was transferred to the 
Tong airbase on December 4, three days after the other aircraft had departed for the return trip to 
France. Cony and Ledet, 240. 
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Chief of Staff had signed an act for the establishment of an air formation—the “Air 
Guard Division” (Division de la Garde aérienne)—on the first day of the upcoming year. 
The goal of this unit was to enhance the capacity of the air force to respond swiftly to a 
sudden attack, whether within the empire or against France. The overseas maneuvers in 
the fall of 1937 included the initial trial use of the Air Guard Division beyond the 
metropole.584 The formation of this unit—and the undertaking of the air convoy to 
Southeast Asia—indicates that French officials were investigating possibilities for 
defending Indochina that did not rely solely on an air force contingent that was 
permanently stationed in the colony.  
Like other French observers, Governor General Brévié praised this voyage and 
the efforts of the aircrews; Brévié noted with satisfaction how the operation, which was 
directed by a General Pastier, had left a “profound impression” on the European and 
indigenous populations. The Governor General explained that this mission had 
demonstrated “France’s interest in its far-off possession in Asia…[at a time when] the 
Sino-Japanese conflict leaves a shadow hanging over the destiny of this region.” Yet 
Brévié cautioned against becoming overly optimistic about the ability of metropolitan 
forces to come to the defense of Indochina in a timely manner. He estimated that with the 
probable scenario of the hoped-for material assistance arriving too late, Indochina would 
be required to face an initial hostile incursion with only the colony’s own resources. 
However dazzling were the possibilities that Pastier’s mission had appeared to open up, 
the Governor General concluded, “the air defense of Indochina can and must rest only on 
                                                
584 Manchon, 618-619. 
 253 
a complete organization [that is] installed on its soil and that allows it, while waiting for 
assistance from the metropole, to face outside air attacks forthwith.”585  
Similarly, Devèze wondered if, in the event of a generalized conflict, the colony 
could actually count on aviation reinforcements from France. He pondered this question 
while taking into account not only the possibility that aircraft resources could be 
considered more crucial to the European theater but also the prospect that difficulties 
would arise in the lengthy journey from France to Southeast Asia. Devèze wrote that with 
the present capabilities of aeronautics technology, this metropolitan aid would probably 
consist of only heavy, long-range aircraft. With this point in mind, he made three 
observations. First, the successful utilization of such planes would be determined by the 
conditions of the local infrastructure.586 Second, Indochina would not be able to expect a 
contribution from lighter aircraft beyond those with which the colony’s air force should 
have already been provided; dispatching faster fighter planes from France did not appear 
as a viable option, Manchon notes, because these planes lacked the required long-range 
capabilities. Third, barring a preemptive declaration of war, metropolitan reinforcements 
would be unable to provide immediate aid to Indochina in the event of a sudden attack.587  
                                                
585 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine à Monsieur le Ministre des 
Colonies,” December 31, 1937. Brévié added that, because the first objectives of an enemy 
operation would likely involve targeting Indochina’s air force facilities, the capacity for action of 
any metropolitan aviation reinforcements would be seriously compromised upon arriving in the 
colony. 
586 The infrastructure did not appear to Devèze to be particularly well suited to receiving 
long-range planes such as the Farman aircraft. “Currently and in dry periods,” he remarked, only 
four of the local airstrips were able to accommodate these heavy airplanes without risk of 
incident; to this list of four airfields—Gia Lâm, Tong, Vientiane, and Tan Son Nhut—he 
cautiously added the runways at Tourane and Hué. Later in his report, Devèze indicated his 
preference for aircraft that were not only lighter than the Farman planes but also better adapted to 
the infrastructure’s “still rather rudimentary” condition. 
587 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Compte rendu sur le passage en Indochine des avions Farman 221 
et 222 ayant effectué les manœuvres aériennes d’Outre-Mer,” [December 17, 1937]; Manchon, 
625. The date of Devèze’s report is found in Cony and Ledet, 241.   
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Air force Deputy Chief of Staff Tarnier confirmed Brévié and Devèze’s verdict 
two months later. For the metropole to intervene in the defense of the empire, Tarnier 
explained, there needed to be not only a suitable local air network but also military planes 
available to assist. The fundamental problem of a lack of sufficient resources remained 
though, which was an issue that French officials both reluctantly acknowledged and 
desperately attempted to address. Tarnier himself observed, “in the event of even a 
localized colonial conflict, it does not seem that the European situation, in the present 
state of our air forces, makes it possible to divert units to reinforce the defense of our 
overseas possessions [italics original].”588  
While the overseas maneuvers were successful in both meeting the stated 
objectives without major incident and positioning the French empire’s air defense at the 
center of strategic debates. Even so, these exercises had also revealed the Air Guard 
Division’s ineffectiveness as an option for defending the empire. In analyzing the 
shortcomings of this group, Manchon contends that it was situated too far away, would 
take too long to put into operation, and had too few “means of action” (moyens 
d’actions). Consequently, shortly after he was named air force Chief of Staff on March 8, 
1938, General Vuillemin determined that this aviation unit would be discarded, effective 
April 1.589  
 
 
 
                                                
588 SHAA, 2B31/D4, “Le Colonel Tarnier, 1er S/Chef de l’Etat-Major de l’Armée de 
l’Air à Monsieur le Général Billotte, Membre du Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, Gouverneur 
Militaire de Paris, Président du Comité Consultatif de Défense des Colonies,” February 14, 1938.  
589 Manchon, 625-626. 
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Local Aeronautics Production in Indochina 
Along with considering options that involved having the metropole either provide 
planes to colonial squadrons or directly assist in the defense of overseas France, officials 
examined the prospect of having individual colonies produce some of their own war 
equipment. Yet a key problem was that, from the 1920s, little effort had been made to 
develop raw material industries within the empire. For Indochina in particular though, it 
was recognized that the colony faced the realistic possibility of being cut off from the 
metropole for an extended period; this eventuality led the Advisory Committee for the 
Defense of the Colonies (Comité consultatif de défense des colonies) to determine in late 
December 1936 that Indochina was the only area of the empire in which the 
establishment of a local war industry was an option worth investigating. The 
Committee’s judgment was reflected in the attempts in the second half of the 1930s to 
utilize local materials and personnel for building up the colony’s air force.590  
By the fall of 1938, metropolitan officials were studying the possibility of 
developing an aeronautics production center in Indochina. In late October, Minister of the 
Colonies Mandel requested that the Air Ministry provide feedback on a recent study 
concerning the local construction of wooden aircraft frames; such a facility would make 
the colony less dependent on France for aviation materials. On November 15 and without 
waiting for the Air Ministry’s response, Mandel approved a plan for building an 
                                                
590 Thomas, “At the Heart of Things,” 345-346. Even as military aviation was being 
organized in the early 1920s, officials aimed to incorporate locally sourced materials into the 
processes of assembling and repairing aircraft in Indochina. Yet this interest was, in general, not 
reflective of the larger scope of the efforts discussed below. And, of course, the need for planes—
both quantitatively and qualitatively—had reached a critical point the following decade. 
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aeronautics factory in Indochina—at a cost of 100 million francs—that would be able to 
produce 150 airframes and 400 motors in a year or less.591  
 Several months later, Air Minister La Chambre expressed his dissatisfaction with 
this project, highlighting that the plan was premature and failed to properly take account 
of certain regulations concerning the role of the Air Ministry. Furthermore, he believed 
that this proposal was, in fact, beneficial neither to France nor Indochina. Elaborating, La 
Chambre explained that the project would only allow for the production of a single type 
of airplane and that Indochina would still need to rely on the metropole for aircraft 
materials, which would ultimately divert precious resources away from France. The Air 
Minister concluded that the project would neither “provide the colony with the sought-
after autonomy” nor “lead to any savings.” La Chambre, Thomas frankly states, felt that 
“it was nonsense to believe that a solitary assembly plant could produce enough fighters 
to alter the strategic planning of the Japanese military.”592  
 In any case, the plan developed by the Minister of the Colonies would not have 
been able to immediately enhance the colony’s air force. At a meeting held at the Air 
Ministry on May 10, 1939, it was noted that the proposed facilities would begin 
producing airframes—and these would still require engines from France—toward the 
start of 1941. The gathered commission, whose purpose was to determine which aircraft 
                                                
591 SHAA, Z12946/D1, “Note sur la fabrication d’avions en Indochine,” February 8, 
1939. Proposals were also examined for the local production of aircraft munitions, bombs in 
particular. See, for instance, SHAA, 2B33/D4, “Note pour la Direction du Matériel Aérien 
Militaire,” April 5, 1938, and SHAA, 2B33/D4, “L’État-Major de l’Armée de l’Air à la Direction 
du Contrôle, du Budget et du Contentieux,” May 14, 1938. 
592 SHAA, Z12946/D1, “Note sur la fabrication d’avions en Indochine,” February 8, 
1939; Thomas, “At the Heart of Things,” 352. Thomas makes the more general point that projects 
for the establishment of parallel industries—colonial and metropolitan—remained hotly disputed 
in France. The reasoning was that fostering industrial development in the empire would create 
unnecessary competition and divert resources from the metropole. 
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model was best for Indochina, preferred that any manufacturing center should initially 
focus on the assembly of planes using only materials sent from France.. For his part, La 
Chambre preferred to maintain the status quo while also endorsing the idea of providing 
the colony with enough aeronautics supplies to sustain the air force for several months of 
war.593  
The commission’s report seems to indicate that the Ministry of the Colonies’ 
proposition was still being considered in the late spring of 1939 despite La Chambre’s 
objection several months prior. By the date of this meeting, the plan had progressed to the 
point of a contract for the facilities and equipment being concluded with the Breguet 
aeronautics firm. Furthermore, this account noted that the “production surplus” of the 
locally re-assembled planes could be exported toward French territories around the Indian 
Ocean as well as “neighboring countries,” which were presumably not hostile to the 
French. Manchon notes that the effort to establish a local site for building planes and 
munitions continued even with the outbreak of war in September 1939. What remained 
appealing about this type of facility, he explains, was that it not only allowed Indochina 
to address part of its aviation needs but also reduced the empire’s dependence on 
metropolitan aeronautics materials. Manchon adds that the availability of local resources 
could prove crucial if the communication lines with the metropole were severed. The 
manufacturing center was being erected at the Tong base by the end of the year, but this 
still-disputed project was ultimately abandoned the following summer. After his 
                                                
593 SHAA, 2B33/D3, “Compte-rendu de la Commission chargée de déterminer le type 
d’avion devant équiper les formations aériennes d’Indochine,” [May 20, 1939]; SHAA, 
Z12946/D1, “Note sur la fabrication d’avions en Indochine,” February 8, 1939. La Chambre did 
endorse, and had perhaps even suggested, the proposal for an assembly factory and repair 
workshop that would initially rely on parts sent from the metropole; these facilities would utilize 
more and more local resources as they were gradually expanded into a full-scale aeronautics 
industry.  
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appointment as Governor General in July 1940, Admiral Jean Decoux ended the program 
due to rising costs and interminable delays.594 
Aside from establishing an aeronautics facility in the colony, other locally based 
solutions were offered to address the issue of improving Indochina’s air force. Most of 
these proposals involved utilizing the colony’s existing manpower and machines. For 
example, in 1935 a General Armengaud conducted a two-week tour of Indochina’s 
airfields and aero clubs, taking time to encourage local Frenchmen to train as pilots. 
Armengaud envisioned the formation of a reserve air force consisting of aero-club 
members from around the empire. Despite enthusiastic responses from the settler 
populations, this idea was unrealistic given that France already was failing to meet 
metropolitan demands for military aircraft and thus could not be expected to supply the 
empire with additional materials. As further evidence of this plan’s impracticality, 
Thomas’ cleverly observes that “a host of trained settler pilots was no more feasible than 
divisions of Mois tribesmen halting a Japanese advance.” As a more reasonable option 
for employing aero-club resources, Devèze proposed using the groups’ equipment and 
personnel for transporting military orders and General Staff officers.595  
Separately, Devèze suggested that the air force could requisition the 
crewmembers and aircraft that Air France was using on its recently opened route between 
Hanoi and Saigon. By early 1938, air force commandants throughout the empire were 
granted the power to requisition civilian aircraft, crew, and any infrastructural materials 
                                                
594 SHAA, 2B33/D3, “Compte-rendu de la Commission chargée de déterminer le type 
d’avion devant équiper les formations aériennes d’Indochine,” [May 20, 1939]; Manchon, 641. 
595 Martin Thomas, “Economic Conditions and the Limits to Mobilization in the French 
Empire, 1936-1939,” The Historical Journal 48, no. 2 (June 2005): 495; SHAA, 2B33/D6, 
“Exercices de Cadres et Manœuvres”; Thomas notes that Governor General Alexandre Varenne 
had in fact made this proposal for utilizing the Mois as a colonial defense force. 
 259 
in the event of mobilization for war. Responding to an inquiry about the application of 
this statute to Air France’s line to Indochina, Minister of the Colonies Théodore Steeg 
wrote that the personnel and materials used on the route east of Karachi would be 
withdrawn to Saigon; the six aircraft that traversed this section would then be repurposed 
as a section of cargo planes. As a means of further compensating for the air force’s 
shortages, Steeg also pointed out that the Air Minister had determined that private 
tourism aircraft could be requisitioned.596 
Reflecting on options for putting civilian aviation resources at the disposal of the 
air force, certain officials were unconvinced about the military value of Indochina’s non-
military personnel and aircraft. Augereau, for instance, voiced skepticism regarding the 
advantage of employing commercial and tourism planes. In late November 1936, he 
expressed serious doubts about the extent to which such additions would improve the 
capabilities of the military squadrons. Even prior to the mid-1930s, officials had appeared 
unwilling to entrust parts of the civilian workforce with the task of making a productive 
contribution to the air force. Glaize opined in February 1924 that the only way to 
overcome the weak position of the colony’s air service was to mobilize reserve personnel 
and use local facilities to meet some of the requirements for aeronautics supplies. 
“Without mentioning it for now,” Glaize added, “we can also avoid the assistance of 
personnel and material from civil aviation companies that could come to be set up in 
                                                
596 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Compte rendu sur le passage en Indochine des avions Farman 221 
et 222 ayant effectué les manœuvres aériennes d’Outre-Mer,” [December 17, 1937]; SHAA, 
2B33/D1, “Le Ministre des Colonies à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine,” March 
9, 1938. Steeg’s letter stated that officials anticipated that service on Air France’s route beyond 
Syria would be discontinued in the event of a conflict. 
 260 
Indochina.”597 Yet the fact that French officials had to seriously consider pressing civilian 
resources into the service of the air force underscores the increasingly desperate situation 
that French Indochina faced by the later 1930s. 
 
The French Air Force, the Aeronautics Industry, and the Economy  
By the mid-1930s the external threats to Indochina were evident, as were different 
options for how to deal with these menaces. Yet the efforts to quantitatively and 
qualitatively improve the colony’s air force were mired in a morass of economic, inter-
service, and industrial challenges that originated in a France that was scrambling to 
address the looming danger of a second European conflict. As the effects of these 
problems radiated from metropole to colony, they essentially stymied the development of 
a military aviation presence that was capable of providing an air defense for Indochina.  
John E. Dreifort observes that military officials in France firmly believed that the 
majority of the nation’s defensive capabilities would be needed to stave off Germany in 
the event of war. Consequently and even without considering the additional blows that 
the economic crisis dealt to Indochina, France’s military forces in Southeast Asia would 
be “woefully inadequate” to take the lead in containing Japanese expansion efforts.598 As 
Dreifort’s comment implies in referencing the need to focus on the defense of France, 
Indochina’s military deficiencies were not singular. Simply put, the French government 
prioritized the defense of the metropole over protecting the empire. “Reduced to 
essence,” Thomas states, “empire defense was an unaffordable luxury to a France 
                                                
597 SHAA, 2B33/D1, “Le Colonel Augereau à Monsieur le Président du Conseil de 
Défense du Groupe de l’Indochine,” November 23, 1936; ANOM, GGI 66499, “Note sur 
l’Aviation en Indochine. Demandée par le Gouvernement Général,” [February 3, 1924].  
598 John E. Dreifort, Myopic Grandeur: The Ambivalence of French Foreign Policy 
toward the Far East, 1919-1945 (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1991), xi. 
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struggling to meet the threat of German invasion.”599 Additionally, France lacked a 
coherent program for defending the entire empire. The expectation was that imperial 
resources would be used in some capacity to support the French war effort in Europe. By 
the mid-1930s the defense plan was, in Thomas’ estimation, a “confusing and ad hoc 
system” that failed to reconcile the fact the colonial forces would not only have to ensure 
security in the empire but would also likely have to serve in France. In fact, Thomas 
argues that Indochina’s situation in the 1930s highlighted, more than anyway else in the 
empire, the contradiction between the expectations for colonial assistance and the reality 
of local external threats.600 Dreifort summarizes the dilemma that France faced in 
attempting to deal with rising tensions both in Europe and in Southeast Asia:  
If the resources of the empire were concentrated for the defense of French 
interests in China, Indochina, and the Pacific, Germany might seize the 
opportunity to attack in Europe. On the other hand, by focusing its attention and 
resources in Europe, France ran the risk of providing Japan with an opportunity to 
expand in the Far East at French expense.601  
 
Like the majority of Western nations, France faced the challenges of the Great 
Depression. The French economy began to feel the effects of the crisis in early 1931. 
France reached an economic nadir by mid-1935 and only began to recover at the end of 
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the decade.602 Of course, the problems experienced in the metropole certainly had 
repercussions throughout the empire. Thomas points out that the negative consequences 
of the difficult period from 1931 to 1935 were worse in the colonial setting than in 
France, and, as a result, the imperial economies required more time to stabilize than did 
their metropolitan counterpart.603  In fact, even when supposedly at its pinnacle in the 
1920s, French Indochina was already beginning to suffer from “symptoms of 
dysfunction,” as economic and political problems started to arise.604 The economies 
throughout the empire showed signs of recovery between 1936 and 1939. However, as 
the political situation in Europe concurrently began to deteriorate, France began pressing 
the colonies for wartime resources, and these demands threatened to sink the empire back 
into a depression.605 
The challenges that the air force General Staff and the Air Ministry faced in trying 
to establish a viable metropolitan air force also contributed to the struggles encountered 
by the aviation service in Indochina. Robert J. Young writes that by 1936 the air force 
was both “tactically and strategically deficient.” This situation was the consequence of 
not only the economic crisis but also a “clash of theories, neither of which was 
characterized by a broad vision” and an “inter-service credit distribution which gave 
aviation a low priority.” While military expenses began increasing after 1934, Eugen 
Weber adds, the combination of “military conservatism and financial orthodoxy” resulted 
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in the air force receiving a meager portion of funds. Aviation historian Patrick Facon 
explains that the army and navy had vehemently opposed the development of an 
independent air force because those who endorsed an autonomous air arm sought to 
overturn traditional war strategies that favored sea power and land forces.606  
The impediments to rearmament in mid-to-late 1930s France were not limited to 
disagreements about military doctrine or rivalries among the armed services. In fact, for 
most of the interwar years, the structure of France’s aeronautics industry was itself an 
impediment to the mass production of aircraft. “The aeronautical industry was a 
shambles,” Weber contends, describing this sector as “a congeries of small firms 
incapable of facing the world of modern productivity and unwilling to test its waters.” 
This situation appeared as somewhat of a reversal of the position that the country’s 
aeronautics firms had occupied prior to the 1920s.607 Herrick Chapman indicates that as 
early as 1928, “nearly everyone connected with French aviation recognized that French 
manufacturers were slipping behind.”608  
Thus in the early 1930s, France was faced with the daunting task of reviving its 
aeronautics industry in the face of both advances in aviation technology and the 
impending threat of German rearmament. In short, a comprehensive restructuring, 
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expansion, and modernization of the French aircraft industry sector was needed. 
However, as Chapman points out, “change of this sort did not come easily in France, 
where mass production and industrial concentration were much less advanced than in 
Germany…. Most of the major aircraft manufacturers evaded rationalization in the early 
1930s.” He concludes that by 1932 the aeronautics industry remained “as fragmented, as 
ill equipped for mass production, and as poorly prepared to compete with foreign rivals 
as it had been in in the late 1920s.”609 Of course, the dizzying variety of aircraft models 
considered for Indochina’s air force during the mid-to-late 1930s highlights this 
industry’s disarray.  
By the later 1930s the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies that resulted from 
France’s floundering effort to mass-produce aircraft were evident.610 Alarmed by the 
aggressive actions of Nazi Germany in 1938 and 1939, the French government began a 
feverish rearmament plan in an attempt to deliver the modern aircraft that the air force 
had needed since the middle of the decade.611 Yet, even prior to Hitler’s annexation of 
Austria in March 1938, the French government was aware of how severely unprepared 
the nation’s air force was for war in Europe. Chapman observes that a “sense of urgency 
actually became pervasive at the highest levels of government” in mid-January 1938 
following Vuillemin’s report that in the event of a conflict, the German air force would 
handily defeat its French counterpart in only a few days. In the wake of this admission, 
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La Chambre, who had recently replaced Cot as Air Minister, was able to gain approval 
for a revised plan for aircraft production.612 The actualization of a new program proved 
difficult though. “Making aircraft production a priority of the government was only a 
beginning,” Chapman explains, “the real challenge was to find a way to apply the 
financial resources of the state to enable the industry to do what it had not done since the 
First World War—mass-produce airplanes.”613  
A major three-year rearmament scheme—Plan V—was approved by the Superior 
Air Council on March 15, 1938, and this year itself marked a turning point for the 
aviation industry.614  For the first time since the 1920s, the annual aircraft output saw a 
substantial increase. While manufacturers produced 833 aircraft in 1937, the number for 
1938 was 1477 airplanes of varying quality.615 With the guidance of the Air Ministry, the 
French aeronautics industry was able to improve the monthly output of aircraft in the two 
years leading up to the Nazi invasion of France.616 Between September 1939 and May 
1940, manufacturers were able to drastically increase production. In fact, France 
produced more airplanes during this period than either Great Britain or Germany.617  
Overall, the rearmament effort occurred too late though, as a wide gap—in terms 
of both quantity and quality—still separated French airpower from the superior German 
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air service when France and Germany faced each other in the spring of 1940. When Nazi 
forces invaded France in May, the German air service counted more than three times as 
many aircraft as the French air force. Furthermore, the aircraft that France deployed were, 
on the whole, of an inferior quality compared to the German machines: many of the 
French planes were “unfit for combat,” lacking cockpit instruments, certain equipment, or 
armaments.618 
 
Conclusion 
While Indochina’s military aviation service was called on to play a role in 
defending the colony against external threats—Japan and Thailand were identified as the 
most likely adversaries—government and military officials recognized that the air force 
would be unfit for this task without major renovations to the local fleet. This issue of 
equipping the colony with sufficient aerial reinforcements became more pressing as the 
1930s progressed. However, during this same period, the work of providing Indochina 
with aircraft that were more powerful and of a newer design than the outdated and 
overworked planes currently in use also became more difficult. Moreover, officials came 
to realize that Indochina could neither realistically expect timely air assistance from 
France in the event of an external attack nor employ local resources to bolster its air 
force. 
The consequences of numerous problems within France radiated toward Southeast 
Asia, leaving Indochina’s air force plainly incapable of carrying out the defensive tasks 
that were optimistically expected of it. Within France, inter-service rivalries among the 
armed forces, an economic crisis, and socio-political strife combined with an aeronautics 
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industry that remained ill suited for the mass production of aircraft for most of the 
interwar years and a worsening international climate. As war threatened Europe in the 
later 1930s, the already limited aviation resources needed to be funneled toward the 
defense of the metropole instead of being spread toward the outer reaches of the empire. 
As Manchon points out, military aviation in the empire “did not exist in a vacuum.” 
Decisions made in France about the structure and financing of the air force, the 
capabilities of the metropolitan aeronautics industry, the requirements of the metropolitan 
squadrons, and, above all, the need to protect France itself, dictated how—and with 
what—the empire’s air services would be equipped.619 This situation proved especially 
true for Indochina, both the most remote and most threatened part of overseas France. 
“Like the other European countries that had an empire in the Pacific, [namely,] Great 
Britain and the Netherlands,” Cony and Ledet observe, “the forces in the Colony were 
feebly armed and too few in number to withstand the armed forces of a nation like Japan. 
Unfortunately, the air force units were the clearest reflection of the deficiencies in 
personnel and material.”620  
When France found itself facing another global conflict less than two decades 
after the prolonged slaughter of the First World War, neither the French air force, nor 
Indochina—or the French empire as a whole—appeared as assets to be defended at all 
costs. In short, France lacked the resources to defend its extensive empire, a fact that the 
French were never willing to openly face. In theory, the empire was supposed to furnish 
the resources that justified France’s claim to be a major world power, but, in practice, the 
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empire did not figure into serious French thinking about a major war, which centered on 
protecting the metropole from a German invasion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 269 
CONCLUSION: AVIATION AND INDOCHINA AFTER THE INTERWAR YEARS 
While traveling on a French plane during his pedagogic tour of Indochina, Jean 
Marquet’s young Annamese protégé declared, “I thought I was dreaming: I had just 
traveled almost two thousand kilometers, crossed ten rivers, and a thousand 
mountains...thanks to a flying machine that passed over all of Indochina in a few hours.” 
Elsewhere in this fictional travelogue from 1928, Marquet’s narrator proclaimed, “You 
can tell everyone that the French have conquered, by their science and their audacity, 
even the sprits of the air.” Elsewhere, in the middle of the following decade, French Air 
Minister Victor Denain praised aviation in the French empire as a “perfect tool of 
authority and leadership.”621 
Whether discussed in works of fiction or as part of the everyday activity of 
government, aircraft were for many interwar observers the embodiment of power, speed, 
technological prowess, and—in the empire—colonial authority. My dissertation has 
argued that the French, armed with this belief in aviation, employed aircraft as a vehicle 
for extending, consolidating, developing, and protecting French interests both within 
Indochina and throughout Southeast and East Asia. Indeed, an assortment of people and 
entities—government and military officials, scientists, commercial airlines, and local 
businesses—sought to put airplanes and seaplanes to use for a variety of tasks. The 
diverse work with which aviation was charged in Indochina included the following: mail 
and passenger deliveries; medical transports; photography and reconnaissance; coercion, 
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for those natives who refused colonial authority, and astonishment, as a more general 
reminder of French control; and protecting the colony against external attacks. In short, 
aviation was viewed and utilized in Indochina as a multi-purpose tool of empire.  
However, the hopes for aircraft were not matched by the realities of flight in the 
1920s and 1930s. Aviation failed to get off the ground to the extent that its proponents 
imagined for several interconnected reasons. Problems with ensuring adequate financial 
and material resources—these shortages became much more dire as the 1930s 
progressed—combined with challenges of weather and geography that the French never 
fully overcame. These supply problems and the difficulties of the local environment in 
this part of the world—not to mention the distance between Europe and Southeast Asia—
only further burdened the era’s relatively fragile flying machines. In turn, the limitations 
of contemporary aircraft were concerning to military and government officials laboring to 
install an infrastructure that would allow planes to safely travel in the colony. French 
military aviation and civil aviation were also challenged, both implicitly and explicitly, 
by nations in Europe, East and Southeast Asia, and the United States. These challenges to 
French aerial supremacy were present within the colony itself, although in a more indirect 
manner, through the ways that the colonized responded, or failed to respond, to French 
aviation. 
This stark contrast between hopes and realities extended across the entire 
spectrum of how aircraft were utilized in the context of Indochina. Even in cases that the 
French could cite as aerial achievements, the realities of aviation tended to fall short of 
the hopes according to some metric—whether cost, usage, practicality, effectiveness, or 
speed of development. Moreover, this contrast between what the French believed aircraft 
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could achieve and what planes actually achieved—and the reasons for this gap as well—
reveal much about the experience of French colonialism in Indochina. Thus my study 
encapsulates not only the highest hopes of the French imperialists but also the 
weaknesses and the limits of French control and technological prowess in the empire. 
Ultimately, in disappointment of the lofty expectations that the French had for powered 
flight and their faith in the seemingly unlimited potential of this technology, aviation 
failed to maintain, rejuvenate, and strengthen French colonial rule in Indochina. French 
power and colonial authority—even in the form of a modern, multi-purpose device like 
the airplane—were not omnipotent.  
For all intents and purposes, the end of the interwar period marked the end of 
aviation as a multi-purpose tool of empire in Indochina. Yet the history of French 
aviation in Indochina extends into the mid-1950s. The question arises, then, of the links 
between the utilization of aircraft in French Indochina during the heyday of colonial 
aviation and the usage of planes during the difficult years that stretched from the Second 
World War until the end of the First Indochina War in 1954. The extent of the turmoil 
during this period marked a distinct break with the prior decades of colonial history. 
While aviation was used in the 1940s and 1950s, the context mainly related to wartime 
necessities involving transportation and military operations. Stated otherwise, airplanes 
and seaplanes were not employed in exactly the same way in these two periods; indeed, 
the scope of how aircraft were employed in Indochina was sharply narrowed in the years 
that followed the French defeat in June 1940. While the previous point may seem 
obvious, what is less evident is that aviation, both military and civil, did play a key role in 
the victories and the defeats of these wartime years.  
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Moreover, many of the same problems that impeded aviation in the 1920s and 
1930s also hindered the deployment of aircraft in France’s short conflict with Thailand 
that started in late 1940 and, more consequentially, during the protracted war with the 
Vietminh that broke out in 1946. Mirroring what was plainly evident during the interwar 
era, French aviation was never able to fully overcome the hurdles of Indochina’s 
geography and weather. In addition, the lack of modern aircraft and an inadequate 
number of personnel again proved problematic, as did the inability to find suitable 
aeronautics resources either locally or via the metropole. Furthermore, Indochina did not 
have an aviation infrastructure suited to the needs of the moment; while these needs 
related to wartime requirements in a way that was obviously not present during the 
interwar years, the fact remains that aircraft could not operate effectively without certain 
basic elements in place on the ground. 
A final, major concern—and one that certainly was not apparent in the 1920s and 
1930s—was a local population that was vehemently opposed to returning to colonial rule 
as it had existed prior to the Second World War. Of course, as my dissertation has shown, 
there was insurgent activity and growing anti-colonial sentiment in Indochina during the 
interwar period, but the specific circumstances in which these manifestations occurred 
were quite different than what emerged after the Second World War. Yet in both 
environments, the French wholeheartedly believed in the efficacy of airpower as a means 
of putting down rebellion and asserting—or reestablishing—control. In fact, the use of 
airpower against insurgency in Southeast Asia only increased after the bombing and 
strafing missions of the early 1930s. In the decades that followed, historian Alexander B. 
Woodside states, the French military—and later the American forces—relied upon 
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“increasingly destructive doses of air power…in a desperate attempt to stop 
revolution.”622 For France as well as the United States, Daniel R. Headrick contends, the 
firm conviction that possessing superior airpower would guarantee victory proved to be a 
“disastrous illusion.”623  
For the French, the experiences in Indochina during the 1940s and 1950s magnify 
not only many of the challenges they had encountered in getting aviation off the ground 
in the interwar years but also the disastrous results of not adequately dealing with these 
issues. A measure of longer-term success did occur for civil aviation in Indochina during 
these years, though this success was not primarily about the French. Specifically, the 
period of the First Indochina War led to the eventual establishment of locally operated, 
non-French airlines. As French colonialism made its exit from Southeast Asia in the 
1950s, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia each were able to launch their own air services.  
 
The Franco-Thai Conflict and the Second World War 
The fall of France to Nazi Germany in June 1940 initiated a sequence of events 
that ultimately led Indochina into a relatively short conflict with Thailand.624 Around the 
time France surrendered, the colony was defended, Bernard F. Fall estimates, by a force 
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composed of “about 70,000 French troops equipped with completely obsolete material—
there were 15 modern fighter planes and one operational tank company in the whole 
country.” Furthermore, Indochina was facing “the territorial appetites of both Japan and 
her sole ally and satellite in Asia, Thailand.”625  
The scenario that unfolded to bring Thailand and Indochina to war appeared to 
confirm French military thinking regarding this nation’s irredentist intentions. 
Emboldened both by the French defeat in Europe and by the appearance of an Indochina 
whose leaders were essentially powerless against Japanese demands, Thailand moved to 
reacquire its lost territories. The conflict that broke out, which lasted from late November 
1940 until late January 1941, included various encounters between the opposing air 
forces. According to the peace treaty—a settlement that Japan mediated—Thailand 
regained most of its ceded territories, and the French in Indochina received six million 
piasters in reparations. While not a decisive victory for Thailand, the Franco-Thai War 
was nonetheless tremendously important for the nation; the conflict represented the first 
time that Thailand had won concessions from a European power.626 
Assessing the job of the French air force during this war, Edward M. Young 
comments that this service “fought commendably with the material it had available.” 
Likewise, Christophe Cony and Michel Ledet judge that French military aviation 
performed respectably in a conflict that pitted it against an air force that was numerically 
superior and outfitted with more modern flying machines. The French air force had 
sustained significant damage though: about thirty percent of the local contingent was 
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unserviceable by the time the fighting ceased.627 Of course, considering the decrepit 
status of the air force at the end of the interwar period, these losses—or any losses for 
that matter—would be all the more significant in later years. 
Meanwhile, Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery observe that “the war in Europe, 
France’s surrender to Germany in June 1940, and the refusal of the British and 
Americans to commit to eventual cooperation with the French colonial enterprise made 
Indochina an easy target for the Japanese.” The Vichy government signed an accord with 
Japan, which gave the French the “illusion of a durable sovereignty” in Indochina. This 
illusion was shattered on March 9, 1945, when Japan initiated a complete administrative 
takeover of Indochina.628 Despite the damage sustained to its fleet since 1940 and a 
shortage of spare parts, until 1945 the air force remained “militarily operational.” In this 
capacity, the majority of the air force’s duties involved flying support missions to assist 
the land army. Cony and Ledet add that these assignments were carried out even though, 
in the event of war, the effectiveness of the service’s completely obsolete Potez 25 planes 
was doubtful.629 
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Military Aviation and the First Indochina War 
Predictably, and as the previous paragraph suggests, the air force still suffered 
from material deficiencies by the time France became embroiled in the First Indochina 
War near the end of 1946.630 As my dissertation has demonstrated, France clearly lacked 
a modern, powerful air force to challenge Nazi Germany both leading up to and during 
the Second World War. Modernizing the French air force was obviously an unrealistic 
option during the subsequent years of Nazi occupation and collaboration; as Cony and 
Ledet note, the French defeat in June 1940 “plunge[d] Indochina into an isolation that 
became total in the fall of 1941.”631  
François Le Roy describes the “tragic state of disrepair” of French aviation at the 
end of the Second World War. He observes the damaging consequences of various issues 
stretching from the 1930s until the liberation of France in the summer of 1944: “the 
adversities of war, combined with the errors of France’s air policy in the 1930s, had 
caused its ruin. The Vichy regime’s misguided actions, the occupiers’ exactions, the 
Allies’ raids, and the Resistance’s sabotages had left the aircraft industry in shambles.” 
The air force itself, Le Roy points out, at this time consisted of a “disparate and 
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unimpressive collection of French, American, British, Soviet, and Japanese battle-worn 
aircraft.”632  
French military aviation thus entered the First Indochina War as a depleted 
service arm. Philippe Gras frankly concludes that the French air force was nonexistent in 
Indochina in 1945. For France to expect to deploy airpower effectively against a resilient 
enemy, the air force would have to be laboriously rebuilt. In fact, the air fore truly started 
being reinforced only in 1949, nearly three years after the conflict had commenced. “In 
the end,” Gras writes, “only the transport planes, and, beginning in 1951, [certain] 
bomber aircraft, will really be suited for the war. The others, particularly the fighter 
planes, [were] designed for air combat or for theaters of operation less subject to climatic 
contingencies.” Yet there was no other option for what could be sent from France to 
bolster the air service. While the Second World War had of course left France with few 
spare aircraft, the French aeronautics industry was handicapped by misguided leadership 
as the nation emerged from the conflict.633  
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aeronautics industry with the guidance that this foundering sector sorely needed. The air force 
was also able to recover, benefiting from both increased direction from the state and integration 
into NATO’s defense structure. Yet despite the progress that had been made, “not all was well” 
with the nation’s aeronautics industry from the mid-1950s. Budgetary limitations—long a major 
problem for French aviation—consistently posed a hurdle to recovery and growth for both the 
industry and the air force; these fiscal constraints were only worsened by the wars of 
decolonization in Indochina and Algeria. Le Roy judges that by 1958 “the French aeronautics 
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The material situation that the French squadrons faced—being outfitted with 
flying machines that generally were worn out, required constant maintenance in the 
humidity and heat of Southeast Asia, and were a poor fit for guerrilla warfare—proved to 
be a major problem that was never fully solved despite the arrival of newer American 
aircraft in 1950.634 Indeed, these deficiencies in suitable planes, spare parts, and 
munitions plagued the air force for the duration of the First Indochina War.635 In addition 
to quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in aircraft and aeronautics materials, the air 
force had to deal with a personnel shortage, which of course placed enormous strain on 
those who were serving.636  
The entirety of these material problems was compounded by the fact that pilots 
were operating in a hostile country that lacked a suitable highway network. Aircraft 
offered the only rapid means for delivering supplies to military posts and for rescuing 
those in need. Deficiencies in other means of transport only increased what was already 
to be a heavy reliance on aviation. “Within Indochina itself,” Dominique Legarde 
observes, “the transportation routes—roads, rail lines, waterways—were blocked, and the 
                                                                                                                                            
industry could proudly celebrate its achievements.” He concludes, “the position of France among 
air powers had dramatically improved between 1950 and 1958.” Le Roy, 9-10, 14-15, 22-23, 27. 
634 The United States started providing aid to the French and Bao Dai’s French-backed 
government in the State of Vietnam in an effort to stop the spread of Communism in Southeast 
Asia. North Vietnam began receiving military assistance from Communist China in the same year 
as American help arrived. The French had also received aircraft from Great Britain, but these 
fighter planes were better suited for air combat against an opposing air force than for a war 
carried out in dense jungles and mountainous highlands. Mark Philip Bradley, “Making Sense of 
the French War: The Postcolonial Moment and the First Vietnam War, 1945-1954,” in The First 
Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 18-19; Gras, 19-20. 
635 Philippe Gras, “L’adaptation tactique de l’armée de l’air et la guerre d’Indochine 
(1945-1954),” Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps 29 (1992): 22-23; Headrick, Power over 
Peoples, 335-336. 
636 As there were no reserve flight teams in Indochina, aircrews carried out missions on 
what was essentially a non-stop schedule. Gras, 17. 
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maritime links with France were lacking.”637 Regarding the damage that anti-colonial 
forces had caused to the railroad network in particular, David W. Del Testa writes that 
between 1944 and 1954, “large sections of the railroads...became unusable due to Viet 
Minh sabotage.” In doing so, the Viet Minh “deprived the French of a major mode of 
heavy transport in areas under French control.” However, to address the military’s 
burgeoning transportation needs, the French could not simply lean more heavily on a 
functioning local air network that had been installed during the interwar years because no 
such network existed. Indeed, Legarde states that the current aerial infrastructure was 
composed of airstrips that were “all in a pitiful state” (en piteux état) in 1946 and needed 
to be adapted to a traffic that would ceaselessly intensify as the conflict evolved.638  
Headrick offers the reminder that “environments can help or hinder conquerors,” 
and this latter scenario certainly was evident for the French air force as it struggled with 
problems of weather and geography during the First Indochina War.639 While the 
                                                
637 The expectations that were heaped upon the air force were due in no small part to the 
fact only 150,000 troops—composed entirely of volunteers and Legionnaires—could be sent to 
Indochina; the relatively small size of this ground force was a result of it being “politically 
impossible to send draftees to reconquer a distant colony.” Headrick, Power over Peoples, 335. 
638 Gras, 17; Dominique Legarde, Aviateurs d’Empire: L’èpopée de l’Aviation 
Commerciale dans la France d’Outre-Mer (Chanac: La Régordane, 1993), 87; Del Testa, “Paint 
the Trains Red,” 308.  
639 Headrick, Power over Peoples, 370. Gras emphasizes that the region’s heat and 
humidity caused malfunctions in aeronautics equipment and made working conditions for pilots 
and ground personnel very challenging, even dangerous. Moreover, the rainy season turned 
certain airfields into what were essentially “huge swamps.” Some of the larger bases remained 
fully operational throughout the year. Other airfields, however, had to limit the types of aircraft 
that could land at specific times of the year, and certain sites were simply unusable during the 
wettest months. More generally, few of the French airstrips were concreted. The French also 
grappled with foggy and hazy conditions, particularly in the more mountainous areas of 
Indochina—my dissertation has of course emphasized the problems that these climatic and 
geographical conditions caused for French aircraft in the 1920s and 1930s. The environment 
proved an at-times insurmountable challenge to the French land forces as well. “One of the 
reasons the French had lost their war was because the environment of Indochina was so hostile to 
conventional forces,” Headrick states. “There were few roads or open ground for tanks and 
trucks. Wetlands, rice paddies, and steep mountains impeded the movement of soldiers. And the 
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environment greatly handicapped the French, the Vietminh utilized local conditions to 
their advantage. Their ground forces not only “readily melted into the rural population” 
but also exploited a familiar landscape that was “the ideal terrain for ambushes and 
guerrilla tactics.” Moreover, Gras points out that aerial photography often was unable to 
spot the Vietminh’s mobile and well-camouflaged workshops and depots.640 This point 
provides a striking example of how the all-seeing, omniscient capabilities of the aerial 
perspective touted by the French in the interwar years could be enfeebled by a 
purportedly inferior enemy.   
 
Commercial Aviation and the First Indochina War  
Though increasingly restricted by a dwindling supply of materials and the damage 
inflicted by Allied bombings, civil air transport continued within Indochina during most 
of the Second World War; conversely, flights between France and the colony had 
ceased.641 Yet in the First Indochina War, civil aviation played a major role in 
transporting people within Indochina and between France and Southeast Asia. Of course, 
the context for these non-military flights had shifted from the interwar years. As Legarde 
rhetorically asks, “did anyone really have the desire to travel to Tonkin during this period 
if they were not expressly obligated to do so?”642  
                                                                                                                                            
forest cover made it impossible for aircraft to see the enemy.” Gras, 17; Headrick, Power over 
Peoples, 343. 
640 Headrick, Power over Peoples, 335; Gras, 18.  
641 Cony and Ledet, 533-534. For more information on French civil and military aviation 
in Indochina during the period of the Second World War, see the relevant chapter in Cony and 
Ledet’s book. For the topic of civil aviation in particular during this time, see André Evrard, “La 
situation de la compagnie Air France en Indochine au cours des années 1939/1940,” Icare no.163 
(1997): 82-97. 
642 Legarde, 88.  
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Resuming postal and commercial service to Southeast Asia in June 1946, Air 
France would be one of several French airlines that provided transport during this 
conflict. Indeed, a host of other aviation companies created in the late 1940s and early 
1950s offered flights to, within, and through the colony during this time.643 It should be 
noted that many of these airlines were relatively small firms that had rather short-lived 
existences. These flights, moreover, should not suggest that there existed a flurry of 
“regular” commercial traffic but rather a traffic that was primarily motivated by the 
necessities of the wartime moment. Such necessities—which only increased as the 
conflict wore on—entailed not only passenger and mail deliveries but also ambulance 
service.644  
According to Legarde, the French airlines in Indochina signed a joint declaration 
on June 17, 1950, that asserted that Air Viet-Nam (or Air Vietnam) would be “one of the 
first national firms created at the request of the Vietnamese Government following the 
                                                
643 Legarde, 87. The airlines that participated in some capacity with air transport—either 
within Indochina, within Southeast and East Asia or from Saigon to France—included the 
following: Air France; Aigle-Azur, which assisted with medical missions starting in 1949 and 
opened a route to Saigon and Hanoi at the start of 1952; La Société des Avions-Taxis d’Indochine 
(SATI), which was founded in February 1947; La Société indochinoise des Transports Aériens 
(SITA), established in November 1947; La Société Transatlantique Aérienne en Extrême-Orient 
(STAEO), founded in 1948 by Le Comptoir saïgonnais de ravitaillement (Cosara; this was the 
name under which air service was carried out); Autrex; Air Outre-Mer; La Compagnie de 
Transports Aériens Intercontinentaux (TAI), created on June 1, 1946; and Union Aéromaritime de 
Transport (UAT). Finally, La Société Auxiliaire de Gérance et de Transports Aériens (SARL 
SAGETA, more commonly SAGETA) was formed in December 1953 to undertake flights 
between France and Indochina; R.E.G. Davies notes that as a result of the transport needs of the 
First Indochina War, “all the airlines of France together with SNCASE, the Armagnac 
manufacturers, formed...SAGETA and kept a regular supply line in operation from France to 
Saigon and Hanoi.” Legarde, 88-93, 97; R.E.G. Davies, A History of the World’s Airlines 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 276-277. Davies provides certain information that 
differs from what is given by Legarde. Davies states that the Société des Transports Aériens de 
l’Extrême Orient was the name of COSARA; he indicates that this firm had commenced 
operations in October 1947 and offered regular service on a network “from Saigon to all parts of 
Indo-China.” Davies, A History of the World’s Airlines, 409.  
644 These medical evacuations repatriated around fifteen thousand individuals. Legarde, 
89.  
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Pau Accords.” This company was to have an “exclusive monopoly on the interior air 
routes coming under the territorial jurisdiction of this State.” The Pau Accords were 
concluded at the end of November.645  
A progression toward the development of local, non-French aviation was soon 
apparent, and this occurred even with the conflict continuing to rage in Indochina.646 At 
the beginning of October 1951, Air Vietnam was formed through a collaborative effort 
between French and Vietnamese interests. The Vietnamese government owned half of 
this company’s shares, and the French government—represented by several French firms, 
most of which were airlines—was in possession of the other half. After its creation, Air 
Vietnam assumed the responsibilities for “local domestic and regional” flights while 
French companies continued to provide air service between Paris and Saigon. With an 
agreement concluded in 1952 for Air Vietnam to provide transports to, within, and 
through Cambodia, the principal destinations to which this company offered service from 
its headquarters were as follows: Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Hanoi, Dalat, and 
Hong Kong.647 As 1952 came to a close, Laos also became directly involved in 
                                                
645 Legarde, 93. Martin Thomas observes that these agreements were “intended to place 
the individual Indochinese territories on an independent economic footing.” In reality though, the 
Pau Accords “were as much about what they symbolized as what they said. These conventions 
were...the diplomatic contribution to a propaganda war in which the French refuted the accusation 
of imperialism.” Martin Thomas, Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 148-149. 
646 Thomas writes that the Pau Accords were concluded at a time in which “a vicious 
campaign in northern Vietnam recently expanded thanks to fresh injections of Chinese advice and 
support to the DRV army.” Thomas, Fight or Flight, 149. 
647 Legarde, 93-94; R.E.G. Davies, Airlines of the Jet Age: A History (Washington: 
Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2011), 277. Davies states that Air Vietnam was formed 
on October 1, but Legarde indicates that the firm was created two days later. For more 
information on commercial aviation in Vietnam since the end of the First Indochina War, see 
Davies, Davies, Airlines of the Jet Age: A History, 277-278. 
 283 
commercial aviation. Air Laos, a Franco-Laotian firm created earlier in the year, 
launched service on December 20, 1952.648   
 
Aviation at Dien Bien Phu and after  
The French surrender that followed the siege of the Dien Bien Phu base signaled 
the end of French colonialism in Southeast Asia. This battle also witnessed the 
desperation, the weakness, and, ultimately, the failure of French aviation in Indochina.  
In November 1953 General Henri Navarre determined that the French needed to 
build a base in the mountains of Tonkin at Dien Bien Phu in order to cut off the route 
through which the Chinese Communists were providing materials to the Vietminh. The 
following March the Vietminh launched a siege on this fortification, which was supplied 
entirely by air. While their artillery quickly rendered the airfield unusable, anti-aircraft 
fire—combined with the drizzly and foggy conditions in this region—made flying 
dangerous and airdrops ineffective or at times impossible.649 During this battle, aviation 
                                                
648 Legarde, 95-96; Davies, A History of the World’s Airlines, 409; Davies, Airlines of the 
Jet Age: A History, 279. This airline operated out of Vientiane and provided service both within 
and to Laos, including flights to cities around Indochina and as far away as Hong Kong. Air Laos 
was funded through a fifty-percent contribution by Laotian interests, a thirty-percent contribution 
from Air France, and a twenty-percent contribution from Aigle-Azur. Legarde, 96; Davies, A 
History of the World’s Airlines, 409; Davies, Airlines of the Jet Age: A History, 279. For more 
information on commercial aviation in Laos until the early twenty-first century, see Davies, 
Airlines of the Jet Age: A History, 279-280. 
649 Fall notes that a key pair of hilltop positions—the French had established these to 
prevent the Vietminh from firing directly on the airstrip below—were overcome by enemy forces 
within twenty-four hours of the start of the engagement. “The airfield (upon whose continuous 
use the success of the battle hinged) became useless within a few days,” he reports. Fall, 317. The 
other information in this paragraph is from Headrick, Power over Peoples, 337; Gras, 17; and 
Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam 
(New York: Random House, 2012), 544. 
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companies also assisted in the dangerous work of delivering men and materials to the 
besieged base.650  
As part of his assessment of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Fredrik Logevall 
states that the French military “committed the common error of overestimating the 
strategic capabilities of airpower.” General Lionel-Max Chassin, the head of the French 
air force in Indochina from 1951 until 1953, described how this siege “cost aviation in 
Indochina dearly.” Chassin reported that 62 planes were lost—48 were shot down, and 14 
were destroyed on the ground. He noted that over 10,000 sorties were flown, of which 
6700 were transport missions; certain pilots even logged nearly 150 combat flight-hours 
in April 1954 alone. Chassin’s comments highlight the limits to which military 
aviation—flying machines as well as personnel—were pushed during this particular 
battle. Yet his remarks, and Logevall’s appraisal as well, also are representative of this 
service arm’s experience throughout the First Indochina War. “For the French air force,” 
James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson conclude, “it was a war with too many missions, 
too much territory to cover, and far too few airplanes and personnel to carry out the 
mission.”651  
                                                
650 Legarde, 88. Before the end of the siege, according to Legarde, a company named 
Aigle-Azur Indochine was undertaking air transports in the region. This airline continued to offer 
transports to Laos after this battle and until 1963. Legarde’s reference to Aigle-Azur Indochine is 
somewhat confusing though. Earlier in his text, he references another airline, Aigle-Azur 
Extrême-Orient (AAEO), which of course has a name that is very similar to Aigle-Azur 
Indochine. Formed as a subsidiary of Aigle-Azur in 1949 or soon thereafter, Saigon-based AAEO 
was one of the airlines that participated with the transport duties required by the French forces 
during the First Indochina War. Overall, then, it is unclear if AAEO was the same company as 
Aigle-Azur Indochine or if these were two different entities. Legarde, 89-91.  
651 Logevall, 544; Chassin’s quote is from Legarde, 98 [Legarde provides no further 
information for this source]; James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: 
Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003), 160.  
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The singing of the Geneva Accords on July 20, 1954, put a stop to hostilities in 
the First Indochina War. With regard to aviation in Southeast Asia, the end of this 
conflict was followed by the launching of local, independent airlines. “As has been the 
custom since the air age began,” R.E.G. Davies observes, “the immediate adoption of a 
national flag was followed by the creation of a national airline.” He asserts that “there is 
no better way of displaying the national flag than on the nose, wings and fins of a modern 
airliner.” The reason, Davies explains, related to the symbolic weight of aviation and air 
travel: “the airline has become a status symbol. No independent country can afford to be 
without one.”652   
Indeed, shortly after the war, Air Laos reached an agreement with the Laotian 
government for the company to be granted the status of a national airline. Also in 1954, 
Air Vietnam concluded an agreement with Aigle-Azur, the terms of which allowed for 
weekly air service between Paris, Saigon, and Hong Kong.653 Having gained 
independence in 1953, Cambodia formed a national aviation firm at the beginning of 
November 1956, according to Legarde. This company, Royal Air Cambodge (RAC), 
undertook flights within Cambodian territory. Davies elaborates on the establishment of 
RAC, providing certain information that differs from Legarde’s data. Davies notes that 
RAC was created on June 15, 1956, with ownership shared among the Cambodian 
government, Air France, and private investors. On October 20 this firm commenced 
                                                
652 Davies, Airlines of the Jet Age: A History, 277; Davies, A History of the World’s 
Airlines, 398. 
653 Legarde, 98. 
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operations with a route that connected Phnom Penh and Siem Reap to Bangkok; service 
to Hong Kong was launched in early July of the following year.654  
 
Conclusion 
As Gordon Pirie contends in discussing civil aviation in the British Empire—and 
as my dissertation has argued for aviation as a whole in French Indochina—“the gap 
between rhetoric and reality of Empire aviation was a marked one.”655 The French—
dazzled by the myriad possibilities of aviation as a tool of empire—found their hopes for 
what aircraft would accomplish in the service of empire dashed by the realities of 
developing and utilizing aviation. Aviation was not, as the interwar public was inclined to 
believe according to French Deputy Léon Archimbaud, “a panacea, capable of fulfilling 
all the missions in the blink of an eye.”656 Stated otherwise, aviation failed to provide 
metropolitan officials and colonial and military authorities with a definitive means of 
managing and solving the problems that existed on the ground in Indochina. 
 
 
 
                                                
654 Legarde, 98-99; Davies, Airlines of the Jet Age: A History, 278. The percentages for 
this ownership were the following: thirty-eight percent for Cambodian government; thirty-four 
percent for Air France; and twenty-eight percent for the private investors. For additional 
information on the evolution of commercial aviation in Cambodia for the period stretching from 
the 1960s until the start of twenty first century, see Davies, Airlines of the Jet Age: A History, 
278-279. 
655 Gordon Pirie, Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation, 1919-39 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2009), 236. 
656 Archimbaud’s remark related to the use of military planes in the empire, but these also 
applicable to colonial aviation as a whole. His specific point was that a few squadrons could not 
be expected to replace French ground forces in the empire. ANOM, GGI 66499, “Extrait du 
Rapport, fait au nom de la Commission des Finances chargée d’examiner le projet de Lois portant 
fixation du Budget Général de l’Exercice 1926 (Ministère des Colonies et Budgets Locaux des 
Colonies) par M. Léon Archimbaud, Député,” [July 12, 1925; February 4, 1926.].  
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